HUMAN SECURITY ISSUES IN NIGERIA'S MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST BOKO HARAM, 2009 - 2015

BY

ADEWALE OLUSOLA ADEBOYE
Matric. No: 159206
B.A. Mass Communication (Ago-Iwoye), M.A. Peace and Conflict Studies (Ibadan)

A Thesis in the Peace and Conflict Studies Programme,
submitted to the Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

of the

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN

DECEMBER 2019

ABSTRACT

In 2009, the operational tactics of Boko Haram Insurgency (BHI) transformed from soft target attacks into coordinated violent assaults on police and military bases, including converting seized Nigerian territories into caliphates. In response to the BHI new strategy, Nigeria's military changed its tactics. However, the subsequent military operations were marred with criticisms that border on high casualties of military personnel and civilians and further mass displacements of the people. Extant studies on insurgencies in Nigeria have focused on the origin, evolution, target of attacks and patterns of human rights violations. However, the direct and indirect consequences of military actions on human security are mostly unexplored. This study was therefore designed to examine the tactics, impacts, human security issues and challenges encountered by the military in tackling BHI in Nigeria's northeast.

Frank Hoffman's Critical Hybrid Warfare Theory provided the framework, while descriptive design was utilised. Key informant interviews were held with 20 purposively selected officials from the Office of National Security Adviser (one), Department of State Security (two), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (one), Civilian Joint Task force (one), Boko Haram members in military custody (four), community leaders (four), displaced persons (five) and humanitarian workers (two). Thirty-three in-depth interviews were also conducted with Nigerian Army officers (14), selected officials from National Human Rights Commission (two), Lake Chad Basin Commission (one), National Emergency Management Agency (one), security analysts (four), civil society organisations (five) and academia (six). Five focus group discussions were conducted with internally displaced persons (one), community leaders (one), commissioned officers (one) and other ranks (one). Secondary data were obtained from the Army's Rules of Engagement, Operational Mandates and field reports of relevant organisations. The data were content analysed.

The military operational tactics were rigid, aggressive and enemy-centric. In rural areas, military used aerial control tactics to expose the insurgents and deprived them of support and resources, while in urban areas, psychological warfare, cordon and search tactics were adopted. In both rural and urban areas, large-scale sweeping operations to capture or neutralise the insurgents were deployed resulting in collateral damages. Razing of houses, high civilian casualties, increased sympathy for BHI, which gave them more freedom of actionwere identified as some of the impacts of the military tactics. Sexual harassments and frequent road closure, which hindered free movement of people and goods were the human security issues identified by civilians. However, for the military respondents, human security issues were curfew enforcement, protection of humanitarian workers and guarding of critical infrastructure. Lack of clarity in the rules of engagement, terrain difficulties, dearth of operational equipment, poor combat support, commercialisation of intelligence, mismanagement of resources, and corruption within the political and military leadership were the identified challenges.

The change in operational focus of Boko Haram in 2009 shocked the military in Nigeria, while the subsequentenemy centric approach that the military adopted undermined the tenets of human security. Future military tactics during insurgency should be comprehensive, hybrid and conformable to the ever-dynamic operational environment.

Keywords: Military operations, Boko haram insurgency, Mass displacements

Word count: 492

DEDICATION

In memory of:
Francis TosinSuberu (1979 - 2017)
Prof. Jim Hentz (1955 - 2018)

Francis was my friend for 16 years. He 'bowed down' on 18 January2017 after a brief Illness. He was also pursuing his PhD degree at the time. His ideas and thoughts I always found provocative and pungent.

Prof. Jim was of the Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia, USA. He was my mentor, a friend and cheerleader. He left unannounced on February 17, 2018 after suffering a stroke.

Both memories linger, Adieu Francis and Jim!!!

The aching emptiness of your demise stills any sense of elation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

the following people are worthy of mention: Maj Gen M.M Mshelia, Brig. Gen. D.H Ali-Keffi, Maj Gen T.A. Gagariga and Col.O.N. Taiwo (Rtd).

My 2016 study trip to Yola was the source of much enlightenment. The immediate past VC of ModdiboAdama University of Technology, Prof. Kyari Mohammed was quite magnanimous as he providedme with accommodation and also referred me toa number of respondents to who shared valuable information that strengthened my work. By this,I understood many things through fascinating conversations with Prof. AjaAkpuru-Aja, Prof. Bill Hansen and Prof. Margie Enseen the immediate past President of the American University of Nigeria, Yola. My two research assistants, Malgwwi (Adamawa State) and Mohammed Wuyo (Borno State) are also worthy of commendation.

In July 2015, the UNDP invited me to Nairobi, Kenya as a discussant on finding workable solution to Radicalization in Africa. The meeting proved rewarding. I met some experts in the CVE field and their inputs helped shaped my work. In this category are Prof. Biodun Alao (Kings College, University of London), DrOzonniaOjielo (now UN Resident Representative in Kyrgyzstan), and Prof. Anne AzzaAly, a CVE expert per excellence and now a member of the Australian federal parliament.Her refreshing insights and mentorship I continue to enjoy.

Some friends deserve mentioning. the late Prof. Jim Hentz supported my second field trip to Maiduguri, while Prof. Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Cardozo Law Institute in Holocaust and Human Rights, New York, Muhammad Feyyaz (Terrorism Research Institute, Pakistan), and Ami Fagin (Beyond Genocide, New Haven, Massachusetts, US) provided some editorial comments.Dr Chukwuemeka Eze (WANEP, ED), proved to bemore than a friend through his unalloyed dedication and comradeship.Likewise, is Ignatius Onyekwere from Fund for Peace who read about my work, reached out to me via LinkedIn. Other friends who remained outstandinginclude: Mrs. Yinka Balogun (my UI school Mummy), Uncle Biodun Aiki-Raji, Col. N.N. Orok, Dr Fortune Afatakpa, Dr Emeka Thaddeaus Njoku, Edmund Obilo, Dr Johnson Alalibo, Vitus Ukoji, BukiFadipe, Dr Akin & Yemi Fadipe, Lanre Yusuf, Modupe Animashaun, Mrs. Chiro Oduyemi (Sechi), Emmanuel Popoola, OmolaraTubosun, BayoSowemimo, Lukman Adedeji, Mrs AdenikeOnifade, and Henry Hamilton.

A worthy shout out to my amiable parents, Pap's and Mam's Boye for laying solid foundation for me to grow.Similarly, my 99-year-old Grandmother, Mama

CERTIFICATION

I certify that this work was carried out by **Adewale Olusola ADEBOYE** of the Peace and Conflict Study Programme, in the Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan, under my supervision.

…………………………………

Supervisor
Prof. Rasidi A. Okunola
B.Sc., (Sokoto), M.Sc., Ph.D. (Ibadan)
Department of Sociology,
University of Ibadan, Nigeria

TABLE OF CONTENT

PAGE

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ABBREBIATION

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
AQIM	Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
BBOGs	Bring Back our Girls
BHi	Boko Haram Insurgency
CAC	Comprehensive Approach Concept
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CHS	Committee on Human Security
CJTF	Civilian Joint Taskforce
COAS	Chief of Armed Forces
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DSS	Department of State Security
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
FGN	Federal Government of Nigeria
GOC	General Officer Commanding
GTD	Global Insurgency Database
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
HSN	Human Security Network
IDI	In-depth Interviews
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Electronic Device
IEP	Institute for Economics and Peace
IPCR	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
IRA	Irish Republican Army
JAS	Jama'atul ahl al-sunnah li da'awatiwal jihad
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
NDLEA	Nigeria Drug Law Enforcement Agency
NEMA	National Emergency Management Authority
NER	North East Region
NHRC	National Human Rights Commission
NIPSS	National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies
NOA	Nigeria Orientation Agency
ONSA	Office of National Security Adviser
ORBAT	Order of Battle
PIND	Presidential Initiative for Northeast Development
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
START	Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UN-OCHA	United Nations Office of Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs
UNTFHS	United Nations Taskforce on Human Security
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The idea of human security began to receive world attention due to the various reports of international commissions set up by the United Nations and other regional bodies from the 1950s through the 1980s (Bajpai, 2000). The dissatisfaction of international relations practitioners with the existing traditional idea of security motivated the creation of the human security concept. Prior to the end of the Cold War, scholars have, for many several generations conceived and limited the understanding and meaning of the concept security to the protection of security of the state with little emphasis on the population (Danjibo, 2012: 486). Human security of the population is therefore an important element that military operations should take into consideration and always strive to achieve.

Expectedly so, there is little consensus on the concept, human security. Nonetheless, human security proponents have been of the opinion that, the civilian populations are most at the risk during violent armed conflicts and military operations. The various shortfall of state security has been established in extant studies on the subject matter. Some of the issues that limit state focused security includehow to appropriately mix civilian and military components coupled with lack of necessary capabilities to tackle ancillary issues associated with violent conflicts. The military forces and police have often failed in their bid to ensure civilian protection and in some instances actually constitute themselves as threats to the civilians.

The training and conformity of the militarywith rules of engagementduring operations become crucial because of the idea of human security. Good equipment and agility of military personnel are also indispensable. That most insurgent groups ordinarily do not conform to the laws of war or regard human security as absolute makes the task of providing human security more challenging and complex for the military. Scenarios of this nature have put human security into the forefront of global security discourse. With human security gaining more prominence, the universality of the terminology remains in doubt. However, since 1994, human security has been explained within the

framework of tackling the fundamental issues threatening human beings and finding long-lasting solutions to them and there is the need to emphasisethis under the human security rubric wherea greater attention is given to the personal wellbeing, safety and securityin comparison to the sovereignty and nation-state security.

The Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that came out in 1994 and the Commission on Human Security (CHS) report that followed in 2003 were two foremost documents thatelicit broad perspectives to human security. These key reports conceptualise"human security as freedom from fear and freedom from want". Through these documents, two distinctive aspects of human security became elaborated. The first was the concern with how people would be protected from endemic diseases, hunger and suppression, while the second has to do with guarding against unexpected and hurting interruptions in the flow of peoples' daily living, across every arena of the society (UNDP 1994: Commission on Human Security, 2003). As such, enhancing human security has become an area of priority for addressing threats such as insurgency and terrorism confronting humanity in some parts of the globe. Often used interchangeably, the word insurgency and terrorism do not mean the same thing (Hoffman, 2006). Notwithstanding the contextual usage of the word, insurgency has deprived women, men and children of their basic rights to security and undermined human capital development not to mention the effect on the economy of many nations.

As for insurgency, some countries are breeding grounds;some provide safe havens for insurgents while some countries are prime targets for insurgent attacks. These insurgent groups have little regard for the people or population and therefore execute their planned attacks both in sparsely and in densely populated environments (Cordesman, 2015). Rasler and Thompson (2012) contends that this behaviour is not limited to insurgent groups because there is really no major distinction between acts of violence perpetuated by insurgents and sometimes by the military basing this argument on the premise that, one of the tactics deployed by both the military and insurgents is siege. Under this circumstance, civilian fatalities are high and large numbers suffer from varying degrees of injury and fatalities.

With Nigeria in view, current discussions on the country's national security challenges are replete with issues aroundthe threats of terrorism, kidnapping, herders-farmers' violence, human smuggling, piracy, trafficking of drugs, weapons proliferation and

resource exploitation by the state and non-state actors (Olojo, 2013; Nwolise, 2017). Notably, with the entrenchment of Nigeria's democracysince 1999, there has been increase in crimes, conflicts and violence. Boko Haram breakout however presently tops the list of insecurity triggers in the country. The regional and international communities have both realized the dangers associated with Boko Haram activities within Nigeria and also across the Lake Chad basin region (Azazi, 2011; Onouha, 2011).

The spate of Boko Haram insurgencyis characterised by human security challengesin forms of abduction, bombing of hospitals, homes, educational facilities, and places of worship including farmlands (Achumba, Ighomereho and Akpor-Robaro, 2013). Boko Haram insurgency is a threat to basic features that make human living and survival possible such as food, shelter, health, education personalsafety and community cohesion. As a means to tackle the scourge of global insurgenciesin the mode of Boko Haram, Ipe, Cockayne and Millar (2010) argue for increased global military capacities to help stabilise areas where insurgency activities are dominant. David Gompert who was the lead researcherin a production titled;*War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency*, puts the argument in another way that, it was high time to focus on States capacity to protect, more sosince the international laws and politics have increasingly recognized a responsibility to protect or R2P approaches in ensuring human security (Gompert, John, Adam, David, Seth, Martin, Edward, Brooke, and Robert, 2008).

In relation to human lives, the Boko Haram violence has cost over 20,000 human lives in Nigeria with additional damages in significant proportion to physical infrastructure (Awortu, 2015). Social and economicservices have been destroyed includingthe social cohesion among the communities with mistrust among the population widespread. Across the conflict zones of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe at least 1.8 million people have become victims of internal displacements while many thousands have crossed to become refugees in countries like Cameroon Niger and Chad thus becoming sources of concern for the global community (The World Bank, 2016). The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)equally affirms this line of thought in their analysis of the destruction by Boko Haram. START (2018) concluded that, between June 2001 and June 2018, there were two thousand and twenty-one (2,021) attacks traceable to Boko Haram, leading to killings

of at least 37,530 people. Within the same period, The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project[1](ACLED) identifies three thousand, three hundred and forty-six (3,346) incidents, leading to the death of thirty-four thousand, two hundred and sixty-one (34,261). These figures however are reflections of all fatalities emanating from Boko Haram fighters, state forces and the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Nigeria and its surrounding environment.

While insurgents have records of deliberately targeting civilian population, the expectation was that the actions of military forces would protect innocent people, ensure human dignity and security. This has often not been the case in Nigeria. The failure of the military to respect and comply with extant rules of engagement while confronting Boko Haram is ascribed as one major military shortcomingwith grave consequences for the civilian population (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

To understand the context better, Issac Olawale Albert in his article titled *"Terror as a political weapon; Reflections on the Bomb explosions in Abacha's Nigeria",* provides an exploratory insight into the understanding of Nigeria's journey into insurgency. The contention of Albert was that, insurgency in Nigeria was probably taught and instigated by the State. This he argued with explanation that, Nigeria during her days of military dictatorship, sponsored acts of terror through series of killings by deploying parcel bombs and assassinations (Albert, 2005).If Albert's view is to be accepted, arguably, Boko Haram is a by-product of years of both military dictatorship suppression and civilian government misrule. Oguntade (2013) supports Albert's thinkingwith the submission that, the impunity of Nigeria's extra-judicial killings perpetuated by its agents broke the social-contract existing between government and the governed, thus, questioning the State's ability to provide human security.

Such practices of extra-judicial killings explain how and why Mohammed Yusuf, a self-acclaimed Boko Haram founder and leader was murdered while in police custody in 2009 after he was arrested. The killing of Yusuf in the hands of state security forces changed the operational dynamics of Boko Haram insurgency (BHi) from attacking

---

[1]CFR's Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), an independent nongovernmental organization based at the University of Sussex. Data has been filtered to include only incidents involving Boko Haram. (Both projects also track other types of violence in Nigeria.)

soft Gtargets to coordinated violent attacks on police and military bases including seizing Nigeria's territories and converting such into Caliphates. Boko Haram insurgents by their actions have changed the landscape of terror in the Nigeria from being defined as state inflicted into non-state perpetuated violence.

In response toBoko Haram's new strategy which became manifest from 2009, Nigeria's military also changed its tactics. The military efforts that were aimed at reducing human security risks occasioned by Boko Haram witnessed drastic increase in Nigeria's military deployment for Internal Security Operations (ISO). Yet, the increase in military presence has not mitigated the fire power of Boko Haram, its ability to attack and fatalities have not reduced (Stevenson, Pate and Asiamah, 2017).As such, the military operations have been marred with criticisms that border on high causalities of military personnel, civilians and mass internal displacements (Akinola, 2017).

Today's causes of most insurgencies are manifold and interconnected with one factor complicating the other. Addressing such insecurities therefore requires the blending of military and non-military ideas, initiatives and activities. Resting on the above concerns, this research is predicated on the following two issues. First, on how insurgency inspired asymmetric warfare continues to change the military functions during in internal security operations. The second relates to the understanding and interpreting the correlationof military actions with the human security promotion in relationto insurgencies.

1.2   Statement of the Problem

Studies on Boko Haram insurgency can be grouped into five categories. The first is on Boko Haram as a form of sectarian violence threatening national security. The second connects to human rights concern where Boko Haram violates basic human rights and dignity. The third addresses the insurgency as a regional threat with multiple transnational dimensions for West Africa and indeed the Sub-Sahara Africa. The fourth conceives Boko Haram as violent extremism and radicalism issues resulting from globalization. The fifth traces Nigeria's insurgency to the challenges of border insecurity arising from the porous nature of African boarders resulting in the free movement of "Small Arms and Light Weapons" (SALW) which has strengthened criminals and non-state actors' access to illicit weapons.

Furthermore, extant studies have also discussed the origins of Boko Haram (Adesoji, 2011), modus operandi (Forest, 2012), nature of violence (Onuocha, 2012), displacement patterns and the psychological explanation of the group (Ijide, 2010), including insights into how and why the Boko haram insurgency has continued unabated (Botha, 2009). While these studies capture some issues associated with the insurgency in Nigeria, there is a danger of reducing Boko Haram research into some monolithic discourse. An important but often neglected factor borders on the military and their response mechanism and how such reduces or escalates the daunting human security challenges.

The direct and indirect consequences of military actions on human security are mostly unexplored and for the people that experience the insurgency, only when their insecurity is tackled comprehensively and their rights and dignity are fully respected by insurgents and military alike will they begin to feel safe. This study therefore underscores that to be sustainable, military operations must be inclusive and people-centred. The study fills such an important gap examining the tactics, impacts, human security issues and challenges encountered by the military in tackling Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria's northeast.

1.3 Research Questions

- What were the different operational tactics deployed by the military against Boko Haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria?
- How have the different operational tactics deployed by the military impact the Boko Haram insurgency?
- What were the human security issues in northeast Nigeria due to the operational tactics deployed by the military?
- What were the challenges encountered by the Nigerian military in tackling the Boko Haram Insurgency?

1.4 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The aim of this study was to examine the tactics, impacts, human security issues and challenges encountered by the military in tackling Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria's northeast. The specific objectives:

- Examined the different operational tactics deployed by the military against Boko Haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria.

- Determined the impact of the different military operational tactics on the Boko Haram insurgency.
- Examined the human security issues that manifested in northeast Nigeria in line with the operational tactics deployed by the military.
- Discussed the Nigerian military challenges in tackling the Boko Haram Insurgency.

1.5 Significance of the Study

Achieving significant results in countering insurgency often rests on what is done, how it is done, when it is done and who it is targeted at. Military operational tactics is a combination of many collaborative efforts in order toguarantee success. This study therefore provides knowledge to government entities, policy makers, the military, international development about human security issues that are important while initiating military operations to fight insurgency.

With regards to contribution to human security policy and military operations practice, the recommendations of the study would be an important reference for defence policy-makers and military practitioners. If some of the recommendations are adopted, it will generally help National Security framework designers and civil society organizations focusing on human security in their quest to achieve peace and security in countries and regions embroiled in insurgencies.

In addition, asfound from literature there arelimited studies on the human security issues associated with military operations against insurgent groups. Therefore, this study serves as additional literature for other researchers in that area which is also significant to the security sector reforms, society and the government by providing feedbacks about the potentials and limitations of military operational tactics in realizing mission objective and provision of human security.

With regard to its contribution to knowledge, the study demonstrates that human security components are crucial elements of human security and that the military alone is not capable of providing human security by the use of force. Since today's wars are now more asymmetrical, this academic research on the human security issues associated with military operations in insurgencies has contributed to the body of literature generating knowledge and serving as a reference document for further research in the field. Future researchers who intend to undertake related studies in the future will find the outcome of the study useful.

1.6   Scope of Study

Although North-eastern states of Nigeria constitute the study population, this study was restricted to Boko Haram activities and military operations in the three high impact states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa from 2009-2015. The year 2009 is significant because it was regarded in many quarters as the turning point of the Boko Haram deadly transformation. The year witnessed clashes between the group members and security operatives such as the police and the army in Bauchi and Maiduguri, where Comoli (2015) documented that at least seven hundred (700) people were killed. It was during one of such clashes that the Boko Haram founder and leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was arrested and killed in police detention (Hentz and Hussain, 2017). The typical elements of human security are seven. However, this study's scope has been restricted only to three of the sevenelements. Thesethree are the personal, political and community security representing Boko Haram insurgents displaced population from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa the so called three hotbed zones of the insurgency.

1.7   Operational definition of terms

To avoid ambiguity and misconception of terms, this section provides some clarifications on the application of certain terminologies used in relation to this study. Below are such terms:

1.7.1 Military Operations: In this context, these are actions deployed to support some other apparatus of national power typically involving combat motion in forms of attacks, defence and manoeuvres with the aim to secure the goals of the operational campaign. Such actions are coordinated actions sanctioned by the state in response to a developing situation and mitigate the situation to the advantage of the state

1.7.2 Doctrine: These are basic propositions by which state military and their orconstituentsconduct their manoeuvre to support national interests and aspirations.Military doctrines are well founded but in application requires troops. It is authoritative but requires sagacity.

1.7.3 Insurgency: In this study, insurgency is defined from the lens of the Counter-Insurgency Initiative (2009) as organized use of subversion and violence to seize, to nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Actions from insurgency tend to

replace established governance structures and be in charge of the wealth of that nationin a given territory using force.

1.7.4 Human Security: The combination of threats coming from insurgency, anti-insurgency and counterinsurgency, resulting in population displacement, disruptions of community life and destruction of properties which accelerate the removal of peoples' freedom and increase their fear of violence.

1.7.6 Counter-insurgency: The US DOD (2015) declared that, counterinsurgency are purposive actions and interventions to counteract insurgencies system and make them ineffective to create fear within the population or force governments to achieve the insurgency objectives.

1.7.7 Asymmetric Warfare: Asymmetric warfare exists when the two main armies are of unequal size or strength and encourages the use of non-traditional military tactics, generally by the weaker force to balance out the power inequity.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Insurgency vis-a-vis other forms of violence

It was once convenient to separate conceptually the terms insurgency and terrorism, or political terrorists and criminal gangs, and genuine home-grown insurgency and state-sponsored insurgency. That was in the 60s and 70s. Today, these lines separating the violence have become blurred making the situation more confusing (Vasquez, 2012).The starting point for discussing insurgency in this study was to trace the political scientists'origin and usageof the word terror and thistraced back to the French revolution of the 1789 (Palmer, 2014). This means that the first violence refers to as terrorism or insurgency had the power of state behind it (Adelman, 2008).These French revolutionaries undertook what was termed reigns of terror to suppress and resist the enemy within (Palmer, 2014).

The terror associated withFrench revolution also fits into Tavares (2004) lines of thought about short run goals of insurgencies, which are often to (1) secure mass media gain publicity (2) destabilise existing political order and (3) damage economic wellbeing of states. A shortcoming of Tavares argument was his failure to balance his discussion combining the long-term goals of insurgents. However, Frey and Luechinger (2004) provides the second part of the puzzle relating to the long run goals of insurgency which they conclude are usually about changing the power and wealth narratives of the state under attack. If it is agreed that the word insurgency enters the lexicon of knowledge from the French revolution period, the argument can equally be made that terrorists attacks ofSeptember 11 in theUnited States became the watershed period for the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

Between the French revolution time and the 9/11 attacks, the world has witnessed consistently the emergence and evolution of new kinds of violence and the growth of sectarian violencein forms of insurgencies. Many of such groups, Enders and Sandler (2008)describe as lacking clear definite constitutional supportsother than ruiningmodern culture and mankind. The other contrast of French revolution terror and post 9/11 insurgency is that, French revolution was noted for terror by states while modern insurgencies are mostly linked withgovernance violence perpetuated by groups lacking legitimacy and sovereignty(Frey, 2004).

As Max Weber will put it, today's insurgents lacked monopoly of legitimate use of violence. An essential question therefore is; why has it become difficult for states to maintain the legitimacy of violence in arears where insurgents operate? The answersvary from challenging topography (Herbst 2016) toinequality (Fearon and Laitin, 2003),including states rivalry and economic resources (Besley and Persson 2011). Rather than accepting the appellation of insurgents, those who ultimately challenge the State monopoly of violenceoften consider themselves as revolutionaries or freedom fighters (Bayat, Ellis and Hibou, 1999; Paret, 2007).

The discussion on the subject of insurgency is therefore complicated, tough and emotion-laden and this raises the question about what provokes and sustains insurgency (Botha, 2008).There are other questions that border on the appropriateness of suppression or otherwise to counter insurgency (Silva and Butler, 2011). These questions are not surprising because human population in many countries of the world remained badly battered, as contemporary insurgencies havelittle respect or none at all forborderlines.As such, scholars have provided many works in relation to human security and violence inflicted emanating from State and non-state entities (Ellis, 2001; Danjibo, 2013; Adewumi, 2014;Awortu, 2015).

Among the many scholars on the study of human security, Rudolph J. Rummel (1932-2014), stands out. Rummel propositions made significant contribution to the empirical and theoretical study of human conflict (Mosbach (2017). Rummel discussions regarding insurgency and on human population are quite deep. Relating to the twentieth century, Rummel estimated that, out of nearly 170 million victims who got killed by bullets from government forces fighting to control the area in which they were living, the triplets of Stalin, Mao and Hitler killed 42 million, 37 million, and 20 million apiece (Rummel, 1998). Whereas, by comparison, killing by non-state actors

seems incomparable. The estimate of fatalities in the twentieth century coming from terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla warfareor non-state armed groups generally was about 500,000. With such assertion, terror or killings associated with States or its agents are much by ratio 260-1 worldwide within the twentieth century (Rummel, 1998; Leitenberg, 2006).

Beyond Rummel, revolutionaries, freedom fighters and insurgent groups have also attracted significant scholarly attention from other scholars like Dudouet, (2009); Poloni-Staudinger and Ortbals(2013) including Thomas Magstadtwhosearguments on insurgency delved into the logic, tactics, characteristics, psychology of insurgents, the role of the media and many efforts at countering insurgency. Magstadtattempts differentiating insurgents from terrorists explaining that, insurgents seek to create pandemonium, hoping that following instabilities and fear will fast track the defeat of an existing authority. The contrast for Magstadt is that, terrorists are essentially without ties to any country except that they belong to the category of demography that is considered as young, inward, and homogenous (Magstadt, 2009).

The reality of today's insurgency popularised by groups like ISIL and Boko Haram is destroying Magstadt's argument especially that, today'sinsurgentsare youth, strictly men with deficient psycho-social traits including bigotry and hostile behaviours. Young women and older adults have been involved in insurgency. Magstadt's further contention of insurgents as renegadewhose prime actions are to challenge inequality, poverty and exclusionadoptingindiscriminatebrutality have also been challenged in Smith (2015).

Discussions on insurgency therefore have many flavours. Scholars like Ross (1993), Krueger and Maleckova (2003), Richardson (2006), Feldman and Perala (2008) and Bjorgo and Silke (2018) all suggest wide variety of root causes and approaches at addressing.

One common theme to scholarly works regarding insurgency is the unequal distribution of political and economic power. This situation survives on the platform of 'us' versus 'them' (Forest, 2006). The pattern is common to most politically motivated violent groups'dogmas including terrorists and insurgents.As such, insurgencies have many paradoxes and to address such violence, there will be need to

craftinitiativesthat arecognisant of the different risks along the path of end support for the insurgents.

2.6.5 Defining and Understanding Insurgency and Terrorism

The study on understanding insurgency and terrorism has not reached academic maturity and this leaves many scholars in dilemma (Silke, 2001).This struggle by experts to conceptualize or explain insurgency and terrorism has been on for decades (DeAngelis, 2009;Schuurman and Eijkman, 2013).Long before the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US, frustrating debates about the definitions of insurgency have ensued. However, Smith and Zeigler (2017) notes that following the September 11, 2001 attacks, this debate took new dimension creating further moral challenges to either the proponents or critics of the war on insurgency. The post 9/11 debates become interesting because questions that follow this period go beyond what is insurgency. In post 9/11, concerns like what are the best approaches to tackling insurgency grew stronger in America (Pyszczynski, Solomon and Greenberg, 2003).

In furthering the breaking down of issues around insurgencies, Opafola (2008), made propositions regarding howmultifacetedinsurgency is in terms of cause and effect. In a related manner, Ndubuisi (2008) examines what constitutes insurgency and considers itsbehavioural and faith-based elements. Rourke (2009) contributions on the sources and causes of insurgency focused on weapons and methods being used. The sources according to Rourke are either state or transnational but both come with grave consequences for state and human security. As for Walker (2016), the discussions rest on monotheism, reductionism and absolutism.

It is evident from contributions of these scholars that irrespective of the origin and nature of the insurgency, there are regular pattern common to every insurgency which is the political element.Perhaps, such development madeLutz and Lutz (2009) argue that, largely due to grievances and dissatisfaction, insurgencies have proven effective in bringing about 'change'. Such dissatisfaction with certain status quo in many other nations has led countries to different struggles with insurgency. The other uniting argument on why insurgency exists or occurs is that, in many cases, individuals willing to establish their ideologieshave no empathy for innocent lives that may be consumed by theirsuicidal traits (Herbst, 2004; Ravndal, 2015).

This difficulty of conceptualising or defining insurgency nonetheless does not make it synonymous with civil war, banditry, or guerrilla warfare (Forest, 2012). There was a time in the 60s and 70s when the term *guerrilla* often had a positive connotation. This was when most insurgencies were anti-capitalist in orientation leading to the assumption that where justice prevails, insurgency would diminish (Vasqrez, 2012). The fact that the word 'insurgency' comes from people's lips, yet no one is able to explain convincingly what it means, suggest a need to look at selected definitions of insurgency. This will shed more light to the discourse and of course creates its own confusion.

The "unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instil fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political." (U.S. Department of Defense, 2015)

> "The use or the threat of the use of violence, a method of combat, or a strategy to achieve certain targets… [I]t aims to induce a state of fear in the victim, that is ruthless and does not conform with humanitarian rules… [P]ublicity is an essential factor in the terrorist strategy… (Laqueur, 1987:143)
>
> Insurgency is ineluctably political in aims and motives, violent— or, equally important, threatens violence, designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target, conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia), and perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity (Hoffman, 2006:43).
>
> "The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives" (NATO, 2014).
>
> "Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act"UN Security council resolution 1566 (2004).

Some Nigerian scholars have also contributed to the meaning of insurgency as follows:

> The threat or use of violence and terror for the achievement of a political, socio-economic or other expedient purpose against individual or group of individuals, a thing or group of things, a state or states (Nwolise, 2012)

Akanji (2009) in particular domesticated his insurgency definition argument by saying:

> Domestic insurgency refers to acts of terror committed within the boundaries of a sovereign state against civilians, the government, and public and private properties in a bid to coerce or intimidate the government and people of that state. (Akanji, 2009:56).

Such plethora of definitionsand explanation on insurgency was necessaryas one definition will not fit all forms of insurgency. Laqueur and Jenkins (2003) support this thinking placing emphasis on certain elements common to the definitions of insurgency.

These elementsare relevant to this study and are as follows:

- Deliberate and systematic act;
- Symbolic use or threat of violence;
- Political behaviour;
- Premeditation;
- Non-combatants as targets.

Wilkinson (2008) in trying to conceptualize insurgency concludes on the conceptual misuse of insurgency. The misuse comes by concluding that all political conflicts and violence are acts of insurgency. The other forms of misuse come when popular agitations disapproved by a government turned violent and are then immediately tagged as acts of insurrection. The conclusion of Wilkinson was that insurgency is often used loosely and inconsistently. Apparently, there are hundreds of definitions of insurgency depending on where one consults. Silke (2001) contribution is telling on why consensus on the nature and diverse forms of actors, definitions or categories of insurgency is difficult. This study also acknowledges vitally the difficulty of defining insurgency.

2.6.6   Typologiesof Terrorism and Insurgencies

In this section rather than aligning with specific definitions of insurgency and terrorism, the elements of the acts of terror are provided to serve as basis for better understanding of the concepts. This thinking is in consonance with Tavares (2004), who also instead of defining a concept like insurgency concludes that understanding

the tactical, that is,the short-run of insurgency is more illuminating than trying to define the act. There have been difficulties classifying insurgencies' typologies even as far back as the early 1960s with one factor cantered on the Marxist, separatist, nationalist classification being the defining elements. Such approach has come under some criticism because it overlooks certain characteristics, such as command and control, indoctrination, and enrolment methods, which are critical for dealing with insurgency manifestations (Mackinlay, 2002).

For many years, the US and her allies consider insurgencies as pro communism or support for China and Russia ideologies to cut off the US influence in the world political order.Schmid and Jongman did not follow such thinking about insurgency and terrorism (Schmid and Crelinsten, 1993:28)[2]. Rather they considered insurgency "an anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons". They made an analogy of insurgency to assassination, and both agreed that, the immediate targets of insurgency are not necessarily the focus but a means to cover up or point to something else. Specifically, Schmid and Jongman (1988) joint definition of insurgency states that insurgency is:

> …an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators(Schmid and Jongman, 1988).

More importantly, Schmid's concern about political terrorism is particularly relevant to this study. Hence, the following diagram on Schmid's typology of terrorism is provided for illumination.

---

[2] Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinsten eds., 1993

Figure 2:1 Schmid's typology of terrorism.

Source: Schmid (2005)

Figure 2.1 of Schmid's logic of terrorism is applicable to insurgency and the following qualities distinguish insurgency form of political violence:

- Premeditated strategy of violence to intimidate, instil fear and coerce.
- The use of or threat of force through sustained campaigning or sporadic incidents;
- calculated violence against civil population.
- attempt to bring complete change in state governance.

Figure 2.2: Distinction between Terrorists and Insurgents

Key Differences Between Terrorists and Insurgents

	Terrorists	Insurgents
Targets	Primarily noncombatants	Primarily official (e.g., military, police, government personnel) and economic targets
Operations	Attacks carried out by members of small cells	Paramilitary and military, in larger formations
Territory	Rarely hold territory, and then only for short periods	Hold larger amounts of territory; some create "liberated zones"
Other	No uniforms; rarely if ever abide by the Law of Armed Conflict	Sometimes insurgents wear uniforms; sometimes respect Law of Armed Conflict

Source: Vick,Grissom,Rosenau, Grill and Mueller (2006:11)

The classification and differentiation provided in Figure 2.2shows what separate the understanding of terrorism from insurgency. It also affirmswhythe meaning of both terrorism and insurgencyare disputable (Townsend, 2002). Despite disagreement on the concept, insurgency tactics typically alienate the population resulting in repercussions to the advantage of the existing state.

2.1.4Insurgency: Origin, Periods and Movements

This section attempts approaching trends in global insurgency from holistic perspective using different characteristics suchas forms of attacks, the aggressorsand their causalities. The motive for highlighting such trends is based on the understanding that, tracing and scrutinising activities of terrorists contribute to the understanding of the nature of threats they pose and ultimately the actions to counter them. Adopting the same thinking, Harmon (2000) traced earliest terror groups and discovered that, the Thugs, a Hindu sect who operatedas road bandits and murderedfellow Hindus as insurgency one of the pacesetters. Whittaker (2004) concludes that, to understand periods and patterns of insurgency, a number of historical vantage points persist. These vantage points are classified as follows: insurgency in antiquity; insurgency and the French Revolution; insurgency and Tsarist Russia; insurgency 1900 to 1945; insurgency and anti-colonialism; insurgency and protest, and insurgency and separatism.

Eruvbetine (2008) on its part believes the period of insurgency is traceable to three obscure religious sects. The religious sects are the Hindu Thugs, Jewish Zealots and Shiíte Muslim Assassins. This argument falls with Sandler, Arce, and Enders, 2008 Magstadt (2009) who identified the first insurgency group or patterns in history withthe Jewish Zealots who targeted non-membersthereby instigating the resistance against Roman occupation in 66-73 AD (Magstadt, 2009).

There are bulk of studies on the origin, context and nature of insurgency. These studies (Hoffman, 1999; Rapoport, 2004; Ross, 2004; Enders and Sandler, 2008) demonstrate that the employment of violent coercive means to accomplish definite objectives has been rife for a long time. It is clear from these arguments that violent conflicts, insurgency or terrorism remain part of human existence. However, the discussion of Harmon (2010) revolves around the word "terror" which he claims became prominent with the French Revolution under the "period known as the reign

of terror". Harmon's submission is important however, looking this study transcends the classifications of the origin of insurgency. Rather, the study will limit its outlook of insurgency to the modern era where David Rapoport opines that in the modern era, insurgency remains a major determinant of political order along four different waves (Rapoport, 2004).

Anarchy and assassination were the mark of the initialinsurgency wave andthe major insurgency related event in this period led to theslaughtering of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip a Bosnian Serb.This event was considered as a remote cause of the First World War. The objective conspirators who carried out the assassination desired to merge the Slavs in southern Austria-Hungary with Greater Serbia (McCormick, 2018). A major characteristic of the second wave of insurgency was the quest for self-determination by nations. This drive was heightened by decolonisation. The groups that came up included the Jewish extremist Irgun in Palestine in 1940s and the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland from late 1960s respectively (Rapoport, 2004).

Table 2.1: Rapoport four waves of Insurgency

	1st Wave	2nd Wave	3rd Wave	4th Wave
Primary Strategy	Anarchism and Assassination	Self Determination	Hijackings, Kidnappings, Assassinations.	Attacks on ideology Antagonists
Target Identity			Governments and the U.S.	Strong focus on U.S., Israel and secular regimes with Muslim population
Special Characteristics			Increased international Training and sponsorship	Casualty escalation, decline in number of Terrorist groups.

Source: Thompson (2006: 190)

The third wave essentially involved religion more directly as a motive or at least as a rhetorical and recruitment tool. This period, in 1968 witnessed backlash of US involvement in Vietnam and Israel led to serious antagonism of the 'west' and subsequently led to terrorist attacks of US and Israeli interest by different Palestine groups. The incident also brought out the Palestinian problem for debates (Harrisson, 2004). The last and the fourth wave in this category were defined by reduction in inter-state wars, sharp cutback in the Soviet Union and US tension,the 1979 revolution in Iran and muchinterest and desire of states to use the United Nations frameworks to address violence (Yilmaz, 2008).

Shughart (2006) believes these research outcomes are very useful, but inadequate in explaining insurgency. Shughart rests on the argument that, recent manifestations of insurgency meant what is known is inadequate.This explains the need to look at Bergesen and Lizardo (2005) challenging addition to Rapoport's four waves of insurgency. Bergesen and Lizardosupport Rapoport in terms ofideological character of each wave. The point of disagreement was that the fourth wave coloration in religion was not entirely different from the initial three waves. Consequently, Lizardo and Bergesen conclude that, both 19th century anarchist and currently religiously coloured insurgency are ill-disposed tothe world system as essentially illegitimate and oppressive. The desire and aim of today's insurgency are therefore to further its destruction.

The four waves demonstrate that insurgency is a continuous tool in global politics to draw worldwide attention to either dispossession or lack of freedom. From previous literature and in line with the fourth wave's proposition, it can be deduced that insurgency has always had politics behind it. The politics play out differently for the state and insurgents. Whereas states adopt the use of war as apolitical tool often under the disguise of sovereignty whileinsurgents use intimidation and fear as means of advancing political objectives (Reuveny and Thompson, 2010).An interesting addition to Rapoport's four waves of insurgency is Thompson (2006) categorization as listed in the following table.

Table2.2: Thompson Categorization of Insurgency periods

Wave	Encouragement	Discouragement
1800s-20s	Napoleonic wars	Great power suppression
1830s-60s	Industrialization diffusion	Government suppression
1870s-1910s	Dynamite, globalization, communication and transportation networks	Labour diversion, government suppression, World War I
1920s-60s	Post-WWI Versailles Treaty (self-determination) and decolonization norms	Post-WWII decolonization due in part to war exhaustion
1960s-90s	Cold War ideological struggle	End of Cold War, government suppression
1970s-2020s	Information technology, Globalization, and US systemic leadership and patron-client ties, government suppression? SALW, trades, private mercenary	Government suppression

Thompson's (2006: 193)

An addition has been made to corroborate and further Rapoport (2004) and Thompson's contribution to the insurgency waves. This fifth wave is what Bergesen (2005) calls the periphery and semi-periphery insurgent groups consisting of extremist with brainwashed followers such as Khmer Rouge group of Cambodia in Central East Asia, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and perhaps the Boko Haram in Nigeria (Kaplan, Kress and Szechtman (2010).

The researcher differs from some of these argumentsas described in the waves postulations and from literature cited in a variety of ways. One point of such differentiation is that, causes of insurgency must not be linked to a singular factor, as opined by Rapoport (2004) in the first and second waves of insurgency.Many elements that play a role in why government and individuals (with followers - real or perceived territory) embrace insurgency may not be obvious. Toindividuals like Osama bin Laden and Mohammed Yusuf, insurgency becomes a useful strategic tool to drive home their demands and draw attention to their prowess in wreaking havoc. Based on this, the researcher agrees with the scholarsAnderson (2004); Botha (2009); Alao (2015) who argued in support of insurgency growing as a result of the influence of creed, greed and other psycho-social elements working interwoven.

2.1.5   Trends and Patterns ofContemporary Insurgencygroups

The United Nations and governments across the globe continue to feel the negative impact of insurgency as unabated threats (UNOCHA, 2014). Historically within the global order, neither insurgency nor counterinsurgency is a new concept. As such, no historical period has been immune to the threat of insurgency. This reality has made governments and intergovernmental institutions as well as NGOs/CBOs to keep strengthening states and regional counterinsurgency platforms and strategies.Outcomes of such approaches suggest futuristic thinking and that need for counterinsurgency actors to get concerned about trends associated with demography and technology particularly in states where extremism and insurgency has gained ascendancy (UNDP, 2015).

From the 2012 Global insurgency Database (GTD) released by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) in global insurgency index report, the global trend of insurgency is on the rise rather than decreasing. Beyond the concern of increase in insurgency trend, what was worrisome was that, most insurgents' attacks have

successrates varying from eighty-nine percent (89%) to ninety-seven percent (97%) depending on the year of measurement. This raises concern about effective gathering of intelligence as a precaution against attacks. Whereas, in terms of objectsof attacks from extremist groups, states agents, public infrastructure and security officials were mostly targeted. In 2012, military infrastructures were less targeted compared toeconomic support systems, infrastructure, worship buildings and institutions (IEP, 2012).

In the ten years 2002-2012, IEP (2012) accounted for increased successful attacks by insurgent groups. Of note, the *Global Terrorism Database GTD* (2012) ranking countries on insurgency incidents across the globe notes that,out of 158 countries examined in 2012, there were only twenty (20) without terrorism related issues from 2002-2011. Where insurgency related activities were witnessed, they occurred in the context of a wider conflict situation such as civil war, religious and political uprising. What was most notable was that, ten (10) countries with the most terrorist incidents in 2011 accounted for eighty-seven (87%) of total global incidents.

The results of the 2012 analysis of terrorism and insurgency incidents brings to the fore a critical factor on group grievances as countries with lower group grievances had positive results on the Global Insurgency Index. Other factors that correlate with insurgency are intergroup cohesion, political instability and human rights. The result of this correlation shows that in-group cohesion corresponds with better Insurgency Index results. The same with low political instability which affects insurgency index ranking (IEP, 2012). The next table compares ten countries most affected by insurgency in 2011, 2014 and 2015.

Table 2.3: Ten countries most affected by Insurgency in 2011- 2015

2011			2014			2015		
Rank	Country	GTI Score	Rank	Country	GTI Score	Rank	Country	GTI Score
1	Iraq	9.56	1	Iraq	10	1	Iraq	10
2	Pakistan	9.05	2	Afghanistan	9.39	2	Afghanistan	9.233
3	Afghanistan	8.67	3	Pakistan	9.37	**3**	**Nigeria**	**9.213**
4	India	8.15	**4**	**Nigeria**	**8.58**	**4**	Pakistan	9.065
5	Yemen	7.30	5	Syria	8.12	5	Syria	8.108
6	Somalia	7.24	6	India	7.86	6	India	7.74
7	**Nigeria**	**7.24**	7	Somalia	7.41	7	Yemen	7.642
8	Thailand	7.09	8	Yemen	7.31	8	Somalia	7.6
9	Russia	7.07	9	Philippines	7.29	9	Libya	7.29
10	Philippines	6.80	10	Thailand	7.19	10	Thailand	7.28

Source: IEP 2012, 2014 and 2015

Comparing 2002-2012 period, the primary targets of insurgency changed proportionally in certain contexts and remained the same in others. For instance, primary targets of insurgency have consistently been private property and citizens. Prior to 2012, the driving ideology for insurgency has been nationalist separatist agendas. However, since 2011, religion as a driving ideology from insurgency has increased. This is not to say that political or national separatist movements are insignificant.The key trends of 2012-2014 makes the period unique and significant. Just five (5) states of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syriarecorded over eighty per cent (80%)fatalities to insurgency.

More significantly also was the fact that, one hundred and two countries examined by insurgency index had no fatalities traceable to insurgent activities in 2013. There was practically no direct linkage between insurgency and poverty whereas political stability, intergroup cohesion and legitimacy of the state showed correlation with increase and decrease in insurgency.

2.2 Insurgencyand theSub Sahara Africa

From literature, the common ground for discussion on insurgency in Sub Sahara Africa (SSA) is its link to/with colonialism. There have been arguments about this part of the world that colonialism left many negative marks that are difficult to erase (Curry, 1999; Kukah, 2011). As such, slave trade activities and other repressive actions of the colonial government are in some quarters viewed as 'insurgency' of colonialism era. Any analysis of the root causes of insurgency in Sub Sahara Africa (SSA) that neglects colonial rule effects is deemed incomplete (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). The collaboration of colonial establishment and traditional rulers across Sub Sahara Africa exploited existing trade centres and routes to serve colonialist ulterior interests (Rodney, 1983).

To subdue the people, colonialism systematically enslaved the people in such a way that without dispensed terror, slavery would not have been possible. Slavery thrived on the back of fear, intimidation and suppression.(Edgerton, 2002; Ingiriis, 2012; Elu and Price, 2014). Human casualties and the destruction of properties with associated humanitarian crises have also occurred due to insurgent activities in Sub Sahara Africa, provoking strong interest among national governments of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the international community.

The followinglist therefore represents some of the driving factors of insurgency in Sub Sahara Africa (SSA).

Ideological Factor: This can be through religious extremismor political supremacists view.

Economic Deprivation: This manifests in poverty, inequality,frustration and a lack of economic opportunities. Gurr (1970) explains it as the discrepancy between what individuals think they deserve and what they actually receive.

Modernization Strain: Economic, demographic and social changes across the world due to political and socio-cultural diffusion or transition. Hence, Ross (1993) argues grievances emanates during a transition from a traditional to a modern society where changes in employment patterns,technologies and communication, shift from agricultural to urban societies create 'modernization losers', thus making recruitment, financing or other forms of support more likely for insurgent groups.

Political Transformation and Instability: Changes in political systems are creating political vacuums, which insurgentsare equally exploiting to push their agenda(Campos and Gassebner, 2008). State failure, as the most drastic form of instability is a common root cause of insurgency. While failed states are safe havens for terrorist organizations (Rotberg, 2002).

Political Repression: States that engage in any form of repression including politically motivated ones are often referred to as rogue states Libya, Algeria, Ethiopia, Gambia and Egypt have all at some point regarded as such (Edgerton, 2002).

Identity and Cultural Clash: Huntington (1996) and Anderson (2006)explanations corroborate the idea that most intra or inter-ethnicviolence are consequences of civilization clash. Insurgent groups therefore find it less costly to fan up support against antagonistic identity groupsto shift outcomes in their favour.

Political corruption: Where political leadership did not observe the 'social contract with its citizens and engage in corruption, the powerless citizens look for ways out and violent acts of insurgency, become some form of recourse.

Criminality: Powerful gangs and drug cartels across the SSA regularly cooperate with insurgent groups to expand their territory, protect their profitable activities from potential rivals, and convince the citizens of their neighbourhood not to cooperate with the authorities.

Religious extremism: Fanaticism ideals perpetrated by individuals who believe their actions are sanctioned by a higher power, have led to violent acts.

Beyond the factors above, a number of elements influence insurgency. Using the following table, these elements are captured from Rand (2009).

Table 2.4: Permissive Factors in Insurgency

Class of Permissive Factor	Factor		
Global systemic factors	Global systemic explanations	Repression	
State structural factors	Perceived illegitimacy of the regime	Democracy	
	Foreign policy, ICT, globalization, modernity	Economics	
Social and cultural factors	Grievances and anxieties	Education	
	Mobilizing structures and social ties	Human insecurity	
	Ideology, religion, and culture		

Source: Rand (2009)

2.3 The Nigeria Northeast Region

For several reasons, the Northeast region (NER) constitute the case study for the research. It is the region mostly affected by Boko Haram insurgency. It therefore represents a good place to interrogate the application of counterinsurgency strategies and its interplay with human security. The Northeast region (NER) of Nigeria shows how insurgency and poverty interplay has compounded human security in the region. The region now stands as Nigeria's epicentre of extremism and fundamentalism. Many communities in the region continue to live in fear and uncertainties of insurgents as well as attacks relating to military counterinsurgency operations. A residence once commented that, "when people leave their houses daily, there is no assurance that one will return without some Boko Haram related incidents that could result in death or injuries" (*The Nation, Oct, 5, 2012*). Expressions like this explain the nature of perpetual fear and anxiety that exist in the region. "Many communities are not immune from the Boko Haram danger and even the so-calledtemples of worship are not left out of this danger".As such, the northeast region Nigeria serves as a good case of how both insurgency and counterinsurgency further complicates human security.

The Nigeria Northeast region consists of six states, namelyYobe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe and Taraba.

Adamawa State

The present Adamawa State consists of the defunct Adamawa and Sardauna provinces located in the extreme north-eastern Nigeria. Adamawa State, a creation of the military regime in 1991, with Yola as capital linked Borno State in the north, Gombe State in the west, Taraba State in the south and the Cameroun in the east. Adamawa and Taraba used to be called Gongola state but this changed in 1991. Some important cities in Adamawa include Numan, Jimeta, Yola and Michik(Girei and Dire, 2014). Physically, the landscape of Adamawa State is one of the most contrasting one in the country. The mountain can be as low as 128 meters and as elevated as 2050 metersbeyond the sea level (Maduforo and Ojebode 2011).The State has twenty-one (21) Local Government councils.

Figure 2.3: Map of Nigeria showing three Northeast states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa

Borno State

The Borno State, which was created in 1976, also belongs to the extreme North East of Nigeria. With its capital in Maiduguri, Borno state has a total landscape of over sixty-five thousand square kilometres. The state has international gateways to the Republics of Cameroun, Chad and Niger. As a matter of fact, Borno state is the only state in Nigeria surrounded by three (3) countries. Within Nigeria, Borno state is surrounded by Gombe, Adamawa and Yobe states. This of course has various socio-economic, political and security implications for the state in particular and Nigeria as a whole. The state is also significant because in the pre-colonial times the Kanem-Borno empire was considered as the entry point for Islam in Nigeria as far back as 1096 AD (Alkali 1978). As such, Borno is essentially Muslim dominated state with few people practicing Christianity. The major ethnic group in Borno is the Kanuri while other groups include Fulani, Chibok, Babur/Bura and the Mandara.

There are twenty-seven (27) local government council areas in Borno with many of these local governments in the Sahel with limited rainfall round the year. Many consider Borno State[3] to be quite peaceful that the State had the appellate of 'Home of Peace' until when the Boko Haram surfaced (Monguno, 2014).

Yobe State

Yobe State like Adamawa state was created the 1991 from the old Borno State. The creation of Yobe and Adamawa was deemed necessary because the old Borno state was too large in terms of land area, making it difficult for administrative convenience(Abdulrahman, 2014)[4]. Yobe people are mostly into farming and herding. Yobe state has seventeen LGAs wichGeidam, Potiskum and Damaturu as some key towns.

---

[3]See Abubakar Kawu Monguno is of the Department of Geography & Centre for Disaster Risk Management and development Studies, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria. His piece in CLEEN
[4]Mamman Abdulrahman Centre for Sustainable Development Yobe State, Nigeria

2.3.1 Snapshots of Key moments and events inBoko Haran Insurgency

The emergence of the Boko Haram sect is linked to disagreement with the Quranic teachings of SheikhJafaar Adam at Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri whereMohammed Yusuf had his breakaway as far as 2002 (Owolade, 2014; Adetula, 2015). The influencing doctrines of Boko Haram came from the Wahhabi Movement of Sunni Islamic Fundamentalism of strict adherence to the Sharia law and its implementation in Nigeria (David, 2001).In terms of trends therefore, the following represents some patterns from 2009-2015.

2009 Key Moments and Events in Boko Haram Insurgency

The Boko Haram group has been active before 2009. However, the group turned violent in July 2009attacking Izala mosque and police offices in Bauchi killing at least fifty-five (55).As a follow-up, the group continued attacks against the police in Maiduguri and Potsikum, Yobe State including inWudil, Kano State. This spate of attacks provoked police and military reactions in locations believed to host the Boko Haram members. The battle of state security agencies against the group between July and August 2009 was responsible for over seven hundred (700) fatalities (Comolli, 2015). At the end of the hostilities between Boko Haram sects and the security agencies consisting of Police and the military, Maiduguri was captured while the sect's leader, Mohammed Yusuf was apprehended by the military and was subsequently turned over to the police authorities in Maiduguri where he was extra-judicially murdered.

2010 Key Moments and Events in Boko Haram Insurgency

The year 2010 witnessed the consolidation of security in certain parts of the northeast of the country. This was in a bid to forestall the repeat of July 2009 clashes of Boko Haram with state security agencies where many Boko Haram members died and many others disappeared to treat injuries sustained and or hid from the prying eyes of the security agencies. Such a lull moment allowed for Boko Haram in neighbouring countries to reorganize and receive trainings. By July 2010, and with the one-year anniversary of the death of Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf in view, the Nigeria Army had established a brigade of troops inBorno state to forestall possible revenge attacks by the group.

The Boko Haram group however still surprised the security forces by September when suspected Boko Haram members attacked detention centers in Bauchi state to set free their members. In doing this, the group killed about 8 prison officials and some bystanders. The Boko Haram group eventually dedicated the remaining part of 2010 in attacking in Borno and Bauchi anyone perceived as assisting the Nigerian Government against their agenda.By October 2010, the group began subtle media campaign in forms of posters and handouts to warnthe people against supporting the state security agencies to apprehend their members.

2011 Key Moments and Events in Boko Haram Insurgency

The year 2011 witnessed a steady increase and sophistication in Boko haram attacks, notably in states like Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Plateau, and Kaduna as well as in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The Christmas Day bombing of a Catholic church at Madalla, Niger State was the most notable Boko haram attacks in the year. Within 2011, Boko Haram attacks mostly targeted civilian population, government leaders, police and military officers and clerics. The persistent bombing attacks by the Boko Haram resulted in the creation of the position of counterterrorism coordinator by former President Goodluck Jonathan. TheNational Focal Point on terrorism comprising of twenty-five (25)agencies formed in 2007 eventually became operational.

The consistency of Boko Haram attacks resulted into the legislative responses inform the passing of the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011, which was passed into law inMay, 2011by the National Assembly and was signed into law in June by President Jonathan. As part of stringentsteps to drawback Boko Haram, a state of emergency was declared in December 2011 in fifteen (15) local government areas of Niger state, Borno state, Plateau state, and Yobe state.

2012 Key Moments and Events in Boko Haram Insurgency

The year 2012 continued to witnesswidespreadBoko Haram attacks through killings, bombings and kidnappings in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Kogi, Plateau, Taraba, and Yobe, as well as the Federal Capital Territory. The month of April witnessedthe most notable attack in 2012 - The*ThisDay* newspaper offices in Abuja and Kaduna were attacked by Boko haram members.

The year also witnessed the fractionalisation of Boko haram with the emergence of the "Ansaru group," believed to have ties to AQIM with priority on killing western targets.Increase in attacks by Boko Haram led tothe sacking of the National Security Adviser (NSA) and replacing him in June by President Goodluck Jonathan.

2013 Key Moments and Events in Boko Haram Insurgency

By 2013 the Nigerian government was fighting Boko Haram on many fronts. At this time Boko Haram had been sharply divided where different groups were attackingnon-combatant and combatantsthrough kidnap, hostage taking and bombing. In the month of May of that year, President Jonathan further declared a State of Emergency for six months across Yobe, Adamawa and Borno states. This allowed for military takeover of all security operations in those three (3) states. The military then set up a new command called Seven Division of the Nigerian Army, headquartered in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state.

2014 Key Moments and Events in Boko Haram Insurgency

The year 2014 witnessed continuous Boko Haram attacks in the following states: Kano, Taraba, Plateau, Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe and also the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Some of the high-profile attacks in the year included attacks on the Emir ofKano's convoy and the military vehicles carrying some troops of the Nigeria contingents to Mali. Some women administering anti polio treatments were also killed by people believed to be Boko Haram members.The year 2014, notably witnessed the Boko Haram abduction of the Chibok girls in April. This attack drew international criticism and condemnation. There were further deadly attacks in the towns of Bama, Gwoza, Madagali,BuniYadi and Michika.

2015 Key Moments and Events in Boko Haram Insurgency

Boko Haram acts of killing, bombing, kidnapping and attacks continued in 2015 where Nigeria's northeast, particularly Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states received most of the attacks. The group control of a number of territories and have increased suicide bombings that targeted markets, worship centers and motor parks.The year 2015 was also the year that a new leader, President Muhammadu Buhari took control as the Commander in Chief of Nigerian Armed Forces, President Buhari, on

assumption of office subsequently relocated the military command centerto Maiduguri in Borno State.

2.4   Human Security: Normative frameworks and Dynamics

Among many attempts to reclassify security was the human security concept framework, which emerged in the year 1994 through the UNDP. This documentbecame the watershed for policy makers and academics within the broad field of international relations and development. This human security document was successful in validating the worries of common people yearning for safety and security. The coming of human security has shifted security focus away from the state and put people right at the middle of security consideration. The UNDPreport further identifies six (5)important human security concerns as, economic inequalities, forced migration, environmental security,organised drug peddling, trans-national insurgency and population explosion (Thomas, 1999). In conclusion, the report further summarises human security into seven (7)basic domains: of food, health, environmental, personal, community, economic and political security.

The UNDP through thishuman security documentmade the world realize that properly harnessed human security with necessary political willcan provide the people, freedom from fear and want. The prevention elements of human security aim to minimize the vulnerability of human beings, while reaction elementsidentify where the use of force comes in only as a last resort.Human security by its content thus opens the question of relationship between freedom and security.

Human security came up because the word security for so long has been interpreted narrowly as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust (Hamilton, 2013). As such, the need arose for human security concept to be clearly distinguished from the traditional and narrow concept of security that was almost synonymous with state security. The following table provides some clarifications between traditional and human security.

Table 2:5 Comparison of Traditional and Human Security concepts

	Traditional State Security	**Human Security**
Security Beneficiary	State	Individual
Security Value(s)	Territory	Safety and freedom
Security threats or risks	Military threats from other nations	Military and Non-Military threats
Security Means	Force as the primary instrument for sovereignty	Force as a secondary instrument, governance as key instruments
	Balance of power amplified	Balance of power not essential but the use of Soft power
	Limited cooperation among nations	Cooperation among nations and non-governmental entities important.

Source: Adapted from Bajpai 2000

Human security is not necessarily the substitute to the traditional security concept. Rather, both are classical examples oftackling ever changing threats. Security of the past is driven by sovereignty of a state but human security amplifies theimportance of an individual within the state (Axworthy, 1999).Another important angle to the argument was that security has often been linked with threats to the survival of states, but human security discountenance that showcasing threats to individuals and communities. Disequilibrium in survival, livelihood, and dignityof individuals and community members are the threats human security endeavours to address (Tadjbakhsh, 2009). This explains Matsuura (2008) emphasis that:

> Ensuring human security for the most vulnerable populations has been a major concern of the international community. The threats and risks that these populations face have increased, together with their intensity. They have taken a heavy toll, particularly on women and children, but also on all those who have been deprived, generation after generation, of access to opportunities to forge a better life.

Why Human Security now?

Three questions stand out on in the discussion regarding human security. What is human security? Why human security now? What are the main features of human security? The Commission on Human Security CHS (2003) argues on two fronts while trying to provide answers to the first question of why human security now. One, that human security comes to simplify the difficulties associated with traditional security model and connect both traditional and non-traditional threats which are rather more transnational. The focus on external military aggressions alone would be insufficient to solve non-traditional threats.

On the other hand, the models that human security offers sound more expansive, limitless and inclusive to new thinking in an integrated manner. Conventional methods are therefore antithetical to human security which by nature entailsharmony of development, human rights and national security.

Reacting to the second question of what is human security, the CHS, in its final report titled: *Human Security Now,* defines human security as:

> …protecting the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity. (CHS: 2003: 4).

Table 2.6: The interplay of elements of Human Security

Human security components	Strategies to enhance protection and empowerment	Capacities needed
Economic security	Fundamental of basic income Social safety nets Multiple stream economy	Economical and Human capital Government funding Stable economic reserves
Food Security	Food availability and accessibility Subsistence farming High purchase power Sustainable Food chain supply	Multiple stream agriculture sector National and Global food chain systems
Health Security	Primary health care Societal driven healthcare insurance Disease outbreak monitoring systems across board	Universal primary education system Sound traditional health practices information based education and health system
Environment Security	Sustainable Environment practices Early warning and early response Alternative waste management system	Natural resource fund Biodiversity Indigenous/traditional practices that respect the environment
Personal Security	Rule of law Human rights Free movement	Coping mechanisms Adaptive strategies
Community Security	Protection of different groups within the community Immunity from barbaric traditional exercises Victimisation of and discrimination against women Openness towards otherethnic groups and vulnerable population	Social capital Coping mechanisms Adaptive strategies Memory of past disasters
Political security	Protection from political or state repression, torture, ill treatment, unlawful detention and imprisonment	Good governance Ethical standards Accountability mechanisms

Adapted from United Nations (2009)

From table 2.6 in previous page, human security entails an extensive interplayof the economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security sectors.

In relation to the third question on the main features of human security, the individual and community become the frame of analyses. This framing makes human security across-cutting, cross-practice, multi-pillar, all-inclusive and pro-active process with human face. Consequently, it identifies what shakes human endurance levels, threaten their survival, subsistence.

Table 2.7: Multi-sectoral levels of Human Security

Human Security Principle	Corresponding Approach
People-centered	All encompassing Individuals and communities voice theirwish/frailty People as primary agents of change Sense of collectiveness amplified
Multi-sectoral	Multi-stakeholder, cross-sectional interchange across sectors Orderliness and leadership acrossnaturally distinctfields
Comprehensive	Comprehensive analysis of all pillars or elements of human security Suitable to mitigate endless threats associated with feeble capacities Incorporate actors and segments that traditional security frameworks never considered germane
Context-specific	Focuses on a core set of freedoms and rights under threat in a given situation Zero to the needs of the affected community(ies) Encompasses the act local and think global mantra Conscious of the impact of initiatives on the targeted situation
Prevention-oriented	Focuses on protection and empowerment by identifying root causes

Through this table 2.7, it can be deduced that the principles making up the human security cannot be implemented as separate objectives. That needs to recognise joint collaborative efforts can help address today's complex and multidimensional challenges.

Table 2.8: Key instruments at the UN level of how Human Security evolved

1992	Agenda for Peace	UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali's call for "an integrated approach to human security" to address root causes of conflict, spanning economic, social and political issues.
1994	Human Development Report	This document introduced at global level what human security entails and how-to appropriate human-centric security paradigm in place of state-centric actions.
2000	The UN Millennium Declaration	UN Secretary General Kofi Annan calls the attention of the international community to fundamental values to enhance peoples 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'.
	United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS)	In March 1999 the Government of Japan and the UN Secretariat launch the UNTFHS to finance activities capable of moving the human security approaches into practical actions that are equally sustainable
	Human Security Network (HSN)	A group of like-minded countries from all regions of the world committed to identifying concrete areas for collective action in the area of human security.
2001	Commission on Human Security (CHS)	Establishment of the independent Commission on Human Security under the chairmanship of Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen.
2003	*Human Security Now*	The CHS publishes its final report *Human Security Now,* as a framework document to safeguard and expand people's vital freedoms. The document equally comprises of how to shield people from acute threats and empowering them to take charge of their own lives.
2004	Human Security Unit (HSU)	The HSU at the UN Secretariat in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was established to mainstream human security into the activities of the UN and to extend global awareness and usage of the human security approach
2004	UN Secretary General's *High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*	The UN secretary General's *High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* identifies the interconnectedness new threats to human securityand the need for greater cooperation and partnerships to address them.

Source: Compiled by the Author (2015)

The idea of human security as mentioned in table 2.8 is appealing as the substitute to traditional security architecture mainly because it empowers and makes room for individuals' protection (Bellamy and McDonald, 2002; Krause, 2008; Newman, 2010). Critics, however, have pointed to the negative sideof the human security agenda to include securitisation of everyday life. This makes human security scholarship subject to strong criticism (Hynek and Chandler, 2011; McCormack, 2011). While the traditional approach of security known as realist approach focuses on states. The human security approach provides pragmaticjudgement of global issues and expresses how the global community should respond.

In spite of this elaborate explanation, realists resist broadening the concept of security beyond the state. The Copenhagen School, the Welsh School, and the human security approach have continued to counter the resistance. The Copenhagen School in particular maintains noduality of security exists. There should be nothing like traditional or non-traditional security, rather what must exist is the societal security. In a major contribution to the literature,Barry Buzan of the Copenhagenschool broadened the security agenda to involve five sectors rather than the traditional focus on the military security. These five (5) sectors are political, economic, societal and ecological security sectors (Buzan, 1983; Waever, 1995). This was expanded in the 1990s, by Buzan, in a series of publications with Waever, through their notion of 'societal security' as the framework of analysis to understand post-Cold War Europe (Buzan, 1997).

The contending literature therefore explains how the human security concept as framed in this study provides linkage to the study of conflict and security. This linkageof economic underdevelopment and security as shown by Thomasexplains how human securityconnects basic human needs (food, shelter, education, health care etc.). The achievement of human dignity in forms of unhindered participation in the life of the community is also magnified (Thomas and Wilkin, 1999).

2.4.1 Human Security as strategy for National Security

The idea of human security as important strategy for national security is crucial. Siegle (2011) also points to this submission emphasising that any state that prioritises the protection of its population would be well perceived as legitimate by both internal population and external support groups. Such legitimacy derived from the popular

support would make it less challenging for them to address internal security challenges. This is why ODI (2009) support the idea of connection between state security and the society. When such connections are made attainment of human security becomes viable and sustainablefor states.

Adopting human security components for national security is achievable. It shows the steps that go beyond what single state security apparatus can pilot. Suchstepsprovide illumination for people and governments to jointly own their issues and be able to provide joint problem-solving initiatives. It is also a reminder that,the security issuesof societies should be tackled beyondcoercive measures. This thinking is an important plus for human security philosophy as it rests on its ability to serve as an operational tool for security policy formulation and implementation. Irrespective of peoples' status in the society (citizen, non-citizen, minority or majority, migrant, indigenous community,oras displaced person), fundamentally, the goal of human security is to respect the human dignity and their fundamental freedom from want and fear.

Within this study framework, both insurgency attacks and counterinsurgency constitute threats to this human security thinking.As evidence with Nigeria's state centric approach to the Boko Haram insurgency, the associated costs are in no way marginal. There have been direct and indirect political and social costs to the country. The Boko Haram actions have contributed to a reduction ingovernmental stability and have forced Nigerian government toprioritisenon-human dignity enhancing approaches (HRW, 2012). The state security as being pursued by the military against Boko haram insurgency can also be said to have created loss of individual and collective life satisfaction for the population.The process of military operations aside from collateral damages, has led to critical infrastructures being destroyed or damaged to a level that threatens individual and community survivals.

The discussion of the connection between counterinsurgency and human securityin Nigeria further points to three issues of (1) high military causalities, (2) relegation of civilian contributions to a sub optimal level and (3) radicalisation of young people (Abbas, 2011).Adopting human security as a strategy for achievingnational security means conceiving and coping with the presence of informal, local, powers that are normally more trusted than the central power (Menocal, 2011). Adopting such model will equally ensure that the military operations that the state needto achievelegitimacy

become flexible. Rather than reducing the importance of national security this human security approach isto change and move protection narratives towards law and order.

2.5   Understanding Traditional and Asymmetric Warfare

The state's duty to protect is not a passive duty, but a proactive one. To fulfilsuch duty to protect, states will need to use a range of approaches. One of such is the deployment of militaries in form of military operations. Just as other political-military struggles, the fight with insurgents requires determination, and adaptation to thefast-changing circumstances and conditions.Typical adversaries in asymmetric wars have different standards for measuring success. Insurgents win by not losing. Hence, long term survival serves as victory demonstrating the continuing impotence of the regime or occupying power (Dominic, Johnson and Tierney, 2006). Another difference between of symmetric and asymmetric warfare is that the contest between is primarily conducted on a political rather than a physical battlefield. Battle outcome is determined by whether the insurgents or the government ultimately wins the predominant support of the populace. From this flow the need for soldiers in asymmetric warfare and the population to have first-hand collaboration that transcends acquiring intelligence but also to ensure human security, construct confidence through the win of hearts and minds. This situation connects with Clausewitz teaching that "all military strategy is, or should be, fundamentally political" (Paret, 2007).

In the traditional warfare, there are two or more professional armies with roughly the same experience, resources, and technologies. The only real difference is how they execute their strategies. The other name for such wars is symmetrical warfare and that is because both sides essentially look the same. Such scenario has always shaped the understanding of how wars are fought but the scenario is quite different under asymmetric warfare.With asymmetric warfare, the aggressor is not professionally trained to observe laws of war or embrace rules of engagements that minimises casualties. Under such scenario, the traditional military battle plans against fellow conservative army no longer suffice. Such wars are called asymmetric warfare.

Asymmetric warfare, often-fought using guerrilla tactics, aims to harass the enemy more than trying to obliterate them. Insurgents tend to master the use ofguerrilla warfare to wear out the determination state forces. They do this purposely using the

strategies that destroy public utilities through bombings with sole focus to gradually diffuse the morale of the larger army. When insurgents do this, conventional armies of the state often have a very hard time adjusting (Nwolise, 2017). Insurgents have come to master asymmetrical warfare effectively well. The next section provides the different nature of asymmetric warfare.

2.5.1 Types of Warfare

Guerrilla Warfare

In many attempts to conceptualize or define insurgency, a key issue that comes to the front burner is about distinguishing related violence acts such as terrorism, guerrilla or freedom fighter form one another. In this wise, Whittaker (2004) provides some explanation, noting that, compared to terrorist action, there are contrasts in guerrilla or freedom fighters' recourse to violence. As Whittaker explains, terrorists' targets and mostly unarmed innocent people, and the guerrilla goarmed forces and their bases. The freedom fighters push for the liberation oftheir people from repressive regimes, demilitarisation and discontinuance of tight fist leadership. David Whittaker through his book titled *counter-terrorism and human rights* (2004) maintains that guerrilla groups who operate by engaging in 'people's war' usually are committed to a sole objective, targeting established state forces. The world witnessed this in Cuba with Fidel Castro in Cuba, In Argentina with Che Guevara and in Middle Age England with Robin Hood outlawed followers. Guerrilla groups may get admiration but freedom fighters experience the contrast.

Freedom fighters Warfare

Aside terrorists and guerrilla, the freedom fighters are the other appellation of violent actors often misunderstood in association to insurgency. Freedom fighters experience the contrast because their actionsnecessitate regaining something valuable, something highly desired. Bolt (2001) elaborates this commenting that, terrorists unlike freedom fighters are less concerned with acquisition than they are with destruction. Guerrillas are usually quite intelligent in goal by seizing the marginalised peoples resolve and once they receive what they want they are satisfied. What they want may differ in terms of political agenda, liberation, economic opportunities but its acquisition usually halt hostilities as experienced in Mozambique,Nicaragua, Bosnia, and even in Nigeria with the Niger-Delta freedom fighters.

Figure 2.4: Fluidity of insurgency, Guerrilla and terrorism

From the above figure 2.4 on the fluidity of insurgency, guerrilla and terrorism, it becomes obvious there is some overlap of irregular warrior types that are all intrinsically linked. The separating factors of one to the other especially terrorist to others have little to do with the volume of violence but choice of victims and technique of operations. However, whichever classification it may be the violence against unarmed civilians often turn the action into what many consider as act of terrorism (Whittaker, 2004).

2.5.2 Components of Military Operations

Grand Strategy

From the *US Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy,* grand or national strategy is "a country's broadest approach to the pursuit of its national objectives in the international system".Often, such strategy intrinsicallylinks with the components of national power, which are diplomacy, information, military and economy (USDOS, 2003). The grand strategy consists of the following eight (8) characteristics:

(1) Leadership use power to achieve objectives
(2) Understanding the end state
(3) Fitting balance of end state and instruments to achieve it
(4) Put the end state in the middle of governmental objectives
(5) Elaborate blueprint
(6) Ensuring the strategy process is vertical
 (7) Sound knowledge of the strategic environment
(8) Balancing risks that can minimize failure.

Military Doctrines

Ordinarily speaking from an organizational perspective, doctrine means those shared beliefs and principles that define the work of a profession, institute or association. The doctrine serves as codes of what a vocationideally stands for and practices. The education received for specific profession or occupation constitutes what is called doctrine. As a profession, the military equally has its doctrine for operational purposes. The military doctrine however has two flips. The thinking of military when it comes to warfare and the combat action of military, without which doctrine would be incomplete.

For the military, their doctrines in some cases are written and centralized and at times are undocumented or centralised. Such situation at times makes the doctrine of military profession cumbersome.

By definition, military doctrine is considered as an expression of a military institutional belief system that determines the way a military fight, the relationship it will have with the state and the society that sustains it and its institutional structure (Jackson, 2013). It is also thatprocedurethrough which the military values are understood and measured.

Fundamentally, the principles behind doctrines be it military or otherwise are that they consist of; (1)some assumed roles (2), standards of action (3) predetermined modes of action within a given setting. Hippler (2006) howevernotes that, the military as a profession due to special circumstances of the operations they conduct, theybecome subjected to more oversights.

Table 2.9: Classification of Stability and Support Operations

Types Of Military Operations	Offense	Defense	Stability	Support
	Types of Offensive Operations Movement to Contact Attack Exploitation Pursuit **Forms of Manoeuvre** • Envelopment • Turning Movement • Frontal Attack • Penetration • Infiltration	**Types of Defensive Operations** Area Defense Mobile Defense Retrograde	**Types of Stability Operations** • Peace Operations • Foreign Internal Defense • Security Assistance • Humanitarian & Civic Assistance • Support to Insurgencies •Support to CounterDrug Operations • Combatting Insurgency •Non-combatant Evacuation Operations • Arms Control • Show of Force	**Types of Support Operations** •Domestic Support Operations • Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
Types Of Tactical Enabling Operations		• Reconnaissance Operations • Security Operations • Troop Movement • Breach		• River Crossing • Relief in Place • Passage of Lines • Information Operations

Source: US Army (2003)

The oversight is higher for many reasons. Table 2.9 shows that ultimately, the military is a commissioned agency of government that derive all resources from the political system. It is the duty of governments to increase or limit the capacity of military in a country. The soldiers that constitute the military are the direct product of the society. A key part of their function is being called to work under difficult terrains and inexcruciating conditions. This means soldiers or armed forces profession may be called to expend the lives of its own in the name of the government and the society that it represents.

Such situations are compelling on the military to have no choice than to develop doctrines that spell out the how of their duties. Militarily speaking, therefore "d*octrine* is the concise expression of how Army forces contribute to unified action in campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements (US-DOA, 2001). Doctrine facilitates communication, contributes to a shared professional culture, and serves as the basis for curricula in the Army Education System. The military doctrine delivers a universal language of communication for armed forces to conduct their activities.Such doctrines are derived from current government policy, emerging technology, threats history and lessons learnedand types of regime. The military doctrine in turn influences a number of other concepts such ascampaign plans, rules of engagement, training and education and the force structure.

2.5.3.Tenets of Military Operations

This aspect of tenets of military operations deals with the philosophy guiding military operations. Thesephilosophies ofmilitary operations are built around the principles of war. Army tenets describe the elements that would define victory. Such philosophy can be applied to all operations be it stability or support operations and to offensive or defensive operations. Some of the tenets are:

Initiative: Setting or dictating the terms of action throughout the battle or operations.

Agility: The ability to move and adjust quickly and easily. Tactical agility is the ability of a friendly force to react faster than the enemy does

Adaptability:is meeting changing situations with flexibility and initiative.

Flexibility:The ability to avoid dogmatic responses and to be receptive and responsive without losing orientation.

Depth:The extension of operations in time, space, and resources.In all offensives, defensive, stability, and support operations, staying power and depth of action comes from adequate resources.

Synchronization: The arranging of military activities in time and space. Synchronization creates a synergistic effect that affords the commander greater legitimacy, influence, and control.

Versatility: The transition of forces from one type of operation to another, quickly and with minimal changes to the deployed force structure. Competence in various missions and skills allows Army forces versatility.

2.6   Theoretical Framework

2.6.1   Critical hybrid Warfare Theory

Across the global space, the nature of war has not changed much. What has changed significantly ishow wars are fought or the techniques to wage and win wars (Brown, 2011). This idea is further broadened by Lasica (2009) with an explanation that hybrid war is the merging of different methods and theories of war and warfare at different levels of war, in different realms and domains to achieve objectives at all levels of war. Lasica'sarguments about hybrid warslargely focused at the tactical level, and to a lesser degree at the operational level, but not at the strategic level. What the Critical hybrid warriors do is theconversion ofmilitary tactical agilities and enemies' mistakes into strategic effects.Expandingthe importance of critical hybrid warfare theory, Brian Bond says it is about pursuing victory in the face of two related problems faced by warring parties. The first problem is the operational difficulties ofgetting decisive campaigns. The second is the translation of victories into long-term political advantages (Bond, 1996).

2.6.2   Application of the Critical Hybrid Warfare Theory

Metz and Millen (2004) using critical hybrid warfare thinking, mention four broad principles of national security that should definethe strategies, forces, and technology for counterinsurgency. These broad principles fall into the criticalhybrid analysis of counterinsurgency and it is applicable to this study.

2.6.3 Propositions that define Critical Hybrid Warfare inCounterinsurgency

Understanding the Adversary

The successful counterinsurgency is one that understands opposing enemy's strengths, weak points, scope, capabilities and intentions. This is necessary because hybrid warfare theory targets directly the will of the opposing army to fight. Actions taken by hybrid warriors also exhibit the Sun Tzu adage: 'Know thyself and thy enemy and in a hundred battles, you will never be endangered'. In relation to this study, Boko haram insurgents appeared knowing the military much better than the military know themselves. It is also true that Boko Haram know Nigerian armed forces better than the military know them. As Sun Tzu maintains, such scenario only reinforces in a hybrid war Boko Haram insurgents'ability to manipulate Nigerian peoples' psychology.

The proposition applicable to the study is that, military forces must make honest efforts to know themselves and their enemies (Boko Haram). When this happens, they will be in good standing to identify Boko Haram threats and to contemplate effective responses. Where this is not done, or reluctantly done, measures would be expensive and ineffective.

Build State Capacity and Presence

States lacking the political and administrative capacity to govern in police and intelligence will tend towards shortfall if such states face insurgencies.When the nation facing insurgencies is typicallya 'failing state,' like Nigeria, the presence of deteriorating infrastructure will contribute to the growth of insurgent movements in a number of ways including public-safety vacuum, corrupt, lazy, and incompetent policemen.

Control the Population

The population plays an essential role in any insurgency, with the peopleserving as an invaluable resource base, for food, recruits, arms and transmission of political ideologies. Without the consent andactive aid of the people, the guerrilla would be merely a bandit, and could not long survive (Flanagan and Schear 2001).Here, this theory is equally useful in describing and explaining the human security aspects of the Boko Haram warfare. The Boko Haram insurgents using hybrid war dynamics know thecenter of gravity. The Nigeria's military will to fight is their critical vulnerability.

The prolonged battles in northeast Nigeria have tapped critical human and material resources and have strained the Nigeria military's will to fight.

Keep the Use of Force to a Minimum

The proposition advances a critical argument that, basic cardinal tenets of modern counterinsurgency doctrine involve targeting and neutralizing insurgents' infrastructure. Unfortunately, the default position of most states facing insurgency, including Nigeria is to prioritisesearch-and-destroy operations. The killing of the Boko Haram founder, Yusuf in 2009, typifies what happens when keeping the use of force to a minimum has been ignored or suppressed.

Boko Haram insurgents rarely make themselves available for open combat with government troops.Any overreliance on conventional combat power in populated areas easily leads to civilian casualties, the destruction of crops and properties and, in so doing, antagonizes the very population the government is seeking to enlist in its cause.

2.6.4 Limitations of Critical Hybrid Warfare
Beyond the discussion of these four broad principles of critical hybrid warfare, it is noteworthy to emphasise that the propositions from this theory raise few limitations as well:

a) Critical hybrid Warfare is more appropriate for timely intervention before the insurgency mature.
b) The victory or shortfall of military power will always be decided in the political sphere. Unfortunately, the primacy of the political is often forgotten in the heat of a counterinsurgency campaign.
c) This theory rest on troop's ability to persevere and persist.

d) Prevailing over an insurgency requires a threatened government to conduct honest assessments of its own political, economic, military, and social strengths and

e) From the theory, the political battlefield that counterinsurgency operations must seek to dominate is one in which perceptions and beliefs are what matter(Güler, 2012).

f) Military operations are communication activities that cannot be treated as a discrete function within military planning and operations. Simply put, the military must prove both more trustworthy and more credible than their enemy otherwise military operations would not be effective and perhaps fail on arrival. A key thesis that this study explores is that today's warfare has made all military activities to be communication activities.

A key thesis that this study explores is that today's warfare has made all military activities to be communication activities

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1   Research Design

This study as a form of qualitative research adopted a descriptive research design. The objective for undertaking this study coupled with the fact that the study was concerned about events that have happened, which can no longer be manipulated are what makethe studydescriptive.

3.2   Study Area/Location

The study was carried out in North East Region of Nigeria consisting of six states Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. The Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja also constitutes an important study location. The additional choice of FCT was to enable the researcher access policy analysts and decision-making stakeholders in the Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA), National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), National Defence College and other human security experts.As such, alongside the FCT, Maiduguri in Borno state and Yola in Adamawa state both constitute the study area.

3.3   Study Population

The study population consisted of the total number of people directly affected by Boko Haram Insurgency and the Military Operationsin Borno, Adamawa and Yola states.

Table 3.1: Study Population

Population	Estimate
Population in Northeast Region	24.5 Million (2006 census projected to 2014)
Population of People in Affected Boko Haram Areas	15.5 Million (2006 census projected to 2014)
Internally Displaced People in Northeast	1.34 Million

Source: IOM (2015) NEMA (2015)

3.4 Sampled Population

The sampled population was derived from the Nigerian Army personnel, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), leaders in Boko Haram affected communities, Boko Haram members, officials of the National Security Adviser's office (ONSA), National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA), Department of State Security (DSS), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), National Human Rights commission (NHRC), Lake Chad Basin Commission, Civilian Joint Taskforce (CJTF) members, policy analysts and academia including selected humanitarian workers and members of the Civil Society organisations (CSO).

3.4.1 Sample Size

As such, the sample size consisted oftwenty (20) key informant interviews(KII) and thirty-three (33) in-depth interviews (IDI). In total there were fifty-three (53) interview respondents. The interviews were conducted inthree locations namely Yola, Adamawa State, Maiduguri, Borno State and Abuja in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).Five focus group discussion sessions were held with the internally displaced persons, community leaders and the military personnel.The followingdiagram highlights the seven groups of direct and indirect human security stakeholders and security sector personnel that formed the sample size for this study.

Figure 3.1: Graphical Representation of the Sample Size
Source: Field Study

The breakdown of the sample size as identified above included KII respondents from the Office of the National Security Adviser, ONSA (1), Department of State Security, DSS, (2), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, Civilian Joint Task force, CJTF (1), Boko Haram members in military Custody (2 women, 2 men), community leaders (2 in Yola, 2 in Maiduguri), displaced persons (2 men, 3 women), and humanitarian workers (2).Whereas the IDI respondents consisted of Nigerian Army officers (14), which consisted of Chief of Army Staff, battalion commanders, Director, Army Public Relations, commanding officers, and unit commanders. Others included National Human Rights Commission officials (2), Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) personnel (1), National Emergency Management Agency, NEMA, (1), workers from civil society organisations, CSOs (5) and Independent and private security analysts (4) as well as members of the Academia (6).Additionally, five (5) focus group discussions (FGDs) were held with the internally displaced persons (1), commissioned officers in the ranks of Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel. (1), non-commissioned officers in the ranks of Sergeant and Staff Sergeant (1), community leaders in Yola (1) and community leaders in Maiduguri, Borno State.

3.5 SamplingTechnique

Purposive and snowballing techniques were used in selecting interview respondents.The idea behind the choice of the purposive sampling was that the study focused primarily on people and institutions with enormous experience and working knowledge on human security and military operational tactics in insurgencies. The following Table 3.2 further shows the sampling technique breakdown.

Table 3.2 Sampling technique by respondent category

	Category of Respondents	Sampling Technique
1	Humanitarian workers (UNHCR, IOM, UNDP), & Government/Intergovernmental Agency officials Lake Chad Basin commission official	Purposive
2	Boko Haram members	Purposive/Snowballing
3	Leaders of Boko Haram Affected Communities & Internally displaced Persons (IDPs)	Purposive
4	Academia, policy analysts a& Researchers (National War College)	Purposive/Snowballing
5	Nigeria Army Personnel& Civilian joint taskforce (CJTF)	Purposive/ Snowballing
6	CSOs comprising of NGOs, FBOs and CBOs	Purposive
7	Office of the National Security Adviser, NDLEA and DSS	Snowballing

3.6 Methods of Data Collection

The Primary method of data collection included interviews and focus group discussion.What actually informed the selection of these methods was that, the researcher wanted a detailed, qualitative information about the impressions, experiences and opinions of key individuals that have a working experience and information of the military operations and human security components in the counterinsurgency operations in in northeast Nigeria. The focus group discussions were particularly useful inidentifying how the different operational tactics deployed by the military have affected the Boko Haram insurgency, the human security issues that manifested in northeast Nigeria due to the operational tactics deployed by the military and the challenges encountered by the Nigerian military in tackling the Boko Haram Insurgency.The FGDs was also useful bringing to the surface issues that were not obtained through interviews with security operatives and government policy makers. The FGDs group dynamics made respondents bolder in advancing their opinions. Further secondary data were however obtained from books, journals, internet sources and published research works relevant to the subject including the Army's rules of engagement, operational mandates and field reports.

Basically, interviews and focus group discussions were conducted over a period of 11 months in Maiduguri, Abuja and Yola, Nigeria between September 2016 and July 2017. Initially, the interviews and focus groups discussions were concluded within 6 months. However, during theliterature review and when the data analysis stage began a need to conductadditional interviews became evident and this lasted for another four months.

The interviews and the focus group discussions were carried out by the researcher and through the help of a research assistant who also doubled as an interpreter. The interviews were conducted mainly in English but there was the need for an interpreter because there were times respondents spoke in Hausa and Kanuri.However, in instances where the participants expressedthemselves in a language other than English this information was translated by the research assistant and also re-evaluated duringthe transcription stage.

3.6.1Instruments of Data Collection

Specifically, to achieve the desired result in this study, two instruments,interview guide and focus group discussions (FGDs) were used for data collection. For complete understanding of the data generated by the researcher, secondary sources instruments from United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Nigeria watch, Nigeria Army's rules of engagement, International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) reports and statistics were triangulated to corroborate the field data generated by the researcher. The following methodology data matrix provideddetailed information about the questions corresponding with the research instrument and sources of data.

Table 3.3: Research Methodology Data Matrix

Research questions	Methods/ Instrument	Source(s) of Data
What different operational tactics were deployed by the military against Boko Haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria by successive regimes from 2009 - 2015?	IDIs and KIIs	Battalion commanders, commanding officers, ONSA official, DSS personnel, Boko haram members, and policy analysts.
How have different operational tactics deployed by the military impact the Boko Haram insurgency?	IDIs, KIIs, FGDs, and Army field reports.	Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Battalion commanders, DSS personnel CSOs, Boko haram members, policy analysts, Director Army Public relations, (DAPR), Civilian Joint Task force (CJTF), and military public presentations.
What human security issues are manifest in northeast Nigeria due to the operational tactics deployed by the military?	IDIs, KIIs, FGDs and UNHCR and IOM and UNDP documentary review.	Soldiers (Staff Sergeant and Sergeant), IDPs, community leaders, humanitarian workers, NEMA, Human rights Commission, NDLEA and Lake Chad Basin commission officials, including journals, magazines and CSOs reports.
What are the challenges encountered by the Nigerian military in tackling the Boko Haram Insurgency?	IDIs, KIIs, FGDs	Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Battalion commanders, unit commanders, policy analysts, Director Army Public relations, (DAPR), DSS, ONSA official, military paper presentations

The interviews were conducted in semi-structured and structured manner through carefully formulated open-ended questions. Some interviews were conducted in Pidgin English, Hausa and Kanuri through the aid of an interpreter and were later translated and transcribed into English texts through a research assistant.

3.7   Method of Data Analysis

The data collected from the different sources were translated where necessary, transcribed and analysed qualitatively using content analysis approach in accordance with the study objectives.

CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

This section presents the results of the analysis of the responses from the In-depth Interviews (IDI), Key Informant Interviews (KII) and the Focus Group Discussions (FGD)conducted with theNigerian Army personnel, Internally Displaced persons (IDPs), leaders in Boko Haram affected communities, Boko Haram members, officials of the National Security Adviser's office (ONSA), National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Department of State Security (DSS), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), Lake Chad Basin Commission, Civilian Joint Taskforce (CJTF) members, policy analysts and academia including selected humanitarian workers and members of the Civil Society Organisations (CSO).

4.1 Research ObjectiveOne: The different Military Operational tactics deployed against Boko Haram Insurgents in Northeast Nigeria

The responses given to the questions from the KII and focus group discussions were to the significant roles that military tactics and doctrines play in the operational theatre from year 2009 through to 2015. The responses captured how the political leadership of Presidents Musa Yar'Adua andGoodluck Jonathanshaped the different military tactics deployed against the Boko Haram insurgency.

The analysis of the information provided by these data gathered from the field suggested that, the military tactics used within rural environments were different from the once used in urban areas. In rural areas, Attahiru confirmed that the military used area control tactics with sole aim of exposing the Boko Haram members, denying them of support and depriving them of resources (KII with army logistics officer in Abuja on 7 November 2016). Within the urban areas where large population and movement of people are involved, according to Gagariga (a Brig. Gen and former Brigade Commander in the northeast operation), the military mainly used psychological warfare and *cordon & search* tactics.

Through the focus group discussions with commissioned and non-commissioned officers, it was also established thatin both rural and urban areas the military operations involved large-scale sweeping tactics aimed to either capture or neutralise the Boko haram insurgents. Large-scale sweeping tactics however have some disadvantages and one of such drawbackswas the associated collateral damages.In

order for the researcher to understand and comprehend the military tactics used in the operations against Boko Haram,the interview responses from the military personnel in specific terms, mentioned that the following tactics were deployed at different times in the operational theatre: Fire attacks, Force concentration, Night combat, Reconnaissance, Shoot-and-scoot. The focus group discussions with the commissioned and non-commissioned military officers at different two locations in Abuja and Yolafurther enumerated the following tactics as deployed against Boko Haram insurgency: Patrolling, Ambush, Interdiction andSiege.

While answering military tactics related questions, some of the displaced persons and selected community leaders who participated in the focus group discussions could not mention or classify the military tactics in any specific terms.Nonetheless, they mentioned that,the razing of houses and high civilian casualties accompanied some of the tactics used by the militaryin their communities. The displaced persons and selected community leadersfurther commentedthat those military exercises were rather harmful to them than the good those actions were set out to achieve. This led tocommunity members' disappointment with the deployed military tactics. As such, respondents noted that some of their community members became sympathetic to the Boko Haram's course insisting that the insurgents were not as harmful and destructive like the military and that Boko Haram seems to treat them better than the military. This submission by the displaced persons and community leaders gavecredence to Jude Momodu's postulation who also concluded that, "the military tacticsin the northeast gave Boko Haram some freedom of action to come atthe military who seemingly have lost the trust of the people in the northeast communities". -(IDI with a lecturer, ModiboAdama University of technology in Yola on 25 September 2016).

Two in-depth interview respondents, AjaAkpuru-Aja and Kyari Mohammed made further knowledge informed comments on the military tactics used against Boko Haram. Aja-Aja a Directing Staff at the NationalInstitute for Policy and Strategic Studies in his explanation concluded that,"the military tactics under the period were particularly rigid."-(IDIheld in Yola on 27 September 2016). On his part,Kyari Mohammed, the Vice Chancellor of ModiboAdama University of Technology in Yoladescribed the"tactics as overly aggressive".-(IDI on 28 September 2016). Also, during the FDGs, the non-commissioned soldiers concluded that military"tactics were

actually more of enemy-centric targeted at arresting or neutralizing the enemies". (FGDs with non-commissioned officer in Yola on 29 September 2016).

As indicated in the literature review,Ijide (2010) corroborated some of these tactics. Ijide however went a little further linking thesetactics to the military doctrine. The doctrines are important to this study because without the military doctrines which is the universal language of communication for armed forces to conduct their activities, the adopted tactics would be meaningless (Herbst, 2004). This study therefore beyond linking how military doctrines drive military tactics suggested that doctrines do not also stand alone. Evidence from the field suggest that military doctrines are equally derived from and driven by many factors such as, current government policy, national security plan, emerging technology, threats history and lessons learned and types of regime(FGDs with non-commissioned officer in Yola on 29 September 2016). Without proper political objective and direction on the country's national security focus, there will be little understanding of what the military tactics should achieve.

However, once the national security objectives have been established, appropriate military doctrines can be developed toinfluence other processes such as campaign plans, force structure, training and education,rules of engagement and operational tactics. Such conclusion by the respondents importantly add new information to existing literature and the conversation on what influence or sustains military operations in insurgency. This is in agreement with the contributions that scholars like Harrison, 2004; Ijide, 2010; Jackson, 2013 have made. The revelation from the field also pointed to the importance of political direction and well-defined national security plans in order to execute military operations.

Most of the respondents agreed that, the attitudes of successive governments against the Boko haram group certainly influenced the type of military strategies and tactics that the military deployed against the insurgents". -(IDI, with a Brig Gen Usman, on 12 December 2016 at Army Headquarters, Abuja). The political leadership indirectly influence thestrategies to be used and which tactics to be prioritised to achieve the political objective of the day.This study therefore argues that among many other reasons, the way in which the military conduct its operationsis influenced by the nature and styles of existing political leadership.This reasoning is in tandem with Fukuyama, (2007) lines of thought thatthe discussions on military operational tactics

cannot be divorced from the political leadership andtypes of mandates. Thefocus group discussants affirmed how crucial the political leadership:

> the reality shaping insurgency comes from violence methods that have shifted from crude guerrilla warfare to tech-savvy insurgent groups that appropriate modern technologies using information, weapons, and operating covert terror cells to attack the State structures as well as human population. - (FGD with some seniorArmy officers in Abuja on 7 December 2016).

Mike Omeri, former Director General of the National Orientation Agency (NOA) believes "the federal government of Nigeria for years could not identify exactly who the Boko Haram is, what the group want and the effective course of action to mitigate the group's growing influence".- (interview at Abuja, Federal Capital Territory). In the same line of thought with Omeri was Jude Momodu who explained that, "the complete misunderstanding of the Boko Haram threat was a major impediment for government and in turn the military in order to choose appropriate strategy". In the words of Momodu:

> it is only when the 'who' of Boko Haram is known that there can be any desired objective for identification and destruction of such threat. The Boko Haram threat to security is one of many issues in Nigeria requiring attention almost at the same time. Regardless of the threats, Nigerian government must be aware of the potential risks that any adopted strategy will have at the tactical, strategic and diplomatic levels. - (IDI, with a Researcher, 25 September 2016 at Yola, Adamawa State).

Akpuru-Aja expanded the argument on government misunderstanding of Boko Haram insurgency insisting:

> Boko Haram under Presidents Obasanjo, Yar'Adu and Jonathan was taken for granted and at best treated as law and order situation capable of being crushed using coercive power…. Such attitude is not surprising, the Nigeria ruling and governing class has track record of negligence of the safety, well-being and human security of common citizens. The strength of Nigeria elite lies in their capacity to spring united action only when their power and stakes are threatened... When their stakes become threatened, elite in Nigeria put aside hegemony. -(IDI, with a Professor, 27 September 2016 at Yola, Adamawa State).

Some of the people referred to as 'common citizens' by Aja-Aja equally expressed dissatisfaction with the structure of governance in the fight against Boko Haram. A number of internally displaced persons reiterate their disgust narrating that:

> State officials are not concerned about civilian causalities of Boko Haram. Their key concerns appear to be their own safety and the survival of the state. The state serves elite's interests rather than the security and safety of people like us.-(FGD with Internally displaced persons, at Malkohi Camp in Yola, Adamawa State on 24 September 2016).

To these displaced persons, their belief for years was that in dealing with Boko Haram, the government has focused too much on coercive apparatus. They also considered the military feeble, citing the military's inability to protect itself from being over-run by the insurgents as a reason. To indicate security forces feebleness, civilian respondents during focus group discussions explained how Boko Haram attacked and destroyed police stations, barracks and military command formations in some of their communities like Kala-Balge, Monguno, Gwoza, Askira-Uba, Damboa, Chibok, Nganzai, Gubio, Damasak, Konduga, Kukawa and Bama. As such, the submission of the internally displaced people was not different from Kyari Mohammed who earlier in his analysis of Boko Haram violence commented thus:

> Boko Haram stronghold on Nigeria is rooted in the failure and serial mismanagement of the group by the Nigeria State. The failure, in the first place, comes through selfish and un-strategic disposition of elite to reconstruct the underlying issues that created Boko Haram. Governance failure contributed to the breeding of a pool of aggrieved, even hopeless, young men who hold very little or no stake in the state. As far as I know, Boko Haram under Yusuf was an expression of dissent- economic, political or religious as well as survival. -(IDI on 28 September 2016 with the Vice Chancellor, ModiboAdama University of Technology, Yola, Adamawa State).

The state's failure to clearly define and conceptualize the Boko Haram group affected the approaches adopted by successive Nigeria governments and policy makers in dealing with the group. The initial modus operandi of Boko Haram according to Shehu Liberty of the University of Maiduguri indicated that the Boko Haram goal was to discredit and overthrow what they term, the corrupt political and religious order in northern Nigeria. Expanding this further, Kyari Mohammed explains that:

The Boko Haram pugnacious attitude should have been a wakeup call to successive political leadership in Nigeria but that was not the case. In contrast, the Federal Government of Nigeria under the leadership of Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Umaru Musa Yar'Adua had short and long-term misconception of Boko Haram as 'extremely small-scale, isolated insurgency group rather than the unconventional insurgency with potentially long-term effects. -(IDI on 28 September 2016 with the Vice Chancellor, ModiboAdama University of Technology, Yola, Adamawa State)

Emanating from field interviews and focus group discussions, including literature, Nigerian government approaches to engage Boko Haram insurgency have included but not limited to the following:Police Crackdown,Military Actions, Declaration of States of Emergency, Negotiations including dialogue and Engagements of mercenaries

FromRichard Clarke's point of view in thebook, '*Your Government failed you*', building local peoples' capabilities against insurgency has advantages for Government and ultimately work to strengthen military capacity against insurgency (Clarke, 2008). To Clarke,the U.S. strategic planning failed to prepare the US troops for their intervention and occupation of Iraq. The U.S. military forces engagement in Iraq therefore provide an excellent overview of what Nigeria could have done or should have avoided. Although some may argue the two insurgencies are not exactly the same.

There seems not to be any lessons learned by Nigerian government and the military on successes and approaches of other insurgencies existing or that have existed in the world before Boko Haram.The inability to pick lessons from past insurgencies in other environments made the Nigerian governmentpolitical dispositions to Boko Haram non-inclusive. For the military, they did not appear to have adequately prepared the Nigerian troops for the asymmetric warfare tasksthat Boko Haram present (KII with Haliru, a Department of State Security official in Maiduguri on 2 November 2016).To buttress this, Aja-Aja concludes that, the following five elements which are critical to achieving military operational success against insurgentgroups such as the Boko Haram were missing in the Nigerian context.

(a) Failure to have regular Police capabilities to engage insurgent movement;

(b)Lack of inclusive Local governance system that fills the poverty gap;

(c) Inefficient infrastructural services that could make life easier;

(d) Non-effective judicial system that provides and ensures justice and

(e) Lack of rule of law.

The availability of these five elements could have given government the impetus to track the Boko Haram driving ideology, strategy and support base. Identifying the elements of Boko Haram ideology would also have allowed better focus of the military time and resources to achieve desired results of predicting the group.

Isaac Olawale Albert emphasizes how such an approach worksin his contribution titled: *Towards African Panacea to International Insurgency,* byarticulating that:

> African states must work towards evolving a more inclusive political system that would enable groups to become less disenchanted. The state systems in Africa must be seen by all to be just. Importantly, security apparatuses in African states must be strengthened and made more effective in patrolling the African borders. It is only after this that military operations can come to bear (Albert, 2011).

The insights provided by Clarke(2008) and Albert (2011) are basic in demonstrating and determining the expected roles of military in counter-insurgency. Such insight gives premium to identifying and addressing underlying governance deficit in a systemic manner. The approach operates at a level where all government systems, structures and strategies to insurgency coincide and overlap bringing out historical and contextual narratives. Some commissioned officers of the Nigerian Army responding through focus group discussion articulated such thinking insisting that:

> no not matter the kind of military support that Nigeria enjoy in fighting Boko Haram, success depends on government ability to nip in the budthose core social issues driving the insurgency. What this means is that no amount of external support to the Nigerian government, the military or other entities in fighting Boko Haram would work unless government remove or eradicate the underlying grievance and governance deficit.-(FGD with commissioned officers of the Nigerian Army, at Army Headquarters, Abuja, 6 December 2016).

As for whether Boko Haram should be explained using historical or contextual narratives, Comoli (2014) believes understanding government attitudes and approaches to Boko Haram insurgency can be either historical or thematic. The historical can be concerned with the chronological nature of government of Nigeria's

intervention while the thematic, covers body of topics, issues and dynamics of events and situations. However, Kyari Mohammed believes, narrating Boko Haram from historical perspective may be misleading. This is because there were too many interwoven occasions that shaped Boko Haram and in turn, Nigerian government approaches that were outside of historical contexts. The discussions in the study therefore followsKyari's line of thoughts because there were indeed inevitable overlaps in terms of years and themes of Boko Haram events. Whether the analysis is historical or thematic is not an entire issue. Patricia Donli a professor at the University of Maiduguri believes what matters most is that Boko Haram has been contending Nigeria's Government claim to monopoly of force and sovereignty. Patricia Donliexplains this further:

> We should not be carried away looking at historical contexts of Boko Haram and neglect that the Nigeria sovereignty and peoples' human security are what Boko Haram is after. Nigeria's claim to monopoly of force or territorial integrity is contingent on its capacity to serve the common good, otherwise the country stands to be confronted by aggrieved elements in society.-(IDI, with a Professor from University of Maiduguri on 10 August 2016 heldat Ibadan, Oyo State).

Further discussions on how successive national governments' attitudes and approaches from 2009-2015 shaped different military operational tactics against Boko Haram are made in the following sections.

4.1.1 Factorsaffecting effective Military Operations in Boko Haram Insurgency

There are a number of efforts driving effective military operations. The findings from this study showed that the military faced what Ndi called inhibitors to effective military operations. The Nigerian military while engaging the Boko Haram insurgents were confronted with different patterns of attacks as described in Figure 4.1:

Figure 4.1: Some threats in the Operation Lafiya Dole Operational Environment
Source: Field research

The threats from the figure 4.1 are further compounded by what military officers described as low national military capabilities. The military capabilities are linked with: available troops and units, available troops and materials in relation to enemy and size, available tactical air support, state of equipment, arms and ammunition maintenance and logistics supplies support that are available.

The Nigeria national military capabilities in the evaluation of Attaihiru and later some other FGD respondents must involve the types of mandate for the security threats such as, 'find and capture' or 'kill terrorists', neighbouring nations' support available, components of command and control and the rules of engagement (ROE). Notably, the functions of Rules of Engagement are tripartite: to provide guidance for operations, act as operations control mechanism and facilitate operational Planning and Training (FDGs with commissioned soldiers in Abuja on 7 December 2016).

To Ali Keffi, the lists of the determinants of military success in insurgency operating environment were: Existing Civilian and Military relations, State and Non-State Actors involved, cultural orientation of affected population, political governance present and influence and economics drivers and Ideology. Ali Keffi therefore advocates for awareness of both national and local political realities before engaging insurgent groups militarily. Keffi relates Nigerian scenario to the U.S. experience in Iraq highlighting the critical importance, of any military intervention, to face country wide and local realities on ground.

Table 4.1: Comparison Chart of Strategic and Operational Planning options

Basis for Comparison	Strategic Planning	Operational Planning
Period	Long term	Short term
Approach	Extroverted	Introverted
Adjustment	The plan lasts longer	Plan changes per situation
Actors	Top level officers	Middle level officers and rank and file
Outlook	Wide	Narrow
Emphasis	Strategic Vision and Grand commanders' mission	Military operational Planning and implementation of routine activities

Source: Fieldwork compilation

In the Nigerian case, the table 4.1 enumerates Strategic and Operational Planning options that have not been adequately articulated in the fight against Boko haram Insurgency. The Short-term primordial interests and objectives of political leadership overwhelmed the military strategic and operational planning. While on the other hand, the Nigerian Army was not prepared to fight a long war with the Boko haram, hence the institution had no incentives to sustain the battle when Boko Haram persisted.[5]

This meant that Nigeria's national and local political realities have not been determined resulting in what Ali Keffi a brigadier general called costly intelligence gap. Ali Keffi therefore mentioned the need for the protection of civilian population and democratic military control/oversight as essential to drive military operations. Also, coming from FDGs with troops, they identified three core functions: commitment, coordination, and cooperation as needed by the military institution to ensure that their operations yield the desired outcomes. The importance of commitment is that it enables military leaders and soldiers to rely on the credibility of policies and they can calibrate their behaviour accordingly.

Many of the FDGs respondents lamented that within the Nigerian military, consistency over time in leadership has not been achievable. Here is how it was summarised:

> As political circumstances change, military leadership also changes leading to defense policy objectives and directives change. Sometimes this means people and other resources will fail to match. The effect of rapidly changing military leadership negatively affects the incentives to implement previously chosen operational direction. Military operations require commitment devices to ensure their credibility, efficiency and effectiveness. - (FDGs with Nigeria Army non-commissioned officers Yola on 29 September 2016)

To achieve commitment, coordination, and cooperation any level Hamakim a major general in the Nigerian Army says, military operations must be premised on commitment and reliability. Commitments of government and the political class, commitment of military leadership, commitment of troops on ground, commitments of local population commitments of international community, commitments of NGOs

---

[5]Emma (Not the real name) is a Col in the Nigeria army and was a commanding officer in Yobe for some of the operations against Boko Haram insurgency. He spoke to the researcher at the Army HQ in November 2016

and other non-state actors and many other commitments.[6] This is in consonance with Ali Keffi who notes that military operations against the Boko Haram insurgency requires the combination of all national power in forms of economic, political, diplomatic and military. Indirectly, Keffi was pointing to the human security components of the military operations which are critically significant for assessing, planning and delivering effective military operations.

Table 4.2: Three institutional functions of military operations' effectiveness

---

[6]Maj Gen Hamakim si the Director of the Nigerian Army Rescource Centre, Abuja. He spoke to the researcher in an IDI in Abuja in November 2016.

Function	Examples of why these functions matter
Commitment	Political decision makers may want to spend on security for short-term result instead of long-term commitment required by military. Politicians resist continuing security policies that are working in preference to other areas associated with their political group interests.
Coordination	Inconsistency of coordination efforts due to constant political change of military sector leadership like National Security Adviser, Minister of Defense and the likes
Cooperation	Lack of inter and even intra agency cooperation because some security agencies have incentives to free ride or to behave independently by not collaborating with sister agencies. For example, DSS, the military usually undermines working with the police and vice-versa. At other instances, some actors potentially affected by policies may be excluded from the operations, which weakens coordination and leads to fragmentation or mission creep.

Source: Researchers compilation from the fieldwork

Table 4.2 is a summary of the identified institutional functions of the military. In Nigeria, these enumerated functions have not been properly backed up with institutional support capable of enhancing military operations, not to talk of safeguarding lives orthe protection of citizen's long-term human security.

The insight that a failure to coordinate military operational activities can lead to disaster is decades old (Wright, 1983). For military operations to succeed, credible commitment alone is not sufficient. Elements of coordination are also most important. For military operations against Boko Haram insurgents to achieve some positive military outcomes, coordination, cooperation, particularly in relation to local populations' willingness to contribute to public safety and not undermine it. "The extent to which military can ensure human security attainment for all depends on military ability to provide confidence-building measures. Had the human security approach been adopted, Nigeria's military operations would have been more acceptable to the people". -(IDI with Yusuf Mohammed Yusuf, a Professor of Law at the University of Maiduguri, in Maiduguri on 8 July 2017).

Nigeria once perceived as strong partner, both globally and regionally, has seen the fight against Boko Haram exposing the shortcomings of her military. Ali Keffi in an interview insists that the military capabilities such as mobility, firepower, communications and interoperability are the critical elements to the fight against Boko haram and these were below par. In Matuidi's conclusion, Boko Haram experience suggests that Nigeria military needs to undertake an "honest assessment" of its capability and requirements for support in the campaign against Boko Haram insurgency. Aja-Aja adds to the call for military re-evaluation of their approach, suggesting that, the Nigeria military in generally requires deep rethinking of their campaign methodologies. Lt Gen Tukur Buratai, Nigria Chief of Army Staff was honest to explain that:

> If you see challenges faced by Nigerian Army two years before now *(2013-2015),* you will see that our *(Nigerian Army)* responses have been reactive than proactive. At the same time, professionally the Army had gone down. We have not been conducting ourselves professionally the way we should. We have all the books, we have all the training, but unfortunately our professional standing especially in the perspective of the fight against Boko Haram in the north east, where you see our troop losing the initiatives to BHT. Commanders rather than act, allowed the terrorists to continue to exercise freedom of action.

So it is against this background that I was determined that there must be change. -(personal conversation with Nigeria's Army Chief in Yola, Adamawa state on 26 September 2016).

Goan, a soldier who now serves as protection officer in one of the IDPs camps in the northeast says:

> "you cannot compare defensive ECOMOG operations with offensive Boko Haram, operations and despite all the shortcomings and limited resources available to the troops, many soldiers displayed courage, persistence, and determination to defeat Boko Haram. We work with patchy support in terms of personnel, and antiquated equipment but I tell you we were able to hold our head high. -(KII with a Nigerian soldier in Maiduguri, Borno state on 31 October 2016).

Some FGD respondents to the question on Federal Government approach to Boko Haram equally agree that,

> The Federal Government of Nigeria play key roles that drive the military operations against Boko Haram... the campaign against Boko Haram insurgency requires honest a thorough analysis and appraisal of the Nigerian defense and Counterinsurgency framework. -(FGD with Nigerian Army Troops, 2016).

The Crisis Group would rather focus on the state of the military where the Nigerian Military has been labelled as 'military in distress' (Crisis Group, 2016). Several other writers provide some insights of how the decline of Nigeria Armed forces' is traceable to the years of dictatorship in the country. From 1966-1999 Nigerian leadership witnessed six successful coups, two failed attempts and three alleged coup plots (Ademoyega (1981); Siollun (2009; 2013). To these two writers, the many years of military rule witnessed deliberate denial of the military with necessary equipment and weapons because of the fear by military leadership that such could encourage military coup d'état. The Nigerian military invariable can be categorized as self-destruct.

A Nigerian soldier and protection officer in Maiduguri IDPs camp subtly alluded to this thinking. Abu provided explanations on how military equipment were allowed to deteriorate saying:

> Weapons bought under President Sagari regime were carelessly kept under high weather. The weather effects destroyed parts and components resulting in fuel and oil leakages…In fact I can tell you, there is no maintenance regarding arms and ammunition and this led to failure to fire well…In a ridiculous manner, some of the weapons paraded on NTA [Nigeria's national television]

were painted weapons that were refurbished and note necessarily newly bought. No doubt, military infrastructure as far as I am concerned is Zero. When you talk of infrastructure, it was Governor of Yobe in Damaturu that bought Motorola walkie-talkie for my unit. -(KII in Maiduguri, Borno state 31 October 2016).[7]

Evidently, from this study, the years of military administration cultivated Nigeria's many security-governancechallenges. Officers of the Nigerian troop cited how military incursion into governance and politics compromised military professionalism and even eroded military's sincerity. Through coups and counter coups, the Nigerian military eliminated their best of officers with at least 117 military personnel killed during coups, after failed attempts or for allegedly planning takeovers (Siollun 2009; 2013).   Hundreds of soldiers have equally been forcibly retired, particularly from 1985 to 1993 (FGDs with soldiers). To the Crisis Group, each successful or failed coup increased suspicion making heads of state to sometimes deliberately emasculate specific units or services of the military, for example by slashing funds, prohibiting training exercises or deliberately allowing military equipment to deteriorate.[8]

4.1.2   The NigerianGovernment Approaches to Boko Haram

Over the years, successive Governments in Nigeria have confronted regular and irregular human security threats nature that includes acts directed at civilian populations by either government forces or non-state forces and groups. Boko Haram insurgency, the Niger-Delta Militancy, Armed robbery, Kidnapping, Biafra agitation, herdsmen killings are some of non-state actors led violence. Peculiar, but also challenging security threats is that post 1999 conflicts in Nigeria have witnessed evolution in violence and terror traceable to state actors like the police, the DSS and the military. Aja-Aja summarised this saying:

> Beginning with President Obasanjo, from 1999-2007, federal Government of Nigeria faced violence emanating from religious and ethnic division, and electoral violence. Obasanjo's government also contributed to violence through state repression. Two cases that come were massacres in Odi and ZakiBiam in Bayelsa and Benue states respectively. Instructively, Boko Haram before becoming an insurgency equally germinated during Obasanjo's Presidency. -(IDI, with a Professor from

---

[7]Abu (not the real name) is a soldier of the Nigerian army serving in Maiduguri. He made the explanation to the researcher during key informant interview.
[8]"How IBB killed air force, by Agboneni, retired vice marshal", *Daily Sun* (Lagos), 15 December 2003.

NationalInstitute for Strategic Studies, on 27 September 2016 held at Yola, Adamawa State).

Kyari Mohamed extrapolates the federal government disposition to Boko Haram under on President Obasanjo:

> Primarily, there was consensus that Boko Haram presented no real threat to the state. Under Obasanjo's Presidency, the idea in government circle, across political leadership divides and the elite in general was that, Boko Haram was just a passing phenomenon. The elite hoped, somewhat naively, Boko Haram would go away gradually. Sadly, Boko Haram violent trend resonates consistently over the years with greater venom and brutality. -(IDI on 28 September 2016 with the Vice Chancellor, ModiboAdama University of Technology, Yola, Adamawa State).

Apparently, in the early years of the Boko Haram, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) classified Boko Haram's threat as minimal. There was no realistic approach to preventing Nigeria territories from falling into the hands of Boko haram. The Nigeria Police who were in charge of Nigeria's first organized opposition to the Boko Haram insurgents were inadequately prepared or equipped to understand the threats they face. The Nigerian government at the local, state and local levels made little no effort to define a clear mission for Nigeria Police force engagement or provide support that will make the police track the situation. The summary of comments from one of the focus group discussions with Nigerian soldiers indicates that:

> the Nigerian Police force are the first responder to internal security situations but the Federal and state governmentshave over the years been unable to empower the police to face internal security threats squarely in a professional manner. Also even when the military was mandated to intervene,federal and state governments political interest was overbearing and theycould not agree on creating an "oil spot strategy" (concentration of forces into an expanding, secured zone which could have been used for military campaigns to other areas.)with that could have helped create safe zones in multiple locations and which would be gradually expandedto other areas where Boko Haram groups were manifest. -(FGD with commissioned officers of the Nigerian Army, at Army Headquarters, Abuja, 6 December 2016).

Government failures described above by the soldiersare what Kyari Mohammed believedembolden the Boko Haram insurgents to reinsert themselves into previously

cleared areas of Maiduguri and Kannamma, a rural town in Yobe state where the group initial had a base named 'Afghanistan' a symbolic representation of the Taliban that Boko Haram first model. Like KyariMohameed, other scholars (Smith 2016; Walker, 2016 and Comolli 2015) also established that, serial mismanagement of intelligence by security agencies allowed Boko Haram to become a detached but organized entity that was enforcing strict Islamic codes of conduct. FisayoSoyombo, an investigative journalist agreed that government and in turn, the military festered peoples' grievances and therefore made Boko Haram insurgency popular. At some point, even the media venerated the group so much that at a time the group was tagged, the 'Nigerian Taliban.' The Taliban appellation came because Boko Haram had the boldness to put new inscriptions of Taliban on the vehicles they seized or stole from the police whenever they had violent clashes-(IDI on June2017 with a journalist in Abuja Nigeria).

Three major developments were identified as critical paradigms that made Boko Haram obstinate and intractable. (1) The extra judicial killing of Mohamed Yusuf, whose 'rising and rock star profile' was unequalled among insurgents. Comolli (2015) and Walker (2016) both explains how Yusuf's death brought home to many Boko haram loyalists and sympathizers that the Nigerian State either would not or could not assist them in achieving their political goals. (2) The mistake by security agencies, which allowed Yusuf to appoint a successor under their watchful eyes. On this Kyari Muhammed does not agree less:

> …during Yusuf interrogation, he was asked in a video about his second in command and he said Abubakar Shekau. The following day, Yusuf died in police detention under controversial circumstances. As at the time of Mohammed Yusuf's arrest by the military and the handing over to the police authority, there was no clear line of succession in Boko Haram leadership. The moment Yusuf was killed, Boko Haram members were all clear as to whom to follow, Shekau… The saying among Boko Haram members was that, Malam (Yusuf) said it was Shekau and all members fell in line. -(IDI on 28 September 2016 with the Vice Chancellor, ModiboAdama University of Technology, Yola, Adamawa State).

Yusuf's extra judicial killing led to a period of silence for Boko Haram insurgents to regroup and re-strategize. Boko Haram's return in late 2010 announced by the Abubakar Shekau wave, orchestrated attacks seeking either the release of Boko Haram

prisoners or ransom for people kidnapped. How a democratic form of governance gave rise to Boko Haram is central to the escalation of the insurgency (Walker, 2016).

Mohammed Wuyo, who leads the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding activities in northeast Nigeria, explains that the Boko Haram insurgency grew violent in 2007 in response to heavy-handedness of security forces on Boko Haram protesters (IDI, inMaiduguri, Borno State; 9 July 2017). The initial push by the government, coupled with Boko Haram leaders' emphasis on local grievances and relative deprivation resulted to low level of violence directed solely at the state. Comolli (2016) agrees such provided tremendous popular support to the insurgency. A couple of focus group discussants among the community leaders also believe trajectory of uncoordinated intervention made Boko Haram to grow. The FGN uncoordinated intervention and perhaps serial mismanagement of intelligence is central to the understanding of the turning point in Boko Haram violence. This leads us to (3), which was the military forces attitudes, thatKyari Mohamed described as probably the most unfortunate dimension of Boko Haram evolution:

> the military attitude of 'killing anything on the street tactics' which was the case in many communities where Boko Haram were prominent, especially during the earlier days of the insurgency. The unleashing of indiscriminate violence on those communities by the military immediately backfired resulting in the loss of hearts and minds. This effect of psychology of war became apparent on the military. Boko Haram slaughters men in uniform and soldiers started killing everyone on the streets. These are soldiers, not criminals and Boko Haram is not their teachers.-(IDI on 28 September 2016 with the Vice Chancellor, ModiboAdama University of Technology, Yola, Adamawa State).

Mike Omeri added that a key challenge that limited government early tracking of Boko Haram violence was the sudden death of former President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua in 2009. The death of Yar'Adualed to the emergence of a southern Christian, Goodluck Jonathan as President (IDI on 17 July 2017 with the former DG, National orientation Agency, Abuja Nigeria). To Akpuru-Aja, a former Directing Staff at the National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), the result of President Jonathan emergence was Governments policy redirection, which moved from the 7-Point Agenda to Transformation Agenda and the Transformation Agenda itself became compromised evidently resulting in corruption of security governance

and the politicization of the insurgency. -(IDI with a Professor from the National Institute for Strategic Studies held in Yola, Adamawa State on 27 September 2016).

The government initial approach to Boko Haram was anything but inclusive and robust. The approach was antithetical to Abubakar's 2014 postulation on the application of comprehensive approach mechanism for internal military operations in Nigeria. Effective management of internal security operations, in Abubakar's comprehensive debate involves coordinated planning and execution with different governmental stakeholders and support groups (Abubakar, 2014). Gagariga, a Brig Gen and a former Brigade Commander for the Nigerian Army operations in northeast alluded to the concept of comprehensive internal military operations. Gagariga however expanded the elements of comprehensive internal military operations saying 'the correct and appropriate mix is essential to success though very difficult to achieve.'- (IDI with a Brigadier General, held in Abuja on 8 December, 2016).

The elements of the comprehensive internal military operations mix as mentioned by Gagariga include the diplomatic instrument, the economic instrument, and the military instrument. Thispoint was tagged 'elements of national power' by Ali Keffianother former Brigade Commander for the Nigerian Army operation in northeast. Keffi explains that:

> Military operations or war is a venture. A venture that requires all elements of national power; economic, political and diplomatic. The flow of military operations thus streams from the highest office of Commander in Chief…. Using national resources in piecemeal cannot work. Groups like Boko Haram require shuttle diplomacy just like President Buhari did to Niger, Chad and Cameroun. Such action is necessary to deny Boko Haram access to resources and space so that it becomes difficult for them to use trans-border strategy to hit Nigerian communities... If you train and equip the military with everything and do not address such diplomatic shortfall, or other elements of our national power, Boko Haram would remain a threat.-(IDI with a Brigadier General, held in Abuja on 6 December, 2016).

Ensuring these elements work and mix appropriately has been difficult for the Nigerian government. Structures and systems have not synchronised in responding to Boko Haram. Ndi, a former commanding officer of the Nigerian Army in Gwoza asked the researcher rhetorically that, 'how can the FGN develop sound approach to Boko Haram threat when they have failed to come to terms with Boko Haram reality?

(Interview at Maiduguri,31 October 2016). The rhetorical question by the former commanding officer was presented to another respondent (Aja-Aja). In his words:

> What is responsible for Nigeria not being in tune with Boko Haram is the failure to use thorough intelligence to cultivate a valid dossier in terms of the Boko Haram inside dealings. This is symptomatic of the incompetence of the Nigerian state structures. Nigeria has history of struggling with capacity challenge of security and intelligence institutions. There is also huge trust deficit and near collapse of institutions while poverty of politics persists in Nigeria.-(IDI with Prof. Aja-Aja, a Director at Nigerian institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, held in Yola on 27 September, 2016).

To Ndi, Boko Haram is a franchise consisting several tendencies, some political, others economic, while some, if not all retain the religious elements. Fighting insurgency to him is multifaceted but has not been approached that way in Nigeria. The government near total reliance on military options in fighting Boko Haram has not only been controversial, it has been imprecise and ineffective. Further evidence from the research field interactions suggest that, in Boko Haram insurgency, the end state of the military instrument should be the creation of a green space in order to allow building of societal fabrics that necessitate the insurgency in the first place.

Like United States' initial failure in Iraq, Nigeria's approach to Boko Haram insurgency equally ignored or underrated most of the underlying societal and cultural considerations and grievances (Cordesman, 2006). Borrowing from Maslow's famous hierarchy of human needs: basic needs, safety and security, social belonging, ego, self-esteem and self-actualization, these were priorities ignored but essential to the fight against insurgency. Thus, to overcome Boko Haram insurgency, Fatima Kyari-Mohammed, former ECOWAS adviser concludes the Federal Government of Nigeria must provide for human security and economic opportunity devoid of state exploitation, despotism and or repression (IDI with an ECOWAS commission adviser, held in Yola on 28 September 2016).

The Federal Government's management of Boko Haram was the primary focus of this section, which interrogated the different mandates or strategies adopted by the country which culminated into military operations. To this end, Ogunlade, a former Brigade Commander for the Nigerian Army operations in northeast recounts that from around 2001, the Federal Government of Nigeria's mandate in the fight against Boko Haram

comes in different forms and approaches. These approaches range from counterinsurgency to counter-terrorism, from enemy-centric to population-centric warfare and from extensive use of air strikes to a commitment of more troops on the ground (IDI with a Brigadier General, held in Abuja on 10 December, 2016).

The trend from this study is that prior to 2009, the military had been involved with countering Boko Haram Insurgency. Virginia Comoli corroborated this timeline of military intervention noting that, there was military deployment to Yobe on 2003 Christmas Eve. The military deployment was a joint police-military effort and the aim was to dislodge the Boko Haram. The 2003 operations lasted until early 2004 when joint police-military effort pursued Boko Haram insurgents to Mandara Mountains in Nigeria-Cameroun border (Comoli, 2015). Kyari Mohammed also alluded to the year 2002/2003 as possible first period of military involvement with the Boko haram group but was quick to add that the government mentality and those of military leadership at this early period was that, once Boko Haram insurgents were chased out of Nigeria, the group no longer constituted security problems. This mentality and approach erased any hope, beyond the year 2003, for realistic long-term planning against the insurgents.

While the scope of this study does not cover 2002 or 2003, the period was significant. as the foundation of military involvement with Boko haram. The scope of this study is 2009-2015 because it was in 2009 that the infamous battle of Maiduguri between Yusuf led Boko Haram and the Nigerian security forces broke out. Discussing the battle of Maiduguri in details is also beyond the scope of this study but the following background of the accounts will help our understanding of Nigeria military operations within Boko Haram context.

4.1 Research Objective Two: How different military operational tactics impacted the Boko Haram Insurgency

Typically, the Nigerian military comprises of the Army, Navy and Air Force. These three separate forces have the primary mandate of defending the territorial integrity of the nation. However, for this research, conceptually, the term military referred to the Nigerian Army and their operations against Boko Haram insurgency. The discussions and analysis on the Nigerian military tactics against Boko Haram will be incomplete

without the understanding of Nigerian Armed Forces structure, which in turn defines its capabilities and force of action.

4.2.1 The Nigeria Armed Forces Structure as Tactical Force of Action

The military of most countries is the symbol through which their national power is projected. Usually, the creation of military force exists along environmental and functional lines for the Defence of territorial integrity and projection of national interests. The military force of Nigeria as empowered under Section 217 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria comprise the Nigerian Army (NA), Nigerian Navy (NN) and the Nigerian Air Force (NAF). Of these three, the Nigerian Army, which is the oldest and largest, is saddled with the responsibility of conducting ground battles in favour of Nigeria.

Since Boko Haram phenomenon emerged in Nigeria, the Nigerian Army has been the primary instrument in the country's fight against the insurgency.Komolafe mentions how "the involvement of Nigerian military with the Boko Haram insurgency indicates that Boko Haram violence has become greater than what the Nigeria Police force and other civil security actors can handle. He explains, the involvement of Nigerian military means the Federal Government over the years feel the police force is no longer capable of dealingwith violence in ways that can endanger public confidence (KII with the Director of policy and Plans at Army Headquarters Abuja on 7 December 2016).

Since Nigeria's military operations against Boko Haram insurgents have been Nigerian Army driven, it is therefore natural that the study of the military operations provides some understanding of the Nigerian Army structure of command as well as Nigeria's national defence priorities, which focuses on the preservation of the safety of Nigerians at home and abroad the protection of the sovereignty of the country and the integrity of itsassets.

Figure 4.2: Representation of Nigeria's National Defence Focus
Source: Nigeria's National Defence Policy (2006)

Figure 4.2 shows the focus of Nigeria's national defence as enshrined in the 1999 constitution of the country.The policy document further argues that National Defence is a vital interest which all nations including Nigeria seek toachieve. Nigeria's Defence Policy arose from the need to provide a frame work that will ensure the protection of theterritorial integrity of Nigeria within its internationally agreedboundaries. This imperative coupled with the security challenges confronting the nation made the need to operationalize the policy. Consequently, operationally wise, the Nigerian Army'sframework works to articulate the country's national defence. To achieve this, the Nigerian Army is premised on various combat divisions and a brigade of guards. The combat divisions are sited and organized to among other considerations, provide effective command and control of the formations and units within their command, simplify the logistic support requirements and to make the best use of resources available from the other two Services (Navy and Air force) in joint operations (FGDs with soldiers Abuja, June 2017).

Figure 4.3: Selected Formations and Units in Op Lafiya Dole
Source: Fieldwork

Figure 4.3 highlights some formations and units in Op Lafiya Dole.[9] However these formations and units do not stand alone. The have been derived from the Nigerian Army Order of Battle. The researcher was able to have an overview of the Nigerian Army 2010 Order of Battle (ORBAT) which is document comprising the extant force structure of the Nigerian Army. The ORBAT typically consolidates the combat division's structure but for national security purposes such a sensitive document would not be discussed further in this analysis. Military discussants agreed that the 2010 ORBAT design was to enable the Army achieve its assigned roles, as a principal component of the Nigerian Armed Forces. The groupings of the Nigerian Army include infantry, armour, artillery, mortars, Special Forces Teams and Combat Forces (FGDs with soldiers Abuja, December 2016).

4.2.2 Nigerian Army's Understanding of their Operations against Boko Haram

There was this need to know the extent at which the soldiers truly understand their operations against Boko haram. As such questions were asked from senior and junior military officers regarding this. Hence, describing the term military operations, Nyam, a Brigadier General and the Army Director of training explains that, in generic terms military operations are actions or activities of military by use of kinetic force and the fundamental goal in any counterinsurgency operation must be to gain the allegiance of the population to the government.

Ali Keffi, another brigadier general believes that, the concept of 'military operations'is subsumed under counterinsurgency and encompasses all elements of national power and resources. The numerous areas of national power are military, economic, social, political and diplomatic. These powers, Brig Gen Ali Keffi submitted are to be utilized continuously to be efficient. In his words:

> The combine articulation of national powers has positive advantages lacking for most part of Nigeria's early fight against Boko Haram insurgency. To a remarkable extent, Nigeria for many years did not diplomatically engage with Lake Chad Basin Countries on the issue of Boko Haram. Nigeria's lack of diplomatic initiatives encouraged LCBCs to view Boko Haram as Nigeria's problem for years until the spill over effect got to Cameroun, Niger and Chad. Underpinning this diplomatic failure from Nigeria and LCBCs is the critical lesson that

---

[9]Op Lafiyadole, which literarily means 'Peace by all means') is the code name for the on-going military operations against Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria northeast.

increasing military power against terrorist requires mutual mix of political, social, economic and diplomatic aspects.-(IDI with a former brigade Commander, Nigerian Army at the Army Headquarters Abuja on 6 December 2016).

Soldiers and senior military officers in two other focus group discussions corroborated Ali-Keffi's argument mentioning that, for months and some even argued that for years there were little progress made in combating Boko Haram. There were some reasons deduced for this by senior military officers who participated in on of the focus group discussions. A unanimous answer was that, the political leadership committed tactical diplomatic errors where initially there was little to no cooperation/collaboration with the Lake Chad Basin Countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroun. Such blunder created safe spaces for Boko Haram insurgents to hide and also launch attacks at the military and the population (FGDs with commissioned soldiers of the Nigerian Army in Abuja on 7 December 2016).

Other FGD respondents agreed that, the range and diversity of elements contributing to military operations particularly against insurgency are numerous.One officer noted that, 'the fight against Boko Haram is not just all about sound security sector but also points tothe need for effective legislation and justice system'. Emanating from the discussion was that military operations come under comprehensive security governance where one area does not stand alone in comparison to the other. Mohammed Abubakar, is an advocate of 'the comprehensive approach concept (CAC) to internal security operations[10]. In referring to the CAC, Abubakar concludes that, CAC application to Nigeria internal security operations involves the collective participation of different instruments of government. Abubakar even proposed a legal framework in form of national act of parliament to back his comprehensive approach concept. One soldier from the Nigerian military shares such belief saying, ultimately, the Nigeria military needs to demonstratethe use of comprehensive approach concept where human security interests should supersede political or economic considerations. -(FGDs with soldiers Abuja, December 2016).

Within the context of CAC, a functional judicial system is equally important but in reality, judicial responsibility is most lacking in Nigeria. Patricia Donli on her part submits that, military and policedo not stand alone or as sufficient to remove Boko

---

[10]Mohammed Abubakar is a Major General in the Nigerian Army and a former GOC, 2 mechanized Division, of the Army. He is the author of Abubakar (2013)

Haram's influence (IDI with a lecturer at the University of Maiduguri in Ibadan on 10August 2016).

There are some benefits that a comprehensive approach concept (CAC) to internal security offers. The CAC could have weakened activities that Boko Haram depends upon but Nigeria seemingly have littlemechanisms to help insulate, investigative and adjudicative insurgency cases. Ralph explained to the researcher that:

> Hundreds of Boko Haram cases are pending in courts across the country with no hope in sight for the accused. …Justice can enhance popular support but the failure of judicial system to isolate Boko Haram through justice has destroyed people's confidence that their interests will be advanced and protected. If the judiciary has failed or is failing, what alternative efforts are there to bolster the legitimacy of the state and discredit Boko haram? -(KII with a State Security official inYola, Adamawa state on28 September 2016).[11]

Argument like these exist about how to enhance strong military operations. There is the need for stronger coordination or what Akpuru-Aja calls, a unified and tightly process between executive, legislature and the judiciary to respond to Boko Haram. This must become Nigeria's priority, though it has proven difficult to achieve in Boko Haram insurgency case. Gagariga believes the solution lies in military communication and information campaigns. There must be deliberate and conscious effort by the custodians of military operations to be able to combine their communication and information systems in ways that synchronize This argument leads us to the discussion on the military media engagement strategy and the Boko Haram Insurgency.

4.2.3   *Military media Engagement Strategy and the Boko Haram Insurgency*

This section is important to the study because of the linkage of the military media strategy to the critical hybrid warfare theory. The need to understand official and non-official information sharing within the operational environment is critical to military operations. For the purpose of this section, the term people is so important and connotes all civilians and non-civilians within the operational environment under the military influence whose activities and opinions may obstruct the military mission.

---

[11] Ralph (not real name) preferred to be anonymous. He is one of the DSS lawyers trying suspected BHT detainees in the northeast. He spoke to the researcher as a key informant in Yola, Adamawa State in September 2016.

Ahmed Sajoh, Adamawa's State commissioner for information and Mike Omeri, former DG of the National Orientation Agency both shared that, Nigerian military needed to be more conversant with visual and audible signals that include graffiti, posters, signs and videos.Such falls under the information and psychological operations which are helpful to discredit or validate insurgents' actions (Interviews in Yola and Abuja respectively). The theme on military media is worth discussing further because most of the counterinsurgency or military operations literature consulted connect in explicit manner the correlation between strategic communication and military operations. These discussions range from elements of information and psychological operations to the use of propaganda.

This study adding to the existing ones implies that military operations' strategic communication, when correctlydone, can deliver support for population and reduce support for Boko Haram insurgency. This also aligns with the study's theoretical framework, Critical Hybrid warfare theorywhich suggests communication and information movement act as likely force multiplier for controlling Boko haram insurgency.Nonetheless, for Critical Hybrid warfare to enhance military operations as conceived in this study, the following factors must be in place:

- Strategic communication and themes must be in tune with overall country's counterinsurgency approach.
- Strategic communication cannot work in environment where forces create unattainable expectations.
- Strategic communication messages must be well coordinated across all involved   government agencies.
- Strategic communication must aim at maintaining unity of efforts and command.
- Strategic communication, military operations and government actions must be consistent (i.e keeping of promises).
- Strategic Military operations must manage expectations and help maintain military credibility with populations in operational environment.

From the strategic communication angle, the political leadership and the military for longer time were unable to provided assuring messages to populations in northeast. The situation led to the lack of synergy between government and military forces

expectations which also contributed to reinforcing the people's sympathy for the insurgents. Lack of cooperation hampered intelligence collection and delegitimize the government. In the contrast, the Boko Haram maximized the importance of strategic communication to engage the nationaland global audience. The insurgents'advantageattempted to influence local and global opinion by sending video messages through international mainstream media (Albert, 2017).

Gagariga agrees there exist the need for strategic communication. For the military, strategic communication must target at leasttwo primary audiences. The first is the local population who are not yet sympathetic to the Boko Haram cause. The second audience are the insurgents or their supporters who may not be so committed to the cause as their leaders. Since a major goal of most insurgencies and Boko haram inclusive is to influence public opinion against established government, successful military operations should work to also influence public opinion to the benefit of the military forces. The following matrix shows how the military strategic communication should have functionedagainst Boko Haram.

Figure 4.4: Military Strategic Communication framework against Boko Haram insurgents
Source: Researcher's compilation from Fieldwork

This figure 4.4 titled, Strategic Military Communication framework against Boko Haram insurgency showed the interconnectedness of different elements that make effective military media campaign. Ogunlade noted that, for military strategic communication described above to work, three peculiar situations must shape Nigeria's drive against Boko Haram insurgency:

> It is important to note that the military operations and in turn strategic military communication are not done in isolation. The military operates with the mandates from the state. In turn, the following three situations had significant impact onour work as military. The first was the Nigeria's quest for nation Building, the second involved the political expediencies of overcoming Boko Haram negative effects and third was the negative international attention that Boko Haram had given the country. These three situations amounted to subtle pressure on the military operations against Boko Haram.-(KII with a former Brigade Commander of the Nigerian Army in the Northeast at the National Defense College, Abuja on 10 December 2016).

There are many scholarly conclusions that winning of heart and mind is what strategic military communication aim to achieve. To Usman, the strategic military communication is to provide appropriate information on Nigerian Army operations and to inform different categories of audience.[12] Such audience Gagariga notes are categorized into 1) wider audience (the population within Nigeria) and 2) global audience (population outside of Nigeria) to influence their support. Usman explained further that 'the military media team works with National Orientation Agency (NOA), the ministry of information to ensure proper understanding of the Army operations against Boko Haram Insurgency in northeast Nigeria.'

The intended outcomes of military media engagement include building confidence of the local population, providing grounds for support to the Military and Federal Government of Nigeria. When these happen, there would be sense of security. Gagariga is quick to caution that military media engagement may either create positive or negative outcome. The likely negative outcome could be excessive use of military force that can lead to sympathy or empathy by the local population for Boko haram insurgency.

---

[12]Col S.K. Usman, now a Brig Gen S.K Usman was the Director of Army Public Relations, he spoke to the researcher in Abuja.

Usman expresses the believe that in respect to theBoko Haram foot soldiers, the less committed, the military media objective was targeted at encouraging defection by offering promise of no victimisation to those who defect from the insurgency. Usman argument corroborates Stephen Hosmer submission of what is most important to military information campaigns. Hosmer proposed that military information will be most effective when the messages are consistent with the conduct of other military operations (Hosmer, 1996).

4.2.4How Government mandates from 2009-2015 affected military Tactics

The answers to this question were derived from the chronicle of successive government approaches and mandates from 2009-2015. These approaches influenced the military effectiveness in a number of ways.

Military Operations and human security issues under President Umar Musa Yar'Adua
Segun Adeniyi, the former spokesperson for late President Yar'Adua explains the circumstances that brought his principal to power saying that the underlying factor in the election that brought Yar'Adua among other things was to pacify the South-South people of the Niger Delta. That was why Jonathan Goodluck, from Niger Delta minority group was nominated as Yar'Adua's deputy. This political move and subsequent election of Yar'Adua-Jonathan presidency succeeded in the reduction of hostility in Niger Delta especially following the introduction of the Niger Delta amnesty program (Adeniyi, 2012).

Nevertheless, that Yar'Adua came from the north, the political situation was insufficient to arrest the brewing Boko Haram insurgency. By 2009, two years into Yar'Adua-Jonathan presidency Boko Haram had become a serious human security menace. Hentz and Solomon (2017) provide narration of events that defined 2009 as the year of Boko Haram growing violence. Comolli, tagged the period the 'Battle of Maiduguri' that took place from June 11- July 30, 2009 as significant. As the Battle of Maiduguri rages, on July 26 about 60 Boko Haram insurgents attacked Dutsen Police post in Bauchi killing about 50 people. The following day of July 27, the Boko Haram insurgents' attacks had spread to Borno, Kano, Yobe and Kastina producing over 100 causalities in attacks aimed at police stations and government buildings (Comolli, 2015). The motive behind the coordinated attacks was for Boko Haram insurgents to free their members held in various prisons across the northern states.

Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria, June-August 2009

As established, the initial battle of Maiduguri occurred under the Presidency of late Umoru Musa Yar'Adua. In his assessment,Gambo Matuidi of ModiboAdama University of Technology, Yola, recounts that, by the time President Yar'Adua gained leadership of Nigeria from Olusegun Obasanjo, some degree of local economy of the north was already suffering significantly due to increasing Boko Haram attacks. Matuidi during an interview explained the situation further:

> On Yar'Adua's assumption of office, FGN policies such as temporary border closures to stem movement of Boko Haram insurgents have had negative impact on commercial activities across Nigerian borders with neighbouring countries. Free flow of goods across states to the north were also been curtailed in the name of security. This disruption in economic activities brought about by Boko Haram insurgency made the northeast population accustomed to the frequency of Boko Haram action. In turn, the will at which the insurgency manifests grew, in all likelihood, in the hopes of achieving their political aims.-(IDI with a Lecturer at MadiboAdama University of technology, held in Yola on 26 September 2016).

Malgwi, an Internally Displaced Person from Biu in Borno State supports this claim. Malgwi pointed out that, in communities across Maiduguri and its environs where he once lived before his displacement Boko Haram had become an 'accepted fact of their everyday life for the people. Matuidi's earlier narration underscores the Boko Haram dominant rhetoric as likely reason for such acceptance of fate by Malgwi and his people. The aspect of dominant rhetoric is an area that Boko Haram insurgents have proven to be ahead of the Nigerian state. Such dominant discourse manifests in propaganda, hate speeches and micro-economic empowerment and this won Boko Haram many foot soldiers and sympathizers.

For many reasons, the Nigerian state could not match Boko Haram rhetoric. The discussions on the issues of rhetoric are in another section of this report with the title, Boko Haram and Nigeria Military media strategy. However, Segun Adeniyi, explains why the Nigeria state and the elite failed to match up with Boko Haram in rhetoric. 'Even in the face of failing approaches, the rigidity and selfishness of people in power

and politics of Nigeria make it difficult for them to exploit alternate ways of handling the war against Boko Haram(Adeniyi, 2002).

Certainly, the voices of disconnected local communities from northern Nigeria were inaudible enough to warrant government close attention. Feelings of discontent, growing inequality, lack of political representation and general disenfranchisement produced sentiments leading to people's aloofness and sense of solidarity with Boko Haram (Walker, 2016). The feeling of discontent and growing inequality Kyari Mohammed describes as a 'convenient platform for former Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf to use his charismatic leadership as influence that produced significant Boko Haram foot soldiers ready to pursue survival through violence and even unto death'.-(IDI with the Vice Chancellor, ModibboAdama University of Technology, held in Yola on 28 September 2016).

Figure 4.5: Regional Incidence of Poverty by Geopolitical zones in Nigeria
Source: NBS (2010)[13]

---

[13]NBS (2010) Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010

4.2.5 President Yar'aduaapproaches to Boko Haram

President Umaru Yar'Adua, who succeeded Obasanjo in May 2007, highlighted a seven-point agenda[14] to tackle the country's problems. Apkuru-Aja expressed that, President Yar'adua's security focus was on the Niger Delta. The need to turn around the military was not in any way a priority[15]. Being terminally ill, before his demise in May 2010, President, Yar'Adua was not equally in good position to provide the necessary leadership for security governance (IDI with a Director at Nigerian institute for Strategic Studies, held in Yola on 27 September 2016).

The researcher's analysis of Yar'AduaPresidency's attitudes to Boko haram insurgency indicates thatthe approach was more of 'a crush them approach'. The demonstration of President Yar'Adua's crush them approach surfaced in the wake of the battle of Maiduguri between security forces and Boko Haram. Yar'Adua as Head of the Federal Government of Nigeria gave a directing order that security forces spare no effort in' identifying, arresting and prosecuting leaders and members of the 'extremist sect'[16] involved in the attacks[17]. What followed this Presidential order was the deployment of Nigerian Army 3 Armoured Division in Jos to Maiduguri to 'crush' Boko Haram headquarters. A military commander[18] said, specific goals of the military after the Presidential order was to regain full and total control of Maiduguri, Potiskum, KasuwanShanu towns that Boko Haram had taken since 26 July 2009 uprising.

---

[14] Seven point agenda
[15] (IDI, with Aja-Ajain Yola 2016)
[16] Under Yar-adua, the name Boko haram is equally instructive of how the FGN saw the insurgency. Boko Haram was refered to as 'extremist sect' by the government
[17] reference
[18] who preferred to be anonymous

Figure 4.6: Boko Haram vs Military Attacks, July 25-29 2009
Source: Compiled by the Researcher from the Nigeria Watch Data[19]

---

[19]Nigeria watch http://nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=11662&rang=1)

The above figure 4.6 indicated that in five days either Boko Haram or security forces killed at least 802 people. The figure tallies with Comoli accounts of the same period where, she described that, Maiduguri battle resulted in the death of over 800 Boko Haram members including their alleged financiers BujiFoi, and Baba Fugu Mohammed. While Comoli documented for three days the figure from above comes from events of five days which consistedof people killed by Boko Haram and security forces. What is certain however was that within this period, Yusuf Mohammed, the Boko Haram leader was arrested alongside his lieutenant, Abubakar Shekau.

Shekau was said to have been helped to escape from the prison by some prison officials. Shekau's escape underscores the complicity of security forces and intelligence in Boko Haram case. Ultimately, Yar'Adua's Presidential orders paved the way for the military intervention that led to Mohammed Yusuf's arrest. Yusuf's arrest was a joint collaboration of police and the military. Shortly after the military debriefed him, Yusuf was handed to the Police and the following is the paraphrased transcript[20]of Muhammad Yusuf's interrogation by the military prior to his death.

Interrogator: Security agencies came to your compound a day before. There were lots of animals and items for making improvised devices. Why do you have those items?

Yusuf: Its for my protection

Interrogator: (Cuts in)…why are you protecting self when we have security people in the country?

Yusuf: But these are they same people after my life and that of my people…

Interrogator: What's your offence?

Yusuf: Do I know? … I am just and Islam evangelist.

Interrogator: But I am also a Muslim…

Yusuf: You should tell me why you have not accepeted my type of islam

Interrogator: What makes Boko a Haram (sinful)?

Yusuf: So you don't know it is Haram?

Interrogator: Why?

Yusuf: Plenty reasons…

Interrogator: The cloth wear? …

---

[20]https://naijainfoman.wordpress.com/2011/12/11/transcript-of-muhammad-yusuf-interrogation-before-he-was-summarily-executed-by-members-of-the-nigeria-police/

Yusuf: (cuts in) …it is pure cotton and cotton belongs to Allah

Interrogator: But Allah said in the Qur'an 'iqra' (read), that people should seek knowledge…

Yusuf: Very true however it is not the knowledge that go against Islam. Any knowledge that go against the one in Islam is not acceptable and banned by the Almighty… witchcraft or magical power is knowledge, but abominable to Allah…

Interrogator: What about those hardware and laptops including medical equipment we saw in your place, are those not product of knowledge?

Yusuf: Just technological things, not Boko at all…you must know that westernization is different.

Interrogator: You look healthy because you eat balance diet. You have state of the earth vehicles and put on good cloths but you force people you lead to sell their belongings and survive on water?

Yusuf: Never! Those people live to their income. Are you not different yourself? If you can afford good cars, drive it. Those living with needs have no means of survival.

Interrogator: Tell us why you left your mosque and apartment?

Yusuf: It was because the military went and shot people there...

Interrogator: You also encourage your people to stay and die there?

Yusuf: Those were not my people. My people had run away from.

Interrogator: People have been fighting for you…Tell us places your disciples are?

Yusuf: But you have pursued all of them out already.

Interrogator: We are not talking of Maiduguri alone…

Yusuf: Of course they were in Bauchi and police pushed them out. In Gombe same thing, the police attacked them at home and scattered them. Everywhere they have been, Yola, Jalingo Police continued to pursue and push them to the streets. When they were chased out of all those places they had no place to go but to come to Maiduguri.

Interrogator: You have some injuries in the hand. How did that happen?

Yusuf: I stumbled

Interrogator: Where? (Maiduguri), Tell us about your commands?

Yusuf: The headquarters is right here.

Interrogator: What about other branches?

Yusuf: Gwange, Bulunkutu…

Interrogator: Where they intercepted weapons the other day, right?

Yusuf: (Laughs) Intercepted weapons?

Interrogator: Who is your second in command? People said you have your own army

Yusuf: That is not true…

Interrogator: Do you have a second in command, who lead when you are not around?

Yusuf: I have…

Interrogator: What is his name?

Yusuf: Malam Abubakar Shakau

Interrogator: Where is he now?

Yusuf: No idea.

Interrogator: Tell us other people who escaped with you?

Yusuf: I did not run with anybody

Interrogator: Who are your sponsors, here at home or abroad?

Yusuf: No body

Interrogator: No, tell us the truth…

Yusuf: Insha Allah, I won´t lie to you…

Interrogator: You have a farm around Benishek?

Yusuf: yes

Interrogator: You have allowed us kill innocent people, what will you say on this?

Yusuf: That is your own cross to carry. Every one you have killed is on you...

Interrogator: How about people murdered by your followers?

Yusuf: My followers killedno one

Interrogator: What about those killed among your followers?

Yusuf: Those killed among my followers, whoever killed them are those who committed crime.

Interrogator: Where are you from originally?

Yusuf: I hail from Yobe State.

Interrogator: Where in Yobe State?

Yusuf: Jakusko

Interrogator: What about your father?

Yusuf: He is also from Jakusko.

Interrogator: What about your mother?

Yusuf: She is from Gashua

Interrogator: Have you ever travelled abroad?

112

Yusuf: Only Hajj (Pilgrimage)

Interrogator*: What year was that?*

Yusuf: 2003 and 2004.

The Nigeria Policeunder the disguise that Yusuf wanted to escape, allegedly killed him. Mohammed Yusuf was not the only Boko Haram key personnel killed in this period. The Joint Task Force also killed Yusuf's trusted ally, Momodu Bama, aka Abu Saad and his father, AbatchaFlatari believed to be a spiritual mentor to Boko haram.[21] Abu Saad was widely held to be responsible for indoctrination of child soldiers abducted by Boko Haram. Bill Hansen maintains that, "the killing of Mohammed Yusuf and other Boko Haram elements underscores a 'false victory for Yar'Adua led Federal Government of Nigeria" (IDI with Lecturer at America University of Nigeria, held in Yola on 26 September 2016).

Ndi on his part attributedYusuf's killing to Government initial approach of simply 'getting the enemy' (IDI with a Soldier Lance Corporal at MadiboAdama University of technology, held in Yola on 26 September 2016). Kyari Mohammed concludes that government's focus on Boko Haram as an adversary made a mess of any holistic approach to the issues that Boko Haram emergence was pointing at. That means, each time Boko Haram members or leaders were killed, the regrouping of the insurgent movement was inevitable.

The Return of Abubakar Shekau and Trajectory of attacks

Shekau in video of April 2010 announced his comeback. It was not surprising that the focus of Shekau led Boko Haram was attacks on any institution representative of democracy. These included theIndependent National Electoral Commission (INEC), political assassination, and of politicians. Shekau's post 2009 Boko Haram leadership was the convergence of four factors. First, Federal and State Governments as a whole have devoted little attention to the causes of Boko Haram, the expectation being that key security threats came from South-south of the country where the oil money was more important. President Yar'Adua amnesty to Niger Delta agitators testifies to this thinking (Peel, 2010). There were limited resources devoted to the northeast region of

---

[21]http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/142735-nigerian-troops-kill-boko-haram-second-in-command-abu-saad-jtf.html

the country with no sound national efforts at countering the growing violent extremism (Interview with Idris a lawyer in Yola. September 2016).

Second, military crackdown on hitherto less sophisticated Boko Haram pushed the group's members out of Nigeria to Niger, Chad, Mali and the Sahel, where intelligence and security deficit was high. The Mali violence of 2012 created opportunity for Al Barnawi led Boko Haram to be prominent following their joining of Al-Qada in the Mahgreb (AQIM). Some Boko Haram members went towards Libya where the Arab Spring was growing and eventually joined the militia that pushed Qadaffi out of Libya. The third was that the influx of weapons and mercenaries from post Qaddafi Libya boosted the size, capabilities and confidence of Boko Haram and allowed the regrouping and revival of underground cells. The Arab spring experience produced Boko Haram accustomed with mounting machine guns something they were not used to pre 2010. They also learnt effective explosive devices usage and increase resources was the hallmark of the Boko haram period. Four, the extrajudicial killing of Yusuf Mohammed and wounding of Shekau left the Boko Haram members thirsty for revenge (vengeance) and provoked the change of leadership that refocused Boko Haram to a brutal group and full insurgency.

Unfortunately, President Yar'Adua died in the period and his death did not provide enough bases to examine his government led reaction to Shekau inspired leadership. President Yar'Adua's Vice, Goodluck Jonathan in May 2010 became the substantive President of Nigeria. The next section chronicles the Federal Government responses to Boko Haram insurgency under President Goodluck Jonathan.

4.2.6 President Jonathan'sGovernment Approaches to Boko Haram Insurgency

In responding to questions regarding President Jonathan Government's approach to Boko Haram, two interview respondents reasoned it was not clear that Jonathan led government was committed to the agenda of halting the Boko Haram. The Crisis Group also captured the pessimism regarding Jonathan's government in terms of sincerity quoting a retired Major General in Nigerian Army:

the President (Jonathan), the parliament and defense ministry, who ought to have been the manager, coach and captain of the security reform team, remained largely spectators, at best a fan club" Lack of political leadership to reform was partly because the President was out depth on defense matters and, by several accounts, less involved with leading and managing the military than his predecessors. (Crisis Group, 2016).

Under President Jonathan, 2012-2015, the Boko Haram situation not only deteriorated, with increased casualties, from 2014 through 2015, Boko Haram group gathered strength, courage and brutality. The Boko haram started hijacking territories, military formations belonging to the country and soldiers' casualties began to surge. The loss of territories exposed the limitations of political approaches and poorly conceived military strategies (Hentz and Solomon, 2017).

The strategy applied by the Nigeria military, under Jonathan, was what Gagariga described as a combination of network-centric with enemy-centric approach (Interview at Abuja; June 2017). Of course, such an approach only resulted in a short-term 'victory'. Ralph an officer in the Department of State Security corroborated the network-centric warfare. Nigerian armed forces attention was targeting Boko Haram strategic areas of strength such as information sources and training centers. This single-minded strategic approach was insufficient to create enduring results. Over dependence on Boko haram as the state enemy attracted fire power to the group to the neglect of the people who got caught up in the resultant exchange of fire power. Root causes of the group emergence such as lack of governance presence and shortfall of facilities and services to make life better for the people.

Jonathan led Federal Government transformation agenda may have sounded significant, but in relation to security, the agenda did not amount to real transformation. Instead, the fight against Boko Haram under Jonathan showed no evidence of calculated leadership and robust legislative control (Interview with Bill Hansen in Yola: September 2016). The Boko Haram situation exposed President Jonathan's lack of military experience and flawed political leadership (Kyari Mohammed). This period also saw the military sunk into unprecedented depths of corruption and mismanagement of personnel and operations where soldiers' mutiny and prosecution in court martial became the order of the day (Crisis Group, 2016).

States of Emergencies Declaration

In Nigeria, going by the constitution, section 305, sub-section 1 of the 1999 constitution empowers the State to respond to threats to state security by declaring state of emergency. To demonstrate this power, the Federal Government in some occasions declared emergencies because of Boko Haram insurgency. In a bid to convince Nigerians and the international community of his government efforts against Boko Haram, President Jonathan in a nationwide address in 2013 declared a State of Emergency explaining thus:

> Previously, we adopted a multi-track approach to the resolution of Boko Haram problem through actions, which included persuasion, dialogue and widespread consultation with the political, religious, and community leaders in the affected states. We exercised restraint to allow all efforts by both State Governors and well-meaning Nigerians to stop the repeated cases of mindless violence. We have a duty to stand firm against those who threaten the sovereign integrity of the Nigerian state. Our will is strong, because our faith lies in the indivisibility of Nigeria. The Chief of Defence Staff has been directed to immediately deploy more troops to these states for more effective internal security operations. The troops and other security agencies .... have orders to take all necessary action, within the ambit of their rules of engagement, to put an end to the impunity of insurgents and terrorists.-(Sahara Reporters, 2013).

One of the inferences from President Jonathan speech, while declaring the emergency was his preference for more troops' deployment. Of great importance to this study too were the narratives and the name given to Boko Haram under Jonathan. The name changed from 'violent sect', which was the preference of his predecessor, late Yar'Adua to insurgents and terrorists. This change of labelling influenced the approach adopted. While the change of name or labelling was commendable, the missing enduring approach aided continuous resurgence of the Boko Haram each time they were degraded.

Table 4.3: Nigeria's Ministers of Defense 2007- 2015

Minister	Duration	Appointer
Yayale Ahmed	2007-2008	President Umaru Yar'adua
Shettima Mustapha	2008-2009	President Umaru Yar'adua
Godwin Abbe	2009-2010	President Umaru Yar'adua
Adetokunbo Kayode	2010-2011	President Goodluck Jonathan
Haliru Mohammed Bello	2011-2012	President Goodluck Jonathan
Olusola Obada	2012-2013	President Goodluck Jonathan
Aliyu Mohammed Gusau	2014-2015	President Goodluck Jonathan
Mansur Mohammed Dan Ali	2015-2019	President Mohammadu Buhari

Source: Researchers compilation

Table 4.3 above showed some confusion of the government under President Jonathan.This manifested is a number of ways. One of such was that in June 2012, Jonathan sacked the Minister of Defense, Haliru Mohammed Bello without explanation and did not appoint substantive Minister of Defense for fifteen (15) months. Although Olusola Obada, the Minister of State for Defence was retained as acting minister, the failure to appoint a substantive minister erased meaningful political leadership to continue the Nigeria's push against Boko Haram insurgency within that period. By December 2013, it had become evident that a resurgence of Boko Haram inspired activity against the government was imminent (IDI with Gambo Matuidi, Yola September 2016).

Further evidence from the field research indicated that President Jonathan led Government's strategy lacked counterinsurgency approaches. 'Prior to 2013 the Government did very little to counter the narratives of the Boko Haram insurgency' (IDI with Gambo Matuidi, Yola on 26 September 2016). Up until 2013, Nigeria under President Jonathan was short of strategies to eliminate the people's reliance on Boko Haram and guaranteeing security to the population in North East Region. The military under Jonathan focused too much on gaining tactical victories through the deployment of more and more troops. The military hierarchy also had preference for punishing soldiers in the name of mutiny and cowardice without paying attention to why they were failing in their operations. The approach, many respondents agreed led to low morale among the troops and ultimately the separation of military forces from the people (FDG with non-commission military officers in Yola on 29 September 2016).

Another major mistake of the Federal Government 2010-2015 was the misunderstanding of the causes of Boko Haram insurgency. Patricia Donli believes Boko Haram insurgency is rooted outside of ideology and reinforced missed opportunities, low income, inequality and lack of basic human security (IDI with Patricia Donli of the University of Maiduguri which was held in Ibadan, 10 August, 2016). President Jonathan while speaking with Christine Amapour on CNN made a speech that entirely disagreed with Donli's thoughts of Boko Haram as emanating from misrule and poverty. Jonathan on his part insisted:

> Boko Haram terrorist organization was not a product of misrule or poverty. The sect was not borne out of misrule, definitely not; sometimes people feel it is a result of poverty, but no. Boko Haram is a local terror group... That is why we call on the rest of

the world to work with us and that is why we are talking about Algeria and northern Mali. Our belief is that if you allow terror to exist in any part of the world, it will not just affect that country or that state, it will affect the rest of the globe and we should not play politics with Boko Haram.[22]

The comments from President Jonathan demonstrate one of many accounts of the President begging the question regarding Boko Haram. One critical thing that Jonathan led Federal Government failed to appreciate was that, even when territories were being lost to Boko Haram's control, regaining previously lost territories could have increased government acceptance and raise support for military and other non-military efforts of government as sincere.

Bill Hansen recounts that under Jonathan Presidency, the military could not gain ground with Boko Haram until the twilight of 2015 elections. Even at that, the resurgence of the Nigerian military under Jonathan in 2014/2015, was aided by the use of private mercenaries. While all of the military personnel interviewed declined to comment on the use of mercenary, some key informants who were also soldiers confirmed that Nigeria actually engaged mercenaries.-(IDI, with a lecturer at America University of Nigeria, Yola, Adamawa State on 26 September 2016). Of course, there was inconsistency as to where the mercenaries came from. Some respondents said they were from Ukraine while others said they were from South Africa. One point of convergence for the researcher was that the informants all alluded to the fact that these mercenaries operated at night using helicopters to target key Boko Haram areas while the Nigeria troops do the clearing operations in the daytime.-(FGD with commissioned officers of the Nigerian Army in Abuja on 10 December 2016).

Apparently, successive military operations initiated by President Jonathan could not identify nor remove the Boko Haram support structure until the engagement mercenaries. The deficit in Governance allowed Boko Haram group to rebuild their capabilities with more deadly attacks within the northeast of Nigeria.-(IDI with the Director at Nigeria Institute for Policy Strategic Studies, in Yola on 27 September 2016).

---

[22]"Boko Haram is not a product of poverty" – Jonathan, *By Ali Adoyi on January 24, 2013* http://dailypost.ng/2013/01/24/boko-haram-is-not-a-product-of-poverty-jonathan/

Criticisms of Military Operations under President Goodluck Jonathan

President Jonathan has penchant of showing optimism that Boko Haram challenge was nothing but short term, will soon fizzle out and that Nigeria shall soon get over it. Optimism was good but optimism alone is insufficient in fighting insurgents. Jonathan reiterated one of such optimistic views at the 2011 National Economic summit in November. By December of the same year, he declared a State of emergencies on 15 LGAs of Borno, Yobe, Niger and Adamawa. This emergency declaration follows the dangerous trends in the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents in the Nigeria, especially the Christmas day systematic bombing of some churches.

Table 4.4: Local Government Areas (LGA)s affected by State of Emergency

STATE	LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA
Borno	Maiduguri Metropolitan, Gamboru Ngala, Banki, Bama, Biu and Jere
Yobe	Damaturu, Geidam, Potiskum, Buniyadi-Gujba, Gashua
Plateau	Jos North, Jos South, Barkin-Ladi andRiyom
Niger	Suleja

Source: Researchers compilation from the fieldwork

The above table 4.4, shows the fifteen (15) LGAs of mostly affected in the four states of Borno, Yobe, Niger and Adamawa. Beyond these four states, there were closure of borders with Chad and Niger republic and the deployment of about 30,000 security personnel occurred during this period (Comolli, 2015). The state of emergency declarations in Borno, Yobe, Plateau and Niger states in December 2011 and the one in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states in May 2013 were effective for a short period, but triggered ill-feelings from the population (Jacob and Akpan, 2015). "One overbearing negative impact of the emergency declaration was the blocking of GSM communication in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states which were aimed at disrupting the Boko Haram group's communication". -(IDI with Mohammed Wuyo of Borno Coalition of Democracy and Progress held in Maiduguri, 9 July 2017).

Further analysis from data received from key informant interviews indicate that the deployment was instructive. Gagariga, a Brig. Gen. in the Nigerian Army explains that at that time, about 20 percent of Nigeria defense power was concentrated in northeast of the country. In spite of the emergency declaration and forces concentration, Jude Momodu is of the opining that "the implementation of State of Emergency did not reflect improvement on the ground in those states or affected communities". - (IDI, with a lecturer, ModiboAdama University of technology Yola on 25 September 2016).

The emergency declaration was for six (6) months and the following figure 4.3 provides statistics of Boko Haram attacks under the emergency period.

Figure 4.7: Boko Haram Attacks in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe
Source: Fieldwork compilation by researcher from the Nigeria Watch Data

Furthermore, the above figure 4.7 highlighted the trends of Boko Haram attacks within the emergency period that covered December 31, 2011 - June 30, 2012. There were 507 fatalities recorded in 83 violent incidents in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states while about 47 deaths were recorded in Adamawa in 6 incidents, 407 in 59 incidents in Borno and 53 in 18 incidents in Yobe.

Figure 4.8: Boko Haram Jan- June, 2012 Attacks in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe
Source: Fieldwork compilation by researcher from the Nigeria Watch Data

The figure 4.8 above showed the monthly breakdown of Boko Haram Attacks from January-June 2012, which was a period under the state of emergency implementation. The month of February 2012 was particularly deadly in Borno. However, there were no Boko Haram attacks outside of the northeast during the first emergency period. There is probably the need to find out why this was so. Whereas, there were persistent Boko Haram attacks within northeast states under the watchful eyes of the military where the state of emergency was declared. This supports the argument by scholars like Virginia Comolli who were of the opinion that the military failed to degrade Boko Haram under President Jonathan 2010-2015.

Comolli in her book titled: *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency* particularly commented that Nigeria military that boasts of 80,000 active troops plus 82000 para-military could not degrade Boko haram due to happenings beyond President Jonathan. Nigeria, Comolli maintained was paying for defense spending mistake under military that witnessed deterioration of military equipment and procurement targeted at state-state rather than asymmetric threats of insurgency or insurgency (Comolli, 2015:110). Bill Hansen equally reasoned in ways that suggested reasons for President Jonathan's regime failure to achieve positive results against Boko Haram. On his part, Hansen attributed these reasons to two events:

> One, the abduction of the Chibok Girls and two, the massive looting of security budget under President Jonathan erased any hope of claiming victory or progress in their government fight against the Boko Haram. Arguably, President Jonathan lost the fight against Boko Haram, then lost the 2015 elections on the backdrop of issues relating to the abduction of Chibok girls, and perceived corrupt nature of his Government. -(IDI with a Professor at ModiboAdama University of Technology, Yola, on 26 September, 2016).

Haliru's opinion did not differ from Comolli and Hansen. To him, Government approaches to Boko Haram under Jonathan shifted with a goal and creation of awareness that government cared enough to protect population and enhance human security of the people. However, Haliru concludes saying:

> "the change could not achieve positive results' perhaps because that government was lacking political will needed... There is no greater scenario where Jonathan's lack of political will was exemplified than the handling of the Chibok girls' abduction. The second perhaps was the Federal Government management of the military' invasion of Bama. These two situations are the sour

moments of President Jonathan Presidency handling Boko haram.
-(KII with an official of the State Security services (DSS) in Maiduguri, Borno State on 2 November 2016)[23]

While Jonathan through the National Orientation Agency and Ministry of Information created awareness about the negative impacts of Boko Haram urging citizens to support the government efforts, such awareness on Boko Haram insurgency did not so much translate attracting international support until 2014 reality in the abduction of the Chibok girls. Ironically, the Bring Back our Girls (BBOG) campaign that followed Chibok girls' abduction, though timely and commendable, was flawed by Issac Olawale Albert in his expose: *BBOG and military media strategies-BringBackOurGirls: A critique of a Nigerian Hash Tag Activism,* because of the groups misplaced strategies that Albert considered as destructive rather that constructive in helping the government to focus on rescuing the abducted girls.

With lopsided strategies and perceived insincerity of for men surrounding President Jonathan, the defeat of Boko Haram and the stability of Northeast Nigeria under Jonathan were unthinkable. Ahmad Sajoh, a former commissioner for information in Adamawa Sate agreed to this saying"the delayed 2015 Presidential election by President Jonathan was a sign of desperation which underscores the hypocrisy of Jonathan's government fight against Boko Haram insurgency".-(IDI, with Adamawa State commissioner for information in Yola on 26 September 2016).

Lost Territories to Boko Haram insurgents under President Jonathan

There were many important landmarks of Boko Haram insurgency under Jonathan's presidency. The period saw Boko Haram onslaught outside of Nigeria crossing to the Lake Chad Basin Countries (LCBCs) and also witnessed Nigeria losing some of her territories to the control of Boko Haram insurgents. This section captures some territories lost to Boko Haram within the period of this study.

Fatima Kyari-Mohammed explains that the insurgents attacked nearly the whole of Borno State except the Maiduguri Municipal Council and Jere LGA, which were only

---

[23] Haliru (not real name) is a senior officer in the Department of State Security (DSS) and shared some thoughts with the researcher in Maiduguri

attacked sporadically.[24]"Due to Boko Haram attacks and taking of territories, thousands of people fled their homes, became refugees, and internally displaced". Under Jonathan Presidency, "Nigeria lost territories in the following Local Government Areas to Boko Haram control: Gamboru-Ngala, Dikwa, Abadam, Marte, Bama, Madagali, Gulak, Gwoza, Mitchika, Mubi and the towns of Vintim, Ran, Gulumba, Ngala, Wulgo, Banki, Darjamal, NguroSoye, Izge, Pulka, Ngoshe among others".-(FDGs with IDPs on 24 September 2016 and non-commissioned soldiers on 29 September 2016 in Yola).

A military General during Key informant interview confided in the researcher that some of the news reclaiming territories by the military prior to the 2015 elections was 'false and misleading'. He insisted the focus of the military for longer period was to defend Maiduguri from Konduga to ensure the town does not fall to the insurgents. However, Ibrahim, the Director of External relations at the office of National Security Adviser differs with the military source arguing that:

> in all fairness, President Jonathan Federal Government led approach was not just military focused, new laws on national counterinsurgency coordination were passed as early as 2011 while there were initiatives on Countering Violent Extremism as well as proposals to build schools for the Almajiris.-(KII with ONSA director in Yola on 26 September 2016).

Of course, President Jonathan Presidency consisted of many contrasts. Jonathan was initially unwilling to negotiate with Boko Haram but on January 27, 2012, he expressed possible change of mind saying:

> 'If Boko haram clearly identifies who they are and say this is the reason why we are resisting, this is the reason we are confronting government or this is the reason why we destroy some innocent people and their properties...then there will be a basis for dialogue. We will dialogue, let us know your problems and we will solve your problems but if they do not identify themselves who will you dialogue with' -(Thisday (Lagos), January 27, 2012, pp. 1-6).

Such was the same dialogue that Jonathan considered heretical when the Galtimari Presidential Committee proposed it as part of investigations into the Boko Haram

---

[24]Fatima Kyari Mohammed, an indigene of Maiduguri was a consultant to the ECOWAS and Nigeria's candidate to African Union Peace and Security Commissioners election. She spoke to the researcher in a personal discussion in Yola and also shared her thoughts and experience via email.

insurgency.[25] By April 2013, President Jonathan announced amnesty committee establishment to evaluate feasibility of pardoning the Boko Haram insurgents. This announcement came with outcries from many other groups and sections of the country like the Christians. Comolli (2015) alluded to the loftiness of these ideas but expressed pessimism on the practicability of such ventures in the midst of politicization of security and other national issues by the ruling People's Democratic Party and the opposition parties.

---

[25]Galadinma Presidential committe

BHi attacks under the second State of emergency, May 14, 2013-Sept 30, 2013 (Borno, Yobe Adamawa)

Figure 4.9: Boko Haram Attacks during the second state of emergency
Source: Fieldwork compilation by researcher from the Nigeria Watch Data

The figure 4.9 demonstrates that during the second state of emergency declaration, an overall 1311 deaths were recorded in 73 violent incidents in the three states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Majority of the fatalities (1106) in 60 incidents were in Borno, while 201 fatalities in 12 incidents were recorded in Yobe and a fatality in Adamawa. Results like these under Goodluck Jonathan were what made interview respondents and focus group discussants to conclude that after six years, the Nigerian military had no stability or was able to guarantee peoples fear of violence in the northeast.

The declaration of emergencies and curfews by President Jonathan to prompt the defeat of the Boko Haram in 2012 and 2013 many focus group discussants concluded alienated the locals from the Nigerian Government. This was because "ordinary people on the street perceived the government as corrupt and weak".-(FGDs with IDPs in Yola, on 24 September 2016).

Figure 4.10 The second state of emergency Fatalities in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe
Source: Fieldwork compilation by researcher from the Nigeria Watch Data

Apparently, from figure 4.10, the strategy of declaring states of emergencies by President Jonathan led federal government in Nigeria never yielded desired positive outcomes. There were more attacks in the three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe under the periods of emergencies. Beyond Boko Haram, to some FGD respondents, government and the military contributed to their businesses being paralyzed. On the orders of military, pupils and students practically abandoned schools. To most interview respondents from Borno and Adamawa State, the proclamation of the state of emergencies did not really help the fight against Boko Haram. The actions rather severed the state and residents from the rest of the world under very difficult human security circumstances.[26]

Interrogating why the contrasts happened, a military General said the military incompetence and ineffectiveness during the emergency periods was due to the lack of prompt and effective media campaign and over dependence on force of action. The result was loss of confidence by the local population and this limited military effort. Another reason for military setback in the fight against Boko Haram under President Jonathan was the lack of international support. There were arms embargo placed on Nigeria on the excuse of perceived military bad human rights records (Hentz and Solomon, 2017). This situation notwithstanding, Matuidi believes:

> To interrupt Boko Haram momentum of violence, first, it was necessary for Federal Government create some level of stabilisation. But a government cannot give what it does not have. Creation of stability is impossible without sincere and believable government. Such was a missing link. Moreover, the Nigerian military over-reliance on military equipment and weapons from foreign governments meant the maintenance of military equipment, order and delivery all depended on the country's disposition with government of whose countries make supply.-(IDI with MAUTHEC lecturer in Yola, Adamawa State on 26 September 2016).

The failure to reform and confidently builds valid alternative to Boko Haram insurgency in the minds of people predates Jonathan government. Corruptions, incompetence of public office holders and inefficient institutions are the anomalies that have become synonymous with the Nigerian state.

---

[26]Field interview with some residents of Borno in Yola and Maiduguri

4.2.8 *President Mohammadu Buhari and the Military Tactics Against Boko Haram Insurgency*

Although the timeline of the scope of this study extended to President Buhari's Presidency, this is not enough to do an assessment of his approach. The following overview is however important to the analysis of Nigeria Military operations against Boko Haram and should serve as focus of future research by others. The field research conducted in late 2016 suggests that the tide was turning against Boko Haram in favour of the government under President Buhari's direction.

The election of President Muhammadu Buhari to lead Nigeria in 2015 brought hope and optimism to many Nigerians with the expectations that Boko Haram insurgency should receive better attention. At the time, Buhari was sworn in the Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin area had stretched into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. President Buhari 2015 inaugural speech became a precursor to his government fight against Boko Haram. In his reflection on the inability of Nigeria's political leadership to work in cooperation with regional governments of Niger, Chad and Cameroun,Zakaria QusmanRamadane, the Director General of the Chadian centre for strategic studies explained that:

> The Government of Nigeria under President Jonathan stepped backwards diplomatically but the new leadership of President Buhari embraced regional diplomatic cooperation. You will recall that the Lake Chad Basin countries were some of the countries that President Buhari visited immediately he was sworn in.-(IDI with the DG of Chadian Institute for Strategic Studies in Yola, Adamawa State on 27 September 2016).

When the President Mohammadu Buhari assumed leadership of Nigeria on May 29, 2015, Boko Haram insurgency was on their highest crescendo. However, President Buhari, himself being a devout Muslim, was therefore quick to label Boko Haram insurgents as 'a mindless, godless group who are away from Islam'. By this statement, the principal perception of Boko Haram by President Buhari administration became unambiguous. Buhari's government expression to approach Boko Haram insurgency with renewed vigour and direction led to the Federal Government Nigeria campaign in northeast using the document titled Buhari's plan for rebuilding the northeast.

The insight into Buhari's plan for the northeast was echoed in his inaugural speech of May 29, 2015, where he ordered that the military relocate the command centre from Abuja to Maiduguri. In President Buhari words:

> …victory cannot be achieved by basing the Command and Control Centre in Abuja. The command centre will be relocated to Maiduguri and remain until Boko Haram is completely subdued...Armed Forces will be fully charged with prosecuting the fight against Boko haram. We shall overhaul the rules of engagement to avoid human rights violations in operations and ensure a population-focused approach to our fight against Boko Haram.[27]

The President's inaugural speech mandating the military command relocation carries some elements of human security intentions. President Buhariargument that '... we [Nigeria] cannot claim to have defeated Boko Haram without rescuing the Chibok girls and all other innocent persons held hostage by insurgents' also resonates and demonstrates new thinking of how a government intends to measure her success against the Boko Haram. President Buhari government's goals against Boko Haram insurgents not yet measurable, but the ongoing military operations have birthed human security elements such that when matched with adequate resources and intelligence there could be hope of achieving desired result. A setback from for Buhari's government would likely come from his government lack of counterinsurgency strategy linked to judicial reforms or a reliable security sector capable of enhancing human security. At best, like past governments, Burhari's government is full of promises. 'We shall improve operational and legal mechanisms so that disciplinary steps are taken against proven human right violations by the Armed Forces' Buhari, 2016[28]. Commenting on Buhari's government approach to Boko Haram insurgency, Ibrahim says the insurgency is far from being defeated, explaining:

> Boko Haram has been degraded and destabilized…While not occupying Nigeria territories again; The Boko Haram insurgents still have attacking influence on daily basis. Overall, where proactive measures are being taken, certain parts of the North East region are stable but not entirely secure.[29]

---

[27]President Buhari Inauguration Speech on 29 May 2015.
[28]President Buhari's Inaugural speech
[29]Personal Communication with Ibrahim, ONSA, Director of External Relations

Figure 4.11: Boko Haram Attacks in the first seven months of Buhari's Inauguration
Source: Fieldwork compilation by researcher from the Nigeria Watch Data

Confirming the assertion by Ibrahim that the Boko Haram insurgency is far from over, the figure 4.11 above shows that between May 29, 2015 and December 31, 2016, over 7500 people have been killed by Boko Haram incidents. Out of the 7500, about 588 people were killed in 24 Boko Haram attacks in Adamawa, 6445 persons killed in 330 attacks in Borno and 454 killed in 24 incidents in Yobe.

Beyond the incidents and causalities recorded under President Buhari, the recovery of more communities from Boko haram has pointed to increasing the number of vulnerable people in dire need. Certainly, the number keeps changing.[30] Unfortunately, the government is reluctant to understand or accept the figures and realities of the challenging situations coming with liberated communities. What is needed is scaling up of aid operations as the magnitude of the human suffering becomes apparent and 'the protection crisis under Boko Haram is rapidly turning into a food insecurity and nutrition crises[31].

Ilemobola-Ademola also explained that "the recovery of territories does not really equate possession of villages and towns. What military has succeeded in doing was to reclaim Local Government headquarters". -(IDI with a conflict analyst at Search for common ground in Maiduguri on 6 July 2017).Her argument was because there were a number of communities that were not yet accessible to humanitarian agencies and civil governance. Conclusively, both "Boko Haram attacks and military operations have had a negative impact on the well-being of households".-(IDI with an indigene of Maiduguri who is also the staff of Institute for peace and conflict resolution inYolaon 27 September 2016).

4.3   Research Objective three: The human security issues in the northeast Nigeria due to the military operational tactics deployed by the military

The human security impacts of both Boko Haram and the military have been felt at all levels of society including on individuals,familiesandcommunities.The housing, food,education and health sectors were identified by both the military and civilian respondents as themost disrupted areas of human security. As at when this study took place, there was evidence of the return of displaced population in some areas,but insecurityremainsprevalentandpreventing

---

[30]Head of UNOCHA to Nigeria 2016 TV interview on Channels Television
[31]U.N. Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator Peter Lundberg

returnonalargerscale.Thepresenceofminesandundetonatedexplosivesfurtherincreasesth ehuman security dangersof the population(OCHA, 2016).

With human security central to national security and safety, Huntington succinctly stated in a classic summary of more than a decade's empirical research. In '*The Soldier and the State*', Huntington concludes, "human security is an important aspect of state's security to protects the nation's social, economic, and political institutions" from any threats that may arise.[32]Within the context of Nigeria's northeast, Abu Hussain explained that regardless of your location of displacement, the living conditions and the socio-economic well-being of people have been significantly lowered and impaired due to sudden loss of assets and a lack of access to basic needs.- (IDI interview with an indigene of Maiduguri on 4 November 2016).The military engagements of Boko Haram in the North-East have had devastating human security impacts. The crisis since 2009 has witnesseddisplaced populations experiencing limited access to basic services particularlyfood,shelter,water, educationandhealth(NESTS, 2016).

Disruptions of Personal and Community Security

The personal and community security encompasses all forms of threats to personal and group security, hence is interlinked with justice, human rights, and control of small arms/light weapons (SALW). Human rights abuses have been committed not only by armed actors involved in the conflict. Weak access to justice, accountability and oversight mechanisms facilitate impunity for such violations and leave the population vulnerable. Intimidation or extortion as well as torture or inhumane punishment were the most common threats associated with the military. Other issues included artillery attack against civilians which were significant abuses of personal security. The demonstration of further community insecurity comes in forms of extra-judicial killing, sexual violence and forced disappearances allegedly perpetrated by armed forces.

---

[32]See more in the book, The Soldier and the State by Samuel Huntington.

Figure 4.12: Boko Haram Displacement by year 2012-2015

Source: OCHA[33]

---

[33] Nigerian office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

The figure 4.12 therefore provides displacements patterns by years of displacement which was found to be significant. From the following diagram, the majority of IDPs displaced in the Northeast were displaced in 2014 (75,3%) and in 2015 (23%). These IDPs were identified in Borno (1,525,404) followed by Yobe (139550) and Adamawa (132,626). As at May 2016, the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA] reported that the situation remains dire, with about 7 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Of these, 3.9 million people require food and security, 3.7 million people need basic health services, 1.6 million people require emergency shelter and over2 million children are out of school (World Bank Group. 2016).

Breakdown of Social Fabrics

Another far reaching effect of the military operations against Boko Haram coming from data received was that, the social fabric in the North-East has been deeply damaged. The data from all the focus group discussions indicate that, individuals and families have lost most of their productive assets, homes, and possessions, further pushing most of them into conditions of acute poverty. In certain instances, traditional livelihoods systems have been destroyed, making them more people dependent on external support for food, health care and education. In certain instances, services previously available some locale have also been affected, due to limiting access of entire communities to health, education, justices and other social services. What this portend was that, families and communities are separated, severing crucial social ties and safety nets, and translating to an increased level of vulnerability to unaccompanied children, women heads of household.

The breakdown in social relations argument is supported by Adewumi(2014) where he further the conversation saying, beyond Boko Haram, the military actions have equally contributed to eroding social relations between citizens and government, ethnic groups, communities and even within extended families. Adewunmi's argument itself is derived from Huntington who puts the argument in a proper framework saying human security is both a cause for military operations and a course under military operations.

54.53% of IDP children.

26.01% five(5) years old or younger

92% of IDPs live in host communities

8% live in camps

84 Camps and camp-like sites

Figure 4.13: OCHA breakdown of affected population 2012-2015
Source: OCHA (2016)

Figure 4.13 highlights OCHA's breakdown of affected population and the extent of human insecurity. This report listed nearly fourteen million (14) million people without coping mechanism including 400,000 children. Indeed, after extrapolation, the results of DTM survey showed the vast majority of IDPs identified in the Northeast have been displaced because of the insurgency related violence (95%).[34] The Boko Haram conflict is believed to have resulted in the killings of more than 600 school teachers destruction/damages to over 1,200 schools with nearly 600,000 school children losing access to learning between 2013 and 2015 (IRD/World Bank 2016).

As commendable as military operations leading to liberation of territories is, the head of UNHCR to Nigeria commented that liberation does not translate to improvement in human security situations.

> Military victory of reclaiming does not necessarily translate improvement on humanitarian grounds. It is the other ways round some of these territories have been under BHT for years, liberating the territories uncover level of human security because people have been out of basic things of life. They have been somewhat incommunicado. No humanitarian assistance could reach them for close to two years. Surely, there are few areas where relative stabilities have returned. LGAs HQ and towns. Out there in villages is a situation that has not significantly stability that would allow return in dignity, safety and security. These returns must be voluntary, in dignity and in face of chances for sustaining reconstruction and plan must be done swiftly.[35]

Considering where Boko Haram insurgency where for too long the situation was invincible, unattended with low international assistance synergy galvanized to address Boko Haram challenges until indicators showed that a national crisis in Nigeria has become sub-regional crisis of the Lake Chad basin. UNHCR head in Nigeria believes the FGN has definitely arisen to respond to the challenges. Her submission is captured as follows:

> Nigeria has merit of institutions NEMA, SEMA, LEMA national committee for refugee, migration and internally displaced person, Institute for Peace & Conflict Resolution (IPCR). All those institutions have merit of existing. The challenge is that the magnitude of Boko Haram insurgency outstrips capacity of any institutions. The required response also compounds response

---

[34]Data tracking matrix (DTM) is a tool by IOM, NEMA to randomly register displaced persons and ensure reliable estimate of displaced persons in Nigeria.
[35]UNHCR head to Nigeria interview on Channels Television, November 2016

mechanism of these agencies. There is the need for sound coordination of experts and minds involved with the human security management. There must be structure for coordination in the crisis on the north east, the Presidential Initiative for Northeast Development (PIND) and all actors involved call for systematic and sound coordination to avoid duplication or creating additional gaps in intervention.

Interruption of Local Government activities

The Boko Haram insurgency and resulting military operations interview respondents agreed have also weakened the role of local governments as frontline agents of recovery and peace building in the North-East. Boko Haram specifically through their attacks has weakened the human, financial, and institutional capacities of the local governments, with devastating impact on their ability to carry out core functions. As the place where the State connects with society, and where government policies interface with the aspirations of the people, there are at least 112 LGAs in the North-East. These local governments are mostly remote and damages, along with threats to their lives, have forced these local governments to operate from makeshift facilities or, as in Borno and Yobe, to flee to and operate remotely from the State capital. This means under the period of this study; many local governments have been detached from their constituencies.

Under such situation, there can only be little level of deliver and the following Figure 4.14 shows that what further compounded human security across the north east was the damage of nearly 700 public buildings. The damages were attributed to both parties in the insurgency (UNOCHA 2014). Jude Momodu notes that "further damages to human security included destruction of various road assets such as bridges, culverts due to shelling bombing, fire, movements of tanks and heavy armed vehicles. The insurgents using IEDs have also deliberately destroyed bridges and roads to prevent military movement". -(IDI with MAUTECH lecturer, in Yola on 25 September 2016).

Housing Damage in Six Conflict Affected States in North East, 2015

States	Total Housing Stock, 2015	Reported Total Number of Damaged Houses	Total Number of Fully Damaged Houses	Total Number of Partly Damaged Houses	% of Housing Stock Damaged, 2015	% of Fully Damaged Units	% of Partly Damaged Units
Borno	10,35,370	409124	275301	133823	39.51	67.29	32.71
Yobe	5,60,666	16209	12156	4053	2.9	75	25
Adamawa	7,57,619	5134	4237	897	0.68	82.53	17.47
Gombe	5,58,070	525	513	12	0.1	97.71	2.29
Bauchi	11,23,233	200	200	0	0.02	100	0
Taraba	5,72,172	650	621	29	0.11	95.54	4.46
Total	46,07,130	431842	293028	138814	9.37	67.86	32.14

Figure 4.14 Housing damages in Northeast as at 2015

Source: World Bank Group (2016:63)

NEMA officials and other international organizations such as IOM equally expressed during interviews and personal discussion how in order to respond to the human security needs of the population, getting accurate data regarding housing units and the displaced population was difficult. For many years, instability and complex nature of security in many LGAs of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa disallowed for the DTM assessments to be carried out in most areas in the Northeast. Kyari Mohammed notes that Northern Borno was practically cut out of Nigeria with little or no easy movement for residents.

One health official from Maiduguri recounted how the period of emergency paralyzed health security of Borno state narrating that the 2013 curfew coincided with medical staff industrial action at the University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital (UMTH), in a protest to police high-handedness when they laid siege on the hospital to know complain about improper mortuary services for their slayed colleagues. Journalists also expressed intimidation from military who they accused of insisting journalists must emphasize patriotism in their reportage - (IDI with a medical doctor in Maiduguri on 4 November 2016

Residents in border communities resulted to the use of Cameroonian cell phones lines to communicate and trace their loved ones. As at March 2015, only four LGAs in Borno State for instance were accessible. The LGAs are Maiduguri, Jere, Biu and Konduga. By January 2016, about 15 out of the 27 LGAs in Borno State are freely accessible to aid workers and population. These include AskiraUba, Bayo, Biu, Chibok, Damboa, Gubio, Hawul, Jere, Kaga, Konduga, KwayaKusar, Mafa, Magumeri, Maiduguri and Shani.

4.3.1 Human Security enhancing initiatives by the Nigeria Military

The military respondents considered the listed as human security activities whereas, civilian respondents listed sexual harassments and frequent road closure, which hindered the free movement of people and goods as the human security emanating from military operations. This view was corroborated by some community leaders who explained how the military contributed to human insecurity by burning of villages and deliberate destruction of buildings along their way to Boko Haram hideouts in places like Marte, Mobbar, Gubio, Guzamala, Abadam(FGD with community leaders in Yola on 25 September 2016).

Some notable human security enhancing initiatives by the Nigeria Military as identified during the focus group discussions with commissioned and non-commissioned officers included:The facilitation of humanitarian activities; Confidence building initiatives/civil military relationship through medical outreaches; Re-opening of roads to inaccessible territories; Reconstruction of infrastructures; Handling of displaced population through the provision of security.

Table 4.5: Military Operations and Promotion of Human Security

Military Operations Tasks Relevant to the Promotion of Human Security	
Protection of relief workers	Escort humanitarian aid convoys
Enforcing curfews	Guard critical infrastructure
Coerce Boko haram foot soldiers and logistics supplier	Cordon-and-search operations against Boko haram bases
Demining	Provide safe passage for civilians
Creating bases in areas of civilian insecurity	VIP protection
Establishing safe corridors and maintain security there	

Source: Focus Group discussions with commissioned and non-commissioned officers

The table 4.5 above consists of the lists of the human security enhancing initiatives by the Nigeria Military.However, civilians who participated in another focus group discussion differ on how they perceived human security enhancing initiatives by the military. Specifically, the FGDs participants made reference to April 16 and 17, 2013 fight in Bama where more than 200 were and nearly 2,000 houses were burnt by the military and not the insurgents. This was under President Jonathan, and the Nigerian government not only contested the casualty figure, but also did not accept that the military was responsible. Bornorespondents also groaned[36] under heavy presence of armed military personnel, armoured tanks and carriers as well as how artillery dominated their communities. The respondents felt compelled to be confined indoors. In an FGD one resident commented that the 2013 imposition of the State of Emergency was most brutal to the population with no communication and lack of freedom to pursue daily living.

Reports of focus groups and interviews also substantiated the abuses mostly committed by the security agencies in their communities. The respondents mentioned beating, physical harassment, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and extortion as common violations in the communities. Many respondents explained that, due to State of Emergency they were restricted in making phone calls while they were even unable to make provision for food, water and other basic needs. Such divergent of opinions about the human security issues in the northeast between the civilian and military respondents is a significant finding of the study.

---

[36]https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/weekly/index.php/component/content/article/63-cover-stories/12726-borno-yobe-adamawa-residents-groan-under-state-of-emergencyBorno, Yobe, Adamawa residents groan under state of emergency ;By Hamza Idris, Yahaya Ibrahim, Ibrahim Sawab, Maiduguri & Hamisu Kabiru Matazu, Damaturu | Publish Date: May 25 2013 4:01AM

Picture Plate 1: Military Medical Outreach
Source: Army Public Relations

Picture Plate 2: Military Construction of Road Gwoza – Yamtake Bridge
Source: Army Public Relations

To keep responding to the human displacement, which apparently shows human insecurity, the military respondents insisted that in their operations they conducted what they term confidence-building exercises. These confidence building activities serve as both a strategy and intervention.

Figure 4.15: Some Military activities in the Operational Environment
Source: Field Study

Human security has indeed been a challenge for internal military operations against Boko haram insurgents. The people have also witnessed interrogation methods that include abuse, the lack of a right to due process, enforced disappearance, unlawful surveillance and bugging, as well as other attacks on personal liberties and properties. There are several reports of people imprisoned without trial and without any time limit and that which has used against purported terrorists, and of cases of death in custody. The Amnesty international and Human rights watch expressed concern about the restrictive laws, arbitrary arrests and the inhuman conditions that Boko Haram insurgent's suspects are subjected to and Nigeria Army has consistently denied the reports.

The Nigerian Army spokesman, Sani Usman in an interview expressed that Amnesty international has been unfair to Nigeria in the fight against BHT. Sani believe Amnesty international posture of unverifiable evidences of abuse and extrajudicial killings has reinforced Boko Haram with more damage to the Nigeria fight against the group. In his word, Sani said:

> If a BHT is caught with uniform, we disarm and taken to holding centre. For the first we have gone ahead to set up Human Rights desk here in Abuja. It was moved out of the Army HQ to a different location to ensure that people have easy access.-(IDI with Army PRO in Abuja on 12 December 2016).

Malgwii laments:

> Boko Haram insurgency must be condemned unequivocally, and no underlying reasons can legitimize it. If there is a collapse of the rule of law in the struggle against Boko Haram, I am afraid Boko Haram has succeeded in their work, regardless of their aims. The Nigerian state, by way of its actions, seems to aid erasing the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets and has gradually led to measures where human rights have been sacrificed in the war on insurgency. Sadly, national security has been made a priority over individual human security.-(IDI with a local government employee in Maiduguri on 3 November 2016).

Picture Plate 3: Maiduguri – Dikwa – Gamboru Ngala
Source: Army Public Relations

4.3.2 Impact of Military tactics on Agriculture, Education, Transport and Housing

The conflict in North-East Nigeria has had a deep impact on the region. An estimated 20,000 lives have been lost, and nearly two million people have been forcibly displaced. The human, social and economic losses of the conflict, and the investments for the recovery, peace building, and reconstruction of the Northeast, are overwhelming.

Figure 4.16: NairaCost of damages to infrastructurein Adamawa, Borno and Yobe
Source: World Bank 2016

The figure above provides a detailed overview by four sectors of Agriculture, education, transport and housing. The overall impact of the military operations and Boko Haram insurgency on human security of northeast is estimated at US$ 42.5 million. Agriculture, education, transport and housing sectors were the mostly destroyed sectors of human security in northeast.

Notably private housing and agriculture sectors were two areas that suffered most across the three states. In Borno, schools were shut from March 2013 – November 2015 and most school buildings turned to IDP camps in Maiduguri with over 600 teachers killed, 19,000 displaced and 1,200 schools destroyed (World Bank, 2016). Students were killed or abducted in places like Mamudo, BuniYadi, Bama and the famous Chibok abduction. - (personal communication with selected heads of educational institutions in northeast at a meeting in Yola, Admawa State). On why education sector became Boko haram targets, Irabor, a former theatre commander of operation Laifiya Dole explained that Boko Haram insurgents target educational institutions for ideological reasons. The education sector is Nigeria's symbol of authority and insurgents considered the institution as symbol of their struggle. Some of the institutions were attacked as soft target and revenge mission to spite government and host communities. The schools that were not attacked were forced to close down with Adamawa State University and the College of Education, Hong falling into this category.

In agriculture sector, lands were not tilled since 2012 until around 2015. Kyari Mohammed explains that:

> The Lake Chad and Yobe was essentially closed to fishing while Pepper and Tomato farming and trade banned in some areas. In early 2015, the sale of fertilizer and planting of maize and sorghum were banned by the military. For housing 68% of houses were destroyed. 95% was in Borno State either through Boko Haram bombs or shelling by the military or by gun fire exchanges between Boko haram and the military. Both parties also deliberately set some of the buildings on fire. -(IDI with the VC ModibboAdama University of technology in Yola on 28 September 2016).

Civilian deaths and damage to non-military targets accompanied Nigerian military operation against Boko Haram.

4.4 Research Objective four: Challenges encountered by the Nigerian Military in tackling the Boko Haram Insurgency

There were numbers of challenges that defined the operational environment and in turn military tactics against the Boko haram insurgency. The nature of the northeast in terms of governance deficit ensures that the Boko Haram was able to frustrate the Nigerian Government's continuous claim of sovereignty and legitimacy too costly. Thus, by buying into local population support, Boko haram insurgents were able to obtaining the level of operation similar to controlling a state. Four forces, aided Boko Haram in this venture. The media[37], globalization/ICT[38], religious fundamentalism,[39] and proliferation of weapons and ammunition[40] influenced the Boko Haram insurgency operational environments. However, the following represents some of the basic challenges that the military encountered in tackling Boko Haram insurgency:

Nature of Boko Haram Insurgency Operational Environment

The question of operational environment includes how the Nigerian military perceive and describe the enemy. Talking about Boko Haram description in the eyes of Nigerian Army, Abu Hussain, said, in his village, the military virtually view everyone as the enemy. To Hussain, when soldiers launch attacks there is no separation or discrimination as to who the 'enemy' is. 'We are not certain whose interest the soldiers are serving. There is no clear distinction as to whether they are protecting us or intimidating us.'[41]To comprehend what the operational environment in which the military engages the Boko haram insurgency the following diagram sheds some insights:

---

[37]Col (now a Brig Gen) S.K. Usman, is the Director Army Public Relations. He spoke with the researcher in Abuja at the Army HQ in December 2016.
[38]Ibid, Gen Hamakim
[39]Ibid Kyari Mohammed, Ndi and Patricia Donli all spoke about how religious fundamentalism aided the operational environment in favour of Boko Haram
[40]Ibid Attaihiru
[41] Abu Hussain is a medical personnel in a government hospital in Maiduguri

Figure 4.17: Typology of Military Operational Environment against Boko Haram
Source: Fieldwork, 2016

Human Terrain (The People)

The human terrain is otherwise referred to as the people in the operational environment, Ogunlade explains that:

> At the centre of any counter insurgency are the people otherwise called the human terrain. In population centric warfare strategy, the people are the most important. This is the opposite of the physical terrain, which is primary in conventional warfare. However, while human terrain provides the room for human security consciousness, the physical terrain is also of great importance to the military in especially in northeast Nigeria context. Both Boko Haram and the military need the support of the human terrain, that is, the people while at the same time to enhance troop's freedom of movement there is that need to understand the physical terrain.-(KII with a former Brigade Commander of the Army in Abuja on 10 December 2016).

Support Ogunlade's argument, Michelia said because Boko Haram presented non-conventional war environment, the Nigeria military dependency on in-depth understanding of the civil considerations by the acronym ASCOPE that stands for Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events in the operation theatre. Michelia elaborates saying:

> The ASCOPE strategy is important to the military to understand the population and the Boko Haram insurgents to gain the true picture and control of the operational environment. In military conventional operations, the population is an obstacle to avoid but non-conventional operations like the fight against Boko haram insurgency the population cannot be avoided, they are central as and whoever (Boko Haram or military) garners the population 's support has the advantage in the operational environment.-(IDI with a Brig Gen of the Nigerian Army in Abuja on 8 December 2016).

Interrogating the importance of ASCOPE, the researcher asked Nyom for clarifications. Nyom shared further insights: the ASCOPE analysis enables Nigerian Army to specify their Operational Environment and structures (interview at Abuja, December 2016).Some soldiers who responded during FGDs were also of the opinion that in-depth analysis of the civil considerations is vital for the long-term success of their units;however, there were no universal agreements as to how such analysis translates to effective operations in their unit. One soldier said the reason for this was that what is done on paper is always different from what military units face in real life situations.

Areas: What is the relationship between people and *where* they live?

Structures: Why are the natural and manmade structures important?

Capabilities: Who is capable and responsible for providing people basic services?

Organizations: What are the different groups of people in the operational environment?

People: How do people communicate across culture in the operational Area?

Events: When are the events occurring in the operational environment?

Figure 4.18: Six categories of considerations in operational environment
Source: Researchers compilation from the fieldwork

The diagram in figure 4.18 identified the six elements of civil considerations within the operational environment as prescribed in ASCOPE. Analysing the ASCOPE elements, FGDs participants argue that, proper use of ASCOPE in the operational environment has the potential to isolate Boko Haram insurgents from the population. However, Attaihiru in addition to what ASCOPE does added that:

> To understand the operational environment, there are several other components beyond the ASCOPE, we must consider the use information to develop our logistic pattern and analysis. -(FGD with commissioned soldiers in Abuja on 7 December 2016).

On the operational and tactical levels, Kyari Mohammed's submission was that:

> Typically, three (3) indispensable conditions provide grounds for groups like Boko Haram to thrive, a gullible population, insurgent leadership to provide direction and governance deficit. These three allow insurgent groups to enjoy freedom of operation. These conditions not only apply to Nigeria, you find them manifest in Mali, Afghanistan, Libya or anywhere insurgencies exist. The only difference perhaps is that they will take different forms and intensities depending on the society. Many of these issues were either ignored or out rightly denied by the Nigerian state.-(IDI with the VC MAUTECH, Yola, on 28 September 2016).

The Physical Environment

Attaihirufurther mentions how the terrain affected people, equipment movement, visibility, and the deployment of different arms and ammunition. There were challenges fighting Boko Haram because the terrain aspects of each area of operations in Yobe, Adamawa and Borno needed evaluation based on their own merits to determine the impact on Boko Haram and the military. Despite weather extremes, Boko haram like most insurgents had maximise the climate and physical structures to surprise the military at all times.

These military activities coupled with the following operational tasks constantly subjected BHi under pressure. The researcher in the diagram below expresses some of the operational tasks mentioned by respondents.

| Prevent or disrupt recruitment and training | Disrupt communications and databases | Interdict the movement of critical materiel and personnel |
| Protect potential targets | | |

Figure 4.19: Some Military operational tasks against Boko Haram
Source: Fieldwork

The physical environment of Boko Haram insurgency shaped Boko Haram's ability to acquire weapons and gain support from outside of the Country. Chad, Niger and Cameroun served as transits and bases for Boko Haram constant supplies across the Lake Chad Basin border areas into Nigeria northeast.

Figure 4.20: Boko Haram Attacks on Security forces 2009-2015
Source: Fieldwork compilation by researcher from the Nigeria Watch Data

Globalization/ICT

Globalization and ICT tools have created opportunities for insurgent groups to access advanced weaponry that can alter their position and supremacy in operational environment. While Boko haram insurgents consistently innovate, improvise and adapt to technological improvements, the Nigerian military longer than necessary could not reinvent their use of modern equipment.[42]

Shortage of military manpower and specialists

There are several challenges linked to the military operations against insurgents. One prominent challenge in Boko Haram insurgency was that the northeast environment makes the military operations against the insurgency costly to the military in terms of resources and casualties.[43]Guerilla warfare as fought against Boko Haram is time consuming. This challenge came to bear through inadequate military manpower as some towns do not have military presence. Beyond the required additional manpower to dominate the area of responsibility, specialist such as medical doctors, military police, electrical and mechanical engineering personnel as well as intelligence officer and personnel were found lacking in most brigades (FGD with soldiers at Abuja, December 2016).

Lack of government presence in rural areas

The movement of infantry where armoured vehicles were vulnerable in built-up areas created additional challenges for operations. In general, the lack of government presence in rural areas of northeast Nigeria ensured that Boko Haram took advantage of that to provide monetary incentives and food to people who in turn surrender their Nigerian allegiance to Boko Haram. The idea of confronting government establishments due to growing frustration made people nonchalant to civil authority.

Misinformation of realities at the operational environment

Kyari Mohammed narrated in the fight against the insurgency politicians either to exaggerate progress or to hide bad news, or to simply deliver information without clarifying analysis. Nigeria government and the military showcasedfavourable data, and hide from the public what they unfavourable.

---

[42]Ndi and Goan in separate KII held in Yola and Maiduguri in 2016
[43]KII, Attaihiru, 2016.

The Army Public Relations Officer, Sani Usman did not totally agree with Kyari Mohammed. Usman response was that counting bodies was often impossible in the imposing Boko Haram operational environment. Usman insisted most of the soldiers lost in combat were given befitting burials and family members duly contacted. For Kyari, the implication of this body count on the military operation was that commanders who lost men have tendency to become loath to risk their lives. This affected the morals of troops leading to mutiny where soldiers shot at the General Officer Commanding (GOC) in protest for high causalities and lack of adequate motivation for the fighting forces.

Lack of Vehicular IED detection Equipment

Interview response from one of the military officers maintained the narrative that one main threat to the advance of troops was IEDs and the only means of detection was the use of hand held metal detectors. This manual method was slow and required protection for the engineer team. In some locations in Damaturu axis for instance, the IED operators were only three and fatigue quickly set in and affected efficiency. Moreover, in order not to lose momentum of the military advance several efforts were made to open new route but the muddy nature of the terrain made it impossible. This highlights the need for mechanized means of IED detection in addition to the manual methods.

Medical Challenges/ Efficient Causality Evacuation (CASEVAC)

Most of the troops operating against Boko Haram insurgents were deployed widely apart and have to conduct short and long-distance patrols. This resulted to fatigue and with dearth of medical personnel; it was not possible for medical orderlies to be deployed in all locations. There was no medical orderly accompanied some patrols. A soldier also mentioned that some Brigades lack Personnel First Aid Kits in case any of them fall casualty. For instance, the 25 Task Force Brigade was said have a doctor, but has no field Ambulance for treatment of personnel. There were instances where IEDs caused severe injuries to troops while on the advance but lack of ambulances and medical evacuation helicopters.

Diplomatic Relations blunders with Lake Chad Basin Countries

Nigeria's reluctance to initially seek and collaborate with countries bordering Lake Chad Basin hampered Nigeria efforts to fight Boko haram and stabilize region up to

the Lake Chad Basin area.The unwillingness of Nigeria to seek military support through diplomatic alliance with Chad and Niger reduced Nigeria's strategic options in the LCB region. It took the commitment of President Buhari after defeating President Jonathan in 2015 elections to engage Cameroun, Niger and Chadregarding Boko Haram in Lake Chad Basin region. This is in consonance with Albert submission that:

> Africa's regional security stability largely depends on translating regional policies, agreements and cooperation into peaceful outcomes where African leaders must also have political will, strong institutions and resources for driving these processes (Albert, 2017).

Intelligence failure

Intelligence is imperative to success of any military operations and general policing efforts to counter insurgency and insurgency. There is always the temptation for insurgency warfare to focus on the enemy. From the field observations, Nigeria lost many military operational battles to Boko Haram, attributably to intelligence failure. Nigeria military and other security forces, by not abiding by what OlusojiAremu describes, as community intelligence obviously could not match Boko Haram (Aremu, 2014). The following are specific areas of Nigeria military intelligence failure.

Figure 4.21: Three areas of military intelligence failure in the fight against Boko Haram

Source: Fieldwork

Failure to Identify the 'Center of Gravity'

Sambisa forest and MandaraMountains were two physical centres of gravity in the operational environment.The military serial mismanagement to identify these elements of Boko Haram strengthblurred the centre of gravity. These were signs that Nigerian troops were unprepared for urban, guerrilla warfare exists.

Lack of vision and Clear objectives

Adam Higazi suggests that said the insurgents enjoy near freedom of action because Nigeria military lacked vision and clear objectives. Nigeria only has a defined national security strategy on paper without any holistic approach to implementing it.

NSA- 2006-2010 Abdullahi Sarki Mukhtar

NSA- March-Sept 2010 Aliyu Mohammed Gusau

NSA -Sept- Oct 2010 Kayode Are

NSA- 2010-2012 Andrew Azazi

NSA- 2012-2015 Sambo Dasuki

NSA- 2015 till date Babagana Monguno

Figure 4.22: Nigeria's National Security Advisers 2006-2015

Source: Researcher's compilation

Poor Logistics

Deficiencies in the Nigerian military logistics system degraded combat effectiveness. The Nigerian transportation system failed in certain areas due to topography. Armoured vehicle recovery was extremely difficult and dangerous due to the terrain (FGD with soldiers at Abuja, December 2016).

Failure to Isolate Boko Haram Insurgents

Though the Nigeria military was present in several major north east cities, they were never able to isolate the insurgents. Hence, these insurgents continued to receive a steady flow of arms and supplies through porous Lake Chad Basin border areas. Consequently, the insurgents maintained the initiative.

Troops Frustration

The theatre of operations was at a time full of disgruntled soldiers on the ground resulting in mutiny.[44]   There is frustration at the judicial systems inability to deal effectively with terror suspects and the knowledge that it is often possible to bribe one's way out of prison play a role in driving those in uniform to commit such acts-in a perverse attempt to ensure justice is served(Nwolise, 2017).

Command and Control fragmentation

Nigerian military commanders lacked clear policy guidance. The Nigerian military's ability to attain and maintain steady, logical operational progress got hampered, if not negated, by a lack of clear governmental policy. The result was a major propaganda victory for the insurgents in many operations. Sharp divisions manifested across the Federal government of Nigeria's agencies on how to best address the insurgency. This division translated into poor command and control structure for brigades, battalions and units leading to lack of overall situational awareness, and poor coordination of tactical forces.

---

[44]Nigerian soldiers mutiny over weapons, premium times 14 may 2014)
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/160762-boko-haram-mutiny-nigerian-soldiers-shoot-commanding-officers-vehicle.html

Figure 4.23: Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff, 2008-2015

Source: Researcher's compilation

Political Will Deficit

The political class proved unable for many years to offer effective response to the violence, which has been in the main politicized. The government of Nigeria and the opposition penchant of using the fight against Boko Haram as tool to discredit each other, to accuse one another of ineptitude or collision overshadowed any progress made. Examples of political will deficit was the political nature of Service Chiefs appointments.From 2007-2015, Nigeria's Minister for Defense was changed eight times with significant effect on the political and military course of action. The military flag level during the course of the intervention equally witnessed arbitrary changes. There were five Chiefs of Defense appointed between 2007 and 2015 and they got in each other's way.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

5.1   Summary

This study examined Nigeria's military operational tactics and its impact on the Boko Haram insurgency. Also, the study involved identifying the human security issues of the population as a result of the military engagement of the Boko Haram insurgents as well as the associated challenges in Nigeria's northeast.Using critical hybrid warfare theory as framework of analysis, the study was conducted with primary data derived from key informant interview, in-depth interview and focus group discussions mainly with the Nigerian Army personnel, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), leaders in Boko Haram affected communities, Boko Haram members, officials of the National Security Adviser's office (ONSA), Department of State Security (DSS), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), policy analysts and academia including selected humanitarian workers.Additionally, secondary data were obtained from books, journals and other relevant publications including the Army's rules of engagement, operational mandates and field reports.This was achieved using purposive and snowballing techniques across three identified locations namely, Yola, Adamawa State, Maiduguri, Borno State and Abuja.

From the study an important discovery was that consecutive political structures in the country shaped the mandates of different military tactics that have been deployed against the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Furthermore, the study noted that, in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency, the operational tactics deployed by the military in rural areas were different from the ones deployed in urban areas. In the rural areas, to expose the insurgents, deprive them of support, cover, and resources, area and population control tactics were used. However, beyond hampering Boko Haram, these tactics forced population relocation and disrupted peoples' normal livelihood activities.Whereas, in urban areas cordon and search, torture and the use of

psychological warfare were usedwith the aim of influencingthe populations' hearts and minds.

In both rural and urban areas, the military deployed large-scale sweeping operations to capture or neutralise the insurgents but often with collateral damages which included razing of houses and high civilian casualties that eventually increased the peoples' sympathy for the Boko Haram insurgents. The different operational tactics therefore in some ways gave Boko Haram insurgents more freedom of action especially within the rural areas where they were able to take and control territories for a while.

As established from the literature consulted for this study, human security is the emphasis on the combination ofthreats to individual and community. However, the military and civilian respondents both viewed human security issues of the operations differently. While sexual harassment by soldiers, road blockage, which hindered free movement of people, burning and destruction of homes and enforced disappearance were issues mentioned by civilian respondents, the military respondents, considered curfew enforcement, protection of humanitarian workers, provision of safe passage for civilians and guarding of critical infrastructure as elements of human security in the operational environment.The respondents mostly attributed the limited human security in the northeast as traceable not only to the Boko Haram insurgents but as well to the military tactics adopted.

Essentially, the capability of the Nigerian military in their operations against Boko Haram insurgency to firmly establish human security for the population in the northeast to live without fear or wantis structurally deficient. This deficiency manifested in forms oflack of clear governmental policy and political direction. The government of Nigeria and the opposition many times turned Boko Haram insurgency into tools to discredit each other or make unsubstantiated accusation of ineptitude against one another. Other deficiencies included weak spatial boundaries between military formations which forced troops and units to think of boundaries in both horizontal and vertical contexts. Further challenges encountered by the military in tackling the Boko Haram insurgency were identified as lack of clarity in the rules of engagement; terrain difficulties;dearth of operational equipment; poor combat support; commercialisation of intelligence; resources wastage and corruption of both political and military leadership.

5.2   Recommendations

Based on the research findings, this study has classified the recommendations into two strands for the government of Nigeria as a whole and to the military as an institution.The political leadership need to have clear, realistic and manageable expectations of the military and their counterinsurgency operations capabilities and limitations. At the same time, the Government of Nigeria need to embrace a comprehensive counterinsurgency approaches thattakes into consideration all instruments of national power and related non-governmental entities in ways that identify and prioritise national and human security components. The preparedness or commitment of government to long-term solutions is essential as human security comprising of economic and political solutions must occur concurrently and be factored into military interventions in violent conflicts.

The Nigeria's military high command will need to have a standardized human security enhancement procedure that can be integrated into their mandates of operation and rules of engagement. This procedure should put human security at the centre of grand military operational planning, execution and evaluation. Such would also need to be integrated across the country's security architecture with coordination with other sister agencies. It is also suggested that the Nigerian military high command should formulate a policy for long-term preparation of units that can easily adapt to counter-insurgency operation demands. The military should harmonise all logistics requirements and platforms, of the armed forces to encourage common usage for internal security operations relating to insurgency. There is also a need for Military operations' early and balanced entry strategy. The strategymust be comprehensive in approach and flexible in usage while resources must be committed to equal the tasks to be performed by the troops.

Finally, the Nigeria military needs to invest more on its leadership and control through a long-term plan to build up significant cadre of professional counterinsurgency combatants and senior officers with experience and critical judgments to take appropriate action in difficult circumstances that insurgencies present. This equally meant that the military must develop counterinsurgencies benchmarks for progress using appropriate indicators. The suggestion here is that the Nigerian military must be

retrospective. The ability of military operations to enhance human security tomorrow will be easier by reflecting systematically on the extent of progress today

5.3 Conclusion

The change in operational focus of Boko Haram in 2009 from soft target attacks into coordinated violent assaults on police and military bases, including converting seized Nigerian territories into caliphates shocked the military and exposed their level of unpreparedness for hybrid warfare. Thispoints to the fact that,military over-reliance on conventional combat power and enemy-centric approaches needs to be re-evaluated.

While military involvement in armed violence has shifted to identifying the best way of protecting populations and ensuring human security, the Nigerian military engagement with Boko Haram largely aimed to provide human security in northeast of the country remain inadequate. As such, the Boko Haram insurgents realized from onset that the population and the terrain are central to Nigeria's military vulnerability and the will to fight. This explains why the military tactics adopted to match up with Boko Haram were antagonistic of the very population the military was seeking to protect. The military attacks not only humiliated the population,but equally created fear that angered them such that they were left to ally with the Boko Haram insurgents, thus bolstering Boko Haram resources and capabilities to evade the military.

As much as the military operations hindered the Boko Haram insurgency, consensus from literature and data collected indicated that all insurgencies are political.Precautionary long term political and non-political strategies capable of defeating insurgencies in its early stages were not prioritised. Such a short-term conception of Boko Haram as an 'extremely small-scale, isolated insurgency group rather than an unconventional insurgency with potential longer-term effects eroded any chance of appropriate political entry point.The political leadership in Nigeria also failed to provide needed strong security governance with preference short political victories over longer-term engagements of the issues that created the Boko Haram insurgency.

The military on its part was equally unable to clarify what human security entails within their operations especially in line with globally accepted frameworks or as it

relates to existing literature.To enhance human security in future military operations involving engagement of insurgency groups, Nigeria requires advancing improvement in threeareas.In the first instance, the country must reshape the military's mandate and role in internal securityoperations. Secondly, there is the need to depoliticise the environment in which the military operates and thirdly, ethics and accountability of troops, and resourceshould be properly institutionalisedinto Nigeria'smilitary culture.Future military tactics during insurgency should therefore be comprehensive, hybrid and conformable to the ever-dynamic operational environment bearing in mind that the people are integral to fighting insurgents.

5.4　　Contribution to Knowledge

There are three key contributions to knowledge from this study. The first wasregarding the object of research when it comes to factors that shape human security enhancement in insurgency.Since the inception of Boko Haram insurgency, extant studies on the objects of human insecurity in the northeast mainly focused on the Boko Haram as critical object of violence largely neglectingthe state or the military's contribution. The critical hybrid warfare theory which holds special relevance to Nigeria's single narrative of Boko Haram as the main producer of violence is dominant was adopted. As such, this study was critical in questioning the traditional counter-insurgency approach of the Nigeria's military as alien to the nature of human insecurity challenges that the Boko Haram poses and identified ways that the military has equally been culpable as source(s) of human insecurity to the people in the northeast.

Secondly, unlike existing literature on the military engagement of insurgency which mostlyconsisted of military operations' assessment from the prism of human rights abuses and civil-military relations, this study contributed a more holistic approach that examined the concept of human security as a measure of effective military operations in asymmetric warfare.

The third and the last contribution to knowledgewas that irrespective of the approaches adopted, be it conventional or hybrid, military operations are not sufficient to guarantee human security. Human security can only be achieved through proper

mix of the elements of national power which transcend just coercive means to identifying structural reasons for the emergence of insurgent groups in the first place emanates from the methodology adopted which departed from using just survey design to highlight the human security issues. The study rather combined triangulation of data from the military personnel, Boko haram members and the civilian population including information from military rules of engagement to generate new data showing how human security straddles personal, political and community security.

REFERENCES

Achumba, I.C., Ighomereho, O. S. and Akpor-Robaro, M. O. M. 2013. Security Challenges in Nigeria and the Implications for Business Activities and Sustainable Development. Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, Vol.4, No.2, 2013 www.iiste.org ISSN 2222 2855 (Online).

Adelman, J. 2008. An Age of Imperial Revolutions. American Historical Review 113, 2, 319–40.

Ademoyega, A. 1981. *Why We Struck. Ibadan:* Evans Publishers.

Adeniyi, O. 2011. Power, Politics and Death: A Front-row Account of Nigeria Under the Late President Yar'Adua, Lagos: Prestige.

Adesoji, A 2010. The Boko Haram uprising and Islamic revivalism in Nigeria." African Spectrum, 45 (2), 95-108.

Adesoji, A. 2011. "Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigeria State". Africa Today 57, no. 4, pp. 98-119.

Adetula, V. A. O. 2015. 'Governance Deficit, Violence and Insecurity in African Border Areas'.in Society for International Relations Awareness (ed.)

Reflections on Nigeria's Foreign   Policy, Vol. IV: The Challenges of Insurgenc. Abuja: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Adewumi A., 2014. The Battle of the Minds: The Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in Northern Nigeria. The West Africa Insight Journal.

Akanji, O.O. 2009. The Politics of combating domestic insurgency in Nigeria in Okumu and   Botha (ed) 2009. Domestic Insurgency in Africa: Defining, Addressing and Understanding Its Impact On Human Security, Institute for Security Studies.

Akinola, O. 2017. The Elusive quest for Peace: Boko Haram and the hollowness of Nigeria's counter insurgency strategy and weak security architecture in Understanding Boko Haram: Terrorism and Insurgency in Africa. Hentz, J.J and Solomon, J (Eds).

Alao, A. 2015. Understanding Radicalisation and the Challenges Posed to Development, UNDP working document. Nairobi.

Albert, I,O, 2017. BringBackOurGirls: A critique of a Nigerian Hash tag Activism, A presentation   on BBOG and military media strategies in Nigeria.

Albert, I.O 2005. Terror as a political weapon; Reflections on the Bomb explosions in Abacha's   Nigeria. IFRA Special Research Issue, Vol 1, PP 37-56

Albert, I.O. 2010. When the State Kills: Political Assassinations in Abacha's in Adebanwi, W. and Obadare, E. 2010. Encountering the Nigerian State. Palgrave   Macmillan.

Albert, I.O., 2017. Regional Engagement in Peacebuilding in Africa: Perspectives and Challenges. 2017 Kofi Annan–Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture given at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre on 4 April 2017 in Accra.

Alex P. Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, New York:2011, Routledge.

Alexander, J.B 2006. "The Changing Nature of War, the Factors Mediating Future Conflict, and Implications for SOF," (Joint Special Operations University Report 06-1, Hurlburt Field, Flourida.

Alexander, Y. and Kraft, M.B. 2008. Evolution of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy Greenwood Publishing Group.

Amalu, N.S. 2015. Impact of Boko Haram on Human Security in Nigeria. Global Journal of Social Sciences Vol 14, 2015: 35-42. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/gjss.v14i1.4 accessed on 8 september 2016.

Amnesty International 2012. Nigeria: Trapped in The cycle of violence. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/16000/afr440432012en.pdf. accessed on 10 July 2015

Anderson, B. 2001. The Enemy Within," Spectator (London), p. 30.

Anderson, B. 2006. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Verso. New York.

Anderson, J. L. 2004. Guerrillas: Journeys in the Insurgent World, New York: Penguin Books.

Aremu, A.O., 2014. Policing and Terrorism: Challenges and Issues in Intelligence, Ibadan:Stirling-Horden Publishers ltd.

Ashafa, A.M. and Jibrin, H. (Eds) 2017 The Nigeria Army in a demoncracy since 1999; A professional demonstration of military subordination to civil authority. Pyla-mak Services. Kaduna.

Awortu, B. E., 2015. Boko Haram Insurgency and Underdevelopment of Nigeria. ResearchResearch on Humanities and Social Sciences (5) 6 pg 213-220.

Axworthy, L. 1999. Human security: Safety for People in a Changing World, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, Canada, 29 April.

Azazi, A. (2011). Responding to the Emerging Trends of Terrorism in Nigeria, 5th Policing Executive Forum Conference Proceedings organized by CLEEN Foundation.

Bajpai, K. 2000. Human Security: Concept and Measurement, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper   (Number 19), University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana: Pg. 48.

Bayat, J., Ellis, S., and Hibou, B. 1999. The criminalization of the State in Africa. The international   African Institute in Association with Indiana University Press.

BBC   2016. Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists?". *BBC News*. Archived from the originalon 6 June 2018. Retrieved 20 February 2016.

Bellamy, A.J. and McDonald, M. 2002. The utility of human security: Which humans? What security? A reply to Thomas and Tow', Security Dialogue, 33:3, pp. 373–77.

Bjorgo, T. and Silke, A. 2018. Root causes of Terrorism, Routledge Handbook of terrorism and Counterterrorism, pp. 57-65.

Bond, B. 1996. The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bond, M. S. 2007. "Hybrid War: A New Paradigm for Stability Operations in Failing States." U.S. Army War College Monograph, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Botha, A. 2009.   Challenges in Understanding Insurgency in Africa: A Human Security   Perspective. African Security Review 17.2 Institute for Security Studies.

Brown, L.F. 2011. Twenty-First Century Warfare Will Be Hybrid. U.S. Army War College,Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Brysk, A. and Shafir, G. (eds.) (2007) National Insecurity and Human Rights. Global Area andInternational Archive, University of California Press, Los Angeles.

Bures, O. 2011. EU Counterinsurgency Policy a Paper Tiger? Ashgate Publishers.

Campos, N.F. and Gassebner, M. 2008. International Insurgency, Political Instability and the Escalation Hypothesis. Mimeo, Brunel University and ETH Zurich.

Chabal, P. and Daloz, J. 1999. Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. The International African Institute. Indiana University Press.

Cheeseman, G. 2005. 'Military Force(s) and In/security', in Booth, K. (ed.) Critical Security Studies and World Politics, Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner. 63-87.

Cilliers, J. 2004. Human Security in Africa A conceptual framework for review. African Human Security Initiative.

Commission on Human Security 2003. Human Security Now. New York.

Comolli, V. 2017. Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency, Revised Edition. London: Hurst Publishers.

Cordesman, A. H. 2006. The War After the War: Strategic Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Cordesman, A. H. 2015. Broad Patterns in Global Terrorism in 2014. Center for Strategic & International Studies.

Crisis Group (2016) Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform Africa Report N°237.

Crisis Group, 2010. "Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict". *International Crisis Group Africa Report* no. 168.

Danjibo, N. D (2009)," Islamic Fundamentalism and Secretarian Violence: The "Maitatsine" and Boko Haram" crises in Northern Nigeria. Peace and Conflict Studies Paper Series, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, 1-21.

David, C. 2001. 'The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria'. Retrieved from www.ctc.usma.edu on 30 July 2017.

DeAngelis, T. 2009. Understanding terrorism. Monitor on Psychology. Vol. 40, No 10

Dominic D., Johnson, P. and Dominic Tierney, 2006. *Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victoryand Defeat in International Politics,* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 283.

Dudouet, V. 2013. Dynamics and Factors of Transition from Violent to Nonviolent Resistance. Journal of Peace Research. 50. 401-413. 10.1177/0022343312469978.

Edgerton, R.B. 2002. Africa's Armies: From Honor to infamy, A history from 1791 to the present. Westview Press.

Ellis, S. 2001. The Mask of Anarchy: The destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African CivilWar. New York University Press.

Enders, W. and Sandler, T. 2008. Economic Consequences of Insurgency in Developed and   Developing Countries: An Overview. In: Keefer, P.,Loayza, N. (Eds.), Insurgency, Economic Development, and Political Openness, Cambridge University Press: New   York, pp. 17-47.

Eruvbetine, A.E. 2008 "Insurgency: Perplexing Perspectives" in AOlukoju and M Falaiye (eds) Global Understanding in the Age of Insurgency, (Lagos: University of Lagos Press), p.4.

Fearon, J.D. and Laitin, D.D. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. The American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 1. pp. 75-90.

Feldman, A.E. and Perala, M. (2008). Reassessing the causes of Nongovernmental terrorism in Latin America. Latin American politics and Society. Volume 46, Issue 2.

Forest, J.F. 2006. (ed). The making of a terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes. Volume 3. West Point.

Forest, J.F. 2012. Confronting the terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria. US.: Joint special operations university and the strategic studies department.

Freeman, C. 2015. South African Mercenaries' Secret war on Boko Haram. Telegraph, May 10. Accessed February 10 2017http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11596210/So th-African-mercenaries-secret-war-on-Boko-Haram.html

Frey, B. S., 2004: Dealing with terrorism – stick or carrot? Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, United Kingdom.

Fukuyama, F. (2004). State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, Ithaca:Cornell University Press.

Gat, A. 1992. The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 215–21.

Girei, A.A and B. Dire, B.2014. Analysis of Poverty and Inequality among Farmers in Yola North Local Government Area of Adamawa State, Nigeria International Review ofSocial Sciences and Humanities Vol. 6, No. 2 (2014), pp. 126-132

Global Peace Index (GPI, 2012) Global Peace Ranking, Institute for Economics and Peace. http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/2012-Global-Peace-Index-Report.pdf accessed on 12 January 2015

Gompert, D. C., John G., Adam R. G, David R.F, Seth G. J., Martin C. L., Edward, O., Brooke S.L., and Robert E. H., 2008. War by Other Means-Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency: RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Final Report. Santa Monica, CA, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG595z2.htmlaccesed on 13 July2015

Güler, R. 2012. The Role and Place of Strategic Communication in Countering Terrorism. The Journal of Defense Sciences Kasım/November 2012, Cilt/Volume 11, Sayı/Issue 2, 1-31.

Hamilton, L., Hoffman, B., Jenkins, B., Pillar, P., Raufer, X., Reich, W. and Reinares, F. 2006. State of the Struggle: Report on the Battle against Global InsurgencyWashington, DC: Council on Global Insurgency.

Harmon, C.C. 2010. Five strategies of Terrorism. Small Wars and insurgencies journal 12(3): 39-66.

Harrison, E. 2004. The Post-Cold War International System. New York: Routledge

Hentz, J.J and Solomon, H. (Eds) 2017. Understanding Boko Haram: Insurgency and Insurgencyin Africa (Contemporary Insurgency Studies), New York, Routledge.

Hentz, J.J. 2010. 'National and Human Security in Sub-Sahara Africa', Orbis, 54 (4): 630-643. https://www.fpri.org/article/2010/10/national-and-human-security-in-sub-sahara-africa/accessed 20 February 2017.

Hentz, J.J. 2017. Nigeria and a war across states in Northwest Africa, contemporary terrorismstudies in Hentz, J.J and Solomon, S. Eds, London and New York. Routledge.

Herbst, J. 2004. African Militaries and Rebellion: The Political Economy of Threat and CombatEffectiveness. Journal of Peace Research Vol 41, Issue 3, pp. 357 – 369.

Hoffman, B. 2006. *Inside Terrorism* (2nd ed.). New York: Columbia University Press.

Horowitz. J. 2012. Counterinsurgency and Human Rights Abuses in Kenya and Uganda: TheWorld Cup Bombing and Beyond: The open society foundations.

Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2012. Spiraling Violence Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria, Human Rights Watch.

Huntington, S. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon &Schuster: New York Institution Press.

Hynek, N. and Chandler, D. 2011. Introduction: Emancipation and power in human security, in   David Chandler and Nik Marhia (eds), Critical Perspectives on Human Security:Rethinking Emancipation and Power in International Relations, Abingdon: Routledge), pp.1–10.

Ijide, W.O. 2010. Violence and Armed forces: The Psychology of Military Violence.

IOM 2014. The IDP situation in North-Eastern Nigeria: Displacement Tracking Matrix Report (DTM). https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/The-IDP-Situation-in-North-Eastern-Nigeria-DTM-December-2014.pdf Accessed on 14 April 2016.

Jackson. A.P. 2013. The Roots of military Doctrine: Change and continuity in understanding the practice of warfare. Asian Institute. Griffith University.

Kaplan, E., Kress, M. and Szechtman, R. 2010. Confronting Entrenched Insurgents. OperationsResearch. 58. 329-341. 10.1287/opre.1090.0728.

Krause, K. 2007. Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Policy Paper N. 26.

Krause, K. 2008. Building the agenda of human security: Policy and practice within the human   security network', International Social Science Journal, 59:1, pp. 65–79.

Krieger, T. and Meierrieks, G. 2009. What Causes Insurgency?

Krueger, A.B and Maleckova, J. 2003. Education, Poverty and Insurgency: Is There a Causal Connection? *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 119–144;

Lasica, D.T. 2009. Strategic Implications of Hybrid War: A Theory of Victory

Liotta, P.H. and Owen, T. 2006. 'Why Human Security?', The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 7 (1): 37-54.

Lum, C, Kennedy, L.W. and Sherley, A.J. 2006. "The Effectiveness of Counter-Insurgency Strategies", *Campbell Systematic Reviews*, no. 2, p. 8.

Mackinlay, J. 2002. Globalisation and Insurgency, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 352.

Magstadt, T.M. 2009. Understanding Politics, Ideas Institutions and issues. 10th edition.

McCormack, J. 2018. World War I Resources. Indiana Department of Public Instruction.

McCormack, T. 2011. Human security and the separation of security and development, Conflict,Security and Development, 11:2, pp. 235–60.

Menocal, A.R. 2011. 'State Building for Peace: a new paradigm for international engagement in post-conflict fragile states?', Third World Quarterly, 32 (10): 1715–1736.

Metz, S. and Millen, R. 2004. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Treat and Response, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army StrategicStudies Institute, November.

Mohammed, M. and Abdullahi, L.F (Eds) 2017 Global Terrorism: The Nigerian Experience in Taming Boko Haram, Headquaters Nigerian Army.

Monguno, A.K 2014. Youths, Radicalisation and Affiliation with Insurgent Groups in NorthernNigeria, CLEEN Foundation Publication.

Mosbach, H.G.B. 2017. R.J. Rummel: An Assessment of His Many Contributions. Springer Briefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice Volume 37.

Nathanson, S. 2010. Insurgency and the Ethics of War Cambridge University Press.

Ndubuisi, F. 2008. "Ethical Issues in Terrorism" in AOlukoju and M Falaiye (eds) Global Understanding in the Age of Insurgency, (Lagos: University of Lagos Press), pp.25-31.

Neville, C. 2007. Introduction to Research and Research Methods, Effective Learning Service.University ofBradford.

Nwolise, OBC, 2017. Nigeria's Anti-Terror War against Boko Haram: The turning point and lessons for National security and Development, Pyla-mak Services. Kaduna.

OCHA (2018) 2018 Global Humanitarian Overview.

Oguntade, G. 2013. The Social Contract: Which way Nigeria? The Nation Newspaper

Ogwu, U.J. 2017 Leadership, Democracy and the challenges of development, New Albany, Ohio.

Okumu, W. and Botha, A. (eds) 2007 Domestic Insurgency In Africa: Defining, Addressing and Understanding Its Impact On Human Security.

Olasehinde-Williams 2014. Research Architecture in Research Methods in Peace and ConflictStudies Albert, I.O, Olasehinde-Williams, O and Aremu, O. Eds.

Olojo, A. 2013. Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram, ICCT Research Paper, October

Onouha, F.C. (2011). Nigeria's Vulnerability to Terrorism: The Imperative of a Counter Religious Extremism and Terrorism (CONREST)Strategy, Peace and Conflict Monitor,2 February 2011, Retrieved from: http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id Accessed on 13 April 2006.

Onuocha, C. 2012. Boko Haram: Nigeria's Extremist Islamic Sect, Aljazeera Global media.http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2012/2/29/20122291133 41793734BOKO%20HARAM%20NIGERIAS%20EXTREMIST%20ISLAMI C%20SECT.pdf accessed on 30 october 2016.

Opafola, S.O. 2008. "The Logic of Insurgency" in AOlukoju and M Falaiye (eds) Global Understanding in the Age of Insurgency, (Lagos: University of Lagos Press), pp.13-21.

Oshita, O.O 2007. Domestic insurgency in Africa Ontology of an Old War in New Trenches in   Okumu, W. and Botha, A. (eds) 2007 Domestic Insurgency In Africa: Defining, Addressing and Understanding Its Impact On Human Security

Owolade, F. 2014. Boko Haram: How a Militant Islamist Group Emerged in Nigeria. GatestoneInstitute International Policy Council. Retrieved from http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/boko-haram-nigeria accessed on 30 July 2017

Palmer, R. R. 2014. The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800, Princeton Classics edn. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Paret, P. 2007. Clausewitz and the State: The man, His theories and His times, Princeton. New Jersey.

Peel, M. 2010. A swamp full of Dollars: Pipelines and paramilitaries at Nigeria's oil frontier.Lawrence Hill Book.

Ploch, L. 2010. Countering Insurgency in East Africa: The U.S. Response Congressional Research Service.

Poloni-Staudinger, L. and Ortbals, C.D. 2013. Terrorism and Violent Conflict: Women's Agency,Leadership, and Responses, Springer New York.

Pyszczynski, T, Solomon, S. and Greenberg, J. 2003. In the wake of 9/11: The psychology of Terror. America psychological Association. New York.

Quinn, P.T. 2008. Human Security and Development: The Case of Cambodia.

Rapoport, D. C. 2004. "The Four Waves of Modern Insurgency," in: Cronin, A. K., Ludes, J. (eds), *Attacking Insurgency: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, Washington, DC. Georgetown University Press, 46-73.

Rasler, K. and Thompson, W.R. 2012. War making and state making: How and where does it fitinto a bigger picture? In Vasquez 2012. (ed) What do we know about War?

Ravndal, J.A. 2015. Thugs or Terrorists? A typology of Right-wing Terrorism and violence inWestern Europe. Journal for Deradicalization.

Reuveny, R. and Thompson, W.R. 2010. Coping with Insurgency Origins, Escalation, Counterstrategies, and Responses, State University of New York, Sunny Press

Rice, E.E. 1988. Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries, Berkeley, Calif.:University of California Press.

Rodney, W. 1983. How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Tanzanian Publishing House, Dar-Es Salaam. 6th reprint.

Ross, J.I. 1993. Structural causes of oppositional political Terrorism: Towards a causal Model. Sage Journal. Volume 30 issue 3, 317-329

Rotberg, R.I. 2002. The New Nature of Nation-State Failure. The Washington Quarterly 25(3), 85-96.

Rourke, J.T. 2009 International Politics on the World Stage, Singapore: McGraw Hill.

Rummel, R. J. 1996. Death by Government. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers

Schmid, A.P. 2013. Strengthening the Role of Victims and Incorporating Victims in Efforts toCounter Violent Extremism and Insurgency.

Schmid, A.P. and Crelinsten, R.D. 1993. Western Responses to Terrorism. Frank Cass Publishers.

Schmid, Jongman et al. 1988. Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature. Amsterdam: North Holland, Transaction Books.

Schuurman, B. and Eijkman, Q. 2013. Moving Insurgency Research Forward: The Crucial Role of Primary Sources, ICCT Background Note.

Siegle, J. 2011. 'Stabilising Fragile States', Global Dialogue, 13 (1): 1-16.

Silke, A. 2001. The Devil you know: Continuing problems with research on terrorism. Terrorism and political Violence volume 13,4, pp 1-14.

Silke, A. 2008. "Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization", *European Journal of Criminology* 5, no. 1, p. 101.

Silva, T.P. and Butler, J.M. 2011. Terrorist Attacks and Counterinsurgency Practices Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York.

Smith, M. 2015. Boko Haram Inside Nigeria's unholy war. I.B Tauris & Co Publishers.

Smith, M. and Zeigler, S.M. 2017. Terrorism before and after 9/11- a More dangerous world? SAGE Journal Vol 4, issue 4.

Solomon, H, 2015. Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Africa: Fighting insurgency from Al Shabab, Ansar dine and Boko haram. London, PalmgaveMacmililan.

START 2013. Global Insurgency Database [Data file]. National Consortium for the Study of Insurgency and Responses to Insurgency. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 13 Accessed on January 2015

START 2018. Global Terrorism in 2017 https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_GTD_Overview2017_July2018.pdf Accessed on 13 April 2019.

Stephen T. Hosmer, *Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars, 1941– 1991*, RAND, MR-576-AF, 1996, especially pp. 199–202.

Stevenson, J.A., Pate, A. and Asiamah, E. (2017) Effective Counter-terorism against Boko Haram: Empirical assessments of coercion, delegitimization, incentivization and denial strategies in Nigeria (2009-2014) in Hentz, J.J. and

Solomon, H. (eds) (2017) Understanding Boko Haram: Terrorism and Insurgency in Africa, New York, Routledge.

Tavares, J., 2004. The open society assesses its enemies: shocks, disaster and terrorist attacks,Journal of Monetary Economics, 51(5), 1039-1070.

Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act. (2013). Nigeria. Retrieved from www.sec.gov.org.pdf Nigeria on 30 July 2017.

The World Bank 2016. North-East Nigeria: Recovery and Peace Building Assessment component   Report Volume II.

Thomas, C. and Wilkin, P. (eds) 1999. Globalization, Human Security, and the African   Experience.

Thomas, N. and Tow, W.T. 2002. The utility of human security: Sovereignty and humanitarian intervention, Security Dialogue, 33:2, pp. 177–92

Thompson, R. 1966. Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (London, Chatto and Windus, 1966) by Roberts, A (2008) Countering Insurgency: Historical Perspective in Bianchi and Keller (ed) (2008).

Thompson, W. 2006. "Emergent Violence, Global Wars, and Insurgency," in Devezas, T., *Kondratieff Waves, Warfare and World Security*, 186-194.

Townsend, C. 2002. Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

UN 2009. Human Security in Theory and Practice Application of the Human Security Conceptand the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security Human Security Unit Office forthe Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs United Nations.

UN 2016. Human Security Handbook: An integrated approach for the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals and the priority areas of the international community and the United Nations system. the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security.

UNESCO 2008. Human Security Approaches and Challenges

UNOCHA 2014. National Emergency Management Agency multi-sector rapid assessment to Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States, March 3-7.

Van Leeuwen, M. (ed.) 2003. Confronting Insurgency: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies, London: Kluwer Law International.

Vasquez, J.A. (Ed). 2012. What do we know about war? 2[nd]edition. Rowman and Littlefield publishers.

Walker, A. 2016. Eat the Heart of the Infidel; The harrowing of Nigeria and the rise of   Boko   Haram. Hurst publishers. London.

Whittaker, D.J. 2004. Terrorists and Insurgency in the Contemporary World Routledge,   London.

Wilkinson, P. 2008. Liberal State Responses to Insurgency and Their Limits in Bianchi   and Keller ed 2008 Counterinsurgency: Democracy's Challenge

World Bank Group. 2016. North-East Nigeria Recovery and Peace Building Assessment: State   Reports. Washington, DC: World Bank

World Bank Group. 2016. North-East Nigeria Recovery and Peace Building Assessment   State   Reports.   Washington,   DC: World   Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25779 Accessed on 10 June 2017

Yilmaz, M.E. 2008. "The New World Order": An Outline of the Post-Cold War Era. Turkish Journal of International relations, Vol 7, No 4.

Yoroms, G. 2008. Counter-insurgency Measures in West Africa in Okumu, W., Botha, A. (Eds). 2008. Understanding Insurgency in Africa: Building Bridges and overcoming the Gaps.

Research Interview Guide
Key Informant Interviews and In-Depth Interview Questions

A. Military Personnel

1. What were the specific mandates given to the military in their operations against Boko Haram insurgency?

2. What specific operational tactics have military deployed against Boko Haram insurgency from 2009-2015?

3. How different or similar were the military tactics used under successive political leadership from 2009-2015?

4. How effective were the military tactics deployed from 2009-2015?

5. To what extent did these military tactics contribute to human security or insecurity of the population in northeast Nigeria?

6. Were there human security issues that the military tactics adopted could not fully address?

7. What unintended human security consequences emanated from the military tactics adopted?

8. What were the challenges encountered by the military in deploying these tactics?

9. How sustainable would you describe the military tactics used against Boko Haram?

10. What challenges were encountered by the military in deploying different tactics against Boko Haram?

11. What factors were responsible for these challenges encountered by the military?

12. How can the military prevent or overcome such challenges in future?

B. Arrested Boko haram respondents

13. How did the military attack Boko haram insurgents?
14. In what ways did the military tactics affect the members of Boko Haram?
15. What effects did the state of emergency have on the Boko Haram activities?
16. How did Boko Haram insurgents frustrate military actions in different communities of the northeast?
17. Did you receive supports from the population and what nature of support did you receive?

C. Leaders of Affected communities and Internally Displaced persons?

18. How did the military tactics against Boko Haram affect people and lifestyle in your community?

19. Describe the military tactics used against Boko haram in your community and whether it made people more safe or afraid

20. How would you describe the strength and weaknesses of these military tactics on your community?

21. Describe the impact of the military tactics on the Boko Haram insurgents?

22. Describe the effect of these military strategies on the population that are not supporting Boko Haram

23. In what ways did the state of emergency help to reduce or increase Boko Haram insurgents' attacks?

24. What human security issues can you link to how military tackle Boko Haram?

25. How did military prevented or contributed to displacement in your community?

26. Mention normal activities that people were able to carry out because of the military.

27. What basic activities of the peoples' lives were hampered by the military and how were they hampered?

28. Could you identify the challenges that military faced in protecting the people?

D. Academia/ Researchers and Policy Analysts Respondents?

29. How will you assess the Nigerian military operations against Boko Haram under successive government 2009-2015?

30. What specific tactics would you identify from the military operations?

31. How did the military tactics adopted changed under successive political and military leadership?

32. Would you describe the military tactics use as effective or non-effective and why?

33. In what ways have these military tactics affect Boko Haram insurgency?

34. What specific human security issues are linked to military tactics adopted/

35. What challenges are associated with these military tactics used against Boko Haram?

E. Civil society organisation officials?

36. How will you assess the Nigerian military operations against Boko Haram under successive government 2009-2015?

37. How did the military tactics against Boko Haram affect people and lifestyle in your community?

38. Describe the military tactics used against Boko haram in the community where you work

39. Did military tactics contribute to making people more safe or afraid?

40. Identify the strengths and weaknesses of these military tactics on communities where you work?

41. Describe the impact of the military tactics on the Boko Haram insurgents where you work?

42. In what ways did the state of emergency help to reduce or increase Boko Haram insurgents' attacks?

F. Related Government Agencies officials: ONSA; NDLEA: NHRC?

43. What mandates were the military given to execute against Boko Haram by successive government 2009-2015?

44. What nature of support did the military receive from successive government to execute their mandate against Boko Haram?

45. Describe the military tactics used against Boko Haram 2009-2015

46. How effective would you describe different strategies of the military against Boko Haram?

47. In what ways did military strategies positively or negatively contribute to human security?

48. What drawbacks were the military faced with in their operations against Boko Haram 2009-2015?

APPENDIX II
Focus Group Discussion Guide

A. Focus Group Discussion Guide:
   Military (Commissioned and non-commissioned officers)

1. What were the specific military mandates given to military by successive political leadership?

2. Were the mandates to the military clear and unambiguous?

3. How did military command and control influence your tactics?

4. Identify and describe military tactics used against Boko haram?

5. In what ways did these tactics impact on Boko Haram insurgents?

6. What human security issues are linked to these military tactics that were adopted?

7. Identify the unintended consequences that came from the military tactics

8. What would you have done differently tactically if you are faced with similar scenario?

9. Mention the operational challenges that were faced by the military

10. How can these challenges be tackled in future?

B. Focus Group Discussion Guide:
   Community leaders and Internally Displaced Persons

1. What were the military tactics used for protection against Boko haram inyour community? Did the tactics work?

2. Did military tactics against Boko Haram work to make people more safe or afraid?

3. Were people displaced only because of Boko Haram or the military also contribute to of displacement in your community?

4. How did displacement occur in your communities?

APPENDIX III

Key Informant Interview List

S/N	Name	Institution/ Organisation	Rank	Post	Sex	Place of Interview	Type of Interview	Date of Interview
1	Mr Ehi	National Emergency Management Agency	Director	-	M	Yola	KII	26 Sep 2016
2	Ibrahim, A.A	Office of National security Adviser	Director	External Relations	M	Abuja	KII	26 Sep 2016
3	Tukur Buratai	Nigerian Army	Lt Gen	Chief of Army Staff	M	Abuja Yola	KII IDI	26 Sep 2016 12 July 2017
4	Wale Ige	NDLEA Adamawa State	State Director	-	M	Yola	KII	27 Sep 2016
5	Ralph	Department of State Security	-	-	M	Yola	KII	28 Sep 2016
6	Ndi	Nigeria Army	Lt Col	Commanding Officer	M	Maiduguri	KII	31 Oct 2016
7	Goan	Nigerian Army Soldier	-	-	M	Maiduguri	KII	31 Oct 2016
8	Haliru	Department of State Security	-	-	M	Maiduguri	KII	2 Nov 2016
9	Shehu	Annonymous	Barr	Human rights	M	Maiduguri	KII	3 Nov 2016
10	Emma Okoh	Nigerian Army	Col	Former Commanding officer	M	Abuja	KII	7 Nov 2016
11	Attahiru	Nigeria Army	Lt Col	Logistics officer	M	Abuja	KII	7 Nov 2016
12	Komolafe	Nigerian Army	Brig Gen	Director, Policy development	M	Abuja	KII	7 Dec 2016
13	J.J. Ogunlade	National Defense College	Brig Gen	DS	M	Abuja	KII	10 Dec 2016
14	AuduBulama	Tony Blair Center for Religion and Geopolitics	Manager	Program Manager	M	Abuja	KII	1 July 2017

15	FisayoSoyombo	International centre for Investigative Reporting	Editor	Investigative Journalism	M	Abuja	KII	4 July 2017
16	Shehu Liberty	Maiduguri Municipal Council	Dr	Former Chairman	M	Maiduguri	KII	6 July 2017
17	Malam	Detained Boko Haram Qur'anic teacher	-	-	M	Maiduguri	KII	7 July 2017
18	Aisha	Detained Boko Haram Suicide Bomber	-	-	F	Maiduguri	KII	7 July 2017
19	Meya	Arrested Boko Haram Suicide Bomber	-	-	F	Maiduguri	KII	7 July 2017
20	Muazu Misiya	Civilian Joint Task Force Bama	Commander		M	Maiduguri	KII	8 July 2017

APPENDIX IV
In-Depth Interview List

S/N	Name	Institution/ Organisation	Rank	Post	Sex	Place of Interview	Type of Interview	Date of Interview
1	Patricia Donli	University of Maiduguri	Professor		F	Ibadan	IDI	10 Aug 2016
2	Jude Momodu	ModiboAdama Universityof Technology	Dr	Researcher	M	Yola	IDI	25 Sep 2016
3	Gambo Matuidi	ModiboAdama University of Technology	Lecturer		M	Yola	IDI	26 Sep 2016
4	Ahmad Sajoh	Adamawa State Commissioner for Information	Commissioner	-	m	Yola	IDI	26 Sep 2016
5	Bill Hansen	American University of Nigeria, Yola	Prof	HOD, International Studies	M	Yola	IDI	26 Sep 2016
6	Adam Higazi	American University	Visiting Scholar	Researcher	M	Yola	IDI	26 Sep 2016
7	Zari Yeni	Lake Chad Basin Commission	Director	-	F	Yola	IDI	27 Sep 2016
8	Zakari Ramadan	Chad Centre for Strategic Studies	Prof	Director	M	Yola	IDI	27 Sep 2016
9	Aja Akpuru Aka	Nigeria Institute for strategic studies	Prof	Director	M	Yola	IDI	27 Sep 2016
10	Mercy Kwambe	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution IPRC/ Indigene of Michika,	Program officer		F	Yola/ Abuja	IDI	27 Sep 2016

204

		Adamawa						
11	Kyari Mohammed	ModiboAdamaUniversity of Technology	Professor	VC	M	Yola	IDI	28 Sep 2016
12	Fatima Kyari-Mohammed	ECOWAS	NigeriaRepresentative		F	Yola, Abuja	IDI	28 Sep 2016
13	TanwaAshiru	Bulwark Intelligence	Former US Air Force	Security Analyst	F	Ibadan	IDI	12 Oct 2016
14	Elizabeth	University of Maiduguri	Student		F	Maiduguri	IDI	31 Oct 2016
15	Malgwwi	Local Government Employee	Admin officer		M	Maiduguri	IDI	3 Nov 2016
16	Abu Hussain	Medical Doctor	-	-	M	Maiduguri	IDI	4 Nov 2016
17	Hamakim	Nigerian Army	Major General	DG, Nigerian Army Resource Centre	M	Abuja	IDI	28 Nov 2016
. 18	Ali-Keffi	Nigeria Army	Brigadier General	Former Brig Commander	M	Abuja	IDI	6 Dec 2016
. 19	Nyom	Nigerian Army	Brigadier General	Director of training	M	Abuja	IDI	6 Dec 2016
. 20	Mischelia	Nigerian Army	Brigadier General	Former Brigade Commander	M	Abuja	IDI	8 Dec 2016
. 21	Gagariga	Nigerian Army	Brigadier General	Former Brigade Commander	M	Abuja	IDI	8 Dec 2016
. 22	S.K Usman	Nigerian Army	Brigadier General	Director, Army Public Relations	M	Abuja	IDI	12 Dec 2016
23	Emeka Okereke	National Defence	Researcher	-	M	Abuja	IDI	2 July 2017

|		College						
24	Lambert Oparah	National Human Rights Commission	Director	-	M	Abuja	IDI	5 July 2017
25	Bukonla Ademola	Search for Common Ground	-	-	F	Maiduguri	IDI	6 July 2017
26	Zannah Ibrahim	Chief Imam, Borno State	Chief Imam	-	F	Maiduguri	IDI	6 July 2017
27	Joe	Detained Boko Haram Fighter	-	-	M	Maiduguri	IDI	7 July 2017
28	M Yusuf	University of Maiduguri	Prof./ Dean	Faculty of Law	M	Maiduguri	IDI	8 July 2017
29	Mohammed Wuyo	Borno Coalition for Democracy and Progress	Director		M	Maiduguri	IDI	9 July 2017
30	John Bakeni	Catholic Diocese of Maiduguri	Rev. Fr	Secretary	M	Maiduguri	IDI	9 July 2017
31	Mike Omeri	National Orientation Agency	Former DG	-	M	Abuja	IDI	11 July 2017
32	Golda Ajode	Institute for Security Studies	Manager	Sub-Sahara Africa	F	Abuja	IDI	13 July 2017

APPENDIX V

Informal Discussions

S/N	Name	Organisation	Rank	Post	Sex	Place of Interview	Type of Interview	Date of Interview
1	MargeeEnsee	America University of Nigeria	Prof	President	F	Yola	Informal Discussion	27 Sep 2016
2	Bolaji Koleoso	Nigerian Army, Training and Doctrine (TRADOC)	Maj Gen (Rtd)	Commander	M	Abuja	Informal Discussion	28 Nov 2016
3	Arthur- Martins Aginam	The Kukah Centre	Dr	Executive Director	M	Abuja	Informal Discussion	12 July 2017

Focus Group Discussion Sessions

S/N	Group	Place of Interview	Date of FDG
1	Internally Displaced Persons	Yola	24Sept 2016
2	Community Leaders in Yola	Yola	25Sept 2016
3	Non-commissioned military officers (Corporal-Warrant officer)	Yola	29 Sept 2016
4	Community Leaders Maiduguri	Maiduguri	30 Oct 2016
5	Commissioned Military officers (Lt Colonel and Colonel)	Abuja	10 Dec 2016

Letters and Approval for the field Study

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN, IBADAN, NIGERIA
INSTITUTE FOR PEACE
AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (IPSS)

Director
PROF. ISAAC OLAWALE ALBERT, *fspsp*
Tel: +234 (0) 803 383 4639 | ioalbert2004@yahoo.com

Secretary to the Institute
MRS CHINYERE ALAWODE
Tel: +234 (0) 803 065 9292 | chinyerealawode@yahoo.com

Friday, 02 September, 2016.

The Chief of Army Staff,

Army Headquarters,

Abuja,

Nigeria.

Dear Sir,

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

This is to officially introduce **Mr. ADEBOYE, Adewale Olusola** who is a Ph.D. student of the Peace and Conflict Studies Programmes of the Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies (IPSS), University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.

He is currently researching on the topic **"Military Operations Against Boko Haram and Human security in Nigeria".**

Please accord him all the necessary support.

Nathaniel D. Danjibo PhD
Coordinator, Peace and Conflict Studies

COORDINATORS

Strategic and Security Studies
PROF. OYESOJI AREMU

Humanitarian and Disaster Management
PROF. T. A. AKANJI

Peace and Conflict Studies
DR. N. D. DANJIBO

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN, IBADAN, NIGERIA
INSTITUTE FOR PEACE
AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (IPSS)

Director
PROF. ISAAC OLAWALE ALBERT, *fspsp*
Tel: +234 (0) 803 383 4639 | ioalbert2004@yahoo.com

Secretary to the Institute
MRS CHINYERE ALAWODE
Tel: +234 (0) 803 065 9292 | chinyerealawode@yahoo.com

Thursday, 03 November, 2016.

The Librarian
National Defense College
Abuja,
Nigeria

Dear Sir,

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

This is to officially introduce **Mr. ADEBOYE, Adewale Olusola** who is a Ph.D student of the Peace and Conflict Studies Programmes of the Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies (IPSS), University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

He is currently researching on the topic **"Military Operations Against Boko Haram and Human Security in Nigeria".**

Please accord him all the necessary support to use your library.

Thank you.

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN, IBADAN.
INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND
STRATEGIC STUDIES
PEACE & CONFLICT STUDIES UNIT

Nathaniel D. Danjibo, Ph.D
Sign.............. Date.............
Coordinator, Peace and Conflict Studies

—— COORDINATORS ——

Strategic and Security Studies
PROF. OYESOJI AREMU

Humanitarian and Disaster Management
PROF. T. A. AKANJI

Peace and Conflict Studies
DR. N. D. DANJIBO

8 November 2016

The Director General,
Nigerian Army Resource Centre
Mambilla Barracks Junction,
Asokoro, Abuja.

Dear Sir,

REQUEST TO CONDUCT INTERVIEW WITH YOU AND PERMISSION TO ACCESS NARC SEMINAR AND CONFERENCE PAPERS

I am a PhD candidate of Peace and Conflict studies, University of Ibadan. The title of my thesis is *Military Operations against Boko Haram Terrorists and human security in Nigeria.*

Sir, I also like to convey to you the approval of the COAS, in the Nigerian Army letter dated 6 october 2016, granting me permission to interact with and conduct interviews with men and officers of the Nigerian Army.

In view of the foregoing, I herby request an interview session with you lasting 15-20 minutes in relation to my thesis. I also use this opportunity to seek your consent for me to access NARC seminar papers particularly presentations relating to the NARC one day discussion on the assessment of Boko Haram Insurgency threats in Nigeria held on Monday 7 October 2016.

Let me reiterate that my study is entirely an academic enterprise aimed to independently educate, enlighten and inform the academic and policy development communities in Nigeria and globally on the efforts of the Nigerian Army against the Boko Haram Terrorists. This same philosophy I believe, among others, the NARC stands for.

I therefore look forward to your positive response as you treat and acknowledge this letter.

Yours Sincerely,

Wale Adeboye
+2348021332561

Enclosure

1. *The copy of the COAS approval letter*
2. *My University of Ibadan letter of Introduction*

Speciality: Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): Deradicalization: Counterterrorism: Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Human Security: Mediation & Negotiation: Peace Threats & Stability Management

Contact:
Peace & Conflict PhD Studies
Institute for Peace & Strategic Studies
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria

Mobile: +2348021332561
Email: adeboyewale@gmail.com
Skype: adeboye.adewale1
Twitter: @waleadeboy

Headquarters
Nigerian Army
Ministry of Defence
Area 7 Garki,
Abuja.
E-mail: ahq.datops@army.mil.ng
ahqdatops.trg@army.mil.ng

AHQ DATOPS/G3/250/24

See Distribution

Oct 16

REQUEST TO INTERACT WITH AND CONDUCT INTERVIEWS WITH MEN AND OFFICERS OF THE NIGERIAN ARMY FOR PhD STUDIES IN PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES BY WALE ADEBOYE

Reference:

A.   Wale Adeboye Letter dated 2 Sep 16.

1.   Wale Adeboye is a Peace and Conflict Studies PhD student in University of Ibadan. He intends to conduct research on the topic "Military Ops Against Boko Haram and Human Security in Nigeria". Accordingly, the Researcher intends to visit some NA institutions/establishments as conveyed vide Reference A. The study is aimed at understanding how the Nigerian Military efforts have contributed to enhance security in the NE of Nigeria. Additionally, it is for academic purposes with the objective of educating and enlightening the academic community both globally and locally on the feat achieved by the Nigerian military in the course of fighting insurgency. Furthermore, the Researcher intends to contribute to the body of knowledge.

2.   In view of the foregoing, I am directed to convey the COAS approval for you to allow the researcher interact with and conduct interviews with officers and men of your command. I am to add that you closely monitor the interview and section to avoid compromising operational security. Furthermore, I am to request you grant him limited access to operations areas as security situation allows. Enclosed is the photocopy of his ID Card for your perusal.

3.   Please treat and acknowledge.

OU OBONO
Brig Gen
for COAS

Enclosure:

1.   Photocopy of Mr Wale Adeboye ID Card   One Copy.

Distribution:

External:
Action:

HQ TRADOC

1
- - - - - - - - -

Picture Plate: 4 The researcher (2nd from the right)in a group picture with Operation Lafiya Dole Theatre Commander, Maj. Gen.Ibrahim Attaihiru, (Middle), Lt Col Dada (first on the left), Col Kuliya (1st on the right) and Prof. Jim Hentz(2nd from the left) in Maiduguri, Borno State.

Picture Plate: 5-The researcher with Major General Hamakim, DG, Nigerian Army Resource center, Abuja

Picture Plate: 6Nigerian Army personnel in Clearance operations

Source: Nigerian Army PRO

Picture Plate: 7Nigerian Army Personnel Destroying Boko Haram equipment

Source: Nigerian Army PRO

Picture Plate: 8The researcher with Brig Gen. S.K. Usman, Director Nigerian Army Public Relations in Abuja