

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This chapter provides a general outline of the study by discussing the background which forms the premise for the current study. It examines a conceptual and historical background to the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, provides an overview of religion in Nigeria and the sampled clerics in the media reports. The chapter also discusses the statement of the problem, aim and objectives, the scope, and the significance of the study.

1.1 Background to the study

Terrorism is an extremely complicated phenomenon that has been at the centre of national and international agendas and debates in the last decade (Sarfo and Krampa, 2013; Bartolucci and Gallo, 2013). It has been identified as a way of using violent means to instil fear in people, whether a group, government or an entire population; usually committed against a significant place with a politico-religious purpose and designed to influence the attitudes and behaviour of a group or to accomplish objectives that are otherwise unattainable (Staun, 2009; Sarfo and Krampa, 2013).

In recent times, terrorism has become a 'brand name' for different kinds of acts against humanity. However, the word became widely known since September 11, 2011, when the World Trade Center in the United States was bombed by an Islamist group led by Osama bin Laden. This terrorist act popularly referred to as 9/11 has become a reference point for similar acts, especially those involving bombings.

This phenomenon has been associated with many Arab and Sub-Saharan countries including Nigeria. Nigeria's version of terrorism, referred to as Boko Haram, is an Islamic sect that believes that the northern part of Nigeria is controlled by corrupt and false Muslims. Hence, the group desires to change this trend by putting in place in the north, an Islamic state that will abide by *Sharia* (Islamic law) (Bamidele, 2012; African Report, 2014: i). This group has been a concern to the nation and other countries and has posed a serious danger to the social, economic and

political wellbeing of Nigeria (Blanquart 2012; Bamidele, 2012; Ekweme and Obayi, 2012; Olojo 2013). The group with a longstanding historical existence has been in the searchlight since 2009 with its increasing violence on government and public institutions, churches and security agents (Lacey, 2012; Sodipo, 2013; Onuoha, 2014) and has become more popular since its abduction of over 250 Nigerian schoolgirls in Chibok, a town in Borno State, northeast of Nigeria (Opharomavua, 2014). It has since become a serious threat to national stability as well as peace and security, especially in the North-east of Nigeria. This terrorist group ranks fourth with a figure of 8.58 on a rank scale of 10, according to World Terrorism Index (GTI, 2013) ranking (This Day Live, Nov. 19, 2014, The News, Nov. 18, 2014). Boko Haram manifests all the characteristics of terrorists (Lacey, 2012) using bombing, kidnapping and killing, especially of civilians to induce fear on the Nigerian populace. These actions have resulted in the loss of over 4,000 lives and have displaced many as well as destroyed many schools and government buildings in the Northeast in addition to economic devastation (African Report 2014: i). From the foregoing, Boko Haram insurgency is a social problem which has an adverse effect on the safety of lives, development and the economy of Nigeria.

Research has revealed that Nigeria is a highly religious society and in fact, the most religious country in the world which comprise about 91 percent of its population attending religious services and about 95 percent praying regularly (BBC, 2004; Emenyonu, 2007) as cited in Chilwa (2008). Religion has been identified to have played crucial roles in generating conflicts (Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008) and has accounted for some of the mayhems perpetrated against humanity in the name of God (Awoniyi 2013). Increase in religious fundamentalism has also constituted a jeopardised both national advancement and rights of individuals and groups with particular reference to Africa (Tamounobelega and Kamalu, 2013). Similarly, terrorist acts in Nigeria have been attributed to Muslim fundamentalists with the prejudicial religious terms - Islamist militants (Kyari Mohammed, 2014; Ayoola and Olaosun, 2014), Muslim politicians (Johannes Harnischfeger, 2014), Islamic radical group (Chilwa and Ajiboye, 2014), Islamist terrorist group (Chilwa and Ifukor, forthcoming), Islamist group (Sodipo, 2013), among others. This shows that Islamic religion has been exploited and it forms the basis for the terror unleashed on Nigerians.

Notwithstanding, religion has also contributed to peace processes (Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008; Rasul, 2009), and historical record shows that the interventions of some clerics like Desmond Tutu of South Africa, Mahatma Gandhi of India and Martin Luther King of the United States have contributed to peace in their nations (Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008; Institute for Economics and Peace:21); and mainstreaming religious engagement is underway in the work of U.S. government agencies (Hayward, 2012).

Religion has been identified as playing an important and influential role, especially, in the Nigerian society (Chiluwa, 2008) and has proven to be a powerful tool for political development since the inception of the country, that is before and after independence. Thus, the state is intricately connected to religion such that one cannot be mentioned without the other (Danjibo, 2010). He goes further to show the crucial role of religion in issues of Jihad, propaganda of civil war, Sharia law debates among others in the northern part of the country and how these affect political development in Nigeria. This assertion implies that the role of religious leaders in Nigeria can equally not be ignored. This, therefore, provides a premise for our argument in this work that clerics' perspective to the Boko Haram discourse is crucial in offering a more balanced evaluation and dimension to the crisis.

Conversely, since Boko Haram has its origin in religion (Danjibo 2010; Onuoha, 2012) which cannot be ignored, it foregrounds the important role of religious leaders in the lives of their followers and in the process toward peace (Hertog, 2010; Jenkins, 2012). This makes it imperative for Nigerian religious leaders to rise to the occasion by lending their voices in the Boko Haram situation in Nigeria with a view to finding a solution to the insurgency.

1.1.1 Historical background

In this section, the historical background to terrorism as a global phenomenon and Boko Haram as Nigeria's terrorist organisation is presented. It discusses the religious background of Boko Haram and its transformation into a terrorist group. The chapter also looks at terrorism as a discourse as well as its link with the media and language.

1.1.1.1 Terrorism

The discourse on terrorism is ubiquitous as the world seems to live in perpetual fear of the activities of terrorists. Although the term is difficult to define because of its high complexity, it

has been at the forefront in national and international agendas and debates in the last decade (Sarfo and Krampa, 2013; Bartolucci and Gallo, 2013).

The word 'terrorism' found its way into the vocabulary of the twentieth century as a concept many are familiar with but one which is not clearly defined. Scholars argue that the concept is difficult to define because it is a value-laden word and the many views given to it depend on how speakers perceive it, which in turn is determined by their posturing within the social and political spectrums. Therefore, while some use the term terrorists, others refer to them as fundamentalists, freedom-fighters and so on (Bamikole, 2004, Sarfo and Krampa, 2013). According to Hoffman (2006), the label given to terrorism includes any special act of violence against society such as the bombing of buildings, the assassination of leaders, mass killing of civilians by military units and so on. Terrorism also covers poisoning of products on shelves at supermarkets or the intentional adulteration of medication over counters in chemists' shops among others. This kind of listing obviously makes the current act of terrorism rather difficult to classify.

Thus, defining the word 'terrorism' has been a herculean task for scholars in various fields of human enterprise. Bruce (1998) asserts that terrorism is commonly conceived as a derogatory term with basically negative connotation commonly used by people to refer to their enemies and opponents, or to people with whom they have disagreeing opinions and with whom they disdain. He claims that the decision to refer to someone or tag some organisation 'terrorist' is a matter of one's subjectivity, which is largely dependent on whether one sympathises with or disapproves of the entity concerned. Hence, if one's sympathy is towards the victim of the violence, it will attract the term 'terrorism', whereas if one identifies with the perpetrators, the violent act is regarded in a positive light; and it is not terrorism. From a political perspective, Bruce (1998) conceptualises terrorism as being the creation of violence to intentionally induce fear or cause threat for the purpose of achieving change in the political environment.

His description of actions that depict terrorism can be categorised as:

- i. involving violence or threats pointing to violence
- ii. acts intended to have great psychological effects that go beyond the victim(s) concerned or what the attack is targeted at

- iii. a means to introduce fear in order to frighten, a large number of the public who may be enemies, religious associations or an entire country, government apparatus or public matters in general
- iv. a means to create power available where it does not exist or to have great influence where such influence has been insignificant
- v. using the publicity of violence to gain the power they hitherto not have which they seek to use to transform a political situation.

Among the varying definitions of the act, it has been identified as a way of using violent means to instil fear in an audience, either a group, leadership or a population; usually committed against a significant place with a politico-religious purpose intended to change the attitude and behaviour of a people in the realisation of their own objectives that they naturally lack (Staun, 2009; Sarfo and Krampa, 2013). One way to select among the variety of meanings is to restrict oneself to the definition that is essential and appropriate to the project which a particular researcher wants to undertake (Bamikole, 2004) because what one considers as a terrorist may be seen by another as a freedom fighter (Staun, 2009; Sarfo and Krampa, 2013). To scholars like (Bradley, Nd), terrorism does not occur as a single act of various forms of attack but as a social movement of people with a shared belief for a common goal. It is a means to an end to phenomena such as political, economic, religious, and/or social objective. With overt violence acts as a means, terrorism is considered as a way of communicating something. According to Stern, terrorism is a mode of conveying religious, ideological, economic message, or an array of motives (Stern 2003).

Terrorism has been broadly categorised in the literature into two: old and new terrorism. While the former occurred largely in the 60's and 70's and dealt with fights for freedom, especially from colonisers, had a clear-cut aim and attacked identified targets and were localised; new terrorism is motivated by religious fanaticism, having cross-boundary affiliations or international connections, without a definite motive and engages in non-selective colossal destruction of lives and property with a desire for martyrdom (Bamikole: 2004). Thus, religion has been identified to have played critical roles in generating conflicts (Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008) and accounted for some of the carnages committed against humanity in God's name, Awoniyi (2013).

In the contemporary usage of the term, many researchers consider terrorism as a political phenomenon. In this sense, it is a means of gaining political power and the use of power to realise a political change. In characterising terrorism, Sergen (2009:11) states that the difference between criminal violence and terrorist violence is that the latter act is propagated for political or politico-religious connotation. While this notion of the phenomenon annexes two important motivators of the act, a third significant idea behind terrorism is branded as ideology. Hence, the US Department of Defense proposes a more recent definition, which describes terrorism as the unauthorised coercion or use of violence against persons or government or societies in order to gain political, religious, or ideological objectives.

In recent times, the attack on the World Trade Centre in the United States on September 9, 2011, popularly referred to as 9/11, led by Osama bin Laden brought international terrorism to limelight (cf Staun, 2009:6). The Post 9/11 public discourse generated an understanding of the word ‘terrorism; as a morally wrong and condemnable act. Terrorism attracts global attention as a dangerous trajectory and one which seriously threatens the human peaceful existence and collective interest (Okoli, and Iortyer, 2014).

This phenomenon has attracted scholarly attention from various fields of study, such as politics, religion, sociology, counter-terrorism, peace and conflict resolution, linguistics etc. (Bartolucci and Gallo, 2013).

1.1.1.2 Brief history of Boko Haram

Boko Haram is a religious organisation which terrorises the north-eastern region of Nigeria in particular. The group was established by Mohammad Yusuf in a remote city in Maiduguri, Borno State, in north eastern Nigeria in 2002 and was largely unknown until 2009 when it came to limelight through some remarkable series of events that took place in Maiduguri that led to the death of their founder (Bamidele, 2012; Loimeier, 2012). According to Purcek, (2014), Yusuf’s original intention was to set up a religious group but since Western education is believed to be ‘sin’, hence, he started a school to give Muslim children Islamic education according to the teachings of Islam. Purcek cites Zenn, (2013) as saying that this was the principal motive of Boko Haram which is to be realised through the institutionalisation of Sharia Law throughout Nigeria. This is corroborated by Agbedo (2012:159) who states that the sect’s main desire is to have

Nigeria become a totally Islamic nation and to implement criminal Sharia courts in Nigeria. The meaning of Boko Haram in the indigenous Hausa language is ‘Western education is forbidden,’. The group formally refers to itself as ‘Jama’atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda’wati wal Jihad, which in English means a ‘People committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad’ (Agbedo, 2012:159).

The 2009 crisis resulted in the death of their leader Yusuf. The killing was caused by raids in their camp by the by the Nigerian police and many Boko Haram followers were killed. This necessitated a new strategy for attacks by the group against police stations and other targets (Loimeier, 2012). However, this mode of attack changed in 2011 and 2012 when in addition to government outfits, churches came under attack, especially, the Pentecostal churches. Similarly, non-fanatical Muslims construed by Boko Haram as a potential threat to the hegemony of Muslims also became objects of attack. After the death of Yusuf, the group became known as *jama’atahl al-sunna li-l-da’wa wa-l-jihad ‘ala minhaj al-salaf*. The new name, which in the words of Loimeier, may be translated literally to mean a people of the Sunna (prophet) out to propagate his will in Nigeria. Their mission is against non-Muslims and Muslims who do not support their operation (Loimeier, 2012:152). Thus, the claim of the group presents them as Islamic insurgents believed to have arisen because of their dissatisfaction with the political and religious situations in the country (Blanquart (2012). Blanquart’s conception of Boko Haram from different angles is therefore that it is any of a terrorist group, religious fanatics or freedom fighters based on their origin and driving beliefs if compared with other well-known terrorist organisations such as AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, a Salafi-jihadist militant group). Like the previous scholar, Blanquart corroborates the political and religious dimensions of the group which threatens the sovereignty of Nigeria. Also, its catastrophic activities of terrorism (in the form of destruction of lives and property) is a clear form of threat to the Nigerian economic, social and political sectors (Bamidele, 2012).

1.1.2 Terrorism as a discourse

Locating terrorism within discourse analytic studies will mean investigating the discursive elements that constitute the ‘talk’ on terrorism. Like terrorism, proffering a single definition of the term ‘discourse’ has been a task for scholars of linguistics, who have come up with various definitions. Different researchers conceptualise it in different ways in their various academic

cultures (Wodak and Busch, 2004:109). One common view to this is to define discourse as the study of language use that is beyond the sentence and has a broader range of social practice that includes nonlinguistic and nonspecific instances of language (see Schiffrin, et al, 2001:1). Discourse also refers to the use of spoken or written language in a social context (Nordquist, 2015). However, from Foucault's perspective, discourse transcends the notion above to include 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak' (Foucault, 1972: 49). Based on this, a discourse does not exist solely in and of itself to be studied, but as something which produces something else (an utterance, a concept, an effect). This systemisation allows opinions, concepts, ways of thinking and behaving within a particular context to be identified as the discourse structure of that event.

An understanding of terrorist discourse can, therefore, be deduced from the explanation of the concept of discourse offered above, to mean texts (spoken or written) which produce conceived ideas of the act of terrorism through the selection of those activities that contextualise them. In other words, terrorist discourse focuses on discursive elements that point to the characteristics of the act, the objects related to it as well as the people involved and affected by such acts. Terrorism is a social act engaged in by social actors that have an effect on a people. It is therefore common practice to find the discourse on it in the public domain.

1.1.3 Media and society

The media discourse occupies a prominent place in discursive practice in the everyday lives of people beside conversation (van Dijk, 1995; Lunt and Livingstone, 2001). People's beliefs on social and political issues and knowledge about the world are derived from what is read or seen daily from news reports. This has helped people to understand the world and to position themselves with regard to information around the world. Thus, the media has become identified as something that plays a fundamental role in the everyday lives of people and also plays a significant role in the society because the texts in newspapers exemplify the use of language in social context (Lunt and Livingstone, 2001).

Media influence is one contemporary significant factor in economic and cultural spheres. It helps in the understanding of identity by virtue of the audience that shape debates, who talks in the media and who writes. By this means we understand ourselves and capabilities. (Pugh Yi and Dearfield, 2012). The language of newspapers is usually explored by linguists because it is

undoubtedly the most widely read genre in Western countries (González and Rodríguez, 2006). Thus, media texts have become a ready source for data for corpora in linguistic analysis and it has also made the news genre emerge as a highly outstanding area of interest in linguistic approaches to texts, specifically in discourse analysis (Wodak and Busch, 2004:107).

Media texts are intertextually connected to many other genres, diachronically or synchronically through quotes or indirect references thus boosting meanings or decontextualizing and recontextualizing meanings. According to Wodak and Busch (2004), media produce and reproduce social meaning.

1.1.4 Language and the society

Language is the most flexible and potential subtle kind of human communicative behaviour which is capable of communicating different types and degrees of details in a more successful way compared to other behavioural practices. It is used primarily to account for human phenomena such as experiences, reality, feelings, and knowledge and it includes what participants say in addition to what is written about what they say. It also includes thoughts or feelings that are not expressed (Edwards: 2006: 42).

Also, representation and communication activities by human beings are enacted with language.

Put differently, language is used to do different social acts to depict the real world. As a tool of discourse, language is used to enact social practices that produce effects of power in social relations. It is a means through which social practices like politics, religion and other cultural activities convey ideas of the language-user to generate social effects on the people that use language and the people they intend to communicate social realities. In other words, language is used to 'do things' as is proposed in the Speech act theory (Austin, 1962).

Yongtao (2010) argues that apart from the fact that language functions communicatively in reflecting realities, it also has the power to bring about change in the minds of its users and receivers which is crucial to a change in behaviour as is evident in discourse analysis.

In addition to actions performed with language, (Holtgraves, 2002) asserts that it is also a social action connecting other people with the aim to understand and to be understood with resultant effect. Therefore, language affects how interactants think and feel about each other. Such actions are meaningful with consequences for the speaker, the hearer, and the conversation of which it is

a part. Therefore, understanding meaning implies that there must be a speaker and reference to a context against which a speaker's utterance meaning can be derived.

Human interactions are largely socially motivated and language is the tool used to achieve the various aims in the interactions or accomplishing particular ends. Holtgraves (2002:152) argues that language as a tool for thought is a vital tool that enables the enforcement of decorum or social order. He states that language is one phenomenon usually taken for granted which has an influence on our social existence. It is "irreducible part of social life" (Fairclough, 2003) and it is important in almost everything done with other people.

1.1.5 Language, media and terrorism

Discourse from organisations like Al-Qaeda affects the radicalisation of groups and individuals and the process of radicalisation is derived from "talk to action" (Staun, 2009). Adopting Wittgenstein's approach to culture as being embedded in language, which includes mythologies and conceptual system, he illustrates the use of language as a way to better understand the phenomenon of terrorism.

Thus, the language of terrorism is seen as resulting from radicalisation. One of the London – bombers in a suicide-video is quoted as emanating from the discourse of war. He states that his (the bomber's) discourse is built upon the view that the Ummah is under attack and the Muslim world is at war with the West, thus legitimising the use of force against the West as well as implying that fighting the West as a defence for one's Muslim nation is also legitimate. Thus, he shows the connection between language and action, thereby establishing the fact that:

Language is something learned, socially propagated, something we have 'inherited' from our parents, our upbringing, school and something we are constantly being fed with from the media, society and our interactions with other people. The concepts we are used to are concepts we have acquired through a social context.

(Staun, 2009:8)

Furthermore, giving a larger explanation to Wittgenstein's language game as a form of discourse, Staun sees language as a 'life-form' or human activity. In other words, language provides the platform for action and both are constitutive in use. Hence, the connection is drawn where talk (language), which is non-violent, comes before the violent action (terrorism). The act of terrorism itself is seen as a way of communication where fear is sent as a signal to an audience, that is, the

public in a particular country. It is the message of communication which makes terrorism (Stern 2003, Staun, 2009).

The media serves as a way of information dissemination through which many people get informed about the happenings around the world. The mass media is the main source of information for a great number of people in modern times. The nature and manner of dissemination of information also has become seriously instrumental to the way people understand the world around them (Alghamdi, 2015). The reality of the terrorist situation all around the world is communicated to the public via various media. It is, therefore, safe to say that the media is the primary avenue for the communication of terrorism as media discourse is the totality of how reality is represented in broadcast and printed media from television to newspaper (O' Keeffe,2006:1).

1.1.6 Overview of religion

This section looks at the role of religion and religious leaders from a broader perspective and narrows down to religion in Nigeria. It also presents the identities of the selected clerics.

1.1.6.1 Religion and society

Religion and society are two human concepts that are mutually inclusive. This means that one ensures the existence of the other. Among other meanings, the term 'society' refers to "people in general, living together in communities" and "a particular community of people who share the same customs, laws, etc" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary). This implies that people with a particular religious belief can form a micro-society within the macro concept of society as people in general in different communities.

Religion is an agent of socialisation and it is a part of every human society though not everyone is religious (Achoeah, 2013). However, the former has often been a source of concern to the latter. Dieng (2013) states that religion or ideological implications have largely been responsible for wars and conflicts through manifestations of intolerance and discrimination on the ground of religion or belief. He adds that this occurs in varying degrees and no society has escaped this tragedy nor are they contained to a single religion or belief. As a societal phenomenon, he argues that different beliefs in the different religions have contributed to the struggle for human rights

(enshrined in most religions) and peaceful living. The principle of equality, which is present in the different beliefs, supports the right to be different, hence demands diversity and respect for individual identity in furtherance of peaceful coexistence.

Nevertheless, this diversity has often been the reason for wars and conflicts that have adversely affected the socioeconomic interests of nations. Studies have revealed that much evil has been committed by people who declare such acts as being done in the interest of God (Awoniyi, 2013).

1.1.6.2 Religion: a weapon of peace and war

Religious disturbances have long been in existence among humanity. Based on religious dogmatism or fundamentalism, religions have engaged in intra and/or interfaith conflicts. This can be traced to both Christian and Islamic religions in the early Bible days of Exodus to the origin and spread of Islam in the first eight provinces to North Africa. Thus, the two main religions in Nigeria have histories of violence (see Awoniyi, 2013).

The use of religion to perpetrate violence, injustice, and discrimination has been a common phenomenon in existence for many decades. In this regard, religion has been labelled a vital element responsible for certain conflicts. Notwithstanding the negative trends resulting from religious differences, religion has been a significant tool towards peacemaking (Rasul, 2009).

Religion is a source not only of intolerance, human rights violations, and extremist violence, but also of non-violent conflict transformation, the defense of human rights, integrity in government, and reconciliation and stability in divided societies.

(Appleby, 1996)

One way religious leaders attempt to address the wars between religions and to encourage mutual understanding among different faiths is by organising inter-religious faith dialogues and fora. Some organisations and conferences in this regard include: Lanao Muslim-Christian Movement for Peace and Development (LMCMPD) in the Philippines (Rasul: 2009), Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) (Aliyu: 2013, *Information Nigeria*: 2013); International Multi-religious Inter-cultural Centre and World Conference of Religions for Peace (Sterland and Beauclerk, 2008).

1.1.6.3 Roles of religious leaders in society

In the introduction to his presentation titled ‘The Role of the Religious Leader in Dr. Michael Jenkins states that religious leaders do not only play an important role but that religion is a principal tool in the peace process. In the paper, he examines the issues relating to peace within the purview of scripture in different faiths and how cultural issues enhance or restrict the peacemaker role of religious leaders. He premises his work on the fact that God, who is the creator of all is the author of peace and that God’s blessings for nations are determined by religious leaders’ response to God and love for the people. He identifies the role of religious leaders as fundamental in the direction of people and nations. He supports this with a quotation from the Bible in Proverbs 29:18 that “Where there is no vision, the people perish: but he that keepeth the law, happy is he.” Jenkins asserts

World peace can be fully accomplished only when the wisdom and efforts of the world’s religious leaders, who represent the internal concerns of the mind and conscience, work cooperatively and respectfully with national leaders who have much practical wisdom and worldly experience about the external reality or “body.” (Jenkins: 2012)

Furthermore, to see the world complete and whole requires determination to understand how religion impacts on the world views and political goals of those who do not similarly separate church and state (Johnson, 2011). In other words, religion performs a significant function in people’s perceptions and consequently, their political views. Put differently, religion is crucial to politics. They are intricately connected.

Other functions which religious leaders are identified to effectively address as people of faith and compassion are “soft aspects” of peace building such as reconciliation, service, and compassion (Hertog, 2010). In addition to ensuring peace and harmony among religious groups, and by extension, the society at large, religious leaders are expected to be at the forefront in defending freedom of religion, not only for their own followers but for all others too (Onaiyekan, 2015). Onaiyekan explains further that religious leaders in areas dominated by people of their own faith should be responsible for the defense of people of other faith among them. From an inter-faith perspective, Ford (2009) expresses the view that whether one is called into a leadership position or not, it is the duty of all in every human endeavour to assume leadership responsibility.

Specifically, he recommends three things for Christian-Muslim relations namely unrestricted friendship for people of all religions, corporate reading of scriptures, and forming inter-faith groups. Friendship in this sense means to understand, respect, trust and love each other in spite of differences in beliefs and practices. Reading scriptures together is seen as one of the ways to concretely develop an understanding of how the other understands and lives their own faith. Inter-faith organisations require the involvement of leaders from the areas of religion and other spheres of life for 'Common World process'. It is evident that the role of religious leaders covers spiritual or religious responsibility, offering political direction, giving 'social' support (which include 'soft aspect', and defence of religious minority rights) as well as the promotion of inter-faith relationships. A research carried by American Red Cross after the 9/11 terrorism reveals that people really turn to religious leaders for support during the crisis. This is evident in the responses of respondents that in such situations, they turn to a spiritual leader or spiritual guide for help (Ashley and Lockwood: 2007:92). Thus, religious leaders are key social actors in individual societies and the world in general.

1.1.6.4 Religion in Nigeria

Three major religious groups exist in Nigeria. These are Islam, Christianity, and indigenous religion. The late 19th century marked the advent of Christianity in southern Nigeria. It began in the Yoruba southwest being introduced by the Church of England, while the Roman Catholic Church dominated the Igbo southeast. About half the population in the southeast and southwest are Christians along the lines established by the Roman Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Lutheran, and Baptist missionaries (Religion - The People of Nigeria - Nigeria – Africa:2016). There are also many independent African churches, such as Cherubim and Seraphim, which introduced African cultural practices such as drumming, dancing, and polygamy into Christianity. The northern states, dominated by the Hausa and Fulani groups, are predominantly Muslim (Nations Encyclopedia, 2016) but Islam also spreads in the middle belt and in the southwest. Overall statistics indicate that about 50% of the population are Muslims, with a majority practising the Sunni branch of the faith (Nations Encyclopedia, 2016). Nigerian indigenous religions have varied specific beliefs. They believe that deities exist in elements in the environment such as rocks, rivers, and so on which they associate with God (Religion - The People of Nigeria - Nigeria – Africa:2016). Traditional worship believes in gods (as they are called) which are seen as guides

and sovereign authorities. The worshippers also believe that they (gods) speak to the people through mediators, Priests. Some of the gods include *Amadioha, Iku, Urashi, Ogwugwu, Ikuku* and so on. Religion occupies a major place in the lives of Nigerians and in how they identify themselves (Religion - The People of Nigeria - Nigeria – Africa: 2016, Total Facts about Nigeria.com:2016).

i. Christianity in Nigeria

Christianity originated in Judea (present Israel) about 2000 years ago based on the ministry of Jesus Christ to serve God according to His Word (Acheoah, 2013). In Nigeria, Christianity started in Badagry in the southern part of the country after the abolition of the slave trade in the 1840s. According to Awonusi (2004), in 1842, Rev Thomas in the company of Mr. and Mrs. Grant started the Wesleyan mission in Badagry. The Methodist mission also took off in Abeokuta in 1844 with Rev Annear. This was followed by the Baptist convention in the ‘now-extinct’ city of Ijaiye in 1853. In the south-east, missionary activities were also eminent at the time. This was evidenced by the presence of the Presbyterian mission in 1846. Today, in addition to these churches are the Anglican and Catholic churches.

Pentecostalism started in Nigeria between 1910 and 1920. In 1918, an Anglican deacon launched a prophetic movement later known as Christ Army church. Following an influenza epidemic, there were revivals in the mission churches and the Christ Army Church expanded. The emergence of the Precious Stone (Diamond) society and its affiliation with Joseph Babalola of the Faith Tabernacle who aimed at prayerfully stopping the epidemic led to the conversion of many people. Babalola independently founded the Christ Apostolic Church (CAC) in 1914. Other churches which followed were – The Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), 1952; Church of God Mission International, 1972; Grace of God Ministry, 1974; The Deeper Life Bible Church (DLBC), 1975; Living Faith Outreach Worldwide, now Living Faith Church Worldwide also known as Winners’ Chapel, 1986 and so on. (<http://www.pewforum.org>, 2010).

ii. Islam in Nigeria

Islam is identified as one of the three major religions in the world including Christianity and Judaism. The religion is described as a complete way of life that has a fundamental basis for socio-political values and organisation (Abubakar, 2015). Islam came into Nigeria as a result of

trade between North Africa and the West African sub-regions through the Trans-Saharan trade route as the main trade route and through the minor trade route which involved Kanem Borno and other communities surrounding her. By the 15th century, through the medium of trade (via the influence of traders across the trans-Saharan trade routes), Islam penetrated most of the areas in the northern part of Nigeria. The religion also came into the north through military conquests (Omotosho, 2011). The religion also spread to Southern Nigeria through trade by Malians Muslims who came to Old Oyo. Thus, Islam was introduced to the south by Malians and it is referred to as Imale which means the religion of the Malians. It also came through Kano – Badagry trade route (Omotosho, 2011:79). Other factors identified as responsible for the spread of the religion included factors such as festivals or ceremonies of Muslims, intermarriages and barrack life that encouraged socialisation by people of different backgrounds (Omotosho, 2011:80).

Nigeria is identified as a country with the largest Muslim population in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is estimated that about 78 million Nigerians, that is, about 50% of the total population of the country are Muslims. (Pew Forum: 19). There are two main sects in Islam: the Sunni and the Shia. All the Sunni and Shia Muslims agree in the three basic principles of Islam: that Allah is one, Muhammad is His last Prophet and that one day Allah will resurrect all the human beings and all will be answerable to their beliefs and actions. They equally all believe in the tenets of Islam, like salah (prayers), sawm (fasting), hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), zakat (religious tax), etc., as well as belief in the famous sins, like drinking wine, adultery, stealing, gambling, lying, murder, etc. (Rizvi, 2000:1)

1.1.7 Identities of the selected clerics

In this section, a brief biography and the roles of the selected clerics are provided to give an understanding of their selection as representatives of the two religions in focus.

1.1.7.1 Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor

Ayodele Joseph Oritsejafor, popularly known as Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor was born in Delta State, Nigeria. He is a pastor, evangelist, teacher, prophet and author. Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor is the founder of Word of Life Bible Church, a Church he began in November 1987. He was the National president of the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN) in 2005 and served in that

capacity for a period of five years. He was elected in 2010 as the President of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), the highest Christianbody in the country, (nigerianbiography.com/.../biography...) and served in that office until July 2016 as the first Pentecostal leader to handle that position. During his tenure, the association, CAN, came into limelight and became popular on national television stations, radios, and newspapers because he was an outspoken leader in consistent defense of the Church in Nigeria, freedom and equality, and terrorism (*The Christian Post*. 31, July 2013).

Oritsejafor is known to be brutally honest and fearless. He is a proponent of leadership by example (*The Nation*: 20 July 2008). This is evident in the role he played in bringing the crisis in Niger Delta area of Nigeria to an end (Wikipedia). In recognition of his contributions to the development of humanity, Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor has received several awards both internationally and locally in regards to his various peace and humanitarian initiatives. He has been honored with the Golden Key to the City of Kalamazoo, Michigan by the mayor of the city. He was also honoured with the International Youth Ambassador for Peace Award. He was conferred an Officer of the Order of the Federal Republic (OFR) one of the Nigerian National Honours at the International Conference Centre, Abuja on December 22, 2008. On May 9, 2013, The Northern States Christian Elders Forum (NOSCEF) awarded him the title, 'A True Servant of God' (*Vanguard News*: 26 May 2013).

1.1.7.2 Bishop Matthew Hassan Kukah

Matthew Hassan Kukah is a native of Anchuna, Ikulu Chiefdom in Zangon Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State. He attended St. Fidelis Primary School, Zangon and had his secondary education at St. Joseph Minor Seminary, Zaria, after which he went to St. Augustine Major Seminary Jos, Plateau State. At St. Augustine Major Seminary, Kukah studied Philosophy and Theology. He also attended the University of Ibadan and graduated with a diploma in Religious Studies. In furtherance of his education, he received the Bachelor of Divinity at the Urban University Rome in 1976. Kukah also obtained a Master's degree in Peace Studies, at the University of Bradford, in the United Kingdom in 1980. Kukah later proceeded to the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) where he obtained his PhD in the year 1990.

On December 19, 1976, he was ordained a Priest of the Catholic Church. Between the years 1999 and 2001 he served as a member of the Nigerian Investigation Commission of Human Rights Violations. He also served as the Parish Priest of Saint Andrews's Parish, Kakuri, Kaduna. In addition to his work as a parish priest of Saint Andrews's parish in Kakuri, Kaduna from 2004 until his nomination as bishop, Kukah was secretary of the National Political Reform Conference (2005) and from the year 2005 onward, he served as the chairman of the Ogoni-Shell Reconciliation. Between the years 2007 and 2009, he served in the committee for electoral reform set up by the Nigerian government. Matthew Kukah was later ordained a Bishop. He is currently the Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Sokoto. (www.africa-confidential.com/.../Intervie...)

1.1.7.3 Sheik Ahmad Gumi

Sheik Ahmad Gumi is a Saudi Arabia-based Nigerian Islamic scholar and son of one of Nigeria's greatest Islamic scholars and winner of the King Fahd Prize, the late Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi. He is a graduate of the Ahmadu Bello University, ABU, Zaria. He served as a director in the legal services section of the Nigerian Army and a retired Brigadier-General in the Nigerian Army (Leadership, June 17:2015). Gumi is a trained medical doctor, a renowned Islamic scholar who is noted for his frank views on issues of national importance and has sometimes found himself involved in some controversies (*The Nation*: April 21, 2013). Since the beginning of the current security challenge in the country occasioned by the activities of the Boko Haram insurgence, he has remained very critical of their activities and has sometimes, branded them un-Islamic and was a target for a bomb attack by the group in Kaduna because of his statement. He is a firm believer in the fact that the Boko Haram insurgency is a creation of a few persons who want to destabilise the country for their own gains. He was against the granting of amnesty to the group by Jonathan's administration and rather called for the termination of the group (*The Nation*: April 21, 2013).

1.1.7.4 Alhaji Mahammad Sa'ad Abubakar III

Alhaji Mahammadu Sa'ad Abubakar III is the 20th Sultan of Sokoto. He is also the President-General of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs. His position as the Sultan makes him the spiritual head of all Muslims in Nigeria where about 50 percent of the citizens are Muslims. Hence, he is the ruler of Sokoto in northern Nigeria in addition to being the central figure to all Muslims. Abubakar inherited the position of the Sultan from his ancestral lineage. He

is the 20th heir to the throne founded by Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio which has spanned two centuries. This makes him a very important personality and gives him administrative influence among the Muslims in Nigerian religious life. His leadership position also accords him the right as the legitimate voice of all Muslims in the country. With increasing interreligious crisis between Christians and Muslims in the country, especially in the north, his role has become highly significant. (<https://www.naij.com/tag/saad-abubakar-iii.html>)

1.2 Statement of the problem

The Boko Haram insurgency, a religion-motivated terrorist activity associated with bombings and killings in northern Nigeria, has attracted studies from the perspectives of different media and social groups. The religious undertone of the insurgency has brought Christian and Muslim clerics in Nigeria into dialogic engagement in the media. Hence, their views have been presented in media reports. However, significant as these dialogic engagements of the clerics are, researchers on the Boko Haram insurgency have focused more on monologic discursive features, in the area of ideology, the activities and the framing of Boko Haram in general, than on the dialogic interactions and their pragmatic implications in the discourse (Ekwueme and Obayi, 2012; Olagunju and Ajadi, 2014; Ayoola and Olaosun, 2014; Roelofs, 2014;). Though the discursive features and the linguistic choices in media representation of Boko Haram have been examined to account for the ideological constructions of Boko Haram, the description of their activities and deictic markers in newspapers, they have not accounted for the positions of clerics in the discourse which is also crucial in Nigeria. Other studies have generally produced the views of journalists, social media writers, and counter-terrorism analysts (Ayoola and Olaosun, 2014; Odebunmi and Oloyede, 2016; Chilwa and Adegoke, 2013; Chilwa and Ajiboye, 2014; Chilwa and Ifukor, 2014; Blanquart, 2012; Olojo, 2013) but have not paid adequate attention to the limitations of previous works with regards to the views of the clergy (a prominent and highly influential social group in Nigeria) for a more balanced perception of Boko Haram.

Also, many of these studies have restricted themselves to specific aspects of the insurgency and the activities of Boko Haram within a short time frame thereby providing an atomistic assessment of Boko Haram. For instance, Chilwa and Ifukor (2014) investigated the #Bring back our girls# campaign by evaluating the discursive features and stances, and the representation of the kidnap

of over 200 schoolgirls by Boko Haram in Chibok from the angle of social media users on Twitter and Facebook. On editorial reports, Ayoola and Olaosun, (2014) examined media representation of the activities of Boko Haram in newspaper reports from July to August 2011, while Odebunmi and Oloyede, (2016) examined media framing of Boko Haram and the skillful management of information by *The Punch* and *The Nation* from 2011 to 2012. These studies have not adequately covered the critical time span of Boko Haram, thereby presenting a partial viewpoint to the insurgency.

In addition, some of the studies have investigated the Boko Haram insurgency from thematic viewpoints such as faith and ideology, religious identity delineation, global terrorist trend (Uchehara, 2014; Mang, 2012; Loimeier, 2012; Blanquart, 2012; and Olojo, 2013) to respectively, identify the religious motivations of Boko Haram, the conflicting positions of religious leaders based on sectarian divide, as well as Boko Haram being a group associated with modern day fourth religious wave of terrorism.

Furthermore, most of these works have approached the discourse on Boko Haram from the angle of critical discourse analysis (CDA) except Eragbe and Yakubu (2015), and Odebunmi and Oloyede, (2016) who identified pragmatic features in their reports to unveil the pragmatic functions in the discourse.

Though these studies have provided the background for the current research, there is a vacuum in the literature regarding focus on the positions of religious leaders in addition to the pragmatic mechanisms employed and their implications in the discourse on Boko Haram. There is also the need to advance the period covered by previous works for a better assessment of Boko Haram.

Against this background, this work advances the literature by examining the perspectives expressed by two Christian and two Muslim clerics (who are among the most vocal clerics that are well represented in terms of their direct utterances) on the Boko Haram insurgency; the stance types that foreground their perspectives and the pragmatic strategies that characterise them and their functions in the reports of the selected media. It also extended the time frame from 2011 to 2016, the apex of the activities of Boko Haram, to account for a more elaborate assessment of Boko Haram by the clerics. It is hoped that this effort will complement existing views in addressing Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

1.3 Aim and objectives

The aim of this study is to establish the connection between selected Nigerian clerics' perspectives and the pragmatic devices they deploy in order to establish their pragmatic imports in the Boko Haram insurgency.

The study has the following objectives:

- i) to identify and discuss the perspectives of selected Nigerian clerics in the media on the Boko Haram insurgency
- ii) to identify the stance types and their features that foreground the perspectives
- iii) to examine the pragmatic strategies deployed by the clerics and their pragmatic implications in the discourse.

1.4 Scope of the study

The scope of the data was restricted to direct speeches of the selected clerics in news reports and interviews as are available in four Nigerian online newspapers- *The Punch*, *Vanguard*, *Sahara Reporters* and *Information Nigeria*. However, since their speeches are not covered on daily basis like the reports of the media (journalists) themselves, reference is made to other relevant national online news sources where necessary, as a way of providing support for the data. The selection excludes media and public comments on the utterances of the clerics. These, without doubt, would have aided in shaping the opinions of the religious leaders. It also ignores what the clerics say about other terrorist situations in other parts of the world. The delineation helps to specify the focus of this research because attending to all will make the data too large to be handled within a single study such as this. The study is also restricted to lexico-grammatical features that indicate the stances and the pragmatic mechanisms adopted in their perspectives.

1.5 Significance of the study

The outcome of this research has theoretical and methodological relevance in the following ways. First, at the level of theory, it reveals how the resources of related theories like stance and appraisal can be interwoven to give a more robust analytical framework that will help readers to better

comprehend the positions of the religious leaders in the Boko Haram insurgency. Second, it reveals the connection between micro-level linguistic concepts and a macro-level social context (terrorism) that helps in explicating how language affects the society. Primarily, this study makes a pedagogic contribution to terrorist discourse analysts and other discourse analysts as well as in the areas of pragmatics. Furthermore, this study brings into perspective, a more balanced framing of the terrorist situation in Nigeria and provides

a better understanding of the Boko Haram insurgency as a way of proffering possible guide that will add to the strategy used by the government in addressing terrorist activities within Nigeria and by extension, the world.

1.6 Summary

This chapter discusses areas that are considered fundamental to the study. It explores the historical background to the insurgency by expounding the concept of terrorism and the emergence of Boko Haram as well as its association with religion. It also examines religion, the roles of religious leaders and the impact of religion on society. Furthermore, it discusses the nexus between terrorism, the role of the media in information dissemination and language which serves as a tool in the construction of social realities by social actors.

The position taken in this research is that among the many perspectives on Boko Haram, which is Nigeria's specificity of terrorism, Christian and Muslim clerics' views are crucial in having a balanced understanding of the situation and providing possible clues in addressing it since Nigeria is a highly religious nation (Chiluwa, 2008), whose majority of citizens are divided between these two religious groups.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

2.0 Introduction

This chapter examines empirical investigations on the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria within discourse analysis and pragmatics. The findings of scholars in relation to Boko Haram are examined in this section to provide a basis for the current study. In particular, this effort considers investigations on Boko Haram from linguistics and media. Since Boko Haram is an issue of general concern, works from different fields of study are also discussed in this chapter. Thus, the empirical studies are categorised into linguistic and non-linguistic reviews. The chapter also examines relevant works on religious discourse. The review further looks at discourse and pragmatic concepts that are germane to the current study. Also, stance, appraisal, and systemic functional linguistics (SFL) which serve as the theoretical underpinning for this study are reviewed. The linguistic concept of transitivity in SFL helps in understanding the meanings of the linguistic constructions of the clerics' representation and foregrounds the interpersonal significance of the data.

2.1 Review of previous studies on Boko Haram

As mentioned in the preceding section, this part looks at different scholastic efforts on the topic of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, highlighting factors that have necessitated the insurgency and some of the modus operandi of the group. It also provides insight into the emergence of the terrorist group in addition to what has served as internal and external motivations for the group. This section also explores the contribution of the media in both positive and negative regards. Ultimately, it delves into the inputs of linguistic theories as relevant tools of socialisation and language functionality.

2.1.1 Linguistic studies on Boko Haram

Adopting a comparative sociolinguistic approach to the study of language use, Agbedo (2012) examines the linguistic determinants of militancy and terrorism by comparing the Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram terrorists' linguistic resources with a view to providing insight for law and security agencies to identify citizens with militant and terrorist inclinations. Adopting statement analysis proposed by Adams (1996) as an investigative tool, they analysed a number of statements from each of the two groups to highlight the phraseologies and recurrent common themes aimed at equipping intelligent officers and security operatives with a working knowledge of the language patterns that can assist them in identifying these group of people in the society as a way of being pre-emptive rather than reactive to their activities. It is assumed that this approach, which has proven to be resourceful for law enforcement agencies in the investigation of criminals, will also be a worthy effort in curbing foreshadowing militancy or terrorism. Agbedo's assertion is that while the speeches of the spokesperson for the Niger Delta militant group (MEND) consists of phraseologies and themes of oil exploration by multinational corporations in the area, the environmental hazards posed by their activities, the economic injustice and clamour for resource control; that of Boko Haram constitutes the phraseologies and themes of *Islamisation* of the Nigerian state through violence (a stance supported by aspects of the Islamic religion that offers their ideological leanings). He concludes that the objective of the sector group nevertheless determines the linguistic choices made.

Agbedo's work provides a working knowledge of linguistic patterns that will serve as indices for security agents in identifying militants and terrorists in the Nigerian society. He approached the discourse from a sociolinguistic perspective, while the current study takes a discourse and pragmatics dimension. Also, the study differs from the current research both in theory and in focus. While Agbedo identified linguistic patterns of violent social groups, MEND and Boko Haram, the present study identifies clerics' perspectives, in addition to identifying the pragmatic strategies deployed and their pragmatic implications in the discourse. Furthermore, with regard to linguistic elements, Agbedo employed structuralist slant while the current study employs a functionalist approach.

From the perspective of media representation, Ekwueme and Obayi (2012) investigate the crisis from a media viewpoint to expound how publicity (media), which is considered as the "oxygen of

terrorism” can play a significant role, given their power and influence in winning the war against the Boko Haram insurgency via the framing of the group and its activities. The study commends the media for upholding the principle of objectivity of reportage in media which is the onus of the media with a view to highlighting the motivation for the insurgency for the purpose of government intervention. This assumption is premised on the theory of Framing in the mass media that suggests that how an issue is presented influences how it is perceived and subsequently the decisions people take and the choices people make; which interprets that the way a news item is presented has implication on audience’s interpretation of it. The framing of news items is a decision of the journalist.

Agreeing with an editorial report of The Guardian newspaper, they attribute Boko Haram’s emergence mainly to social disorder and lack of active engagement of the youths in the country, while ascribing lack of a well-defined government policy to the confusions and ambiguity in their statements on the sect. They, however, claim that “objectivity” in reportage which the sect claims are lacking in their reportage (reason for the attacks on media personnel and houses), cannot be used in the favour of terrorists against the interest of the state and the security of its citizens. In their conclusion, the media has the capacity to win most part of the war against terrorism by the proper and effective deployment of their professionalism.

Contrary to the view held by scholars like Muller et al., (2003); Vieira, (1991) on the assertion of a former prime minister of Britain, Margaret Thatcher, in describing “publicity as the oxygen of terrorism”, Ekwueme and Obayi posit that there is no link between the terrorists and the Nigerian media as it exists in other parts of the world, as the group does not exempt the media in its attacks. However, they assert that the actions of the group are mainly connected to certain prevalent national issues, youth alienation, and policy failures as construed by Boko Haram. The observation that there is a specific language pattern that characterise the speeches of violence as identified by Agbedo (2012) resonates in the literature as it helps the researchers situate the reason for the insurgency. This proves the usefulness of language in the discourse of terrorism.

Contrary to the ‘objectivity’ position of newspaper reportage revealed by the findings of Ekwueme and Obayi (2012), Olagunju and Ajadi (2014) from a media ideological viewpoint observe that media ideology has the tendency to incite violence. This perspective was informed by their study of lexemes, phrases and sentences used in the representation of the social agents in

the discourse with a view to revealing discourse manipulative strategies by two editorials - *The Punch* (Thursday, January 17, 2013) and *Daily Trust* (Tuesday, February 5, 2013). The study is aimed at understanding the role played by the media in mediating and simultaneously aggravating the argument in the problem of insecurity. The socio-cognitive approach of CDA by van Dijk (1999) adopted by their study reveals that editorials ideologically posit a role swapping in the control of security elements in the country. This position is supported by a quote from the statement of the president [Goodluck Ebele Jonathan], “to take over Abuja so as to make him and those in Government to go and hide”. The editorials, they claim, also lend credence to a worldview that a part of the country has become a “war zone” and the claim that “the insurgents” is Islamic (p. 39); a position which they argue is anti-nationalistic owing to the ethnic cum religious sensitive nature of the country. In representing the “Us” versus “Them” pattern in the editorials, they contend that this is tilted towards the favour of the insurgents who are perceived as more powerful and insurmountable while the government is depicted as making no concerted effort in ensuring national security. This representation pattern, they maintain, exaggerates national insecurity and cripples the security sector. This is contrary to the conclusion in the work of Ekwueme and Obayi (2012:4) that “objectivity” which the sect claim is lacking in reportage cannot be used in the favour of terrorists against the interest of the state and the security of its citizens.

The study also reveals that the editorials use words, phrases, and clauses that task the socio-cognition of the readers to deduce extra meanings that are implicated. The research concludes on the premise that while socio-cognition is a key element in CDA to accurately interpret media ideology, caution is demanded in delicate issues like terrorism so as not to incite readers to reprisal actions. Also, the unity of the country should not be negotiated by media reports because peace is the fertilizer for national development (45-6).

Olagunju and Ajadiopine that the editorials present the insurgents more favourably than the government. While this position contests the finding of Ekwueme and Obayi (2012) that the objectivity of the media is used in support of the government, it corroborates the view held by Muller et al.(2003) and Vieira(1991) that “publicity as the oxygen of terrorism”. These conflicting views in the findings on media representations by Ekwueme and Obayi (2012), and Olagunju and Ajadi (2014) thus, reveal that media ideology can be in favour of either the government or the

insurgents depending on the perception of the newspaper. However, Olagunju and Ajadi's study lacks precision as it generalises on all Nigerian media without delineation which may not necessarily be correct. The present study deviates from Olagunju and Ajadi's study by investigating the views of clerics from definite online media sources: *Information Nigeria*, *Sahara Reporters*, *The Punch*, and *Vanguard*. In contrast to Olagunju and Ajadi, the interest of the current study is on clerics rather than the media.

Similar to Olagunju and Ajadi (2014), Ayoola and Olaosun (2014) examine media representation of the activities of Boko Haram by investigating newspaper reports from July and August 2011. They adopt an interdisciplinary and inter-discursive approach that affords a historical and ideological analysis of the problem. The research licenses a foregrounding of the ideologies of the two social agents – the insurgents and the Nigerian press by exploring certain tenets in the Islamic religion which the group has bent to accommodate their objective in the context; and media ideologies that occasion the representation. For example, the reports of *The Punch*, 9 July 2011: 3, represents Boko Haram as an affiliate of Osama bin Laden led Al Qaeda (terrorist group with international recognition). The media, according to them, also represent the group as outlaws having no regard for national and international laws. They argue, based on their finding, that Nigerians can trust the reliability of the press media, using the report of *The Punch* of July 2011 on the threat by the group to attack areas in Abuja which they fulfilled by the bombing of the Nigerian Police Headquarters, United Nations House. That event is used in the work as a basis to underscore the government's ill-preparedness to handle security issues in the country. The study concludes that contrary to literature portraying daily newspapers negatively as harbingers of misery and libel in their reportage, Nigerian national newspapers are sources of accurate information representations.

Similar to Ekwueme and Obayi's argument that the Nigerian press media is favourably disposed to media principle of objectivity, it advocates reliability of the Nigerian press whose objective reporting on the threat of Boko Haram was actualised as forewarned. Hence, Ayoola and Olaosun represent the Nigerian press as sources of accurate information presentation while they designate the insurgents as outlaws without regards for international laws and as manipulators of Islamic certain tenets. This study, however, restricts itself to the ideologies of the insurgents and the Nigerian press and differs greatly from the current research which concentrates on the perspectives of Nigerian clerics. It is also at variance with the present study in terms of the period

covered. While Ayoola and Olaosun cover the activities of the insurgents between July and August 2011, the present research covers reports from 2011 to 2016, thereby presenting a more extensive report on Boko Haram activities. In addition, Ayoola and Olaosun deployed interdisciplinary and inter-discursive approach, whereas the current study takes a discourse-pragmatic approach.

Chiluwa and Ifukor (2014) view the campaign, #Bring back our girls# from the position of linguistic theories, appraisal framework, and critical discourse analysis, to evaluate the discursive features and the representation of the kidnap of over 200 schoolgirls by Boko Haram in Chibok (Borno State) in Nigeria. The study reveals that writers on the campaign on social media (*Twitter* and *Facebook*), use a lot of affect and evoke emotions in their representations of persons, groups, and governments. Their judgement presents the situation negatively, a position which the writers want their audience to share with them. The insurgents are represented in negative words, the Nigerian government is represented in highly emotive words, while the abducted girls are appreciated by being portrayed as “beautiful things”, “life” etc. The writers themselves assume different positions and identities in the discourse, (like as religious ‘seekers’ and ‘God’s people’) by employing words of appeal that express different emotions. They, however, argue that unless social media campaign is followed with practical offline actions, the effort will end up as mere slacktivism. They also claim that the writers of tweets and posts on *Twitter* and *Facebook* respectively utilise both inscribed and invoked evaluations to have readers’ judgement and to also align with their own positions. There are also implicit constructions in the discourse which the researcher either aligns with or rejects with instances.

Like the study of Ayoola and Olaosun (2014) that depicts the insurgents in a negative light, the evaluation of these social media users in Chiluwa and Ifukor (2014) also reflect a negative assessment of Boko Haram by describing them in negative words. The abducted girls are appreciated while the Nigerian government is represented in highly emotive words. Their judgement presents the insurgency negatively, a position which the writers want their audience to share with them.

Although this study adopts the appraisal framework in addition to stance theory, which the current research aims to utilise in its investigation, both studies diverge in the area of the social actors as sampled well as in understanding the pragmatic implications in their evaluation of the insurgents.

Also, they studied media users' comments on a campaign (#Bring back our girls#in *Twitter* and *Facebook*) associated with the kidnap of over 200 school girls in Chibok by Boko Haram which is an atomic view to the insurgency; the current study mirrors the views of clerics on the insurgency in online media reports in a more holistic dimension by studying another important social group (clerics) over a period of five years.

Chiluwa and Ajiboye (2014) examine how Boko Haram exploits the power of ideology to influence and gain the support of some Nigerian youths through the use of 'ideological discourse' on a social online media –*Tweeter*. Adopting the concept of 'ideological square' of van Dijk (1998), they claim that Boko Haram utilises five ideological strategies - actor description, argumentation or authority, comparison, exaggeration and disclaimer – to present the 'We' and 'Them' polarisation between Boko Haram and 'others' (the government, Christians, Muslims with western inclination, and the Nigerian security agents), who they describe as 'infidel' that deserve death.

This research supports van Dijk's position that ideologies primarily function in social spheres as coordinators of the effective realisation of the goals of social groups and the preservation of their interests and practices by members, (van Dijk, 2005). While this study is similar to Olagunju and Ajadi (2014) on the ground of the element of investigation, ideology; they differ with regard to the social actors examined. Olagunju and Ajadi focused on ideology in editorials whereas this studied the ideology of the terrorists as conveyed in a social media forum, *Tweeter*. This study differs from both with regard to the subject (clerics) of investigation and the focus (perspectives, stance, and pragmatic strategies) of the study.

From a discourse analysis standpoint, Roelofs (2014) examines the framing of the Boko Haram uprising since 2009 in Nigeria from a "meta-conflict" theoretical viewpoint. By applying, Foucault, and Lakoff and Johnson (1980) discourse analytical methodology framework, he identifies four competing conceptions of the state by various social actors. The Nigerian state is framed at the Socioeconomic discourse level as the provider of development, whereas the Political Agency discourse argues from the position of the state as the provider of order. At the religious structure position, the discourse stresses the secular role of the state in containing expansionist Islam. He also identifies the need for the state to help mainstream Islam maintain control over deviant sects. The analysis reveals that these conceptions are not explicitly stated but

are embedded in the language used in describing the Boko Haram situation in the country. This conclusion is derived from the analysis of national (*Daily Trust, The Nation, The Guardian, This Day*) and international (*BBC News Online, Al Jazeera English, and The British newspaper, The Guardian [UK]*) newspaper reports between 26 July to 31 August 2009. Through the meta-conflict postulation of Horowitz 1991, the study highlights the conflicting opinions of various social agents in assigning blames and responsibilities. He opines that discourses “seek to silence or marginalise other competing discourses, presenting rival explanations as attempts to whitewash the real causes of violence, or else discounting them as superficial and self-serving” (Roelofs 2014:113). He refers to these processes respectively as ‘rarefactor’ and ‘exclusion’. A third discursive process which is identified in the study is that of ‘objectification’ which is “the simplification of messy and disparate elements of human experiences with defined properties as if they were physical objects” (Roelofs 2014:113).

The four framings given to Boko Haram uprising are all explained to fit into wider opinions by locating the violence within different contexts in order to identify the causes of the crisis and to apportion blame. According to him, the socioeconomic view attributes the cause of the uprising to poverty and exclusion and argues that this is the major cause of violence in Nigeria. He buttresses this position by quoting phrases such as “these sorts of episodes”, “uprisings like this”, “this most recent eruption” and the description of the ‘object’ as “the northern Nigerian version” of the violence in the Niger Delta (Dickinson 2009a; Herskovits 2009). This framing accepts the role of religion in the crisis but simplifies it as almost inconsequential and criticises the government as part of the process of rarefaction and proposes a government with ‘good governance models’ as a solution to the problem. The study presents the view that this group downplays the threat of the insurgents and contrasts it with “the excessive force” of the state’s response (Herskovits 2009 and Kawu 2009). While mildly reporting the actions of Boko Haram as clashes between security agents and the group, their judgement tilts against the latter as compounding the problems of the sufferers of the activities of the insurgents.

Secondly, the framing of the discourse takes the form of religious structuring which views the problem as a religious conflict by describing it as “intrinsic tendency with Islam” (p.121). The conflict is further contextualised as one of the incessant religious crises in that part of the country as jihadist attempts and as part of world’s *Islamisation* campaign. This opinion objectifies and

depicts Muslims as having certain characteristics. It also identifies two groups of Muslims with a common desire of imposing their beliefs on others – the moderates (those who do not match their desires with action) and the extremists (those whose desires are accompanied by actions). This view holds that state and society are fused and therefore submits that the end of this violence is dependent on the resolution of the underlying motivations of religious antagonism, recognising, however, that Boko Haram is a religious problem with a political solution.

Also, within the religious framing, a contrary view presents Boko Haram as Islamic agents with ideas and behaviours that are an aberration to mainstream Islam. This position argues that it is a manipulation of normal Muslims to act in an abnormal way. Roelofs cites (Abubakar 2009; Ebije 2009; *The Guardian* 2009a) as arguing that the tension is a religious problem which demands a religious solution. In contrast with the Socioeconomic stance, religion has a major part in the crisis.

The fourth view presented is Political Agency discourse which represent the violence related to Boko Haram as governments' effort to maintain peace and order threatened by forces like Boko Haram(122). It presents attacks by non-state actors as having particular threat and so describes the physical actions of the group. Opposed to the notion of the Socioeconomic group on the security, the upheld view here is that the security agents are rule-governed and are “the guardians of the forces of order” (Idris & Haroun 2009). The subjective voice of the researcher, however, blames the government as failing to wield sufficient control in the situation. This position is demonstrated in the use of verbs of control such as a monitor, forestall, empower, enforce, guide, regulate etc. It also undermines the power of Boko Haram by the use of pejorative expressions as dangerous lunatics, religious fanatics, and awfully superstitious. The common ground established in all four views is the tilting of the discourse towards the state (government) as a key player in the crisis, simultaneously possessing the ability to curb the situation.

This study presents a broad perspective to the insurgency by examining the conflicting opinions of various social agents in assigning blames and responsibilities within the four framing in which the state (government) plays a prominent role, while the current differs by focusing only on the views of the clerics. Also, unlike other studies (Ekwueme and Obayi, 2012; Odebunmi and Oloyede, 2016) in which Boko Haram is framed separately, Roelofs (2014) provides four framing of the state (government) within which Boko Haram's uprising is framed. This he claims is not

explicit but embedded in the language used by different social actors to describe Boko Haram. Furthermore, contrary to this position is the finding of Agbedo in which the language choices of the insurgents construct the identity associated with them.

Eragbe and Yakubu (2015) examine the uses of deictic expressions in creating effects in Boko Haram insurgency reports by the media in the four affected countries of West Africa. They discovered that media reporters use person, time/temporal and place/spatial deixis to locate the participants in discourse. They claim that the use of deictic expressions in the reports aids the audience in vividly understanding the incidence being reported by pointing to the agents (the insurgents) or the victims as well as the place and time of the event and enhances cohesion and coherence in the discourse of Boko Haram insurgency reports. They identified prepositional phrases performing locational or directional functions in discourse that give readers ideas about where the insurgency occurred. In the temporal deictic, adverbs of time and tenses marking time in addition to modals and phrasal modals were examined. Another form of deixis discussed is discourse or text deixis. They conclude that the media report on Boko Haram is prevalent with space and time deixis, which are usually grammatical devices. The use of deictic expressions in the reports makes the texts achieve cohesion and coherence. However, they are interpreted only within their contexts of use as pragmatic elements to give orientation to the actors in the report to the mass audience and to set the reports within real time. Also, “as pointing devices, they serve as means of fusing the participants, places and time in order to give the reader a comprehensive knowledge of the discourse”.

Contrary to Agbedo’s (2012) study which identified linguistic choices of militants and terrorists to assist security agents in identifying the actors, the current study emphasises the use of deictic expressions in pointing out agents, victims, and places in the insurgency, the places and times of the attack in the reports. Although they claim that these linguistic elements are interpreted only within their contexts of use as pragmatic elements to give orientation to the actors in the report to the mass audience and to set the reports within real time, they failed to explain the implications of the pragmatic elements in the discourse. Advancing the discourse from this gap, the present research identifies the pragmatic elements in the linguistic choices of clerics and also discussed their roles in the discourse on Boko Haram.

Odebunmi and Oloyede (2016) observe that the operations of BH are usually given prominent coverage by the print media and have received reactions from the Nigerian public. They also observe that most of the papers put the blame of the disaster mainly on the group and sometimes on poor governance. According to them, the news made out of this is 'injected' with pragmatics in the skillful management of information and that the expression of their impression and the bid to expose the terrorist activities are constructed out with careful lexical choices with implicit meanings and ideologies which demand serious inferential ability for interpretation. The requirement for the serious inferential process stems from the fact that the media operates within the limits of terror media mode of operation to avoid negative consequences. Hence, to be able to communicate the much information they have for the public in their framing of the group and other actors, like the government, they rely on pragmatic strategies to achieve these intentions. Thus, the study examines the pragmatic strategies used by Nigerian newspaper reporters of Boko Haram actors in order to establish the importance of pragmatics in revealing Boko Haram terror concerns as the media present them, so as to make contributions to the military strategies adopted in the crisis.

Odebunmi and Oloyede (2016) differ from the previous study by discussing both the pragmatic strategies used by the media and their implications in the Boko Haram discourse. The two studies also contrast in the sense that, while Eragbe and Yakubu's focus is to establish vivid representation of the actors, victims, places and times of the activities of the insurgents and to achieve textual coherence, Odebunmi and Oloyede's interest is on how pragmatic strategies are used by the media to communicate the much information they have for the public through the way they frame Boko Haram and other actors, like the government. The latter approach to the terror concerns of Nigerians, I suppose, will give less publicity to the insurgents as it requires serious inferential ability for interpretation because of the careful selection of lexical choices with implicit meanings and ideologies. This method of reporting while 'deoxygenising' terrorism to contest Muller et al's (2003) and Vieira's (1991) joint position that publicity is the oxygen of terrorism, it will also pose a challenge to the understanding of the situation by the audience without pragmatic orientation. However, it offers a better alternative in the representation of terrorist reports.

Odebunmi and Oloyede's work is different as its focus is on pragmatic strategies used by the media to communicate information, while the present study identifies pragmatic strategies in the

perspectives of the clerics and their implications in the Boko Haram discourse, including the stance types that are employed in the perspectives. Both studies also vary in the area of data sources and period of coverage.

2.1.2 Other scholarly studies on Boko Haram

Blanquart (2012), from an Australian counter-terrorism perspective, designates Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation, having fulfilled the label by its modus operandi as defined by various perspectives to include the use of violence, targets non-combatants, creates a state of fear, aims to influence, intimidate or coerce and being motivated by political, social and ideological objectives (Aly, 2011). He argues that contrary to other opinions describing the group as freedom fighters, average criminals or religious fanatics, Boko Haram is a terrorist group associated with the fourth religious wave of terrorism and adopts similar tactics used by other religiously motivated terrorist organisations in the modern day. Of interest to this research is the fact that identifying the group as a terrorist organisation would “assist in international terrorism approach and securing Australia’s security, Australians and Australian interests nationally and internationally in the future” (p.32). The researcher claims that there is a probability of continuity of the group because of their ideology among other reasons. He cites Adesoji (2011) as asserting that due to the nature of global terrorism, there is the ability for Boko Haram to gain support or be influenced by the current global jihadist movement. He concludes that the group has yet been officially categorised as a terrorist group, but however warns Australian government to take measures to proscribe the group as “a terrorist group in the future in order to apply counter-terrorism measures to protect Australia’s security if Boko Haram continues to evolve and join transnational Islamist movements” (p.35).

The argument of Blanquart is that Boko Haram is a terrorist group as opposed to views that designate them as freedom fighters, average criminals or religious fanatics. However, he submits that there is the tendency of continuity of the group because of their ideology among other reasons, as an ideology is “a system of ideas that help in comprehending the reality around, ... some abstract view of how the world works” Moazzam (2017). Moazzam further asserts that

“ideology has a starting point that directs the adherents of the ideology towards an ambitious and aspired target or goal to change that reality” which supports Blanquart’s claim.

Similarly, adopting structural violence paradigm of Johan Galtung (1969) as a theoretical base from a counter-terrorism perspective, Olojo (2013) examines the key drivers of public support for Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. He identifies socioeconomic factors such as poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, economic marginalisation and the manipulation of religion as key factors in the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. He argues that the complexity in the insurgency lies in the success of the group in exploiting political, socioeconomic and ethno-religious fault lines in the Nigerian state. He suggests among other things, that in addition to the hard, military measures and security cooperation with neighbouring states, a comprehensive approach based on a deep understanding of the driving factors as well as the dynamics of north-eastern Nigeria and inter-religious dialogues and mediation processes should be incorporated in addressing the problem of Boko Haram. He further suggests government’s engagement of credible Islamic scholars and experts, who can contribute to demystifying doctrines which can be distorted by extremists in the propagation of ideologies and violence.

Also, Olojo highlights the need to focus on the challenges of rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders which has been downgraded but which has contributed to jailbreaks within the troubled region, emphasising that the solutions to the crises are situated within the country. He concludes that policy formulation in response to the crises should not focus on the youths as the problem but should be seen as “part of the wider process of identity formation wherein Nigeria is struggling to identify itself as a nation and people” and as a longstanding post-colonial struggle.

The drivers of the insurgency identified in the current study, such as poverty, marginalisation and the manipulation of religion are also buttressed by Roelofs (2014). However, Roelofs submits that the tension is a religious problem which demands a religious solution. Olojo’s suggestion that government should engage credible Islamic scholars and experts, who can contribute to demystifying doctrines syncs with Roelofs’ position.

The background to the problem which Olojo identifies, especially the radicalisation is corroborated by Sodipo (2013). Following a historical trajectory, he claims that the insecurity problem in Nigeria occasioned by Boko Haram is a case of radicalisation which has its root from

the time of jihadist engagement by Usman dan Fodio from 1802 to 1812, through the Maitatsine movement led by Muhammadu Marwa in the 1970s to the Osama bin Laden's jihadist campaign after the September 11, 2001 bombing the US. This latter event received a warm welcome in the northern part of Nigeria that "7 out of 10 boys born at a hospital in Kano were named Osama" (p. 3). He attributes the resonance of the Boko Haram insurgency as a connection between youth unemployment, limited economic opportunities, perverse poverty as well as the emergence of terrorism. As a way of deradicalising the youths, he suggests the initiation of common avenues of association by various religious, rehabilitation programmes that would avail the former radicals with alternative social groups, a positive environment for rehabilitation, and family support. Like other researchers, he advocates a comprehensive approach in addressing radicalism.

However, contrary to the socioeconomic factors and religious manipulation by the group which Oloja (2013) and Sodipo (2013) identify as the grounds for the insurgency, the latter also identified the advent of terrorism which contributed to the radicalisation of the group, thus giving an added dimension to the situation.

Away from being labelled terrorists is the fact that the group has a religion-motivated intention as identified by Uchehara (2014). From a political science perspective, he states that the group has defied the gesture because it is motivated by faith and ideology rather than any other factor. Buttressing this claim, he cites Farouk's (2012) report "that the Boko Haram insurgency only believed in the Quranic verse, which states that "Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors" (Quran 649), even though, it is the same Quran that says "To you be your religion and to me my religion" (Quran 1096). Employing a non-theoretical discursive approach to highlight the various attempts made by Nigerians and the government of Nigeria to use dialogue as a solution to the problems of the insurgents, he argues that failure of the peace initiative made by the federal government to address the issue of Boko is as a result of the lack of determination on the part of the group to end their campaign [*Islamisation*], and because traditional northern leaders do not want to "expose themselves any more than they should to accusations of religious fanaticism by speaking with the sect" (p. 136). He proposes the significance of a continued examination of Islamic fundamentalist history and theory as a review of the literature on Boko Haram reveals that its intention has always been the *Islamisation* of Nigeria and to give supremacy to Islamic laws.

Positing a way forward, Uchehara advocates the federal government's show of sincerity, determination, and commitment as well as governments of the affected states to initiate reconciliatory committees in their various states towards a genuine dialogue. He concludes that given the gravity of the threat posed by the group, the government should adopt a more comprehensive initiative alongside other civic actions. However, unlike Olojo (2013), Uchehara fails to state some of the approaches he may consider as a more focused, pragmatic and dynamic approach in resolving the challenge.

The works cited above variously reveal some of the key factors or motivations for the insurgency in the country which include socioeconomic factors such as poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, economic marginalisation, manipulation of religion, religious radicalisation or ideology, as well as the sheer act of terrorism. Also, these studies have made suggestions in addressing this problem, which include: a comprehensive approach based on a deep understanding of the driving factors as well as the dynamics of the north-eastern Nigeria and inter-religious dialogues and mediation processes (Olojo, 2013); deradicalisation of the youths (Sodipo, 2013); a continued examination of Islamic fundamentalist history (Uchehara, 2014). It is also suggested that branding the group as a terrorist organisation would assist in international terrorism approach Blanquart (2012).

These studies have relevance to the present research because they highlight some of the facts found in the pilot study conducted to ascertain the viability of the current research. It also shows that the views of the clerics either support or reject these conceptions of the insurgency depending on the orientation of the speaking religious leader in the data. In addition, it shows areas of disagreement among some of the clerics, especially the Christians, on their perception of the insurgency.

The points of divergence among the Christian leaders can be linked to the fact that there are different categories of Christians as identified by Mang (2012). At a general level, Mang asserts that the recognition of the two main religions (Christianity and Islam) as instruments of broad national negotiation has helped in creating antagonism between their followers which has further degenerated with the Boko Haram uprising. He claims that the "various categories of identity delineations, Christianity and Islam have carved out not just polarising niches, but have also inscribed within their adherents, new constructs about themselves and of 'the others'" (p. 87).

He submits that this situation has resulted in the desire for reciprocal action among the people affected by the insurgents' activities. Hence, motivates his study in exposing the various perceptions and perspective of Christians towards Islam in contemporary Nigeria with respect to identity, geography, and the rising changes in Christian belief and doctrine concerning 'the other'. He cites Ostien (2006), as "bluntly and rightly" stating that Nigeria's Christians have capitalised on the advent of Shariah to advance "many theories about its causes". The study identifies four categories of Christians namely: Conservative Hierarchical, Conservative Egalitarian, Liberal Political, and Radical who have reacted in various ways in the present Nigerian situation based on their histories and present predicaments. The Conservative Christians within which he located the Anglicans and the Catholics, take a cautionary look at pockets of Islamic dissent as unitary actions which must be addressed as such, through either dialogue or soft threats" (Marshall 2009) because of their in-depth knowledge of Islam and its tradition. It is a group which he also explains encourages "a relatively higher sense of discretion when it comes to issues of inter-religious dialogue because of their background knowledge both within and outside the Bible. Conservative egalitarians Christians, according to him, are localised church organisations based on certain identity leanings such as ethnicity, linguistics, or culture. The sense of egalitarianism among this group owes to the fact that they are largely surrounded by Muslim communities in their relatively sparse geographical space and forms the minority non-Muslims in the north. A third group which Mang (2012) identifies is the Liberal Political Christians, made up of clergy or non-clergy who "build constructs which relate together the state, politics, and Christianity". Radical Christians are described as a group thriving on the symbol of Christianity rather than on its significance or value and claims commonality while at the same time having their various agenda.

Using the differing positions of Christian clergy on the issue of amnesty for Boko Haram, he further highlights the divergent perspectives of Christians on Boko Haram and Islam. He buttresses his position on the conflicting stances of the clergy by making reference to the views of two Christian clerics that attribute it to politics and economy (Aminu 2013; PM News 2013), against the position of Idowu-Fearon that attribute the situation to the negative influence of people with contrary intention using the Christian platform to cause violence (Kawu 2012).

He concludes that the introduction of Shariah opened the door of apprehension for Christians, especially in central Nigeria and that Christians are obviously divided in their general point of view except in the rejection of features of Islamism such as Boko Haram's violence".

While it is important to delve into the efforts of scholars in understanding the problem of Boko Haram in Nigeria, it is more specifically important to understand how language use has helped to focus more light in the interconnectedness between language and society or social actors and their activities. Among the avalanche of literature on Boko Haram, the works cited provide particular research premise for our study because they offer insights into: factors responsible for the terrorist acts in Nigeria (Olojo, 2013; Sodipo, 2013), the labeling of the group as terrorist organisation (Blanquart, 2012; Uchehara, 2014; Odebunmi and Oloyede, 2016), the role and views of the media (Emeka and Obayi, 2012; Ayoola and Olaosun, 2014), the evaluation of Boko Haram by social actors, ideology, pragmatic strategies and framing (Agbedo, 2012; Chiluya and Ajiboye, 2014; Chiluya and Ifukor, 2014; Roelofs, 2014; Eragbe and Yakubu, 2015; Odebunmi and Oloyede, 2016). Mang (2012) explains the reason for the diversities in the view of the religious leaders.

All of the aspects treated in the literature specifically mentioned above are intricately interlaced in the perspectives of the religious leaders which this study sets out to investigate. Hence, they help the current research by providing various background for the interpretations of the views of the clerics. However, it is important to reiterate that the present work differs from them all because it focuses on the views of a specific group of actors in the society, the clergy, whose role in Nigeria is undisputable. Also, in addition to understanding the stance types expressed by the clerics, the pragmatic strategies they deploy in the discourse on Boko Haram insurgency, as well as the implications of the strategies, are highlighted in this study.

2.2 Some studies on religious discourse

Religious discourse has drawn a lot of scholarly attention from all around the world because as scholars claim, no society is without a religion. Within the large volume available in the area of linguistic investigations, a few will be mentioned here, a yet very few will be discussed because of the present study, though about religious leaders, orients more to language use within public discourse.

According to Taiwo (2005), pulpit discourse, also known as sermons or messages is delivered by speakers vested with some spiritual authority within the church or any gathering of Christians. The messages are primarily meant to inform the congregation and so speakers mainly use declarative sentences. However, Taiwo (2005) discovers that interrogatives have become part of pulpit discourse and sets out to investigate messages given by charismatic Christian preachers in South Western Nigeria. He states that the linguistic behaviour in charismatic movements is distinct from that of orthodox Christian bodies as the atmosphere in such places during sermons are usually 'boisterous' compared to the 'usual graveyard silence' experienced during sermons in orthodox Christian bodies. He also observes that charismatic preachers are more flexible and less formal in the delivery of their messages and involve their listeners by encouraging their participation. Congregation participation is achieved by strategies such as members' 'unsolicited comments' like "oh yeah", "hallelujah", "ride on pastor", and interjections which may be rapturous noise or an applause expressing approval of something said by the preacher and other non-verbal behaviour such as clapping and waving hands to show an approval of the message. Repetitions are also a means of seeking approval from the audience which the preachers adopt. (p. 124). The use of interrogative has become one of the methods the preachers use to involve their members in the sermons. In this wise, his study reveals wh- questions, yes-no questions and the rhetorical question as three types of interrogative forms commonly used by charismatic Christian preachers. In his findings, most of the wh-questions used were usually unambiguous while the illocutionary function of the question was not primarily to elicit a verbal response but to stress or underscore some points in the discourse. Generally, the point made is that interrogation, as used by charismatic Christian preachers, is not only to elicit information from the congregation but to regulate their linguistic behaviour in the process of the discourse (sermon). They are also used to elicit non-verbal responses, which could be inform of kinesics and mental behaviour.

The data for Taiwo (2005) were generated from face-to-face interaction, while the data for the present study were sourced from online media reports. Nevertheless, they share similarity with regard to the Christian denominations being examined, Orthodox and Pentecostal leaders (pastors). Also, both studies are similar in their identification of pragmatic strategies used in the discourses. However, the present study also adopted a discourse analysis dimension which Taiwo ignored. Furthermore, there is a divergence in the two studies in the domain of the discourses.

Whereas Taiwo's work is solely situated within religious discourse, the current one mirrors a social phenomenon (insurgency) which is located within terrorist discourse.

Chiluwa (2008) examines the ways in which vehicle stickers construct individual and group identities, people's religious faith and social vision in the context of religious assumptions and practices in Nigeria through vehicle stickers. Adopting the framework of the poststructuralist discourse theory, he observes that stickers serve as means of group identification, guarantee social security, provide privileges for the users and that the stickers are used to define their individual and group identities within religious institutional practices. According to him, one crucial revelation about his data is that they are stickers that reveal the tension between Islam and Christianity and the struggle to propagate one above the other (Chiluwa, 2008: 371). Following his data, he categorises religious sticker functionality into three: those that communicate social vision, individual/group identity and those that reaffirm faith. Chiluwa states that social vision stickers reveal different personalised visions, project 'forward-looking, personal-aspiration statements' based on religious conventions or beliefs. The personal pronouns 'I', 'we', 'me' or the possessive 'my' are employed to linguistically mark this identity. Stickers in reaffirmation of faith utilise paraphrased scriptures from the Bible as faith boosters while those that portray individual or group identity are based on some supposed conversion experience or an encounter with supernatural forces. However, he submits that overlap exists as one sticker can be explained within the three categories. He concludes that vehicle stickers are discursive and reflect social discursive practices and that in Nigeria, it reveals religious groups as well as institutional practices and system of beliefs. They also help in moulding perceptions of Nigerian religious practices.

While Chiluwa (2008) examines discourse features in stickers which can be domiciled within socio-religious context, the current discourse is in the terrorist context. Again, while Chiluwa's work is driven by religious inclination within Christianity alone, the current study centres on public phenomenon but with attention on how two distinct religious leaders (Christian and Muslim leaders) react in or to the situation. Moreover, Chiluwa utilised only a discourse theory, the current one combines discourse and pragmatic approaches.

Within a pragmatic perspective, Inya (2012) investigates Christian apologetics (a concept of defence in Christian theology) using pragmatics act theory as an analytical tool. Through Mey's (2001) concept of the pragmatic act, he identifies the practs: arguing, substantiating, disclaiming,

authenticating, challenging and defending as instantiations of the pragmeme (generalised situation type) by which speakers defend the thesis of their argument. He claims that ‘these acts are recovered as the utterances are embedded in the context and the cotext such as metaphor (MPH), shared situational knowledge (SSK), inference (INF), relevance (REL), and reference (REF), which enrich the logical forms of the utterances and yield the appropriate practs’.

Inya’s work investigates acts performed within the ambiance of religion, but which are set within the social context of argument. It centres on the defence of one’s faith which partly manifest in the media reports by clerics on Boko Haram discourse. Notwithstanding, he dwells on pragmatic acts that are performed in the discourse, whereas the present study investigates perspectives, stance types together with pragmatic strategies in the perspectives of Christian and Muslim leaders. There is also no demarcation in the denominations of the apologists. The salient point here is that both studies are pragmatics based.

On identity and ideology, Kamalu and Tamunobelega (2013) investigate the motives behind expression of religious identity and ideology in three Nigerian literary texts: Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s *Purple Hibiscus*, Chidubem Iweka’s *The Ancient Curse* and Uwem Akpan’s *Say You’re One of Them*, to show the attempt of some 21st Century Nigerian writers to present a situation in which groups use language to construct individual and collective identity and ideology, legitimise their actions, and justify acts of violence against others. He asserts that this is a result of the exploitation of the sociopolitical climate in postcolonial Nigeria that engendered a culture of hatred, intolerance, violence, exclusion, and curtailment of individual and group rights in the name of religion. This situation is revealed through grammatical resources of mood and transitivity in functional linguistics and through various discourse forms realised within the tenets of critical stylistics and critical discourse analysis (CDA). They observe that the mood system in grammar helps to uncover the fact that individuals and groups perceive and relate with others based on religious affiliations and beliefs. The transitivity system in grammatical also aids understanding of the experiences of religious discourse participants. Furthermore, the study reveals that language use in religious discourse is mediated by ideology as participants convey their beliefs, attitude, and bias towards others, which goes further to legitimise and justify their actions against others in addition to establish their desire for others to accept their religious ideology. Thus, the literary texts reveal the implications of religious ‘fundamentalism and

charlatanism on national development'; factors which generate violent desires, disrupt fellowship and also affect economic development.

Like the study of Chilwa (2008), Kamalu and Tamunobelema's (2013) intervention is on religious identity and ideology. The difference between these and the current study is that the latter addresses the social/public phenomenon of terrorism in Nigeria, whose traces are nevertheless, highlighted by Kamalu and Tamunobelema in the literary texts examined. This shows the connection between religion and violence and reinforces Awoniyi's (2013) claim that atrocities are committed against humanity in God's name. In this wise, the Boko Haram insurgency which has a religious undertone has brought Christian and Muslim in seemingly contentious positions in media reports.

It is observed that the literature on religious discourse has focused on areas such as religious language, identity and ideology, using discourse investigative tools such as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), pragmatic or speech acts that are performable within religious discourse and through the linguistic tools in functional grammar such as mood and transitivity systems in Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). However, these studies are to the exclusion of religious leaders' use of language outside the shores of the pulpit and other religious domains. More specifically, the linguistic interventions of religious leaders outside the purview of religion have been under-researched in spite of the fact that these leaders also make contributions to talks that border on national peace and security, and most recently, terrorism, among others. Their personal evaluations of situations, expressions of attitude and personal judgements have been backgrounded. It is within this realisation that the present study explores the gap created by linguistic researchers by investigating the perspectives of clerics in a social issue of global prominence, like terrorism, taking Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria as a case study.

These reviews on religious discourse demonstrate aspects where clerics use language to largely reflect religious domain. Nevertheless, the reference in this section is to establish the fact that though clerics, their language use in this research situates the discourse within religio-political domain because their identities place them within the religious domain whereas the issues under investigation are largely religio-political.

2.3 Review of relevant concepts

This section reviews some of the concepts that are related to the theory of stance, which also are necessarily oriented to in the explanation of speaker's or writer's stance. Some of these concepts include subjectivity, dialogicality, and intersubjectivity.

2.3.1 Subjectivity

Subjectivity is a term connected with Cognitive Grammar and is understood as the inclusion of the perspective of the conceptualiser of a phenomenon into the description of the event, where the conceptualizer is usually the speaker (Verhagen, 2005). It means explicit incorporation of the author's personal thoughts, judgements, and feelings within a text or in the use of language (Iedema, Feez, and White, 1994). It is associated with the presence of the speaker in the utterance. With regard to journalism, Iedema, Feez, and White (1994) opine that subjectivity involves the use of the *first person pronoun* by a text's author, where subjectivity implies the inclusion of personal thoughts, judgements and feelings. They further opine that constructing subjectivity in journalism depend on a writer's mastery of language resources. In particular, they cite the use of *modal verbs* to signal the presence of a speaker or author. They provide the following instantiations as indicating subjectivity:

- i. The real concern of the left should have been to make sure Mr Keating was kept to his promises on the competition.

Through the interpretation of a state of affairs in terms of an emotional response:

- ii. Mr Kennett was unmoved by the protest.

The use of the word, unmoved is a 'subjective' interpretation of the state of mind (affect) of the reference. Other ways of marking subjectivity include the use of *intensifiers*, *means of measure* and the most explicit way of introducing viewpoints into texts is by *means of judgement*. These can be represented in the table below.

SOME WAYS OF INTRODUCING "SUBJECTIVITY" INTO TEXT:	EXAMPLES
MEASURE	<i>a little, lots, for ages, etc.</i>
AFFECT	<i>sad, distraught, desperate, confident, etc.</i>
INTENSITY	<i>adverbs: very, somewhat, etc.</i>
MODALITY	<i>should, might, will, may, etc.</i>
JUDGEMENT	<i>insensitive, stupid, bad, etc.</i>

Table 2.1: (Iedema, Feez, and White, 1994:7)

2.3.2 Dialogicality

According to Du Bois (2007), dialogicality is realised when stance takers draw from the words of previous speakers. This can be realised from the immediate or the current exchange of stance utterances, or more distantly from the horizons of language and prior text as projected by the discourse community. In his terms, dialogicality, when viewed through stance, signals intersubjectivity, which is ‘the relation between one actor’s subjectivity and another’s’. This claim is strengthened by the view of Bakhtin/Vološinov as cited in White (2003:261), that ‘all verbal communication, whether written or spoken, is ‘dialogic’ because by speaking or writing reference is always made to what has earlier been said or written. Subjectivity also means taking up in some way, what has been said/written before, and at the same time anticipating the responses of actual, potential or imagined readers/listeners’. White directly quotes Volosinov (1995) as saying:

Dialogue . . . can also be understood in a broader sense, meaning not only direct, face-to-face vocalised verbal communication between persons, but also verbal communication of any type whatsoever. A book, i.e., a verbal performance in print, is also an element of verbal communication. . . . [it] inevitably orients itself with respect to previous performances in the same sphere . . . Thus the printed verbal performance engages, as it were, in ideological colloquy of a large scale: it responds to something, affirms something, anticipates possible responses and objections, seeks support, and so on.

(Vološinov 1995: 139)

Taking understanding from the views of these scholars that communication as basically dialogic, the present study examines the texts produced by the selected clerics as instances of dialogicality that engage with prior positions, which may be directly derived from the immediate context, or drawn from the distant past utterances of self or ‘other’, or evoked into the present context in order to be engaged within the realisation of the current speaker’s stance. By the effort of engaging with alternative voices and positions, the textual voice actively represents the communicative context as one of heteroglossic diversity. The heteroglossic colouring in the data is

thus, highlighted by orienting to Du Bois' (2007) conception of stance as 'a triune act' that simultaneously evaluates, positions self and 'other', as well as aligns with other perspectives; in addition to the various 'taxonomical' choices used by speakers to negotiate intersubjectivity as proposed by White (2003). Also, the expression of different attitudes presented is aided by Martin and White's (2005) appraisal resources.

2.3.3 Intersubjectivity

Intersubjectivity naturally derives from dialogicality. This is because when people (speaker/hearer; writer/audience) engage dialogically, their individual opinions are bound to feature in their discourse interactions or engagements. Verhagen (2005) asserts that intersubjectivity is a central characteristic of human communication that is concerned with coordinating the points of view of different 'conceptualizers', typically a speaker and an addressee, and one which seeks to explain both the semantics and the syntax of three kinds of natural language constructions: negation and negation-related constructions, concessive and causal discourse connectives, and finite complements (Verhagen, 2005). However, this scholar refers to Traugott (1999) and Nuyts (2001) as referring to honorifics and expressions such as *actually*; and evidential markers like epistemic adjective *probably*, respectively as indicators of intersubjectivity. The next section attends to the concept of context which though catered for in this study as perspectives, is significant in this study.

2.3.4 Context

Context is a dynamic concept used widely by scholars in linguistics, sociology, anthropology among other disciplines, without an explicit definition (Asher, 1994; Fetzer, 2004 and Odebunmi, 2016 and so on). It is considered as the explanation that should be given to meaning in all phenomena (van Dijk, 1977). In the words of Asher (1994:731), context is a commonly used linguistic concept in all situations (contexts) but which is never explained. The concept of context accounts for the situatedness of texts or talks. According to Requejo (2007), context is so crucial to meaning, and that from a cognitive perspective, it is argued that real language use must necessarily involve context. It is a highly idealised abstraction that contains only those facts which systematically determine the appropriateness (pragmatic success) of conventional utterances (van Dijk, 1977).

Van Dijk (2009) makes a broader categorisation of contexts by identifying two types of context, micro, and macro contexts. The micro and macro contexts contain the same contextual features like location, participants, identities, role, relations, aims, knowledge, and action. However, a major distinction is made between the two in the sense that the latter has a broader view to the contextual features than the former. Hence, they are further referred to as ‘local’ and ‘global’ contexts. This is presented in the table below.

Micro context	Macro context
Setting: interaction time location	Setting: period (days, months, years) space (city, country)
Participants: persons identities: professor Roles: teach Relations: personal power Aims Personal knowledge	Participants: groups, institutions, [o]rganizations identities, e.g., ethnic group, school Roles, e.g., education Relations, e.g., institutional power Group goals Group — social knowledge
Action, e.g., explain	Macro act of group, institution: educate, etc.

Table 2.2: Context categories: van Dijk (2004)

The configuration of these features describes context as ‘mental models’ and representations speakers employ to make their contributions appropriate to the situation in which they find themselves. Mental models are therefore taken as the mediating link between language and society. He asserts

Context models are used to manage communicative events. They represent the intentions, purposes, goals, perspectives, expectations, opinions and other beliefs of speech participants about each other, about the ongoing interaction or currently written or read text, or about other properties of the context, such as time, place, circumstances, constraints, props and any other situational factor that may be relevant for the appropriate accomplishment of the discourse.

(1977a:198)

The guiding idea of the mental model is thus relevant to the ongoing discourse, where only the information in the context model which is needed or is connected to the present discourse is necessarily retrieved for communication. In this regard, he proposes a guiding rule for intended knowledge of recipients as: If S knows P (i.e., p is part of the event model of S), and if S believes

that H does not know P and that H should know p or would be interested to know p, then p should be included in the semantic representation (henceforth SR) of the discourse. He argues that “macro-level information in context models in the same way control both the local and the global appropriateness of discourse”.

As cited in O’Donnell (2012), Malinowski, the originator of context in language use holds that to fully understand an utterance, understanding the “context of situation” (the condition under which a language is spoken) of that utterance is highly important. O’Donnell quotes Malinowski as asserting

Our task is rather to show that even the sentence is not a self-contained, self-sufficient unit of speech. Exactly as a single word is save in exceptional circumstances meaningless, and receives its significance only through the context of other words, so a sentence usually appears in the context of other sentences and has meaning only as a part of a larger significant whole. I think that it is very profitable in linguistics to widen the concept of context so that it embraces not only spoken words but facial expression, gesture, bodily activities, the whole group of people present during an exchange of utterances and the part of the environment on which these people are engaged.

(Malinowski 1935:22)

He also claims that the meaning of words lies in their ability to invoke the situation in which they have previously been used. In other words, words might have the indirect meaning which requires the hearer to reconstruct the context of reference based on the way it is used by the speaker (O’Donnell, 2012). His idea of context was based on the understanding that meaning in language use was difficult without knowledge of socio-cultural factors. That is to say, translating a word is only successful or easy when basically, the whole culture of the people is understood (Wolf 1989, Odebunmi, 2006, Hasan 2014), whose statements are being attempted for translation.

Firth, who develops Malinowski’s idea of context, states that “the complete meaning of a word is always contextual, and no study of meaning apart from a complete context can be taken seriously” (see Requejo, 2007: 170). As noted by Saint-Gorges (2013), Hymes’s (1972) work gives another dimension to the study of context with the acronym SPEAKING which offers several contextual factors in the analysis of a speech occurrence: the Setting, the Participants, the Ends and goals of the event, the sequence of Actions, the Key (i.e., the manner and tone of speech), the Instrumentalities (i.e., the channels of communication used), the social and cultural

Norms foregrounded in the interaction, and the Genre (or text types) selected. Halliday (1978) introduces register into the study of context by identifying three dimensions: field, tenor and mode where field relates to the ideational, tenor to the interpersonal and mode to the textual in systemic functional grammar. Summing up the views of these proponents of context, thus, gives credence to Odebunmi's (2006) definition of context as the 'spine of meaning'. To say it differently, meanings of utterances are meaningless without their contexts of use.

Participants' knowledge of the world has also been significant in the understanding of meaning (see Requejo, 2007, van Dijk, 1977a). However, to delineate the meaning of context, it has been divided into linguistic context and situational context (Requejo, 2007).

A larger notion of context is offered by Fetzer (2002, 2004) who identifies three macro contexts namely, linguistic, social and socio-cultural contexts. First is the *linguistic context* which comprises linguistic materials and co-texts. The linguistic context, in her terms, accounts for anaphoric resolutions, retrieval of indexicals as well as constrains the form and function of upcoming talk. Thus, the linguistic context builds context and also constrains the contributions to be made. Second is the *social context* whose prototypical constituents are co-participants, their psychological dispositions, their social and discursive roles, the physical location of the discourse, time and preceding discourse. Third, she identifies the *socio-cultural context* which is used in the same way as the extra-linguistic information needed in the interpretation of contextual meaning. This comprises the co-participants, their physical and psychological dispositions and the specific knowledge or assumptions about the persons involved, the knowledge of the language, the knowledge of routines and activity-types, their communicative intentions and communicative goals, and general background knowledge (Fetzer 2004: 9). Culture is also considered as a key factor in determining the socio-cultural basis of context because it provides the yardsticks for the interpretation of the social situations constructed on specific socio-cultural-context constraints and requirements. These constraints and requirements are tied to the cognitive knowledge which the speaker has of the culture of the interaction or discursive event. Fetzer, therefore, identifies the *cognitive context* as denoting a set of premises and cognitive environment for a set of facts, namely, true or possibly true mental representations. From a relevance theoretical purview, she describes the cognitive context as composed of mental representations, propositions, contextual assumptions which may vary in strength, and factual assumptions. Cognitive contexts are hinged

on an individual's knowledge of the culture but they also require a cognitively based view on communication, thus, they must contain assumptions about mutual cognitive environments. In addition to the mental features already named, she argues that the cognitive context also takes intention into consideration. Hence, Odebunmi (2006) refers to this context as the "mental host of inferences and meaning".

The socio-cultural context gives the universal constituents of the other three contexts, culture-specific interpretations and reframes such as a more individualistically or a more collectively oriented conception of a coparticipant, and a more polychronically or a more monochronically oriented conception of time. She further explains that cognitive material, such as a proposition, a mental representation or an assumption constitutes the cognitive context. If the surroundings are of an extra-linguistic nature, that is non-cognitive and non-linguistic material, they are called social context, and if the surrounding is language material, they are called linguistic context (p.4).

One important fact about context is that it is dynamic and not stable and that interactants constantly adjust their mental models as discourse progresses (van Dijk, 1997) and that it is something that speakers build and transform as they go along because speakers engage in discourse with different "contextualization universe" (Saint-Gorges, 2013). He asserts further that "they might come with a different understanding of a situation, different goals and positions within it, have access to different resources and repertoires; and they might very well attempt to challenge or change the definition of the situation. He explains this situation as language being both context-dependent and context-creating which can 'frame' a situation in a specific way and it can be used to signal changes in the roles and alignments interactants are taking up toward each other.

Other contributions to the research on context include Duranti and Goodwin, 1992; Auer and Di Luzio, 1992; Auer, 1995; Clark, 1996; Mey, 2001; Odebunmi, 2006, 2016; Kecskes, 2010, 2014; Hasan 2014 and so on.

Going by the works of scholars, Odebunmi (2016) defines context as "the condition that constrains the determination of the proposition of an utterance or the understanding of an event or discourse" and develops five perspectives to the study of context. These are context as a macro concept, context as influence from outside in, context as influence from inside out, context as influence from within itself and context as an orientation to both a priori and emergent interactive

cues. Apart from the first which is the macro context, the other four are realisations of the micro context. As a macro concept, context deals with “the broad, traditional notion of context where Fetzer (2002, 2004) identifies three kinds of macro concept namely, cognitive, linguistic and social-cultural context’. Van Dijk (cognitive context models and discourse:1997) identifies context typically comprising, Setting: location, timing of communicative event; Social circumstances: previous acts, social situation; Institutional environment; Overall goals of the (inter)action; Participants and their social and speaking roles; Current (situational) relations between participants; Global (non-situational) relations between participants; Group membership or categories of participants (e.g., gender, age). This is perhaps consistent with his definition of context as “whatever we need to know about to properly understand the event, action or discourse (see van Dijk 1977).

The linguistic context deals with the texts and co-texts that realise a particular discourse event. According to Odebunmi (2016:15), “There is a linguistic context when the meaning of a text is constrained by its structural and lexical environment”. He identifies two types of linguistic contexts: syntagmatic relation and referential relation. The former captures lexical constraint or choice imposed on a word, an idea which he establishes based on Firth’s concept of collocation as an aspect of context of situation. He exemplifies this syntagmatic relation with the sentence ‘This is my new car’ where the word ‘car’ determines the lexical choice of ‘new’ as its collocates. In other words, the word ‘car’ will not admit a choice such as ‘huge’ to have ‘*This is my huge car’. This linguistic understanding, he claims, depends on the language user’s knowledge of the standard dialect which in the technical sense is a stylo-lexical choice from particular fields. Furthermore, he states that “co-text in this situation is constrained by the technicality of the subject matter and the affordances of the local context”. Contextual relation refers to the anaphoric relationship between lexical or syntactic choices that limit their meanings in linguistic contexts.

The social context has to do with the participants in the discourse and other contextual factors such as setting (location), time and the macro-institutional and non-institutional domains, as well as where the genre is crucial (Odebunmi, 2016:17). Therefore, to understand or successfully infer the meaning of utterances, knowledge of these three important aspects is necessary.

At the micro level, Odebunmi (2016) identifies four conceptual understanding of contexts namely: contexts as influence from outside in, context from inside out, context from within itself and context as orientation to both *a priori* and emergent cues. The first is explained in terms of Meyian theory of pragmeme where speakers find their affordances based on the situational context. According to Mey (2001:217), the appropriate meaning of any contribution in any conversation is only made possible within the environment that supports its understanding, and it is the situation and non-linguistic features like gestures, intonation that gives pragmatic acts its true meaning.

This view is within the socio-cultural interactional ambiance that emphasises the priority of socio-cultural and societal factors in meaning construction and comprehension (Kecskes 2010:2889). Kecskes' partial adoption of Mey's idea and inclusion of the importance of the 'wording' that are equally crucial in the construction of contexts brings about the second type of context defined by Odebunmi as context from inside out. In the words of Kecskes, his own idea of context relies on a dialectical socio-cognitive approach to communication and pragmatics. He considers communication as comprising a dynamic process where societal conditions are shaped by individuals and where such conditions also place constraints on the individuals (Kecskes, 2010:2890).

Kecskes' approach relies on situation bound utterances (SBU), which he considers as distinctive lexical items in the sense that they demonstrate the difference between language conventions and conventional usage. Thus, he emphasises the distinction between conventions of meaning as different from conventions of use; the former being what partially makes up a language and the latter being based on culture (manners, religion, law. . .).

As cited in Odebunmi (2016), context from within itself is restricted to conversation analysis (CA) where meanings of utterances are derived from the on-going conversation itself as it is both process and product while context as orientation to both *a priori* and emergent interactive cues reconciles the 'outside in and inside out' views (see Odebunmi, 2016:22-28).

One factor that aids communication and meaning explication in contexts is the issue of speaker/hearer mental representation captured as common knowledge. This has been a contention among scholars of pragmatics. In the terms of scholars like (Clark and Brennan, 1991; Clark, 1996), knowledge is considered as a fixed psychological property in interactants' mental states

and expressed through language. Thus, they consider intention and goal as *a priori* in the realisation of intention and goal in interaction. According to Kecskes and Mey (2008), scholars like Arnseth and Solheim 2002; Koschmann and LeBaron 2003; Heritage 1984; Arundale 1999 view common knowledge as emergent in interaction and not as fixed as earlier conceived. Yet, other scholars have considered 'egocentric' as preceding common ground because speakers want to first say what they know of an issue before shared knowledge. According to (Giora 2003: 103) as stated in Kecskes and Mey (2008), meaning production and comprehension are principally affected by certain meanings domiciled in the mind in spite of the context or simplicity of their use. However, even the notion of common ground is adjusted by other scholars to comprise both *a priori* and *post factum* elements. The position here is that the personality of a language user may be prevalent in some aspects of the communicative event, where dependence on *a priori* devices is more apparently significant than is the case in some other phases of the same communicative process.

2.3.5 Media reports

News reports in the press have been one of the focal points in discourse-analytical media research and serve as sources of knowledge of social and political beliefs about the world on daily basis (van Dijk 1995) and also perform the functions such as informing, educating, influencing, and entertaining, among others (Olawale and Babatunde, 2007). Media communication is very vital in governance, thus, making the press in the modern world one of the most influential and recognised institutions which are almost considered as another arm of government - the Fourth Estate of the Realm (Olawale and Babatunde, 2007: 306). Also, aside conversation, so many people take part in the news in the press and on television more regularly than any other discursive practice (van Dijk, 1995: 110). These media have provided resources for discourse analysis which is concerned with the interpretation of text and talk using theories propounded for the many levels or scope of discourse (van Dijk, 1995). According to Wodak and Busch (2004), media texts are seen as being dialogical and that they also have an intertextual relationship with other genres either diachronically or synchronically (by quotes or indirect references) to decontextualizing and recontextualizing meanings.

The foregoing presents three concepts that are fundamental to this study. First, those media texts are dialogic, secondly, that they are subjectively interpreted and third, that they are intertextual. Therefore, while the current data provides the grounds upon which we examine subjectivity and

dialogicality (intersubjectivity), it also enables us to look at Du Bois' *resonance* as a form of intertextuality, where the stance of a previous speaker is partially reproduced or resonated in order to be engaged by the 'stance follow' (Du Bois, 2007). While these three concepts can be linguistically determined at the micro level, the macro level discourse order demonstrates how social meanings (Boko Haram and its related objects in Nigeria) are produced and reproduced by the clerics. In the next section, attention will be focused on the theories that frame this study.

2.4 Review of theoretical framework

This section of the study highlights the theories that will be used to frame the work. It explores the various theories, their types, and principles as they relate to the current research.

2.4.1 Stance theory

There seem not to exist in the literature a unified definition of the word stance in linguistic studies as many analysts define and approach it from varying perspectives. However, in this section, an attempt is made to survey the concept of stance and some of the types that are available in the literature.

Stance is a socio-cognitive concept that has enjoyed the attention of linguists over the last several years (White, 2003, Du Bois, 2007). It focuses on how social agents evaluate social objects (persons and propositions), how they express their emotion and/or position towards 'self' and 'others' (White, 2003; Du Bois, 2007) in doing so as well as negotiate power and solidarity (Martin and White, 2005). These aspects of human social cognition have been treated under different labels such as evaluation, affect, evidentiality, intensity, hedging, assessment, appraisal (Biber, 2006; Du Bois, 2007). It is also a socio-cultural concept because it explores social values and conveys "presupposed systems of socio-cultural values" (Bois, 2007). Of notable importance is the fact stance subjects draw from language resources, "overt communication means" to express their personal feelings, attitudes and value judgements. Language being a social tool and an "irreducible part of social life" Fairclough (2003) and one of the most important things we do with words [language] is to take a stance (Du Bois, 2007). It deals with linguistic and non-linguistic means employed by interactants to generate and signal connection with the propositions uttered them as well as with the people they are involved with in interaction (Johnstone, 2009). Thus, stance is regarded as a situated, interactional process vigorously participated in by language users in a communicative situation (Palander-Collin: 2008).

Stance is a powerful construct because its specific features have the ability to meaningfully affect audience emotion and how they react in addition to demonstrating the stance taker's commitment to a referenced proposition. It also foregrounds alignment or disalignment with other stance taker's proposition to reproduce or strengthen a socially-situated ideology (see Gales, 2010). It is one of the fundamental elements of human communication (Jaffe, 2009).

As a conceptual framework in linguistics, stance-taking deals with the expression of the mind through the use of verbal language. This notion can be traced to Dennett's (1969) attempt to reconceptualise Ryle's (1949) concept of mind by interrogating the relationship between the physical sciences and the truths expressed in mental language in order to understand how people express truths, beliefs, and desires (Cowley 2011:4). By presupposing a standard view to language, Dennett points out that people take a physical or design stance by linking the principles of physics or design to practical and cognitive skills that inform observations which in turn functions as descriptions and makes a valid prediction about processes and machines (Cowley 2011:135). Cowley extends this concept to mean how anything can be understood. Precisely, he relates it to "how we understand talking people" where language stance functions as a way of predicting what people will do, think and feel. Hence, he asserts that stance "links experience of bodily coordination with wordings that are heard as, together, people use the constraints of a cultural tradition"; and that language already integrates perception, activity, and feeling. Thus, in his conception, verbal patterns are linked with lived experiences, therefore, social actors integrate affect and self-expression with wordings that display both judgments and modes of thinking. Furthermore, Cowley claims that

How we speak, feel, and act shapes social life and, at the same time, becoming social actors restructures perceptually informed 365 modes of action. People come to draw on not just normative patterns but also wordings.

Cowley 2011:11

Also, he argues that collaboration in language involves orienting to wordings or repeated (and systematised) aspects of vocalisations that carry historically derived information within a community; and that this orientation makes language "irreducibly collective". Thus, stance-taking necessarily involves more than a single speaker since one engages with 'wordings' that may be said or done in an attempt to find one's space within the 'wordings'. He says that doing things and

reacting to other people implies orienting to expectations and wordings which are considered crucial.

Stance is an important socio-cultural concept because every human society is daily confronted with issues that prompt varied perceptions, feelings, thoughts and so on. Stance takers as social agents (and in this study, religious leaders) with institutional recognitions exert some degree of influence on the citizens of their society. Since “as stance takers, we alter what people feel, think and know” (p:14); and the fact that stance taking affects actions and views to human agency, the position of such leaders have serious contribution to what becomes of a country like Nigeria in the face of Boko Haram terrorism because “ideas that are prevalent in the community where we live shape who we become”. Thus, the views of clerics can contribute greatly to what becomes of Nigeria, whether there would be reprisal effects in other parts of the country or what strategies can be adopted to quell the violence. Also, this is important because affect is a tool in sensitising to stance taking in the human world which licenses ‘local norms’ that explores values and beliefs. In the words of Cowley, the use of audible wordings makes language ... a collective means of controlling how we resonate to (and dampen) social displays of values.

The importance of ‘wordings’ is non-negotiable in human society as it forms the basis of language which serves diverse functions (see section on Language and the society). According to Du Bois, one of the most important things words are utilised in is in taking a stance. He identifies stance as a powerful concept that has the ability to assign value to objects in which social actors are interested in, thus enabling them to position themselves with regard to the objects they are interested in while at the same time enabling stance takers to ‘calibrate alignment’ in bringing about socio-cultural values that are taken for granted (2007:1).

The notion of stance plays a crucial role both in macro contexts of language as well as in interaction. To this end, Du Bois introduced a theoretical frame as a foundational principle to aid the understanding of its function and the negotiation of meaning. He claims that the realisation of this requires an interdisciplinary exploration of different fields that deal with language. First, he acknowledges that stance is a linguistically constructed social action whose meaning is derivable from the broader scope of language, interaction, and socio-cultural value. Also, theorising stance necessarily brings into focus different resources which connect it with other social concepts such as dialogicality and intersubjectivity which are aspects of language in interaction, among others.

This work finds interest in the above statement as its data brings those two interconnected interactional ideas together in its investigation. More interestingly is the fact that the dialogicality in the data arises not from the immediate context of the speakers, but derived “more remotely along the horizons of language and prior texts as projected by the community of discourse” (p.140). It is also important to know that the fundamental socio-cognitive relations which organise language bring together intersubjectivity, subjectivity, and objectivity that help to realise dialogicality. This thus foregrounds the analytic method of data for this work where speakers embed their subjectivity by exploring certain objective ways of representing their stances as well as projecting intersubjectivity by the way they position themselves and their audience thus emphasising social cognition.

Du Bois posits that as a linguistic endeavour, stance taking essentially involves some level of evaluation that implicates socio-cultural values. He says stance taking involves evaluation which implicates the sociocultural values pointed to in the evaluative act. Furthermore, he asserts that stance has dual implication for social actors that are affected by the stance taken by them and others.

In addition, he claims that current stance act resonates formally and functionally with a stance taken in previous talk. In other words, the value of a stance utterance is shaped by the collaborative act of the participants in the dialogic engagement (2007:141).

From the foregoing, the explicit or implicate invocation of social values makes stance a relevant socio-cultural concept, which in my thinking is a useful tool in ensuring or contributing to some form of ‘sanity’ in any society. Suffice it then to say that stance taking is a useful and laudable social act required for the making of a healthy social life.

According to Du Bois, the act of evaluation has featured in the literature as the most salient part of stance. Some of the works in this regard include Conrad and Biber 2000; Hunston and Sinclair 2000; Hunston and Thompson 2000; Airese and Perucha, 2006 (see Du Bois, 2007). For Du Bois, evaluation generally refers to the process whereby a stance taker orients to an object of stance and refers to it as having some definite quality or value. From his exemplification, evaluation indexes lexical items such as adjectives used to describe targeted objects which he technically refers to as *stance objects*. A closely related concept, he asserts, is that of assessment, as studied in

conversation analysis (Goodwin and Goodwin 1992; Goodwin 2006; Pomerantz 1984). Furthermore, he refers to work on the related notion of appraisal which has been pursued from the perspective of systemic functional grammar (Martin 2000), and additional work on stance, point of view, and related notions as having been developed by a number of scholars (Berman et al. 2002; Berman 2005; Chafe 1994; Karkkainen 2003a, 2003b; Kockelman 2004; Shoaps 2004). (For details on this part, see Du Bois, 2007:143.)

In taking a stance, he also identifies positioning as the way in which speakers (stance takers) present themselves as having affective involvement in what they say or as possessing knowledge or lack of knowledge (ignorance) of the things they say. This phenomenon he designates the term *positioning* and identifies two sub-types, namely *affective* and *epistemic stances*. Hence, he offers a provisional definition of *positioning* as “the act of situating a social actor with respect to responsibility for stance and for invoking socio-cultural value”.

The third function of stance identified by Du Bois is *alignment*, which is a calibration between two stances to either agree or disagree with a given stance. This is, in his words, usually left implicit for the audience’s inference by making a comparison between the stances.

It is important to know that his characterisation of stance as having three functions: evaluation, positioning and alignment, arose as a way of explaining a unified mode of expressing a single stance based on the diversities of types already identified in the literature, which at the same time not been able to resolve the question of how many types of stance there possibly are, and whether those stance types can occur separately or together. Resolving this concern led to what Du Bois refers to as the ‘stance triangle’. This constitutes three different acts that necessarily interact within a context to realise the stance of a speaking subject. Thus, he defines stance as a triune or tri-act:

Stance is a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overtcommunicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects (self and others), and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field. (p.163)

This is represented in his model of stance which he refers to as the *stance triangle*. The first subject, the second subject, and the (shared) stance object located at the nodes of the triangle are three key entities: evaluating, positioning, and aligning. He concludes that the stance triangle is

important in the analysis of stance because it shows the link among all the entities connected with the process of taking a stance.

This mapping of Du Bois' *stance triangle* is germane to this study because it informs the analysis of three stance function as a single act of stance, thereby offering a holistic approach to the analysis of our data. However, since stance is further enriched by resources of related social concepts theory such as appraisal, as it necessarily involves the intersubjectivity, White's (2003), typology and resources of engagement are primarily utilised in this research to identify the perspectives of the selected subjects. However, before turning to examine some notions of appraisal theory, let us examine some other works on stance.

Biber (2006) is an investigation of register variation within the university. By comparing and contrasting the use of a large variety of lexico-grammatical features used in conveying stance in academic against 'student management' within spoken and written registers. He describes major forms of register differences and their importance in all university registers. His findings show significant register differences in the specific meanings realised from grammatical devices utilised in conveying stance within the entire context in which stance can be expressed.

He argues that in English a great number of the lexical and grammatical devices can be used to illustrate the stance of an individual such as personal feelings, attitudes, value judgments, or evaluation. It also deals with how sure they are about its accuracy, how they got the information, and the perspective they are taking. In addition to grammatical devices, he says stance can be to some extent derived from value-laden word choice, and paralinguistic devices. He identified adverbials and complement clause constructions as two common grammatical markers of stance, leaving out others such as value-laden words and paralinguistic devices, which according to him, are difficult to operationalise because they are not obviously evaluative and can hardly be said to be expressing evaluation and attitude (see p.99). Biber (2006) makes the following claims:

A. The most apparent personal stance indicator is the 1st person subject structure

1st person pronoun + stance verb + that-clause:

I know a lot of people avoid Sacramento because of the deathly smog here.

1st person pronoun + stance adjective + that-clause:

We are becoming increasingly certain that the theory has far-reaching implications.

B. grammatical stance devices with implicit attributes are generally described as expressing a speaker or a writer's stance. The list includes the following:

i. Modal verb:

Both of those things might be true.

ii. Stance adverbial:

Maybe someone mentioned this in speaking about it.

iii. Stance adjective controlling extraposed to-clause:

It seems fairly obvious to most people that Watson tremendously oversimplified the learning process.

Three concepts: appraisal, evaluation, and stance have been identified as having similar nature, yet have been differently operationalised. Biber puts forward Gales' (2010) argument that none of these, when considered individually as done in earlier studies, can successfully handle the multilayered nature of stance. This claim makes a positive case for the present study's adoption of a triangulated model as that of Du Bois (2007) that treats the individuated stance types as a single act. Therefore, this study annexes insights from both stance as a concept and resources from appraisal system to understand the stance types in the perspectives of the clerics. Nevertheless, there is a need to survey some of the concepts that have been treated as types of stance. This, therefore, brings us to investigate a few of the literature in the various conceptions while providing one or two of some of the terms that have been commonly used.

2.4.1.1 Types of stance

The concept of stance has been differently approached as evaluation (Hunston, 1994; Hunston and Thompson, 2000), evidentiality (Chafe 1986), and affect (Ochs, 1989). Hyland (1998) describes stance 'hedge' where he treats stance as a means whereby a proposition is presented as an opinion instead of a fact. Therefore linguistic items function as hedges rather than as epistemic markers (see Almeida and Vázquez: Nd, Gales, 2010, Gray and Biber, ...). In this regard, scholars have adopted different methodological approaches that range from comprehensive analyses of a single text to large size investigations of textual components in a corpus, or from detailed analyses of a single language item or descriptions of a wide range of lexical and grammatical items (Gray and Biber, ...). Two major factors that the study of stance is concerned with are:

“meaning of the assessment: personal feeling/attitude H status of knowledge and linguistic level used for the assessment: lexical H grammatical” (Gray and Biber, 2011).

In the next section, stance types are discussed with a few instances from the literature. This does not in any way limit the identified types to what is provided in this section. It only serves as a way of backgrounding the concepts that have been merged by Du Bois in his model since it has been selected as the main theoretical frame for stance in this study.

i. Evaluation

Evaluation has been an area of study that has attracted many scholars. However, there is no uniformity on the linguistic terms utilised to describe the concept (Fragaki, 2010). Hunston and Thompson (2000:5) conceive evaluation as an overall term to communicate a speaker or writer’s attitude or stance towards a viewpoint or expressing feelings regarding the stance object or what is being referenced. They claim that this term performs three functions in discourse. Principally, conveys the speaker’s or writer’s view thereby foregrounding the values of the speaker or his community so as to constantly emphasise that value system. Also, those value-systems form the ideological makeup of such people found in texts. Secondly, evaluation engenders continuation in the relationship between stance takers and their audience by manipulation, hedging, and politeness. They assert that as a concept, evaluation is comparative, subjective and are value-laden and that these can be found at every level of linguistic structure and entails factors such as good/bad, certainty, expectedness, and importance. The third function of evaluation identified by them is its ability to organise the discourse through comparison with norms. Markers of subjectivity include modals, sentence adverbs and conjunctions, and structures that report and attribute speech, as well as markers of value (see Johnstone 2009: 4). For Martin, (1995), evaluation consists of three notions of appraisal which are: *affect, judgment, and evaluation*. Two forms of evaluative meaning namely, inscribed (expressed through obvious lexical item) and evoked (deducible from context). Evaluative meanings referring respectively to explicit and implicit meanings are also identified by him. These meaning forms are made clearer by Hunston and Thompson, (2000) who suggest the terms “conceptual” and “lexical” to aid the recognition of evaluation. The former is comparative, subjective and value-laden, while the latter is simply lexical.

Contrary to Martin's view, Bednarek, (2006) opines that the evaluation should not include *affectas* a type of evaluation. He opines that these two should be treated separately because evaluation deals with the expression of opinion, while term affect is chiefly used when matters of emotion and feelings constitute the discourse.

This suggested exclusion is explainable in the sense that opinion, which involves the expression of evaluation, usually occurs as a result of emotion and feelings, therefore they overlap. Nevertheless, her argument is not tidy since she does not offer any suggestion as to where it should be studied. However, Martin's perspective is supported by other scholars, like Hunston and Thompson (2000), White (2003), Martin and White (2005) and so on.

ii. Evidentiality

Evidentiality as a study implies the indication of a speaker's source of information upon which assertions are made, and which largely takes the veracity of speaker's knowledge into cognisance. It commonly focuses lexical or modal elements as indices of non-grammatical evidentiality in languages thereby making evidentiality clear forms of deixis in their indexing of information to some point of origin (Clift, 2006). She draws similarity in the way deictics are used to signal speaker's position in relation to spatiotemporal or social in the way as stance is used to signal a speaker's position with respect to what they say. In addition, she claims that deictic elements feature spatiotemporal or social coordinates the way stance is shown by certain linguistic forms e.g. 'presumably', or, in Japanese, sentence-final 'the' or 'Rashi') or constructions (e.g. 'said to be. . .').

Clift (2006) explores the concept of evidentiality (linguistic stance) as a non-grammaticalised form of evidentiality by investigating reported speech in English interaction. She claims that reported speech is one of the many resources employed by speakers or receivers to make claim to epistemic priority. However, she argues that those resources cannot be separately identified as stance markers outside of the sequential contexts in which they occur. Reported speech she observes is a linguistic expression of stance that is achieved through interaction based on context. Therefore, she explores the possibility of its systematic use as well as its possibility to index stance in a non-grammatical form by highlighting its usage as a form of deixis. By examining reported speech as a naturally-occurring example of evidential stance, Clift observes that it does not fit into the identified classification of evidential markers. Through her demonstration with an

extended consideration of exemplars from interactions, Clift demonstrates a different perspective to reported speech that differs from those considered in past studies as the typical evidential quotatives by third-person (see Whorf, 1938; Jakobson, 1957; Willett, 1988, Atkinson, 1999; Aikhenvald, 2004, among others) by considering contexts where it does not intrinsically accept third-party authority.

The current study investigates first-person reporting while advancing earlier observations that the turns in reported speech are based on assessments. It demonstrates that reported speech is one of the options employed by participants to mark epistemic stance where coparticipants provide a cogent epistemic authority that can nevertheless be defeated. The illustration with self-reported speech reveals well-ordered structures in their production and placement even in minute instances. Thus, Clift asserts that reported speech is not arbitrarily positioned but:

- i. it is one among the numerous resources for signalling epistemic authority with respect to a co-participant in interaction
- ii. it has a compelling claim to epistemic authority where there is competitive assessment and has the ability to discourage co-participants proceeding with their own valuation which appears only a temporary deterrent, thus exposing its limitation as a sustainable means of evaluation.
- iii. granted that a speaker's stance of authority or subordination; or that of a receiver is marked by specific linguistic items in specific successive positions suggests the label 'interactional evidentials' (which has similarities with discourse and social deixis) to make a distinction between such linguistic resources from 'stand-alone evidentials' that highlight epistemic viewpoint in spite of successive context.

The ultimate significance of Clift's study is that it shows how formal considerations, the means of achieving indexicality, is restricted by interactional demands, thus resulting in a shift of both theoretical and methodological attention on the individual, atomistic and atemporal utterance to the time-bound realisation of a turn in a sequence of turns. The study also brought into focus, the importance of context to the study of a domain where it had essentially been ignored.

There has been significant attention to the grammar of evidentials in its descriptive, typological, and theoretical attention since the 1980s. However, studies on the grammatical and functional

classification of the concept in the social, cultural, and interactional aspects of language have been more atomistic and less systematising in form, thereby making the communicative function of evidentials less understood (see Nuckolls and Michael, 2012).

One of the early approaches to evidentials, Palmer (1986), understood it as a substitute for epistemic modality by explaining its purpose in terms of showing the degree of a speaker's commitment and qualification of the type of evidence as a way of validating it. Scholars have nonetheless made a clear distinction between the two, claiming that there is conceptual variation between evidentiality and modality even though pragmatic and grammaticalization connects the two notions. However, Palmer opines that evidentials do not warrant epistemic modal implicatures thus further mystifying their functions (Nuckolls and Michael, 2012: 162). Therefore, the functional aspect of evidentials has got the interest of scholars such as Aikhenvald, 2004; Michael, 2008; Gipper, 2011 as an attempt to bring into focus the social and interactional perspectives to evidentials (for details see Nuckolls and Michael, 2012). The main idea of the new trend in the study of evidentials is to highlight the fact that, in addition to the universal principle of interaction, social and cultural factors play crucial roles in the emergence of grammatical categories. It also relates to resolving the problem of whether to restrict the grammatical category of evidentials to the narrow frame of 'source of information' or to a broader classification that denotes 'attitudes towards knowledge' that also includes epistemic modality and conceivably other stances types and views about propositions and states of affairs (Nuckolls and Michael, 2012: 183).

iii. Attitude

Attitude is an emotive meaning-making system that refers to a structure for representing feelings (Martin and White, 2005). Attitude is one of the three appraisal systems (Martin 2004) and it involves three semantic areas - emotion, ethics and aesthetics (Martin, 2004; Martin and White, 2005) which, according to Martin and White (2005), respectively correspond with *affect*, *judgement*, and *appreciation*. Of utmost importance out of the three aspects of *affect* is emotion, an inherent resource in human physiology which they refer to as *Affect*. Affect deals with registering positive and negative feelings; feelings of happiness or sadness, confidence or anxiety, interest or boredom (Martin and White, 2005).

The word ‘judgement’ is used as a meaning category to refer to how the attitude towards behaviour is evaluated. Attitude can be admired, criticised, praised or condemned. Appreciation involves an evaluative placement of value on “semiotic and natural phenomenon” in a given field. All of the manifestations of *affect* realise Halliday’s (1979) interpersonal function. Judgement and appreciation, according to Martin and White, can be considered as institutionalised feelings; a feeling that is distinct from everyday commonsense but one of uncommon sense worlds of shared community values. He describes appreciation as the reworking of feelings in a propositional form about the value (worthiness or unworthiness) of things. Attitude engenders a range of different grammatical realisations as a discourse semantic system. An example is its realisation in the systemic functional grammar of Halliday where affect is able to realise modification of participants and processes, affective mental and behavioural processes, and modal Adjuncts. It also realises a range of grammatical metaphor in (Halliday, 1994); for discussion and others like grading and/or intention and reaction (see Martin and White 2005:45-48).

They typify affect (feeling) as having six attributes which can be summarised as follows:

1. feelings construed by culture as negative or positive
2. surge of emotion (being paralinguistic or extralinguistic) or a form of emotive state or continuous mental process
3. feelings necessitated by some specific emotional trigger or as a general ongoing mood for which one asks ‘Why’
4. feelings being graded low, high or mid on a scale of intensity
5. feelings which involve intention instead of reaction with respect to a stimulus or emotion that has to do with
 - a. un/happiness, that is ‘affairs of the heart’ (sadness, hate, happiness, and love),
 - b. in/security, that is being emotions concerned with ecosocial well-being (anxiety, fear, confidence, and trust)
 - c. dis/satisfaction concerned with telos (the pursuit of goals) – ennui, displeasure, curiosity, respect.

Judgment deals with how one’s attitude towards another’s behaviour is being understood. It involves ‘social esteem’ and ‘social sanction’. The former is embedded in oral culture and it has three variables: ‘normality’ (how unusual someone is), ‘capacity’ (how capable they are) and

‘tenacity’ (how resolute they are). Values here are shared within social networks. The latter is more often institutionalised order, monitored by the church and the state and coded in writing, as edicts, decrees, rules, regulations, and laws to determine how people should behave and it has penalties and punishments for non-compliance. Its variables are, ‘veracity’ (how truthful someone is) and ‘propriety’ (how ethical someone is) and the values are encrypted as a civic duty and religious observances (Martin and White: 2005).

In appreciation, which is the third type of affect, meaning is about the evaluation of things, in particular, it is about the value placed on things we make and performances we give as well as natural phenomena. It has three sub-types:

- a. ‘reactions’ to things (do they catch our attention; do they please us?)
- b. ‘composition’ (balance and complexity)
- c. ‘value’/valuation (how innovative, authentic, timely, etc.) (Martin and White 2005: 56)

2.4.1.2 Other types of stance

Other kinds of stance that have been found to exist in the literature are various combinations of the already identified stance types which are also variously used as interconnected concepts or as distinct types. For example, Conrad and Biber (2000) use the term stance to refer to *authorial attitude*. Under this term, they identify three types of areas for the expression of stance. These are epistemic stance, attitudinal stance and style stance. Their explanation of epistemic stance as the expression of certainty or reliability of a proposition is what Cliff (2006) refers to as evidentiality. Attitudinal stance on the other hand, which Conrad and Biber refer to as a speaker’s attitudes, feelings, or value judgments is treated by Hunston and Thompson (2000) refers to evaluation generally as the attitude or stance expressed by speaker or writer’s with respect to a viewpoint held, the feelings expressed about the object or the proposition being talked about (Hunston and Thompson, 2000:5). While Conrad and Biber’s (2000) interpretation of attitudinal stance overlaps in some areas with the Hunston and Thompson’s (2000) notion of evidentiality, the concept of *style* stance squares for both sets of scholars. While the former describes it as how information is being presented, the latter term it as a way of organising the discourse. Style can manifest as “relatively stabilized repertoires” or repeated forms (Johnstone: 2009) and it is sometimes called “registers” by other scholars (see Johnstone, 2009:5). Like other terms, evaluation has also received different labels by scholars such that Fragaki (2012) in his

introductory statement argues that “Although evaluation in text seems to be an attractive field of research, there is, in fact, no agreement even on the linguistic terms used to describe it, let alone their meaning. Among the many terms used for this aspect of the text, the most important have been subjectivity, stance, appraisal, and evaluation”.

2.4.1.3 Expression of stance

The concept of stance is a multidimensional theoretical construct identifiable through socially-constructed ideologies, interpersonal negotiations of power, and functional language practices (Gales, 2010) and it has been investigated largely as being projected through linguistic features (lexical and grammatical), which can be communicated subtly or boldly (Biber, 2006); and in paralinguistic and non-linguistic forms (Gales, 2010; Johnstone, 2009). While the lexical and grammatical manifestation of stance will be treated in separate sub-sections, paralinguistic and non-linguistic markers include pitch, loudness, and duration of speech, and non-linguistic devices, such as facial expressions, gestures, and other body language (Biber et al, 1999; Gales, 2010). However, Biber and his colleagues argue that only a few stance devices in this category are available in the literature because paralinguistic and non-linguistic devices are not traditionally explicit in a linguistic sense (Biber et al, 1999: 966) as cited by Gales, (2010). Another form of non-grammatical stance type such as reported speech in evidentiality in English has been identified by Clift (2006), where she claims that interactional evidential depends on the sequential position of turns that contain them.

Biber (2006) considers lexico-grammatical markers of stance in two types of university registers (spoken and written) and observes that the spoken register largely utilise stance devices of grammatical forms such as modal verbs, stance adverbials, stance complement clause constructions in the expression of both epistemic and attitudinal meanings, whereas the written register (textbooks) scarcely uses such stance devices.

i. Lexical markers of stance

Lexical items have been observed as makers of personal stance and they can point directly to the emotional state of the speaker or writer (e.g., Yeah, I love that film.) or they can spotlight the stance taker’s assessment of another, object, or proposition (e.g., The nurses are wonderful there.) (Gales, 2010:62). From Biber et al., (1999: 968-968), Gales (2010) cites the following lexical items as markers of stance: adjectives such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘nice’ and ‘right’ have more

occurrences in conversation, while ‘difficult’, ‘best’, and ‘appropriate’ display more manifestation in academic prose. Biber et al. further claim that all completely lexical expressions of stance are sensitive to context and shared background for their appropriate interpretation and that stance... is determined by the addressee’s ability to identify the use of value-laden words (Biber et al.1999: 969).

However, pragmatic context has also been argued as a relevant factor in the explanation of lexical stance rather than the semantics of the value-laden words in isolation of context, because the social identity of the interactants also contributes to the meaning possibilities of the lexical choices. For example: *How cruel and wicked it seems...* vs. *That would be wicked cool*, may be used to mean differently between those constructing youth identity and those projecting other types of identity (Gales, 2010: 64). Also, Biber (2006) observes that spoken register deploys an opaque utilisation of stance devices of grammatical types such as modal verbs, stance adverbials more than the written register.

Studies of particular markers have also been investigated in recent times. Some of the works include Fox’s work (2001) on ‘hear’, ‘seem’, ‘evidently’ and ‘according to. .’, amongst others; Kärkkäinen’s (2003b) examination of the prosody of stance markers precisely ‘I think’; and Du Bois’ (2004) study of the alignment between a current stance and a prior with the linguistic indices ‘too’ and ‘either’. Such markers are obvious signifiers of stance in the utterances that contain them (see Gales: 2010). Biber and Finegan (1988, 2009) identify six semantic categories of adverbials marking stance in various stance styles in English. These are: honestly adverbials, generally adverbials, surely adverbials, actually adverbials, maybe adverbials, and amazingly adverbials.

ii. Grammatical markers of stance

Grammatical markers of stance are realised through grammatical constructions (Biber, 2006). He asserts that grammatically marked stance stands out from a distinct grammatical structure used to express stance with respect to some other proposition (Biber, 2006:99). According to Biber et al., (1999), stance is clearly demonstrated in English via five main grammatical categories. These are adverbials, complement clauses, modals and semi-modals, noun plus prepositional phrase, and premodifying stance adverbs. Adverbials are realised through five constructions: single adverbs, adverb phrases, hedges, prepositional phrases, and adverbial clauses. The respective examples

include: unfortunately, certainly; quite frankly, very seriously; kind of, sort of; in fact, without doubt; as one might expect, to be honest. The sixth type of grammatical stance is referred to by Biber et al. (1999) as comment clauses. Examples include: I guess, I think. Complement clauses are made of two separate parts: the stance marker and the proposition that frames the stance, and they can be controlled by verbs, nouns, adjectives, and extraposed structures. Some examples are: I hope that ...; The fact that ...; I'm happy that ...; it's amazing that ..., respectively (see Gales, 2010, Biber et al, 1999). The last three types of stance: modals and semi-modals, noun plus prepositional phrase, and premodifying stance adverbs are not treated as stance markers or the propositions that frame them because they are embedded within the main or matrix clauses or the propositions. This is explained in the following examples.

I don't think she *would* be missed: *would* functions as a marker of the author's predictive stance about the proposition that she will be missed.

... the possibility of many fraudulent foreign medical degrees) (DEF)

demonstrates that while separable into two distinct parts, the prepositional phrase cannot necessarily be argued to be a proposition

a premodifying adverb (a stance adverb plus an adjective or a noun phrase) is simply an adverb that modifies a particular phrase (e.g., ... so happy, ... about this age). The adverb only marks stance towards that specific phrase (i.e., it is phrase internal) rather than marking stance towards a whole proposition (see Gales, 2010).

Like Biber et al. (1999), Biber (2006) clearly claims the existence of two commonly identified grammatical stance devices, namely adverbials and complement clause constructions. The former expresses the attitude or assessment of the speaker/writer with respect to the proposition contained in the matrix clause, while with complement clauses, the matrix clause verb expresses a stance with respect to the proposition in the complement clause.

Obviously, you don't have to come to class on May eighth. (Adverbial)

I doubt [that they've published this]. (matrix clause verb)

In addition, he identifies three implicit stance markers that are attributed to the speaker or author. These are the modal verb (Both of those might be true.), stance adverbial (Maybe someone mentioned this in speaking about it.) and stance adjective controlling extraposed to-clause (It seems fairly obvious to most people that Watson tremendously oversimplified the learning process.). He further classifies the stance markers as follows: modals and semi-modal verbs

having three semantic categories: i. possibility/permission/ability, ii. necessity/obligation, iii. prediction/volition. Three main semantic types of stance adverbs are identified: epistemic, attitude, and style. The first is further classified into two, those that express certainty (e.g. certainly, in fact), and the ones that specify the degree of possibility (e.g. perhaps, probably). Attitude adverbs convey an evaluation of expectations, for example amazingly or importantly. Style adverbs capture the manner of presentation of a message or the perspective of the source of information, as in frankly or generally. Finally, he states that both *that-clauses* and *to-clauses* are regarded as common complement clauses that are used in marking stances with three possible controlling elements, which are verbs, adjectives, and nouns (Biber, 2006:100). He argues that grammatical devices can explicitly attribute stance to a speaker/writer (1st person), and to a 2nd or 3rd person. However, he admits that stance ascribed to the first person is the most obvious expression of personal (speaker/author) stance and it is indexed by the structure: 1st person pronoun+stance verb+that-clause.

Another linguistic approach to analysing stance known as *Dialogic syntax*, [henceforth, DS] (Du Bois, 2010, Du Bois and Giora, 2014) is the structure of engagement between and through signs (Du Bois, 2010) to investigate the linguistic, cognitive, and interactional processes that come into play when language users resonate specific aspects of past utterance and when addressees react to the parallelisms and resonances thereby produced to draw inferences for situated meaning (Du Bois and Giora, 2014: 351). According to Du Bois, the engagement may result from linguistic similarities or other symbolic system and may be evoked utterances that couple with previous ones in the immediate or past, spoken or written or even from face-to-face interaction or from a past speaker's utterance (2010:1).

DS provides a general outline for analysing, describing, interpreting, and representing the structural and functional relations emerging from utterances when they are brought into dialogic apposition. As a resource for engagement, DS can be used to concur or challenge a previous position. However, the focus of DS is on the internal structural relations in utterances. Besides resonance as a linguistic concept, he asserts that dialogic syntax has a relationship with other concepts and theories such as syntactic priming, parallelism, intertextuality, analogy, association, allusion, similarity, among others.

The two ways of analysing stance so far discussed offer different approaches to achieving the notion of the speaker or personal stances in relation to other projected stances within an interaction which may be immediate or remote; written or spoken; but with relevance to particular issues in context.

2.4.2 Appraisal theory

Appraisal theory deals with interpersonal ideas in language that take into consideration the subjectivity of text writers or speakers with regards to how they take stances towards objects of talk or the people they interact with. It also accounts for the construction of specific authorial identities by the way text producers align or disalign with their anticipated audience - readers or hearers (Martin and White, 2005). They identified three broad categories of appraisal resources, namely engagement, attitude, and graduation. The first refers to monoglossic or heteroglossic voices in texts, the second consists of affect, judgement, and appreciation; while the third involves force and focus.

White (2003) classified engagement as linguistic resources used in constructing intersubjective positions generally as those that contract dialogic space and those that expand them. Dialogic contraction consists of two main types: proclamation (made up of concurrence, pronouncement, endorsement); and disclaim (having denial, counter). Concurrence is typically conveyed by means of adverbials such as naturally, obviously and some uses of, of course. Pronouncement is concerned with intensifications, authorial emphases or explicit authorial interventions or interpolations. Endorsement is a formulation in which there is a foregrounding of a textual voice, but in which the foregrounded subjecthood is that of some external source introduced into the text by attribution. The modes under proclaim are used to increase personal intervention in a viewpoint that is advanced to clearly indicate interest in advancing that viewpoint contrary to divergent positions. Denial is outright or absolute negation (the negative acts to invoke or activate the positive). Counter is some expected, rather than a directly negated, position which is disclaimed. It expresses an expected disagreement.

The resources for expansion are classified as entertainment, and attribution (consisting acknowledgment and distance (not used in this study)). Entertainment involves a speaker's presentation of his view as one considerable possibility among an array of potential viewpoints. The text producer accommodates contrary opinions as a dialogic possibility thereby opening up

the dialogic space for contending views. This is grammatically marked by modals of probability/epistemic modality (e.g. perhaps, probably, he may be corrupt, he must be corrupt etc.) and related wordings (e.g. in my view, I suspect, I think, etc.), evidentials (e.g., it seems, apparently, the evidence suggests . . . etc.) and hearsay (I hear). In acknowledgement, textual voice employs attribution or reported speech to foreground the viewpoint of an external voice in order to present his subjecthood. The privileged viewpoint is admitted as an alternative possibility (Martin and White 2006:281-282). According to White, the classifications of the resources address various ways “the textual voice engages with alternate voices and/or points-of-views being referenced or activated by the text” (White, 2003:559). The engagement resources in the appraisal system were employed because as tools for constructing intersubjective stance, they dialogically project the viewpoints of the clerics. In addition, lexico-grammatical elements of stance were annexed to enrich the linguistic analysis in the discussion.

There is also a supplemental use of the notions of affect and judgement within the concept of attitude in Martin and White (2006) approach to appraisal system to complement the stance theory in explicating affective stance to address the attitude of the clerics towards Boko Haram. Affect can be construed as positive or negative; a surge of emotion or emotive state or ongoing mental process; directed at or reacting to some specific emotional trigger or as a general ongoing mood and so on. Judgement is divided into those dealing with ‘social esteem’ and those oriented to ‘social sanction’. The former centres on ‘normality’ (how unusual someone is), ‘capacity’ (how capable they are) and ‘tenacity’ (how resolute they are); while the latter deals with ‘veracity’ (how truthful someone is) and ‘propriety’ (how ethical someone is) (White, 2003:53). Grammatically, affect is derived from the transitivity system while judgement is derived from the system of modalisation (Martin and White, 2006:54).

As earlier mentioned, these resources are employed for the realisation of a more robust examination of the data in order to arrive at a better representation of the perspectives and stance types expressed by the subjects under investigation.

2.4.2.1 Stance and appraisal

Stance and appraisal are interrelated theories that take as a primary focus the interpersonal aspect of human’s socio-cultural relation. According to Recski (2006:77), stance is viewed as a response

to interactional demands and social contexts within which speakers and recipients interact. This approach removes it from the individual speaker towards a dialogical approach and social meaning construction. This means of meaning construction is rooted in the interpersonal metafunction of the systemic functional linguistics, especially in the notion of modality. Similarly, the appraisal theory (White, 2000; 2003; Martin, 2004; Martin and White, 2005 among others) is situated within systemic functional linguistics, where “the various shades of evaluative meanings which can be expressed in language are classified into numerous types and subtypes” (Recski, 2006:77). He quotes Martin and White as saying that appraisal theory emphasises language use in an interpersonal situation with the presence of the subjectivity of the interactants, writers or speakers, in the text towards the objects in question as well as their co-interactants, that is, those with whom they communicate. It also takes into consideration how writers and speakers convey dis/approval, enthuse and abhor, applaud and criticize; position their audience to take their stands; the construction of communal or shared feelings and values; how speakers/writers construct personal identities; and how they dis/align with actual or potential respondents, among others.

This underlining interest of the appraisal system fits what stance has been identified as by various scholars. According to Palaner-Collin (2007) stance is a situated, interactional process actively engaged in by language users communicating with each other, while in the opinion of Biber et al. (1999), it is a culturally-organized —personal feelings, attitudes, value judgements of a speaker or writer or assessment about a subject matter, receiver, or presented proposition. It is also constructed as the lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgements, or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message (Biber and Finegan, 1989); a public act by a social actor established through dialogical engagement using overt means of communication to concurrently evaluate objects, position subjects (self and others), and align with other subjects, regarding any salient dimension of the sociocultural field (Du Bois, 2007). Stance is also construed as linguistic or other methods deployed by interactants to create and connect with their own propositions and with the people they interact (Johnstone, 2009). “Stance taking affects both how we act and our view of human agency ... [affect] ideas that are prevalent in the community where we live, alters what we feel and value” where “language is reconceptualized as part of social coordination” (Cowley, 2011).

It is observed from the submissions above that central to stance and appraisal theories are the following: methods of evaluation, interpersonal relationship (of writer/reader, speaker/listener, text producer/consumer, addresser/addressee and so on), attitude (feelings, judgements, or commitment) towards an object of social concern, linguistic methods (necessarily lexicogrammatical), positioning, alignment/disalignment. One concept that is central to both theories is the term *evaluation* which deals with normative values since evaluating a proposition naturally entails comparing it against a norm (Hunston and Thompson, 2000:21); and appraisal “primarily focuses on affective instantiations of stance” (Gales: 2010).

While the theories have a lot in common that it appears there is only a thin demarcation between them, the current study applies a fusion of the two in order to give elaboration to the data. This is supported by Gales’ (2010) view that regardless of the connectedness of appraisal, evaluation, and stance in contemporary use in the claim of Bednarek (2006), the concepts are differently operationalised, none of them is self-sufficient to effectively handle the complexity of stance (Gales 2010:50).

The next section reviews literature on critical discourse analysis from a broad perspective and narrows down to the sociocognitive model of van Dijk from which the pragmatic strategies deployed in this study are derived.

2.4.3 Critical discourse analysis (CDA)

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a linguistic theory used in the study of language and discourses or talk in social institutions. CDA emerged from poststructuralist discourse theory and critical linguistics. It is essentially concerned with how social relations, identity, knowledge, and power are constructed through written and spoken texts, Allan (1996). Allan asserts that a poststructuralist discourse theory is fundamentally interested in the ability of texts and discourses as constructive phenomena that shape the identities and practices of people.

This implies that language is used as a form of social practice. It is an interdisciplinary approach to textual study concerned with an explication of abuses of power promoted by texts, by analyzing linguistic/semiotic details in light of the larger social and political contexts in which those texts circulate, Huckin, Andrus and Clary-Lemon (2012). From a critical linguistics viewpoint, van Dijk

(1995), construes CDA generally as a way of analysing talk and text from the angle of critical semiotics and socio-political consciousness; a way of investigating language, discourse, and communication. According to Reisigl and Wodak, (2001), the term CDA means giving a critical attention to everything in order to expose all inherent complexities ... to reveal structures of power relations and obvious ideologies. Wodak (2002) argues that the powerfulness of language as people use it resides in CDA, hence, the critical analysis of the language of people in power from the perspective of those who suffer. She adds that the language study centres on that of the powerful because they bring about inequalities since they have the means and the opportunity to improve conditions. Thus, CDA critically investigates social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, and legitimised by language use, Wodak (2006). To be critical therefore entails consideration of implicit and explicit text contents and their consequences in constructing and defining or representing the world (Rogers, 2011).

Among other views of CDA, Fairclough and Wodak identify distinctive principles of CDA to include the following:

- CDA addresses social problems.
- Power relations are discursive.
- Discourse constitutes society and culture.
- Discourse does ideological work.
- Discourse is historical.
- The link between text and society is mediated.
- Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory.
- Discourse is a form of social action.

(1997:271–80)

By attempting to expose and, crucially, resist social inequality as it is, usually surreptitiously, conveyed in and embedded in language use (van Dijk 2001: 352; Wodak 2001: 2), CDA clearly seeks social transformation through a serious understanding of language (van Dijk 1993: 252). Put differently, CDA critically examines the nexus between language and society.

In the literature, four approaches to CDA have been identified based on their methods of analysis. These are:

- Critical Linguistics (Fowler et al. 1979; Fowler 1991, 1996; Kress 1985; Kress and Hodge 1979)
- The socio-semiotic approach (Fairclough 1989, 1992, 1995a, 1995b)
- The discourse-historical approach (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak 1996, 2001)
- The sociocognitive approach (van Dijk 1995, 1998, 2002)

(Hart: 2010)

Hart further claims that these strands can be a differentiated party by the theory of language applied, as well as from the data type analysed. However, he says, Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar has been found to be common to all except the sociocognitive approach.

The current research relies heavily on van Dijk's (2006), categories of ideological discourse analysis. Therefore, it is appropriate that the CDA model of van Dijk is reviewed and connected with his ideological categories which have been adopted as strategies in this study in order to provide a comprehensive path for the analysis.

2.4.3.1 Sociocognitive approach to critical discourse analysis

The sociocognitive dimension to critical discourse analysis is credited to van Dijk who construes CDA as a field of study that is interested in analyzing how spoken or written texts represent the discursive sources of power, dominance, inequality and bias; and how they are produced or reproduced as well as maintained in specific social, political and historical contexts, van Dijk (1998). Social power he claims is based on privileged access to socially valued resources, such as wealth, income, position, status, force, group membership, education or knowledge. It involves dominance of a group over another. Control relates to action and cognition: that is, a powerful group may both limit others' freedom of action, and also influence their minds. He defines dominance as the exercise of social power by elites, institutions or groups, that results in social inequality including political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial and gender inequality. The means of reproduction of dominance may involve such different modes of discourse power relations as the more or less direct or overt support such as enactment, representation, legitimation, denial, mitigation or concealment of dominance, among others. He concludes that power and dominance are usually organised and *institutionalized*. In other words, social dominance can be exhibited by members of a group and not by an individual.

On the analysis of discourse within CDA, van Dijk opines that in the different approaches adopted in the study of the critique of social inequality, what is crucial is to focus on the role discourse plays in the (re)production and the challenge of dominance (van Dijk, 1993:249). Significantly, he says, CDA is interested in the structures, strategies or other features of text, talk, verbal interaction or communicative events that play a role in these means of reproduction. He goes further to argue that:

... in order to relate discourse and society, and hence discourse and the reproduction of dominance and inequality, we need to examine in detail the role of social representations in the minds of social actors. More specifically, we hope to show that social cognition is the necessary theoretical (and empirical) interface, if not the missing link, between discourse and dominance. In our opinion, neglect of such social cognitions has been one of the major theoretical shortcomings of most work in critical linguistics and discourse analysis.

(van Dijk, 1993:251)

In addition, van Dijk claims that critical discourse analysts in addition to covering present, crucial and urgent issues that may have indirect and persistent examination of basic causes, conditions, and consequences of such matters, aim to make specific contributions that require proper understanding of the important role discourse performs in the production of dominance and inequality. He admits the challenge posed by the complex nature of CDA as a discipline which requires annexing interdisciplinary tools to account for the complicated relationship in text, talk, social cognition, power, society, and culture. He concludes by asserting that the achievement of CDA is assessed by its contribution to social change (253).

2.4.3.2 Ideology

Ideology is a concept that is crucial to every aspect of any society and is a concern in many fields of study. As an important notion in human society, it has been conceived in different lights by different scholars. A few of the views are reviewed in this section.

Gerring (1997) provides a three-dimensional definition of ideology. He claims that ideology comprises three components namely, thought, behaviour and language. Ideology of thought, he

says, is the traditional common sense approach which describes it as ‘a science of ideas’, a set of beliefs, values, principles, attitudes, and/or ideals, that is, political thinking. Behavioural ideologies are not isolated from the real world and it is explained in the sense that they direct or influence behaviour as is the situation with political behaviour based on ideology. He further asserts that the language aspect of ideology goes beyond beliefs/behaviour to examine how it is derived from linguistic symbols or discourse. Arguing further, he says that the contemporary conception of ideology is derived not from the intention but from the linguistic norms. Thus, ideological thinking is interpreted in light of ideological language. He cites Eagleton (1991) as asserting that ideology refers to the various avenues from which social powers are contested through signs, meanings, and representations; it is “a verbal image of the good society” in the words of Downs (1957:56). Gerring concludes with the position of Thompson (1984) that “the language of everyday life is the *locus* of ideology and the very *site* of the meaning which sustains relations of dominance” (Gerring, 1997:966 -968).

Gerring summarised ideology as represented in the diagram below:

Table 2.3: A comprehensive definitional framework of ideology by Gerring (1997:967)

1. Location (a) Thought (b) Behaviour (c) Language	(b) Subordinate	(c) Abstraction
2. Subject matter (a) Politics (b) Power (c) The world at-large	5. Function (a) Explaining (b) Repressing (c) Integrating (d) Motivating (e) Legitimizing	(d) Specificity (e) Hierarchy (f) Stability (g) Knowledge (h) Sophistication (i) Facticity (j) Simplicity (k) Distortion (l) Conviction (m) Insincerity (n) Dogmatism (o) Consciousness (p) Unconsciousness
3. Subject (a) Social class (b) Any group (c) Any group or individual	6. Motivation (a) Interest-based (b) Non-interest-based (c) Non-expedient	
4. Position (a) Dominant	7. Cognitive/affective structure (a) Coherence (internal) (b) Contrast (external)	

The concept of ideology as used by media and the social sciences according to van Dijk (2006) is ‘notoriously vague’. He states that its meaning in common usage connotes a negative concept that characteristically refers to “the rigid, misguided, or partisan ideas of others: we have the truth, and they have ideologies” (p.729). He traces this negative meaning to Marx-Engels, who conceives ideologies as a form of ‘false consciousness’. However, he identified dominance as a key element

in the classical notions of ideology and the role it plays in the legitimisation of power abuse by dominant groups. According to Fairclough (2003), ideologies are representations of aspects of the world which can be shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination, and exploitation. He adds that ideological representations can be identified in texts therefore, he suggests the framing of textual analysis within social analysis in order to consider bodies of texts (which include Gerring's "language of everyday life"), in terms of their effects on power relations. In the view of Thompson (1990), ideology refers to social forms and processes within which, and by means of which, symbolic forms circulate in the social world.

Going by these conceptions of ideology, language is key in ideology formulation and maintenance and explains why discourse analysts are interested in its investigation in discourses.

2.4.3.3 van Dijk's categories of ideological discourse analysis

Scholars have associated ideology with different social domains, political, religious, ethnic, and so on. In his (2006) study titled 'Politics, Ideology, and Discourse; van Dijk identified categories of ideological discourse analysis which he opines that manifest the following strategies he describes as the ideological square:

- Emphasize Our good things
- Emphasize Their bad things
- De-emphasize Our bad things
- De-emphasize Their good things.

He asserts that these overall strategies may be applied to all levels of action, meaning, and form of text and talk. He goes further to say that in text and talk everything good is interpreted in favour of the speaker's ingroup by using all discourse structures that emphasis the intended meaning, while the reverse is the case when the talk involves the Other/Opponent/Enemies (732). Using fragments from a debate in the British House of Commons on asylum seekers, held on March 5, 1997; van Dijk identified strategies employed in exposing various ideologies, particularly those of racism and antiracism as expressed in diverse types of structures. He identified 27 strategies and provided the domain of discourse analysis to which the categories belong (e.g., meaning, argumentation, etc.). Out of the categories listed, only the ones adopted in this study are explained. The categories are Actor Description (Meaning), Authority (Argumentation), Burden

(Topos), Categorization (Meaning), Comparison (Meaning, Argumentation), Consensus (Political Strategy), Counterfactuals (Meaning, Argumentation), Disclaimers (Meaning), Euphemism (Rhetoric; Meaning), Evidentiality (Meaning, Argumentation), Example/Illustration (Argumentation), Generalization (Meaning, Argumentation), Hyperbole (Rhetoric), Implication (Meaning), Irony (Rhetoric), Lexicalization (Style), Metaphor (Meaning, Rhetoric), National Self-Glorification (Meaning), Negative Other-Presentation (Semantic macrostrategy), Negative Other-Presentation (Semantic macrostrategy), Number Game (Rhetoric, Argumentation), Polarization, Us–Them Categorization (Meaning), Populism (Political Strategy), Positive Self-Presentation (Semantic Macrostrategy), Presupposition (Meaning), Vagueness (Meaning), Victimization (Meaning) together with Dramatization and Polarization. Out of the 27 strategies discussed by van Dijk, nine are adopted for the current study. These are discussed in the next session.

2.4.3.4 The adopted strategies

Hart (2010) cites Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak (2001: 44) who describe the word 'strategy', as 'a more or less intentional plan of practices (including discourse practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim'. To show how various ideologies, especially those of racism and antiracism, are expressed in various kinds of structures, van Dijk (2006) assigns an analytical category to each example. According to him, out of the 'hundreds of such categories', he has utilised 27 ideological strategies from which nine that are applicable to this study have been adopted as pragmatic strategies to explain the data. These are authority, categorisation, comparison, evidentiality (revised as substantiation), example or illustration (used as exemplification), metaphor (which has been adapted in this study as metaphorisation), national self-glorification (modified in this study as religious-self-glorification), norm expression and vagueness. These terms are explained as follows: authority is used in argumentation to have recourse to the fallacy of mentioning authorities to support their case. Categorisation is derived from social psychology, where people tend to categorise people especially when *Others* (immigrants, refugees, etc.) are involved. Comparison is employed to talk about ingroup and outgroup in talks, while substantiation (evidentiality in van Dijk's terms) are claims or points of view in an argument which speakers use to make their argument more plausible by producing proofs for their knowledge or opinions. This may be established by making reference to authority figures or institutions (see 'Authority' above), or by various forms of evidentiality, that is, how or

where the information originated. This could be by reading something in the paper, hearing it from reliable spokespersons, or by seeing something (with their own eyes). It is an important move to convey objectivity, reliability, and hence credibility. Exemplification is realised in argumentation by providing concrete instances, often in the form of a vignette or short story that illustrates or makes a point defended by the speaker more believable. Metaphorisation is a device by which abstract, complex, unfamiliar, new, or emotional meanings may thus be made more familiar and more concrete. National self-glorification (adapted as Religious-self-glorification) implies positive references to or praise for one's own country, its principles, history, and traditions (in this study religion). Norm expression is explicit norm statement about what should or should not be done. Vagueness refers to the use of vague quantifiers like ('few,' 'a lot'), adverbs ('very') nouns ('thing'), and adjectives ('low,' 'high'), among other expressions which are typical in such discourse. According to van Dijk, in nearly every context, speakers are likely to use vague expressions, terms without well-defined referents, or which denote fuzzy sets.

2.4.4 Systemic Functional Linguistics

Systemic functional linguistics (SFL) is a tool for exploring meaning in language. The theory is premised on the claim that language is fundamentally functional. SFL investigates how language is used to engender social communication and the representation of ideas (White, 2001). In this wise, language is considered as an important semiotic system used in the negotiation of social meaning. As a theory of language, SFL is principally concerned about describing meaning is generated from language in context (Halliday 1978, 1994, 1996, Halliday and Hassan 1985; Halliday and Matthiessen 1999, 2004). In SFL, language is considered as a system where all strata (interconnected subsystems) of the linguistic system have meaning potential and contribute to the making of meaning. It offers a functional dimension to language and emphasises the fact that language implies that the grammatical analysis of texts is not limited to formalised description of the syntax of individual sentences to the exclusion of other surrounding texts or language (co-texts) and context, which provide the relevant extralinguistic activity; but also takes into consideration the functions specific grammatical units perform in specific clauses, in definite text within a certain socio-cultural situation (Heine, B. and Narrog, H. 2015:345). In other words, systemic functional linguistics is, essentially an organised study of how grammar and context interact in the realisation of a particular social field through the grammar that constitutes the text within the social field. SFL is, therefore, a grammar that gives more focus to grammar in context

and does not treat grammatical form as being autonomous but as a part of context. Put differently, it treats language as a functional social phenomenon. This is consistent with Halliday's (1973) claim as cited in Haratyan (2011:260), that the linguistic and functional selection of an author corresponds to the social situation and the influence they wield on his perception which demand emphasis at the discourse level. Haratyan further cites Halliday as saying:

Discourse is a multidimensional process and text as its product not only embodies the same kind of polyphonic structuring as is found in grammar, (in the structure of the clause, as message, exchanges and representation), but also since it is functioning at a higher level of the code, as the realization of semiotic orders 'above' language, may contain in itself all the inconsistencies, contradictions, and conflicts that can exist within and between such high order semiotic systems (1978: 96).

(Haratyan, 2011:260)

In SFL, language has been identified as having three metafunctions. These are ideational, interpersonal and textual functions. The ideational metafunction, which is one of the systems, provides grammatical resources at clause rank to understand both overt and non-overt experience. It is the system explored by social actors in the representation of the way they experience the world around them. The second metafunction which is the interpersonal function addresses grammatical choices that help language users to establish their complicated and different interpersonal relations. In the view of Halliday (1985), the textual function of the clause is to communicate a message, where the Theme/Rheme structure forms the basic element in the organization of the message in a clause. The ideational and the interpersonal functions of language are embedded in the textual function.

2.4.4.1 Transitivity system

The transitivity system functions as one of the clause analysis methods in the ideational function of language, the other being ergativity. It is the representation of experiences or analysing the meaning of a clause as representation. In other words, it is the aspect of functional grammar that gives prominence to experience. Halliday (1981) defines transitivity as 'the grammar of the clause' as 'a structural unit' for 'expressing a particular range of ideational meanings'. Thus, it

makes it easier to understand the clause and its inherent meaning composition. Six types of *processes* have been identified in the transitivity system. They are, material, mental, relational, verbal, and sometimes existential, and behavioral (O’Donnell, 2011; Bustam, 2011). The system also identifies *participants* and *circumstances* as part of the representations in the clause. In the SFL model, a representation of experience consists of: Processes: what kind of event/state is being described; Participants: the entities involved in the process, e.g., Actor, Sayer, Senser, etc. and Circumstances: specifying the when, where, why and how of the process (O’Donnell, 2011).

Material Processes consist of physical actions in the real world. “The processes performed by an animate or inanimate Actor are respectively called Action and Event processes. Action process can be classified into Intention and Supervention processes if respectively performed intentionally or unintentionally” (Haratyan, 2011:261). It has the following Participants: Actor: the one who does the action; Goal: The one who is affected by the action; Recipient: the one who receives something and Beneficiary: the one for whom something is done. The mental process is subdivided into three categories of cognition, perception and affection or emotion; and has two Participants: Senser and Phenomenon. The Senser is the conscious being, that is, feeling, thinking or seeing while the Phenomenon is what is sensed, that is, what is felt, thought or seen (Bustam, 2011). The Verbal Processes are the processes of communication. They include the Sayer: the one who communicates; the Addressee: the one receiving the message; and the Verbiage: What they say. Another type of verbal process is referred to as *Target* where the “sayer is in sense acting verbally on another direct participant, with verbs such as insult, praise, slander, abuse, and flatter. For example, in the sentence: “I’m **always praising you** to my friend”, the verbal process; the underlined word is the Target; while *I* and *my friend* are respectively, the Sayer and the Recipient (see Bustam, 2011). The fourth is *relational process* which is subdivided into three types: intensive, circumstantial and possessive. Each of the types manifests two modes, namely *Attributive* and *Identifying*. This can be explained with the table below:

Table 2.4: The six possible classifications of relational processes in terms of modes and types: adapted from (Bustam:2011)

Mode		
Type	(i) Attributive	(ii) Identifying

1. Intensive	The result is fantastic.	Mrs Davidson is the manager. The manager is Mrs Davidson.
2. Circumstantial	The interview is on a Monday.	The houses are Pollyn's. Pollyn's are the houses.
3. Possessive	Ido has nine horses.	The nine horses are Ido's. Ido's are the nine horses.

Below is an illustration of the various participants in the *relational process*.

1. The result is fantastic.
Carrier Process Attribute
2. Ido has nine horses.
Possessor Process Possession
3. Mrs Davidson is the manager.
Token Process Value

The next type of process is *Behavioral* and it combines features of material and mental processes, hence, it generates confusion to learners. However, one vital point to note in this regard is that the process verb is usually intransitive (requires no object) and has only one participant who is the Behaver (Bustam, 2011). An example is, “**The old mansnores**”, where ‘the old man’ is the Behaver and the process is ‘snores’. The *Existential Process* deals with the representation of something that happens or exists. Characteristically, it has the **be** verb or other verb form that indicates the existence of a thing. This is usually accompanied by a nominal group that functions as *Existent*. An instance is, ‘*There was a storm*’. In this example, the storm is the **Existent**, while was is the **be** verb. For other Participant functions see Bustam, (2011: 29-31).

The transitivity system is given more prominence because it constitutes a reasonable part of the linguistic analysis in this study.

2.4.4.2 Transitivity system and discourse analysis

Discourse analysis is concerned with meaning-making process in social contexts. Systemic functional linguistics is also concerned with the derivation of meaning from the semiotic codes of language. As cited in Haratyan, (2011: 260). It is interested in how speakers generate utterances and texts to communicate their intended meanings through the generalised metafunctions that make a connection between language and the real world where both discourse participants and their social roles have relevance. SFL’s interest is in the functioning of semiotic codes at a higher level

to realise semiotic orders 'above' language. Discourse analysis is concerned with the lexicogrammatical analysis of the language in the social, physical, cognitive, cultural, interpersonal and situational context (Haratyan, 2011: 260). We can say then, that the three metafunctions of language identified by Halliday and his colleagues form the linguistic basis upon which social actions are constructed since all the three metafunctions relate one thing or the other to another within a social setting. For instance, the ideational function relates a social agent to his environment (world) by his choice of linguistic elements in describing others (people, ideas, objects, and so on) within a social or cultural context. The interpersonal function realises one's relation(ship) with another; while the textual function encompasses both the ideational and the interpersonal.

The transitivity function in SFL, which is 'the cornerstone of the semantic organization of experience' (Halliday, 1981), constructs a relationship between a social actor and his conception of things and happenings within the social system. Thus, the notion of transitivity provides the linguistic resources at the clausal level with which the social world is conceptualised, as well as reveals meaning in the world in relation to the linguistic choices made by language users. This language concept is crucial to discourse because, as argued by Fairclough (2001:73), "discourse contributes to the creation and recreation of the relations, subjects...and objects which populate the social world". This goes to say that discourse, which can be interpreted as social language, does not stop at representing the society, but it equally brings about social change.

2.4.4.3 Modality

Modality is one of the concepts in the interpersonal metafunction of Hallidayian systemic functional linguistics. It involves the interpersonal function which is the aspect of language use with participatory function. In other words, it foregrounds the involvement of speakers in their use of language (Halliday 2007: 184). Modality gives room for the expression of the speaker's attitudes and evaluations through the mood and modality system. It also allows for the enactment of the relationship between the text-producer and the text-consumer (Halliday and Matthiessen 1999: 7).

There are two types of modality in English – epistemic and deontic modality. The former is relative to the speaker’s knowledge of the world. The proposition in epistemic modality is dependent on two factors: the epistemic state of the speaker and the state of the world (Sulkunen and Torronen, 1997).

Modalities are structures that in some way evaluate the state of affairs, hence, their relevance in discourse analysis (Sulkunen and Torronen, 1997). Going from logic to linguistics, there have been several types of modalities: alethic (relating to the notion of truth), epistemic (relating to the knowledge and belief), deontic (relating to social obligations), evaluative, boulomaic (relating to desire) and so on. However, among the number, *epistemic* and *deontic* have been identified as crucial to natural language and have therefore received more attention from linguists in their grammaticisation in the system of English (Sulkunen and Torronen, 1997; Recski, 2006). Halliday categorises modal operators into high and low. Low modality is expressed by modal such as *can*, *may* *don’t have to*; and adjuncts like *I don’t know*, *I think*, *I don’t think* and *perhaps*. High modality is expressed by modal such as *must*, *should*, and *have to*, and adjuncts like *I’m sure*, *certainly*, *of course*, and *never* (see Recski, 2006).

2.5 Summary

In this chapter, effort has been made to review some of the existing studies on Boko Haram in addition to some of the works on religious discourse in Nigeria. These empirical references help in situating the current research. Also, significant concepts in discourse analysis and pragmatics that are suitable for this study have been examined. Further accounted for are the theoretical underpinnings in the study. Key aspects of the theories relevant to the present study have been given prominence. The next chapter will focus on how the present research’s aim and objectives are to be actualised.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

3.0 Introduction

In this chapter, the procedure and the description for the current research work are presented under different headings. The chapter is divided into the following sections: research design, data collection procedure, the population for the study, sampling procedure, method and model of analysis, and conclusion.

3.1 Research design

The interpretative design is used in this study to make meaning out of the data. This is with a view to making meaning of the social phenomenon under study, that is, Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The interpretative design was used as a qualitative methodological tool to analyse the data. This makes it possible to discuss the texts by maintaining the coherence of the textual elements in order to achieve appropriate interpretation and representation of the clerics' utterances. According to Newman (2012), interpretative design involves giving intelligible meaning to things through examination of and discussion on textual or visual data in a way that retains the authenticity of the people or situation under study. This design best suits the current research because it is based on the assumption that social reality is not singular or objective, instead, it is framed by human experiences and social contexts (ontology) and is, therefore, best studied within its socio-historical context by reconciling the subjective interpretations of its various participants' epistemology Plez Bill (Nd). In other words, interpretative research design entails a sense-making process. Therefore, it is adopted to make meaning of clerics' subjective and/or intersubjective views about Boko Haram based on their experiences on the insurgency. The interest of this design is to analytically unveil those meaning-making practices while showing how those practices are organised to produce observable outcomes. From a wide methodological viewpoint, the research is qualitative in nature. A qualitative research, according to Slavin (2007), is one in which narrative or visual data are collected to describe social settings and has its origin in social and behavioural sciences. It employs descriptive means to reveal a target audience's range of behaviour and the perceptions that drive it with reference to specific topics or issues (<http://www.qrca.org/?page=whatisqualresearch>).

This study adopts this research methodology because it aims to describe and interpret the connection between the perceptions of religious leaders on a specific social phenomenon in Nigeria, which is the Boko Haram terrorism, as documented in news reports in selected Nigerian online news sources.

3.2 Data collection procedure

The data for this research were sourced from the reports of four Nigerian online news sources – *Information Nigeria*, *Sahara Reporters*, *Vanguard* and *The Punch* from 2011 to 2016. The choice

of the period was to examine the position of the clerics at the time that represented the peak of the onslaught of Boko Haram. The data from these media sources were collected from their primary sites using *UC Browser* which allowed for saving the documents in their original forms. However, the reports from *The Punch* were collected from redirected sources. In order to print the relevant pages for data, the symbol with three horizontal lines on the homepage of the browser was clicked on to open a window which contained among others, the print option. By clicking on the print option, the document is displayed in another dialogue box where the pages to be printed are manually selected. The save option in this dialogue box successfully saved the report pages in the requested folder for use. The sites visited are represented beginning with the exclusively online news sources: *Information Nigeria* and *Sahara Reporters*. These are followed by the online sources that have print versions: *Vanguard* and *The Punch*, however, only the online versions were used in the study. It is worth stating here, that in other to substantiate an advanced standpoint, a countered or supported view found in a few other sources were brought to bear. Thus, in this wise, there was the supplemental (Odebunmi, 2008) use of online news reports from *Leadership* (1), *The Sun* (2), *Daily Times* (1). In all, fifty-four reports were collected from the following sites using the *UC Browser* and they are arranged as earlier stated.

Table 3.1: Sites used

S/N	Report Source	Site visited	Number of reports
1.	<i>Information Nigeria</i>	https://www.informationng.com	26
2.	<i>Sahara Reporters</i>	http://saharareporters.com	7
3.	<i>Vanguard</i>	https://www.vanguardngr.com	19
4.	<i>The Punch</i>	http://jimidisu.com/northern-muslim-elite-laid-foundation-for-b-haram-kukah-punch/	1
	<i>The Punch</i>	http://nollyculture.blogspot.com.ng/2014/10/nigeria-northern-elite-deceive-people.html	1
			54

The discrepancy in the number was due to the fact that the sources do not report daily on the clerics. In addition, the voice of the cleric that spoke the most on the issue also accounted for the difference in number among the chosen subjects. The choice of the selected clerics: Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor - Pentecostal, Bishop Matthew Kukah – Orthodox, Alhaji Mahammadu Sa'ad Abubakar III – Sunni, and Sheik Ahmad Gumi – Sunni; was based on wide representation and presentation of the direct utterances of the clerics. The selection was also based on the two main religious groups in Nigeria, namely Christianity and Islam. These were further delineated by denomination. Within the Christian religion, the two major divides, Pentecostal and Orthodox were sampled. In Islam, only the Sunnis were represented in the media, which explains why two Sunni Muslim clerics were sampled. All four clerics were purposively selected. However, the uneven number of excerpts on each subject is a function of the most represented voice in the reports. This can be clearly seen from the number of excerpts analysed as shown in the table below.

Table 3.2: Clerics’ representation

S/N	Cleric	No.of excerpts analysed
1.	Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor	39
2.	Bishop Matthew Kukah	19
3.	Sheik Ahmad Gumi	23
4.	Alhaji Abubakar Sa’ad	11
		92

3.3 Sampling method

The data were purposively selected from the news sources to address the aim of this study. Since the selection was restricted to only what the clerics were directly quoted to have said, every direct speech form all the reports sampled was extracted and used as data. Hence, within the clerics’ utterances in the reports, only aspects related to the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria were selected to serve as data. The purposive sampling method was also used to choose the subjects under investigation who are considered as key informants by reason of their positions and because they are more widely represented in the media among the most vocal clerics.

In this research, the criterion for selecting the four subjects is that they are all religious leaders with national recognition by reason of the positions they presently occupy or previously occupied.

This also accounts for the wide media coverage they have. These four clerics, comprising two Christians and two Muslims, represent the two main religions in Nigeria (Awoniyi, 2013). The Christian leaders comprise one Orthodox and one Pentecostal church leader. The first category has Bishop Matthew Hassan Kukah, the Catholic Bishop of Sokoto Diocese; who was a member of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee on the Niger Delta Crisis in Nigeria, secretary of the National Political Reform Conference in 2005, chairman of the Ogoni-Shell Reconciliation between the years 2007 and 2009 (www.africa-confidential.com/.../Interview...). The Pentecostal church leader, Pastor Ayodele Joseph Oritsejafor, who at the time of the heightened activities of the Boko Haram insurgency was the National President of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), the highest Christian body in the country. He was, before his appointment into that position, the president of Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (nigerianbiography.com/.../biograph...). The second category of clerics comprise two Sunni Muslims, His Eminence, the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Abubakar Sa'ad III, who doubles as the head of all Muslims in Nigeria and the President-General, Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, the highest Islamic body in the country (*The Punch*, December 27, 2014; <https://www.naij.com/tag/saad-abubakar-iii.html>). Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor and Alhaji Sa'ad Abubakar III have co-chaired Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) (*Vanguard*, 31 January 2013). The second of the Muslim clerics is Sheik (Dr) Ahmad Gumi, a renowned Islamic scholar (*Information Nigeria*, May 8, 2014) and one that has been highly unequivocal (*Information Nigeria*, March 27, 2013) on the issue of Boko Haram in the media (*The Nation*: April 21, 2013). He is a former director of legal services of the Nigerian Army and a retired Brigadier-General in the Nigerian Army (*Leadership*, June 17:2015). It is worth reiterating here, that the Muslim leaders presented in this work are both of the Sunni Islamic sect. The reason for this is that other Islamic sect leaders like the Shites were not found to be speaking on the Boko Haram insurgency in the media. The reason for this is however not within the concern of this research, hence, no further attention is given to this.

According to 2016 Newspaper Web Ranking, as published in (<http://www.4imn.com/ng/>), *Vanguard* comes first, followed by *The Punch*. This is corroborated in (<http://www.allyoucanread.com/nigerian-newspapers/>), where *Sahara Reporters* and *Information Nigeria* are seventh and ninth respectively, on the list. As print versions, *Vanguard* and *The Punch* are thus rated based on their circulation and number of daily publications. While the

former has 130, 000; the latter has more than 80,000 copies published daily. The online medium for these newspapers were, however, used for this research because of ease of access, cost-effectiveness and primarily because the news items are exactly as those represented in the print versions. In addition, with the aid of technological devices, patronage has tilted in favour of the online versions. These reasons make the online channels preferred in this study.

3.4 Method and model of analysis

The data for analyses were subjected to discourse, pragmatic and linguistic theories to provide an understanding of how micro linguistic features are used in the realisation or construction of social reality (discourse) in the macro social context. This goes to substantiate the text-oriented discourse approach of Fairclough (2003), in whose view “language is an irreducible part of social life, dialectically interconnected with other elements of social life, so that social analysis and research always has to take account of language”. Therefore, it is a research where language is employed as a tool in doing social research, thereby bringing out interactive processes of meaning-making among text producers (authors, speakers, writers) and text consumers (interpreters, readers, listeners). Fairclough’s approach to discourse analyses, therefore, gives insight to the present work in understanding the meanings of the utterances of the selected subjects through the application of different discourse theories – stance (Biber, 2006), appraisal (White, 2003) to highlight why the clerics feel particular ways and the processes by which their attitudes are constructed (Palys, 2008). In particular, the dialogic engagement resources that highlighted subjectivity and intersubjectivity were utilised to understand how the textual voices engage with prior stances in order to present their own positions and how their dialogic opponents are positioned.

To achieve the aim of this research, the top-down discourse processing approach was used. Top-down approach is a discourse analytical process that involves identifying and developing patterns based on contextual information. It requires the reading of an entire text content to understand the purpose of the discourse (Sincero, 2018). In this approach, analysis begins by identifying the main purpose of the genre according to skilled informants; thereafter, they are checked against the texts to understand the communicative function of discourse structures.


In carrying out the analysis, first, the data were categorised under four broad perspectives, religion, political, socio-economic and security. Further sub-categorisations were done under each broad category for a more comprehensive discussion of the components of each of the perspectives. Second, each broad category and the sub-classifications were defined based on the presentation of the data to cater for every item or aspect of the data to be examined. Third, instantiations that fit into the categories and definitions were provided to exemplify or substantiate the categories and definitions. The examples are discussed extensively using the proposed theories and concepts. Knowledge from micro and macro contents and intertextuality are utilised to arrive at meanings embedded in the utterances. The linguistic elements are systematically examined to establish a relationship with co(n)textual elements.

The first chapter of analysis employed engagement resources in the appraisal system by White (2003), which offers a typology of engagement devices with categorisations that focus on the way the textual voices engage with alternative voices or points of view that are referenced. By activating the views, they either expand the discourse or restrict (contrast) alternative dialogic positions to present their viewpoints. Lexico-grammatical features of stance complemented the linguistic elements in the engagement resources to boost the analysis in this chapter. This addressed the first objective of the study which is to identify and discuss the perspectives of the selected Nigerian clerics in the media on the Boko Haram insurgency. The stance types in the perspectives were examined through the stance theory of Biber (2006) to cater for the second objective which is to identify the stance types and their features that foreground the perspectives. Within the stance features, the transitivity system in systemic functional linguistics (SFL) supported lexical markers of stance to identify agents and activities connected with the stances of the clerics in the discourse. This was analysed together with the pragmatic strategies deployed by the clerics and their pragmatic implications. To understand the pragmatic implications of the strategies employed, the pragmatic act theory by Mey (2001) was used supplementally (Odebunmi, 2018) to highlight the various practs (pragmatic functions) in the stances of the clerics. Thus, objects two and three were examined together in chapter five.

Insights from stance and appraisal theories aided this research in two distinct ways. First, it enabled the identification of the perspectives of the clerics. Second, it helped in the development of the second chapter of the analysis which explored the stance types found in the data. In

addition, it provided the basis for the exploration of a wide range of lexico-grammatical stance features rather than focusing on a single feature. Added to these, the ideological strategies adopted from van Dijk (2006), which are concepts in critical discourse analysis (CDA), were used in the present study as the pragmatic strategies. The assemblage of these theoretical models helped the work to achieve a holistic approach to dialogicality. This is because, according to Du Bois (2007), dialogicality is clearly linguistically traceable as stance-taking is an act performed by one subject in relation to another subject about a shared object. This is particularly demonstrated in his dialogical triangle and diagraph. His emphasises on obvious dialogicality in the stances of social actors makes it very easy to map stance-leads and stance-follows on an object of discourse by bringing the resource of resonance to bear in the communicative context. However, his model was not used in the analysis because the concept of resonance upon which his idea of stance-taking is based seems to be more realisable in conversations and not in the kind of data for this research (news reports), because it relies on lexical connection (the diagraph) which may not always be obvious in the news reports but could be realised following meaning constructions. Hence, this makes his model appear rather limited for the current work. Again, this blend of theoretical insights from stance, appraisal, critical discourse analysis, and SFL gave a more robust analysis of the data.

The diagram that follows served as the analytical framework for the research.






Figure 3.1: Analytical framework

The diagram shows from the topmost, the clerics selected as the subjects for the study – Nigerian Christian clerics (NCCs) and Nigerian Muslim clerics (NMCs). The next level of the diagram indicates the objectives of the research which are: to identify and discuss the perspectives of the selected clerics, the stance types in the perspectives and the pragmatic strategies deployed by the clerics as well as their pragmatic implications in the discourse. The perspectives present four broad contexts, namely, religious (RP), political (PP), social and economic (SeP), and security (SP). The perspectives were captured through the deployment of seven engagement resources from White’s (2003) typology of engagement in Appraisal theory. These resources are concurrence, counter, denial, endorsement, pronouncement, acknowledgement, and entertainment. The viewpoints projected through the use of these resources were identified and discussed. The manifestations in each perspective were also categorised and discussed as sub-perspectives/themes under the broad categories, which are the perspectives. Fifty-one excerpts were analysed in this chapter. From RP, a line runs down to the box labelled subj, which means that the realisation is a subjective viewpoint. The three straight lines from PP, SeP, and SP lead to Intersubj, which refers to intersubjective positions. RP presents two subjective positions. Nigerian Christian clerics through the engagement resource of Endors (endorsement) perceived Boko Haram as an *Islamisation* crusade, while the Muslim clerics used Pron (pronouncement) and

counter to conceive Boko Haram as a misrepresentation of Islam. In PP, both subjective and intersubjective viewpoints were identified. The subjective view is Boko Haram as an anti-government declaration (subjective) by Christian clerics realised via endorsement as shown by the line which runs from PP through subj to NCCs to connect the viewpoint. Both sets of clerics (NC/NMCs) deployed Con (concurrence) and Ent (entertainment) to formulate the view that Boko Haram is a government-motivated violence. In the social and economic perspective, the Christian clerics viewed Boko Haram as a product of fundamentalism. This is indicated by the free-form line which runs from SeP through Subj to connect NCCs who utilise denial as an engagement resource to construct the viewpoint that Boko Haram is a product of fundamentalism. Within the same perspective, pron. (pronouncement), Ackn (acknowledgement) and entertainment used by both NCCs and NMCs (NC/NMCs) presented Boko Haram as Nigerians' enemies. In the security (SP), both sets of clerics construed Boko Haram as terrorists.

The second objective, to identify the stance types and their features that foreground the perspectives; and the third objective, to examine the pragmatic strategies deployed by the clerics and their pragmatic implications in the discourse were discussed together in Chapter five. Three stance types, Eps (epistemic), Evid (evidential) and Aff (affective) characterised all the perspectives except SeP which lacked evidential stance. The stance types were examined using Biber's (2006) stance concept aided by transitivity process in systemic functional linguistics. The attitude (feelings) of the clerics were discussed with support from Martin and White's (2005) to foreground the clerics' feelings towards stance objects. To represent the objective, the free-form line flows in a continues arc form from Eps through SP, SeP, PP to RP from the top. At the mid position of the perspectives, the same line type flows from Evid to SP and skips SeP to continue from PP to RP. This demonstrates that SeP lacked evidential stance as earlier mentioned. From Aff, the free-flow line runs through SP, SeP, PP to RP to imply that all four perspectives display affectivestance. To show that the stance types manifest transitivity processes (a concept in Systemic Functional Linguistics), the box containing the stance types is connected to the processes that are present in them, namely, Mental, Material, Verbal, Relational and Existential processes. Similarly, the arrow-pointed line that passes from the stance types box to the pragmatic strategies box shows the nexus between the stance types and the pragmatic strategies which also connects the nine pragmatic devices: authority, exemplification, substantiation, norm expression, comparison, categorisation, vagueness, metaphorisation, and religious-self-glorification. These

strategies were adopted (and adapted) from van Dijk's (2006) ideological strategies derived from his sociocognitive concept of critical discourse analysis (CDA). The strategies established the pragmatic imports in the discourse which are: advising, blaming, condemning, exonerating, indicting, reinforcing and anonymising. Fifty-one samples were analysed in this chapter.

The perspectives, stance types and pragmatic strategies were all established in the reports of four news sources: *Information Nigeria*, *Sahara Reporters*, *Vanguard* and *The Punch*, which are all online media reports containing the clerics' utterances on Boko Haram. The subjective viewpoints are presented in rectangular boxes with curved ends, while the intersubjective views are put in the oval shapes.

3.5 Summary

In this chapter, the methodology adopted in establishing the research has been examined. As an interpretative study, the chapter has explored the processes involved in making meaning to actualise the aim and the objectives of the study thus, showing the nexus between the micro linguistic context and the macro social (terrorist or insurgency) context. Two religious leaders were selected from each of the two major religions in Nigeria as the subjects. The source of data for the work, four media sources, as well as the systematic procedures followed in this work have been explained in this chapter. A model of analysis was used to demonstrate the research outline.

CHAPTER FOUR

CLERICS' PERSPECTIVES IN MEDIA REPORTS ON BOKO HARAM

4.0 Introduction

The analysis in this chapter focuses on how the clerics deploy appraisal resources to construct their perspectives to the Boko Haram (henceforth as BH) terrorism in Nigeria. In particular, it pays attention to how the clerics utilise the resources of engagement in foregrounding the

activities of Boko Haram and acts by other social actors which they consider as driving factors to the terrorist situation in Nigeria. Overall, it examines engagement as all those linguistic manifestations which provide the means for the authorial voices to position themselves with respect to and hence to 'engage' with, the other voices and alternative positions construed as being in play in different contexts of the discursive event. Engagement in this study relies on the notion of dialogicality by White (2003), as propounded by Bakhtin/Vološinov and supported by Martin and White (2005), where all verbal communication, whether written or spoken, is 'dialogic' in that to speak or write is always to refer to, or to take up in some way, what has been said/written before, and simultaneously to anticipate the responses of actual, potential or imagined readers/listeners (White 2003:261). Thus, this study orients to how the religious leaders formulate their perspectives on Boko Haram with regard to 'other voices', past verbal or written utterances as captured in the media reports.

4.1 Perspectives on Boko Haram

Within this theoretical background, clerics have subjectively or intersubjectively constructed the BH insurgency within four broad perspectives (which can be considered as contexts) with various manifestations by deploying seven engagement resources. The perspectives are political, religious, social and economic, and security; while the resources used in realising them are: acknowledgment, concurrence, counter, denial, endorsement, entertainment and pronouncement. They are differently deployed to advance or to reject views by expanding or contracting the dialogic space. These resources are generally categorised into two based on their usefulness in either contracting or expanding dialogic spaces. Concurrence, pronouncement, and endorsement are resources of contraction commonly referred to as proclamation. They afford the textual voice the privilege to display its personal investment in a viewpoint being advanced; while denial (negation in the broadest sense) and counter (which deploys various types of concessive, adversatives, and counter-expectancy) belong to disclamation which entails the direct rejection or countering of a dialogically contrary position. Acknowledgement and entertainment belong to the category of dialogic expansion with two respective modes, entertain and attribute. Entertainment stands on its own as a mode while acknowledgement operates under the mode named attribute. Both modes dialogically operate as resources for giving room to alternative viewpoints by presenting the textual voice's view as one dialogic possibility (White 2003). These

resources are complemented by several layers of lexico-grammatical and discourse analytic linguistic constructs that underpin the perspectives.

In this study, subjective position refers to common construal between each of the sets of clerics while the term intersubjective is used to account for views shared by the two sets of clerics.

The religious perspective has two distinctly subjective positions. The Christian clerics construe Boko Haram as an *Islamisation* crusade. It has three features: violence against Christians, propagation of Islamic tenets; and discrimination against Christians. The first two are actions of BH while the third is a perpetration by other social actors that serve as a motivating factor for the situation. From the Muslim leaders' viewpoint, BH is a misrepresentation of Islam which has two manifestations namely: epistemic misrepresentation of Islamic religion by Boko Haram members, and religious-enemies motivated misrepresentation. The political perspective has two indicators: Boko Haram as an anti-democratic declaration, and BH as a government motivated violence. The first is the exclusive view of the Christian leaders while the second is intersubjectively constructed. The social and economic perspective dimension also has three viewpoints namely: BH as a product of fundamentalism, BH as a demand for improved social and economic conditions, and BH as enemies of Nigerians. The first and the second are respectively subjective formulations by the Christian and the Muslim leaders, while the third is intersubjective. The fourth perspective which is the security angle to the crisis has only one intersubjective view: BH as terrorists. However, there are points of divergence in the conception of its membership composition. In all, nine overarching positions are identified within the four perspectives.

In the next sections, we develop the nine predominant views as follows: Boko Haram as an *Islamisation* crusade, BH as a misrepresentation of Islam, BH as a revolution against democratic governance, BH as a government motivated violence, BH as a product of fundamentalism, BH as a demand for improved social and economic conditions, BH as enemies of Nigerians and BH as a terrorist group under the four broad classifications by the clerics in media reports on the BH discourse.

4.1.1 Religious perspectives on Boko Haram

This perspective accounts for the clerics' views based on their interpretations of the activities of Boko Haram and other motivating factors by other social actors which reflect in the group's

actions on the two main religious groups, that is, Christianity and Islam. Two subjective positions held separately by the two sets of clerics are presented and realised through seven engagement resources namely: acknowledgment, concurrence, counter, denial, endorsement, entertainment and pronouncement. These positions are Boko Haram as an *Islamisation* crusade and BH as a misrepresentation of Islam, respectively, by the Christian and the Muslim leaders.

4.1.1.1 Boko Haram as an *Islamisation* crusade

The Christian clerics construe Boko Haram as an *Islamisation* crusade, with ‘*Islamisation*’ being conceived as any physical or psychological acts against Christians (especially in the north) for the purpose of making them accept Islam. It generally accounts for any declaration or action that is done in the name of propagating Islam as explicitly stated by the members of BH and/or implicitly exhibited by key actors in the north which BH members capitalise on to perpetrate their acts. Put differently, it takes into consideration both verbal and non-verbal behaviours of the social actors towards religion. Within this purview, there are three features namely: violence against Christians in the north, propagation of Islamic tenets and discrimination against Christians. These are discussed in turn.

a. Violence against Christians

This is a subcategory of the *Islamisation* crusade viewpoint held by the Christian clerics. Violence against Christians captures physical behaviours that are intended to hurt Christians. These include acts such as killing and inflicting of injuries. The violence against Christians also involves the destruction of their properties such as buildings and land and other forms of attacks on their communities and institutions. These acts are associated with the Boko Haram group.

To advance the view that BH is an *Islamisation* crusade, which thrives on violence against Christians in the northern region of Nigeria, four engagement resources namely, endorsement, counter, concurrence, and denial are utilised. Endorsement is deployed to foreground the textual voice’s subjecthood, concurrence is used in this view to adopting a position in order to proclaim it as a way of advancing one’s subjective view, while counter and denial are used to directly reject invoked contrary positions through negation thereby advancing dialogically alternative viewpoints. The former is linguistically introduced into the text by attribution to an external source, that is, via reported speech while the latter is conveyed through negations (verbs in the

negative form). Two types of violence are identified in this regard – attacks on Christians, their communities and institutions; and abduction of Christians. We discuss them in turn.

i. Attacks on Christians, their communities and institutions

Counter, endorsement, and concurrence are used in the following texts by the authorial voice to negotiate this dimension of the *Islamisation* crusade by highlighting certain contextual clues such as setting (which includes time and place), the action and the participants.

Excerpt 1

.... This is why we insist that the primary targets of Boko Haram are Christians and their Churches. If this is not so, why is it that the attacks are mostly on Sundays when innocent Christians are in their Churches worshipping. Only this Sunday, gunmen as they are also called, attacked members of the Ekklisiyar Yan'uwa A Najeria (Eyn) Church in Jilang Village of Maiha Local Council in Adamawa State, killing 10 persons and injuring 12 others. The gunmen stormed the church at about 11.00 am while the Sunday Service was ongoing. According to one of the Newspaper reports, upon gaining entry, they started shooting at worshippers in the Church, who were listening to the preacher. Reports we in CAN get on a daily basis from Borno, Yobe, Kano and some of the adjoining states are mind boggling. Do we speak of Christians pushed out of moving vehicles on the highway or those slaughtered like cow? What about those abducted from their homes and nothing is ever heard of them? There are other unreported cases of Christians shot in cold blood. You begin to wonder where these human rights groups are.

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, May 10, 2013)

Excerpt 2

Boko Haram already claimed responsibility for these coordinated attacks against the Christian community in Jos, and they also reaffirmed their earlier position saying that “for Christians in Nigeria to know peace they must accept Islam as the only true religion.

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, December 28, 2014)

In excerpt 1, there is an obvious dialogical engagement with an invoked view that Christians are not the target of Boko Haram. This is conveyed explicitly by the use of the verb *insist* in the first sentence of the text which serves as a signpost to a viewpoint being contended by the authorial (textual) voice. By countering the invoked position, the textual voice foregrounds its view that

Christians are BH's primary target by giving instances of attack in different forms – killing, injuring, shooting, pushing out of moving vehicles on the highway, slaughtering like cows, shooting in cold blood. By instantiating these forms of attacks on Christians, it increases the interpersonal cost of anyone with a contrary view thereby contracting the dialogic space and fending off other opposing views. In excerpt 2, the attack is intensified by the adjective *coordinated*, which implies that the attacks were well thought out against the Christians. It can be deduced that the attacks are aimed at reducing the number of Christians in these areas where they are so eliminated in order to make Muslims constitute the majority or possibly the only people in the population to make such places Muslim dominated or Muslim exclusive. The position of the textual voice is foregrounded in reports from quarters that it aligns with, hence it makes attribution to them (one confirmed source, *one of the newspaper reports*, and another unconfirmed source, *reports*). However, the sources are suppressed in order to highlight the actions of Boko Haram and to make the sources of no consequence. According to van Leeuwen (1996), in suppression, the social actors in question is nowhere in the text and it is done among others, to suit the writer's interest and to consider them as irrelevant. In the current excerpt, what is irrelevant to the writer is which newspaper, in particular, reported the event or who or from what media was the reports from Borno, Yobe and Kano gathered, but he considers the attacks by the group as important to be presented. The prepositional phrase, *According to* and the verb *get* are utilised to report the attacks and to aid the textual voice's formulation of its view.

Similarly, in excerpt 2, the verbs *claimed* and *reaffirmed* are used to make attribution to Boko Haram. However, in this instance, the authorial voice makes explicit mention of his source of report which is 'Boko Haram' to both highlight killers (as BH) and to concur with their claim to reinforce its position that BH is killing Christians because they want to Islamise them, that is, make them become Muslims. This is captured in the reported speech, "*for Christians in Nigeria to know peace they must accept Islam as the only true religion*" indexed by double quotation marks. In both excerpts, the people attacked are Christians in church, *members of the Ekklisiyyar Yan'uwa A Najeria (Eyn) Church*, Christians in their home, *the Christian community in Jos*. The numerous forms of attacks on Christians which are given prominence to and the reported declaration by members of Boko Haram in the second example, "*for Christians in Nigeria to know peace they must accept Islam as the only true religion*", strengthen the clerics' view that BH is an *Islamisation* crusade.

ii. Abduction of Christians

Violence also manifests in the form of abduction which implies forcefully taking away Christians from their locations to unknown destinations for the purpose of restricting their freedom to do certain things, in this case, worship of their God as well as reduce their number among the Muslim populace. It is simultaneously a physical and psychological violence carried out by members of BH that can also lead to killing or death. Counter and denial are used to establish this dimension of the *Islamisation* perspective as is evident in the following example.

Excerpt 3

First, these children are Christians and not Muslims and so they cannot be converted to a religion that is not theirs at gunpoint without conviction. Besides, is that how conversion is being carried out? All the children displayed are Christians and that is the motive behind the abduction. It is simple. Because they are Christians and they represent the church in the eyes of their abductors. Secondly, it smacks of some form of religious persecution. If not, why are their captors converting them to another religion?

(Oritsejafor, *Information Nigeria*, May 13, 2014)

Here, the forceful conversion of abducted Christian children into Islam gives credit to the position that Boko Haram is a crusade to Islamise Christians. The textual voice deploys both instances of denial and counter respectively in the noun phrases, *these children are Christians and not Muslims* and *they cannot be converted* ... The concessive, *Besides*, governing the second sentence supports the fact that the children were wrongly converted into *a religion that is not theirs* [Islam], hence substantiating the religious perspective and in particular, the *Islamisation* viewpoint. The process of the conversion into Islam by Boko Haram is disclaimed and conceived as morally inappropriate. There is also an overt act of dialogic disalignment that conveys the effect that the authorial voice sets itself against those who feel that Christian children can be converted to Islam. The disclaimed viewpoint (invoked into the present context) which is that Christians can be forcefully converted is communicated via counter: ... *they cannot be converted to a religion that is not theirs at gunpoint without conviction*. The opposed action of the group warrants the cleric's negative evaluation attitude which represents Boko Haram as forceful converters to Islam. This is conveyed through the prepositional phrase, *at gunpoint* denoting force. Also, the counter indicates authorial authority and gives finality thereby contracting the

dialogic environment for an alternative view. It, therefore, constructs itself as being in solidarity with members of the audience who share the same knowledge, belief, and values and as well holds the same opposing views to the unfriendly actions. Again, the textual voice constructs itself as one that has the moral right to pass judgement (condemnation) on the two oppressive acts of the group – abduction, and conversion. Also, he positions the action of the group within negative social sanction of impropriety (Martin and White, 2005). As abductors, the group denies the abductees, who in this context are Christian children, freedom of movement, expression, and religion. The forceful conversion to Islam is an aberration to both the principles of democracy (freedom of worship) and Christian tenets (where conversion is a result of personal conviction). Social sanction is “more often codified in writing, as edicts, decrees, rules, regulations, and laws about how to behave as surveilled by church and state ...” (Martin and White 2005:52). Thus, the speaker also positions himself as appealing to democratic and religious ethics while Boko Haram and anyone that supports their actions is positioned as unethical and condemnable. Other lexical choices which conform with the perspective are the use of the prepositional phrase, *at gunpoint* and the noun, *persecution* which both support violence against Christians.

b. Propagation of Islamic tenets

Islamisation is also conceived by the Christian clerics as being away of propagating Islamic tenets. In this wise, it is demonstrated as a reference to Islamic texts. That is, the clerics make reference to some beliefs in Islam that BH claims have inspired its movement. Texts such as the Quran and doctrines are mentioned. Endorsement, entertainment, and counter are utilised in this wise.

Excerpt 4

Now, I hear Muslims in northern Nigeria hiding under the cover of the facts by saying: “These Boko Haram people are not Muslims. They do not represent us”. Well, first, they are your own children. You must take responsibility for what has made them what they are today and to the rest of society. They claim they have been inspired by the Quran and no other holy book. They say they want to build an Islamic state. So, they are Muslims.

(Kukah: *Information Nigeria*, November 30, 2015)

Excerpt 5

Boko Haram will not listen to me. Are there doctrines like that? Yes. What are the doctrines that these terrorists around the world believe in? The doctrines they are teaching, are they not coming out of this Wahhabi and Salafi doctrines? Boko Haram is basically an ideology. To defeat an ideology, you need a superior ideology. Many of our Muslim brothers have come to say to those of us who don't know much about Islam that these people are not Muslims. Alright, but what are these people preaching? Is it not from the Quran? Now you say you have the real thing that this is not the real thing. Then match the real thing with the unreal thing or with the fake.

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, November 16, 2014)

Obvious in the text 4 above is the fact that the textual voice is contending with the proposition that the members of BH are not Muslims and do not represent them. Here, the proposition is only introduced as a possibility, as a position which is worth considering but to which the textual voice does not commit itself. Other modals of probability can equally communicate similar meaning, for example, 'Maybe/Perhaps/It's probable these people are not Muslims and do not represent you.' This kind of formulation is dialogic in the sense that the textual voice thereby actively indicates that alternative propositions are possible or even likely. Entertainment is, thus, used to make possible these alternative meanings and by so doing, locates the current proposition in a context of heteroglossic diversity. The adverb, *Well*, linguistically underpins the probable nature of the proposition up forward by the initial stance taker (Du Bois, 2007) which the current speaker subtly counters. Endorsement comes into play in sentence five, *They claim they have been inspired by the Quran and no other holy book.*, where the verb *claim* signals a report and simultaneously adopts the report to help the subjecthood of the writer. BH's reference to Islamic texts as their motivation is again strengthened by another report: *They say they want to build an Islamic state. So, they are Muslims.*, where *say* is a verb establishing the group's desire which is, *to build an Islamic state*, thus fending off any contrary position to the viewpoint that BH members are Muslims who want an Islamic state, therefore carrying out an *Islamisation* crusade. The bare assertion, "So they are Muslims." is a declarative sentence with the illocutionary force of reinforcing the formulated position on Boko Haram as an *Islamisation* crusade.

Also, in example 5, the declaration of BH members as non-Muslims is countered by the textual voice which makes reference to two Islamic doctrines, the *Wahhabi* and *Salafi* doctrines which are assumed to be the source of inspiration for terrorist activities all over the world, thereby situating the BH activities within an ideological context. Furthermore, the counter-expectancy, adverb, *alright*, in sentence six (line 8) represents the textual voice countering an expectation which it assumes to have been prompted in the current communicative by the declaration of “*Many of our Muslim brothers*” that BH members are not Muslims because their (BH) doctrines are not possibly in line with Islamic doctrines and so they are not qualified to be categorised as Muslims. The writer rules out this expectation by making reference to their preaching which is from the Quran. There is apparent dialogic disalignment as the textual voice sets itself against those who feel that BH members are nor Muslims. The rhetorical twist at work here is that those who claim that BH members are not Muslims are not being sincere in making such declaration. We turn now to the third feature of the *Islamisation* perspective to the terrorist discourse which is discriminatory acts.

c. Discrimination against Christians

This is another subcategory of the *Islamisation* crusade formulated by the two Christian clerics. Discrimination refers to any action that particularly favours a religious group to the exclusion of another group, especially Christians, in areas of both formal and informal administration. This is not a direct act by BH but a factor which informed their targeting of Christians for attacks in the northern part of Nigeria. This factor manifests in the data in the areas of exclusion of Christians in possession of landed property (for the purpose of building worship centres), denial of leadership positions, and discrimination in public offices and social institutions. The data shows that the alienation of Christians with respect to the identified areas implicitly accounts for Boko Haram’s violence against Christians. These points are developed under different sub-sections below.

i. Exclusion of Christians in possession of landed property

Under this viewpoint, the Christian leaders decry the denial of land to Christians to build churches in the north as a discriminatory act that inspires BH’s discriminatory killing of Christians in the north. The selective killing of Christians by Boko Haram in this wise is associated with the

discriminatory attitude of the northern public office administrators towards Christians. Entertainment and pronouncement are deployed in this respect. This can be seen in the following instantiations.

Excerpt 6

... because amidst this confusing debris of hate, anger, and frustration, we have had some very interesting dimensions. Christians are now crossing the artificial lines created by falsehood and bigotry. Is that right? Every Nigerian is looking forward to a time when they can live and practice their trade and religion in any part of the country without fear of molestation. They want to apply and obtain a Certificate of Occupancy to build a worship centre in any part of the country as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution.

(Kukah: *Vanguard*, April 1, 2012)

Excerpt 7

Why should a church in the North for the past 30 years not get a Certificate of Occupancy? Any mosque or church in any part of the country should be able to get C of O. Why is it that people will want to build a place of worship in a particular part of the country and they will not get land? We must create a level playing field for everybody; we must deal with everybody equally.

(Oritsejafor: *The Punch*, November 25, 2014)

The two examples above are monologic constructions of the textual voices which put forward propositions that are largely not in contention with dialogic alternatives but rather to foreground their subjective views as ones that should be entertained in the current communicative event. The common proposition in the two texts is the advocacy for churches to be allowed to own landed property to enable them to build churches in the north. This desire is put forward in the texts as both speakers invest their personal interventions in decrying the existing situation where Christians are not issued Certificate of Occupancy. By using the resource of pronouncement (authorial emphasis), both authorial voices present this as an issue to be considered in the context of discriminatory attacks on Christians as the denial of land to Christians to build churches means that Christians are not recognised in such places where they are denied the privilege. This interpretation, which is a possibility with Boko Haram thus informs the targeting of Christians for attack as earlier discussed in section 4.1.1.1. The authorial interpolation (pronouncement)

indicates the authors' heightened personal investments in the view that Christians should be issued Certificate of Occupancy in the north and thereby clearly indicates their interest in advancing this position against any contrary views. Hence, they are making a proclamation by presenting their personal investment in the viewpoint and increasing the interpersonal implication for anyone with contrary views. It is worthy of note, however, that in line two of extract 6, the question, *Is that right?* shows that the speakers' position is negotiated within an heteroglossic environment. Similarly, the first sentence in the excerpt 7 also conveys the same, and in this case, makes it explicit that the denial in building churches is dialogically contrasted with that of building mosques, thus highlighting the fact that the act of denial of privilege is an act of discrimination against the church, that is, Christians. The self-inclusive pronoun, *We*, in extract 7 and *Is that right?* in 6 are linguistic markers of the presence of discourse participants in contention or dialogic confrontation.

The word 'hate' in Excerpt 6 is a contextual cue to Boko Haram which has been described as a precursor to the discriminatory killing of Christians in the northern region by the group. According to Kukah, "The children of Boko Haram have been fed by this sour broth of hate. This is what has bred the bitterness that the northern Christian minorities feel ..." (Kukah: *ThePunch*, October 12, 2014). Also, Farouk (2012) as cited in Uchehara (2014), associates religious bigotry with BH by saying that "the Boko Haram insurgency only believed in the Quranic verse, which states that "Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors". The conceptualisation of non-Muslims as transgressors consequently necessitate their killing. There is the inference in the two instantiations that the reason Christians are not issued certificates of occupancy is the same the reason BH is razing churches in those parts of the country. This inference, therefore, links the discriminatory act of the authority with the action of Boko Haram who claim that "for Christians in Nigeria to know peace they must accept Islam as the only true religion" (*Vanguard*, December 28, 2014). This further implicates that Christians and their churches are not welcome in the north, hence their killing and the burning of their churches as foregrounded by the reference to the demand for certificate of occupancy to build worship centres. The adverbial phrase *...looking forward to ...* in Excerpt 6, and the imperative sentence, *We must create a level playing field for everybody; we must deal with everybody equally.* (Excerpt 7) tacitly used the generic terms *Nigerians* and *people* to refer to Christians because they are the ones denied the right to build their worship centres in the north.

ii. Denial of leadership positions

Categorically, the aspect of the discrimination addresses the exclusion of Christians in leadership positions in even Christian-dominated areas in the north. In other words, Muslims are being imposed on Christians in their own domain within the northern part. Counter is deployed in realising this position. The next example demonstrates this.

Excerpt 8

Do you know that for the past 30 to 40 years, no church organisation has been issued a certificate of occupancy to build a church in the far North? Go to the North of Nigeria and see the suffering of Christians. Are you aware that generally across the North, you cannot be a traditional ruler except you convert? Go to Gwoza. Gwoza is 80 per cent Christians, but they have an Emir of Gwoza. Does it make sense? That a place where 80 per cent of the people are Christians, you start an emirate, and there's an emir who is a Muslim over 80 per cent Christians. Look at Mubi that was just taken over; there was an Emir of Mubi. In a place that is also over 80 per cent Christians. Can it be the other way round? Can you try it? Can you go to Sokoto and say that from now it's a Christian traditional ruler that will rule over a particular area?

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, November 16, 2014)

Quite similar to the construction in example 6, the current writer uses series of rhetorical formulations in advancing its subjective viewpoint on the exclusion of Christians from leadership positions and to put itself in a contending position with anyone with a dialogic alternative stance. Also, as in the other examples, the current textual voice mentions names of town in the north where the statistical representation of Christians far out-numbers Muslims, yet Muslims are the ones ruling. While this sparks off discrimination on religious grounds, it simultaneously contradicts the principle of equity in governance. Substantiating the Islamic crusade perspective in this text is the word, *convert*, which is given as a condition to become a ruler. In other words, only Muslims are recognised, hence, Islamising both the land and its people. It can be deduced here, that it is this lack of acceptance of Christians in such places that make BH target to wipe them out from those communities to have sole Muslim bases. Using the tool of rhetorical questions and interpolations, the textual voice makes a pronouncement in expressing its subjective standpoint that Christians are Islamised in order to be made rulers in their own communities

where they are in the majority. By juxtaposing this unfair act against an impossibility in the case of same act being perpetrated in a Muslim dominated area like Sokoto, the speaker places any holder of an opposing view to the advanced *Islamisation* view at interpersonal cost. This is also found in the area of discrimination against Christians in public offices and schools in some parts of the north as the next example expounds.

iii. Discrimination in public offices and social institutions

Discrimination also takes into account disfavour meted to Christians or unequal treatment in public offices and in social institutions such as the marriage institution and in schools. Pronouncement is used as a tool to convey the personal opinions of the clerics in the identified areas of discrimination in the social context.

Excerpt 9

When you deny Christians chances to go on pilgrimages; when you build hundreds of mosques and deny Christians lands; when you deny non-Muslims places in the bureaucracy or in public life, what are you saying to your children? When you privilege one group and make the other feel inferior, you are opening the window and the people growing up can see the difference between Cain and Abel.

(Kukah, *The Punch*: October 12, 2014)

Excerpt 10

Are we not all aware of what the nice governor of Bauchi State did in Tafawa Balewa and other areas dominated predominantly by Christians? How he went and closed down a girls' secondary school in 2011. Most of the students are Christians. He took the Muslim students from there and put them into other Muslim schools and abandoned all the Christian students

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, November 16, 2014)

Excerpt 11

In your part of the country as in other parts of the world, I hear about families with Christians and Muslims living together, marrying and intermarrying and so on. In the North, this is anathema. Every time I bring this up, I hear people say that this is

what Islam teaches, that the religion allows Muslim men to marry Christian girls (and hopefully make them Muslims) while Christian men cannot marry Muslim women. If this is not apartheid in broad daylight, I do not know what it is. If this is not a case of privileging one religious identity and making it superior to another, I do not know what else to call it. If this is not an assumption that Christian men and their women are inferior and by extension their religion, I do not know what else to call it. If this is not a case of assuming that Muslim men, their women, and Islam are superior to Christianity, I do not know what else it is. When we take this into consideration, can we then blame the members of Boko Haram which, at least, has had the honesty of following the script to its end by insisting that we all convert to their Islam or die?

(Kukah: *Information Nigeria*, November 29, 2015)

From texts 9 to 11, three areas of discrimination in a social context are foregrounded by the Christian clerics. These are in the areas of bureaucracy or in public life a government parastatal in charge of approving citizens for pilgrimages, in educational institution and in the institution of marriage. In all three instances, the discrimination against Christians is overtly stated through rhetorical formulations to make pronouncements which are the subjecthood of the speakers and ones to which they are committed. However, these statements can be retrospectively dialogic because they could represent the authors as responding to what has been said or written and simultaneously be dialogically prospective as they could be fending off other alternatives. Also, according to Berman, Ragnarsdóttir, and Strömqvist (2002), writers may use rhetorical questions for two reasons: a. in keeping with a particular context of discourse and b. the communicative goals of speaker/writers on a given occasion. While all the three texts satisfy keeping with the discriminatory context of the current discourse, they also establish the communicative goal of the authorial voices in making their subjective opinion known that Boko Haram is out to convert Christians to Islam or to kill them. The pronouncements on discrimination raised in 9 and 10 are summed up in excerpt 11 as ... *a case of privileging one religious identity and making it superior to another... a case of assuming that Muslim men, their women, and Islam are superior to Christianity.... When we take this into consideration, can we then blame the members of Boko Haram which, at least, has had the honesty of following the script to its end by insisting that we all convert to their Islam or die?* This vividly states that the various forms of discrimination are the script set by northern leaders and acted out by Boko Haram in its demand for an Islamic state. The authorial voice in excerpt 11 lays the blame on the leaders in the north who have by their

actions prepared the ground for BH's action in the current context of terrorism, thus construing the leaders' action as a driver or motivation for the activities of Boko Haram. The "convert or die" angle to Boko Haram's demand puts a final endorsement to the *Islamisation* viewpoint given to the insurgency in Nigeria. Next, we turn to the perspective of the Muslim which interprets BH as a misrepresentation of Islam.

4.1.1.2 Boko Haram as a misrepresentation of Islam

This viewpoint is the position of the two Muslim clerics. It captures the declarations and activities of Boko Haram which the religious leaders present as contravening Islamic beliefs and therefore dissociate Islam from the acts of the terrorist group. The manifestations in this perspective include presenting Boko Haram members as manifesting an epistemic misrepresentation of Islamic religion, and as religious enemies-motivated misrepresentation. These are discussed separately below.

a. Epistemic misrepresentation of Islamic religion by BH members

In this regard, Boko Haram is represented by the Muslim clerics as a people who make claim to the Quran or other Islamic literature but who do not know and/or practise what the Quran says. Based on this, they are renounced as people with complete knowledge of the religion. This view is expressed through the discursive resources of denial and counter.

Excerpt 12

How can then today, people that are neither specialist in Islamic Law nor specialist in Medical sciences go public with such a fatwa in clear contradiction of the Quran It means the Quran doesn't pass through beyond their throat. Let us assume, they have the rights to their jihad, but that does not give them the license to kill innocent people that see otherwise? When do you kill people on suspicion?

(Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, February 10, 2013)

Excerpt 13

We have said it times without number that any act that breeds violence like the one being exhibited by Boko-Haram has no basis in Islam. As you are aware, our religion, Islam stands for peace as its name denotes. So let us remain peaceful always, so that we may live a peaceful life here and be accommodated in the home of peace in the life to come

(Abubakar: *The Punch*, December 27, 2014)

In texts 12 and 13, certain lexico-grammatical elements point to the fact that the activities of Boko Haram are not in tandem with Islamic beliefs. In 12 for instance, they are presented as non-specialists in the Islamic laws, thus nullifying their religious order (fatwa) as contrary to the Quran through denial via the adverb, *neither ...nor*. The expression, *neither specialist in Islamic Law nor specialist in Medical sciences*, disqualifies BH as Muslims with adequate religious information to make statements that will be binding on other members of their religious community. By the same token, the cleric counters any opposing view. This is further strengthened by the third sentence, *Let us assume, they have the rights to their jihad, but that does not give them the license to kill innocent people that see otherwise?* While the word, *assumes* signals the fact that the dialogic space is expanded to entertain alternative positions, which in the current context will be that BH has a right to jihad, the author almost immediately also knocks out such proposition with the counter-expectancy *but*, to dismiss such view and to foreground the contrary to mean their right to jihad is not a right to killing (innocent people that see otherwise). This counter argument put forward by the textual voice, therefore, contradicts the dialogic space to fend off dialogical alternative positions to what has been proposed in the current context by questioning the circumstance under which people should be killed on suspicion. The stance of the textual voice in 12, is reinforced by the next speaker who reiterates the rejection of the activities of BH members as anti-Islamic, *...has no basis in Islam*. to overtly counter the view of the Christian clerics (as earlier discussed) that Boko Haram members are Muslims who are propagating Islamic tenets. It also substantiates the textual voice's proposition in excerpt 12 that the *fatwa* declared by the insurgents is *in clear contradiction of the Quran*. Denial in the two instances are used to invoke three positive alternatives namely, BH members are incompetent in Islamic laws, they do not have the license to kill people who do not share in their beliefs (extract 12) and Islam does not promote violence. All the three invoked positive views dissociate Islam from the activities of Boko Haram which in the general picture situate the Muslims as countering the Christians religious perspective to the BH terrorism in the country. They also indicate the fact that these utterances are acting in some form of dialogic opposition to other views.

b. Religious enemies-motivated misrepresentation

Another revelation in the religious perspective of the Muslims is that the group in itself is an enemy of Islam and an instigation by those who want to vilify Islam, hence it is considered as

enemy-motivated act. Counter and pronouncement are used in the following texts to demonstrate this position.

Excerpt 14

The sect has disrespect for the Quran or Hadith or even Scholarly fatwa. They have their own interpretation. Anything short of that is part of the enemy that should be killed. So on what basis should there be dialogue or amnesty? It is a creed that must be crushed; it is a creed the prophet – *alaihi Salam*- wished he is alive to exterminate

(Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, March 27, 2013)

Excerpt 15

We hereby call on the Muslims not to allow themselves to be used by our enemies in achieving their desired goals. We should not allow them to cause us to commit acts prohibited by our religion. We, therefore, call upon all those involved in this nefarious act, to fear God and desist from committing this grievous act.

(Abubakar: *Sahara Reporters*, August 31, 2011)

To dissociate Islam from the activities of BH and to present the group as enemies of Islam, the textual voice in 14 uses the tool of pronouncement in making his dialogic opponent know that the group has no allegiance to neither the Quran nor the Hadith and also states their reliance on their own *scholarly fatwa* and not that of the mainstream Muslims. Within the context of demand for amnesty for the group, the speaker contends the fact that any Muslim who is not ruled by the Quran and Hadith is an enemy of the religion. The textual voice goes on to counter the justification for the demand for amnesty for them by constructing them as offenders and therefore exploits common knowledge information that offenders deserve punishment and therefore challenges the amnesty alternative point by demanding punishment for the group. This is evident both linguistically and discursively through the use of the adverb, *so* and the rhetorical formulation, ... *on what basis should there be dialogue or amnesty?....*, respectively. The stance, then, is obviously dialogic as that textual voice is represented as confronting an alternative position to that currently being referenced, which is that Boko Haram should be granted amnesty, by investing its subjecthood in it with the obligatory modality verb, *must*, in the clause, *It is a creed that must be crushed* and buttressing further that *it is a creed the prophet – alaihis Salam-wished he is alive to exterminate*. By these pronouncements, the dialogic space is contracted

further against alternative viewpoints with respect to the demand for amnesty to uphold both true 'Islamism' and to appeal to social propriety (in ensuring a crime-free society).

In excerpt 15, it is construed that enemies are using certain Muslims (*the Muslims* in the first sentence), which are members of BH in the context of the current discourse, to achieve *their goal*. These Muslims are the people who the previous speaker constructs as enemies of the religion. It is again strengthened by the noun phrase, *those involved in this nefarious act* in the current text. Conversely, the present textual voice does not perceive *the Muslims* as enemies of Islam but as agents of 'others' who are enemies of Islam. It is worthy of note that the textual voice is only advancing a subjective position in its pronouncement which invokes the understanding that there are enemies involved in the activities of BH, a situation that naturally brings dialogicality into the text by presenting the speaker as entertaining the possible view that BH is inspired by enemies of Islam. The enemy-motivated act of BH is highlighted in the sentence, *We should not allow them to cause us to commit acts prohibited by our religion.*, while the inimical acts are captured in the noun phrases, *nefarious act*, and *grievous act*. The two viewpoints which are thus expressed in this regard by the Muslim clerics are that BH is both an enemy and an agent of enemies of Islam.

In the next section, the focus of the discussion will be drawn to a political angle which the two sets of religious leaders construct about the Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria.

4.1.2 Political perspectives on Boko Haram

Two perspectives namely, BH as a revolution against democratic governance and BH as government-motivated violence are given to the terrorist situation within the ambiance of politics by the two sets of religious leaders. The former is the subjective position of the Christians while the latter is intersubjectively constructed with different dimensions. This perspective captures dialogic texts by Boko Haram members, government or government agencies or contributions of other key players in the Nigerian political environment. Also of importance here are political issues in retrospect that are perceived to be of consequence in the BH saga or serve as drivers for the group's actions. Six engagement resources, acknowledgement, concurrence, counter, endorsement, entertainment, and pronouncement are utilised within this perspective. In the next section, the perspectives and their features are expatiated.

4.1.2.1 Boko Haram as a revolution against democratic governance

This is the subjective stance of the Christian clerics that describes Boko Haram as an insurgency aimed at toppling the democratic governance in favour of theocracy, where Islamic principles will become the tool for governance. It has two features namely, anti-democratic activities and anti-northern elites' political propaganda. We begin with the first feature in the next sub-section.

a. Anti-democratic uprising

This sub-view by the Christian clerics accounts for the declarations and/or actions of BH members and northern elites that undermine the governing principles, which is democracy. Hence, democratic principles are also evoked into the context to strengthen the stance. It bifurcates into Boko Haram's anti-democratic declaration, and political actions of northern leaders; and it is characterised by endorsement, pronouncement, and counter. The manifestations are discussed in turn.

i. Boko Haram's anti-democratic declaration

This captures the public statement of the insurgents with regard to the kind of government they want in Nigeria as against the type currently practised. To establish this fact, the speaker engages the tool of endorsement to formulate the view that the group is anti-democratic. The instantiation that follows explains this.

Excerpt 16

Since its creation, the Boko Haram network has never hidden its agenda or intentions. Boko Haram has openly stated that they reject the Nigerian State and its Constitution and seek to impose Shari'ah Law.

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, December 28, 2014)

The example above demonstrates the subjective stance of the writer which is invested in its concurrence with the open declaration of Boko Haram, which is to institute Sharia law against the law of democracy, the governing principle of the country as provided for in the constitution in Chapter II, section 14, sub-section 1 of the 1999 Constitution that says, "The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a State based on the principles of democracy and social justice.". The declaration made by the group is brought into the current situation by endorsement through attribution, (... *openly stated*) to an external source (BH) in order to project the position. The endorsement here is, however, to aid the textual voice's formulation of the view that the group is anti-democratic.

The attribution implies that the textual voice is not taking a unilateral stand but only foregrounding it based on the group's statement that coheres with its own angle to the insurgency to assist it in making a pronouncement by investing its subjectivity into that declaration. Dialogicality is introduced into the text as the writer is presented as taking up the position of BH and to advance it in favour of its argument. Also, the endorsement of this public assertion of the group is to contract the dialogic environment against opposing views as the agents of the insurgency themselves have openly made known their intention, *that they reject the Nigerian State and its Constitution and seek to impose Shari'ah Law*. In other words, anyone with a counter view is left to as it were, 'take an interpersonal risk' in the issue. Put differently, the interpersonal implication is heightened for dialogical oppositions.

ii. Political actions of northern leaders

In this regard, the Christian leaders attribute the BH insurgency to certain actions by northern leaders in the past that serve as precedents for the present demand of the insurgents. Hence, this is not a direct factor in the crisis but one that inspired it. The examples below expound the point through pronouncement and counter.

Excerpt 17

Muslims in northern Nigeria cannot accept democracy and reject the inclusive nature of its philosophy as it is the case today. The driving force of democracy is that it presents us with the best instruments for managing our diversity, creating inclusiveness and breaking down the boundaries of exclusion. Unfortunately, northern Islam has continued to privilege religion as a source of identity, power and control. A hypocritical elite continues to believe that it can claim the benefits of democracy but use it only to consolidate its hold on power. This is what has laid the foundation for what is now Boko Haram.

(Kukah: *Information Nigeria*, November 29, 2015)

Excerpt 18

After all, from the debates of the Constituent Assemblies of 1979, 1988, and 1995 and beyond, did their fathers and grandfathers not stage walkouts, demanding Sharia Law? The promise to institute Sharia has become the most potent tool for

political mobilisation and organisation. Till date, the tactics may have changed, but the essence has not.

(Kukah: *Information Nigeria*, November 30, 2015)

In this excerpt, however, the rejection of democracy is assigned to the entire Muslims in the northern part of the country who in the words of the authorial voice, “accept democracy and reject the inclusive nature of its philosophy”. This attitudinal position is contested through the deployment of counter, *Muslims in northern Nigeria cannot* and by expounding the provision of the democratic constitution in the Nigerian context as one that guarantees *inclusiveness* to manage its diversity which is captured as “... to live in unity and harmony as one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation under God” (see introduction to the 1999 Constitution). The commitment of the textual voice to its view is again, categorically encapsulated in the sentence, *The driving force of democracy is that it presents us with the best instruments for managing our diversity, ...*. This knowledge of the Nigerian democratic package is hence contrasted with the northern Muslims, who after accepting democracy, favour a kind of theocracy that uses religion as an index of identity, power as well as control (sentence 3 in excerpt 17), thereby flouting democratic ideals. Emphatically, the writer, so constructs this attitude as hypocritical and one that “... has laid the foundation (is responsible) for what is now Boko Haram.”

In the second instance, the demand for Sharia Law which Boko Haram is making in contemporary Nigeria is retrospectively hinged on the actions of their predecessors referred to as, *their fathers and grandfathers*. The use of the concessive phrase, *After all*, signifies the authorial voice’s interpolation to push forward its articulation of the insurgency situation in the country as having a link with the past demands of the northerners. The activity of the past generations which is the *walk out* in the debates of the cited periods (1979, 1988, and 1995 and beyond) in the Constituent Assemblies, is construed in the current situation as a driver for the demands of the group. The tact which has changed as stated by the textual voice can in the present context be interpreted as a change from *walk outs* in official places to the *use of violence* by a sect in an unofficial setting. In other words, a change from constitutional to unconstitutional demands whose *essence* is the demand for Sharia Law. The use of the concessive phrase again shows that the textual voice is engaging with a dialogic possibility that denies the insurgency as a demand for the implementation of Sharia Law. What is construed here is that the demand for Sharia Law as

propagated by BH is a long-standing issue. All the three demonstrations of the demand for Sharia Law reinforce the Christian clerics' perspective to the insurgency as an anti-democratic agenda. The second feature in this viewpoint is exemplified next.

b. Anti-northern elites' political propaganda

Propaganda can simply be defined as political lies. From the viewpoint of one of the Christian clerics, northern elites had fed their people with these lies and denied them knowledge of democratic policy and have rather presented theocracy to them. This realisation in his opinion is what has partly informed the revolution of the insurgents. The viewpoint is established via counter and pronouncement in the instantiation.

Excerpt 19

We must locate the current crisis of Boko Haram within the context of the inability of the northern Muslim elite to live by their own *dubious creed* of being Muslim. They preached Sharia Law, but only for the poor. They preach a religion that encourages education, yet their own people are held in the bondage of ignorance. They came to power on the basis of a democratic society, but they turned around and declared Sharia to generate a false consciousness among the poor that they want a theocracy. They did not wish to live by the same standards, so they decided to live their own Islam in the capitals of the world away from the prying eyes of their own people. Boko Haram began as a revolt against this mendacity, subterfuge and hypocrisy.

(Kukah: *Information Nigeria*, November 29, 2015)

From the standpoint of the stancetaker in the above excerpt, the propagandist ideology covers three basic areas of the lives of the people – religion, education and, governance. These are three important aspects of human endeavour that deal with ideology and it is foregrounded through the subjectivity of the textual voice through pronouncement. The insurgency is from this stance, partly attributed to the insincerity of the elites in these areas which has given the people false perceptions in those areas, and supposedly, only being realised. On education for instance, according to World Bank report, northern Nigeria has the highest number of children not going to school (Ujah and Binniyat, 2011). Taking girl-child education as an index, the figure indicates enrolment level at 85% for the Southeast and the Southwest, 75% for the South-south and 20% and 25% respectively for the Northeast and the Northwest. From the index, the north east, which

is the region of the operations of Boko Haram has the least figure. On the issue of religion and governance (the state), Sampson (2014) asserts that Nigeria has “since independence, struggled unsuccessfully to clearly articulate the relationship between religion and the state”. He describes this situation as based on the contradiction in the Nigerian constitution which “declares freedom of religion and yet creates and recognises executive and judicial institutions with religious biases”. While at independence the Christians accepted a secular regime, the northern Muslims rejected this but rather desired to operate the Sharia law that existed alongside the British indirect rule (Sampson, 2014). This historic background serves the basis upon which the speaker formulates his idea of the propaganda by the northern leaders. The phrase, *We must locate the current crisis of Boko Haram within the context of the inability of the northern Muslim elite ...*, shows a dialogic confrontation with a view that possibly exonerates the elites from the activities of the BH group. The counter of such invoked view is to help the authorial voice to bring his position to bear in the discourse. Again, the commitment of the textual voice to this view is also signaled by the obligatory modality, *must*, and the self-inclusive pronoun, *We*, to imply that the writer feels strongly that the *inability of the northern Muslim elites to live by their own dubious creed....* The adjectival phrase, *dubious creed* also referred to as *hypocrisy* in the last sentence translates as the propaganda against which the group is revolting in this context, while the categorical assertion (*Boko Haram began as a revolt against this mendacity, subterfuge and hypocrisy.*) stamps the viewpoint. The second broad political perspective is discussed in the next section.

4.1.2.2 Boko Haram as a government motivated violence

Both the Christian and the Muslim clerics construct the view that BH is a government-motivated violence. This viewpoint accounts for all circumstances around the insurgents that warrant government’s intervention but which were deliberately or inadvertently ignored to portray government as having a hand in the insurgency. This manifests in two ways: as concealed identity and involvement of culprits by the government, and a lack of action on information about Boko Haram. Both Christian and Muslim clerics share these views. Six engagement resources: acknowledgement, concurrence, counter, endorsement, entertainment and pronouncement establish these features. We take these in turn.

a. Concealed identity and involvement of culprits by the government

This manifests as government's failure in making public the identities of the perpetrators of the terrorist acts and other acts related to it as well as reluctance or failure to prosecute other offenders whose actions threaten national security. It is an intersubjective position which is realised through counter, concurrence and, entertainment. Here are instantiations from one of each set of clerics to illustrate this point.

Excerpt 20

There's too much secrecy about handling of Boko Haram affairs. Many people were arrested, put in jail and we've never seen the reports. There should be open trials. When there were bombings in Boston Marathon, the press, police and national guards were working hand-in-hand, step by step and when they discovered pictures everybody stepped up the search until the culprits were caught. Everything was open. But in Nigeria everything about Boko Haram is kept secret. Why not expose[d] them so that they speak and we know who their sponsors are. There was a time Boko Haram targeted me. Explosives killed two of them when they were planting them. The military took their bodies away till today. They were not exposed for identification.

(Gumi, *Vanguard*: November 10, 2014)

Excerpt 21

Are you not aware that Libyans have joined them? Are you not aware that Somalians are among them now? Are you not aware that Tunisians are among them? From different parts, they are there among them now, fighting alongside the insurgents. Our borders are so porous. Not only the land borders, but even the air and sea. What of all the weapons that were found in Lagos, where are the weapons till today? Iran was indicted. Where are those people that were caught? What has happened to them? What about the ones found in Kano? We were later told that they were linked to certain Lebanese people based in Kano and Abuja. What has happened to all those things? What has happened to all those people? Have some of those places not been reopened in Abuja? What are we doing to this country? And we say we want to fight insurgency.

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, November 16, 2014)

To construct the view that Boko Haram is a government-motivated or deliberate act of government, both speakers make reference to many actions which are attributed to the

government to validate their point. Counter is used in challenging the many indicting actions of the federal government which have fostered the existence and by implication, the activities of the group. These actions are represented as failure to produce reports on the arrest and jailing of bombers, refusal of public audience to the culprits (in 20), unfortified borders (porous borders), concealing of the whereabouts of seized weapons and non-prosecution of arms dealers (21). In the first instance, the deliberate act of the government is spotlighted through contrast, by juxtaposing the concerted and collaborative actions of various government apparatus in Boston in both arresting and making public the culprits, *Everything was open.*; with the contradictory actions of the suppressed agent, *...arrested, put in jail and we've never seen the reports.* The contrasting act of the writer thus presents him as concurring with the government of Boston while simultaneously countering the action of the Nigerian government to launch his subjecthood in demanding for open trials so that the culprits will be exposed and made to speak publicly so that their sponsors will be known. The potential effect at play here is that the textual voice constructs itself as having the status and moral authority to place a demand on the government to expose the sponsors of the insurgency and at the time to exonerate itself from the actions of BH. In text 21, however, rhetorically formulated bare assertions are presented by the speaker in the first three sentences to exploit 'construal' knowledge of the audience of the composition of the terrorist group based on 'porous borders' which is an act of government. The same representation style is explored to negotiate common ground knowledge with the audience on the concealing of discovered weapons, the people and the nation linked to them, who the government has failed to further make public. With the questions on the weapons, the people indicted about the arms who the government has failed to deal with, the textual voice subtly accuses the government of promoting the insurgency with the sarcastic statement: *And we say we want to fight insurgency.* The government is derogated here not only as a result of its inability to bring the offenders to book but also because of the negative emotional effect that it has on the speaker which it construes as relevant to Nigerians. The questions in this text (21) depict that the speaker is entertaining dialogic alternative views, thereby opening the dialogic space for stances. The indictment of government in the situation is made very obvious in another statement of the first speaker.

Excerpt 22

[The soldiers] know where Boko Haram is because they have their telephone numbers and are interacting with them on the Internet. ... I read in the papers

that this American woman came and said that they cannot use force and fight Boko Haram. And we know they will say sweet things in public and continue conspiracy underground.

(Gumi: *Sahara Reporters*, August 11, 2012)

Here, the speaker makes a bare assertion intending that his audience has shared knowledge of the fact presented, *[The soldiers] know where Boko Haram is because they have their telephone numbers and are interacting with them on the Internet*, and fends off opposing views by construing his audience as having this shared knowledge. A confirmation to this presumed stance of the textual voice is overtly captured in the last sentence, *And we know they will say sweet things in public and continue conspiracy underground.*, where the self-inclusive pronoun, *we* implicates both the speaker and the hearer (the audience) to further indict the government of deliberate acts in the terrorist problem in the country. We examine the second manifestation of this perspective next.

b. Lack of action on information about Boko Haram by the government

This refers to government's knowledge about Boko Haram which lacked commensurate reaction on its part in curbing the activities of the group. It also includes government's lack of a proactive approach to security alerts. In this regard, both the incumbent (Jonathan's, at the time of this research) government as well as the Borno State's government, and the past (Obasanjo's) government are indicted. The distinction is made between the two periods of governance and discussed as Jonathanian government's inefficiency in fighting BH and Obasanjorial government's inaction against BH. Both sets of clerics orient to the first view that accuses the federal government. A state government is also indicted by one of the Christian leaders while only one of the Muslim clerics presents the second viewpoint in the data. The two features are discussed in turn.

i. Jonathanian government's inaction on information about BH members in his cabinet

This captures what both sets of clerics present as Jonathan government's knowledge about the members of Boko Haram and its ineptitude in handling the insurgents or deliberate negligence in order to promote its course or for some other inexplicit reasons. It also refers to a state governor's action during Jonathan's administration. Counter, entertainment and endorsement are utilised to formulate this point that represents BH terrorism as government motivated activity. Some examples are provided.

Excerpt 23

... we know that the President himself, without anybody provoking him, said that there were Boko Haram members in his cabinet. Nobody has been tried, nobody has lost his job as a minister; so we don't know. We cannot say we don't know where they are.

(Kukah: *Vanguard*, November 29, 2015)

Excerpt 24

A whole region is made to suffer economically, socially and politically because of this *blind war* on terror. The present dispensation has everything to gain in refusing the 'amnesty' call for political reasons, that is why it is recalcitrant. Otherwise, if the need to crush BH is genuine, it would have been achieved since.

(Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, March 27, 2013)

Excerpt 25

We were told WAEC told the governor that those girls in Chibok Girls Secondary School should be taken to Maiduguri. But the governor was quoted to have said 'no', that they were safe in the place. So who do you hold responsible? Now you are holding the military responsible, but WAEC did not write the military, it wrote to the governor. If a military man was in charge, probably we would not be talking like this.

(Oritsejafor: *Information Nigeria*, May 17, 2014)

The textual voice in excerpt 23 foregrounds its subjecthood in the declaration of the president that *there were Boko Haram members in his cabinet*. This signals a dialogic basis upon which the speaker is presented as concurring with the president in his proclamation about the members of his cabinet, thereby endorsing it. However, a rhetorical twist is found in the bare assertion, *Nobody has been tried, nobody has lost his job as a minister; so we don't know*. This statement constructs the speaker

as construing that such declaration by the president is expected to be followed by visible action. On the contrary, this is lacking as captured in the sentence, *Nobody has been tried, nobody has lost his job as a minister; so we don't know*. This presumption that such members of the cabinet are supposed to have been tried or relieved of their positions is posed as one possibility, hence the writer is not committed to it. This is also made linguistically evident in the subordinate clause, *so we don't know* to implicitly indict the government of ineptitude or as being ineffective. Counter is also deployed in the last sentence to hold the government responsible for not putting up a reactionary measure to check or deal with such people. In the invoked position counter is one that implies that the government does not know about the members of BH or their supporters.

In example 24, the sentence, *A whole region is made to suffer economically, socially and politically because of this blind war on terror*, is a monologically formulated evaluative viewpoint of the textual voice presented as dialogically active to entertain other views but one which, from the reading position of someone from that region, will be considered as dialogic contractive in the sense that it will position the writer as putting forth a proposition that has consensual knowledge, that is, a view that is generally accepted as true and hence does not call for alternative dialogic positions. The counter-expectancy word, *if*, in the last sentence, however, situates the text within an heteroglossic community as it presents the writer as confronting a dialogic alternative view that possibly describes government's action against the BH group as genuine. Prior to this counter is yet a challenging view that is dialogically contractive by categorically indicting the incumbent administration as being high-handed in the demand for amnesty for the insurgent group, "The present dispensation has everything to gain in refusing the 'amnesty' call for political reasons, that is why it is recalcitrant". Both textual voices in examples 23 and 24 are, therefore advanced counter-factual views that present the current federal government as motivating the activities of Boko Haram in the terrorist context.

The government of Borno State (the operational base of Boko Haram) is also indicted by one of the Christian clerics in excerpt 25 as motivating the group's activities. Here, the subjective involvement of the writer is foregrounded in what some external source had reported, *But the governor was **quoted** to have said 'no', that they were safe in the place*. By bringing this report to the fore, the writer endorses the report and invests his subjecthood into it to blame the government for the abduction of the Chibok Girls. Put differently, the governor is presented as having aided that particular action of the group. In sentence three (25), there is the construal that the military

was held responsible for the abduction of the girls which is being contested. The adversative conjunction, *but*, in the clause... *but WAEC did not write the military, it wrote to the governor...*, vividly highlights the counter to any prospective view that blames the military. Again, the counter-expectancy, *if*, in the last sentence communicates the fact that military is not in charge (in the decision that the girls were safe in that place) to further contract the dialogic space for contending views and increases the interpersonal cost for anyone apportioning the blame to the military rather than to the governor of the state. Also, the rhetorical question, *So who do you hold responsible?*, signals heteroglossic engagement that rules out potential dialogic alternatives to the writer's position.

ii. Obasanjorial government's inaction on information about BH

This sub-classification of BH as government motivated violence is the position of one of the Muslim clerics. By this, reference is made to the failure of the Obasanjo's government to respond to security information in the past that may have nipped BH in the bud, but whose failure is translated in the current context as a source of encouragement to the present terrorist acts of Boko Haram. As mentioned earlier, only one of the Islamic leader orients to this view through endorsement, acknowledgement, and pronouncement as the example below shows.

Excerpt 26

Sheikh Jaafar Adam (of blessed memory) had alerted the government (of Olusegun Obasanjo) and anyone who cared to listen then that late Muhammad Yusuf was up to some dangerous games in very good time but no one listened to him. Consequently, even when Jaafar Adam was mowed down, it could not trigger a suspicion or reaction to use the clergy as the counter narrative solution against the BH group. Obasanjo knew the greater implications to the polity and that was why he was bent on a third term to manage it fair enough. When the third term bid failed, Baba Obasanjo could only be scanty to the incoming Yar'Adua/Jonathan's regimes over the full brief to the Sharia crisis and its logical link with the BH [Boko Haram] for them to remain clueless in its management. The guilt may explain why Obasanjo remained too interested as to seek compensation to the BH leader's family even ahead of the government initiative while prescribing a carrot and stick approach to the counter insurgency effort.

(Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, June 17, 2015)

In the excerpt above, the stance subject draws contextual relevant information from his mental model to make a proclamation that apportions blame to Obasanjo (a former president of Nigeria) for the current activities of Boko Haram. Pronouncement is made to show that the textual voice invests his viewpoint as well as advances what had been expressed by the late Sheik that *late Muhammad Yusuf was up to some dangerous games*. The writer's negative affect is conveyed in the counter-expectancy clause, *but no one listened to him*. This subjectivity invested position of the cleric foregrounds the deliberate inaction of the past government, in neglecting the security alert raised by the late cleric, a situation conceived as having "greater implications to the polity". It is possible, though, that the nature of the religion has affected the political and social behaviour in the people in the northern part of Nigeria and the fact that Islam specifies that its adherents have to live under Sharia (Islamic Law) is perhaps, the reason for the non-reaction of President Obasanjo. According to Ajayi (1999), quite a large percentage of Nigerians believe that the Nigerian Government patronises Islam through its policies. This explains why the textual voice apportions blame to Obasanjo, who was the president at the time when Zamfara, a state in the North-west declared Sharia Law as an institutionally legal agency. Dialogically speaking, the endorsed view of the late Sheik positions the current speaker as fending off presumed dialogic oppositions that the past government's non-reaction to security alert is in no way associated with the activities of Boko Haram. Very emphatically, this opposed possible alternative is reinforced in the sentence: *Obasanjo knew the greater implications to the polity and that was why he was bent on a third term to manage it fair enough*. This bare assertion further closes up space for further distancing of the past president in the current security problem in the country posed by BH and establishes a taken-for-granted alignment with the audience. The reference to Obasanjo's understanding of the polity and his third term bid in this discourse context could be inferred as saying that, knowing the connection between BH and Sharia, he allowed the status quo (the imminent danger posed by the group) to remain for his political interest. It can be inferred on the one hand, that Obasanjo would have taught that his silence to the declaration of Sharia Law in some parts of the north would be interpreted as his 'acceptance of the same' to earn him the support of the northerners in his third term bid. On the other hand, perhaps, this action could be as a result of the institutionalisation of Islam in the Nigerian secular constitution (see Chapter VII, section 260, sub-section (1) of the 1999 Nigeria Constitution). Within this text, the ineptitude of the incumbent government discussed in the previous sub-section is attributed to the previous

government in sentence four, thus, ... *Baba Obasanjo could only be scanty to the incoming Yar'Adua/Jonathan's regimes over the full brief to the Sharia crisis and its logical link with the BH [Boko Haram] for them to remain clueless in its management.* Possibly, a campaign against Sharia would have meant an uprising of the group and a disruption of his third term electoral process as well as loss of votes in the north by reason of the polity of the north. The verbal phrases *could only be scanty, ...remain clueless* communicate, perhaps, the lack of moral justification on the part of Obasanjo and the frustration of the succeeding government in not understanding how to deal with the situation that had been allowed to remain.

However, the deployment of the possibility modal, *could*, indicates that the textual voice acknowledges other dialogic possibilities thereby making the current view count as one among a diversity of dialogic alternatives. This is strengthened by another possibility modal verb, *may*, in the next sentence, *The guilt may explain why* The effort of the named late cleric was aimed at forestalling the violence, *dangerous games*, that the north east and the country in general now suffers. The complacency with which the alert was treated by the past government and all is a rejection of the attitude of the past government and its allies by the writer. The emergence of Boko Haram is in this context credited to two factors: the president's complacency by not heeding the warning; and his non-reaction to the killing of the cleric, Sheikh Jaafar Adam, who sent the alert to the government. The last sentence in the excerpt, *'The guilt may explain why Obasanjo remained too interested as to seek compensation to the BH leader's family even ahead of the government's initiative while prescribing a carrot and stick approach to the counter insurgency effort'* further strengthens the fact that the Obasanjo's administration mismanaged the situation that could have been curbed but which unfortunately has degenerated to the terrorism being experienced in the country. The negotiated position of the authorial voice is supported by Abdullahi and Olajide (2015) who quote Gumi as saying that Boko Haram's threat to national security would have been averted if former President Olusegun Obasanjo had strictly controlled the activities of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, and the people he, the then president, criticised for practising "political Sharia" during his administration. This summarises the point that the past governments left a vacuum that is now occupied by Boko Haram and locates the group's activity as being inspired by the government. In the next section, the third broad perspective to the BH terrorism is brought into focus, that is, the social and economic angle to the crisis.

4.1.3 Social and economic perspectives on Boko Haram

Within this perspective, there are both subjective and intersubjective viewpoints. The social and economic dimension to the Boko Haram insurgency takes into cognisance issues with interpersonal implications between the insurgents and other citizens of Nigeria, and between the insurgents and the government as conceived by the clerics. This perspective accounts for three factors namely, BH as a product of fundamentalism, BH as a demand for improved social and economic conditions, and BH as enemies to Nigerians. The first is the view of the Christian clerics, the second by the Muslim clerics (with the support of one of the Christian clerics), while the third is an intersubjective construal. Five engagement resources, concurrence, counter, endorsement, entertainment and, pronouncement are utilised within this perspective. These are discussed separately in the following sub-sections.

4.1.3.1 Boko Haram as a product of fundamentalism

From the perspective of both Christian clerics, BH is primarily a case of fundamentalism in the northern region of the country. Fundamentalism in this study is extended to mean resistance of non-Muslim communities, especially Christians, because of their religious disposition and their patronage of Western civilisation, especially in the area of education (while the average northern Muslim believes in Islamic/Quranic education). Another aspect of this fundamentalism is with regard to a political ideology enunciated by a northern leader in time past. These are expatiated separately.

a. Boko Haram as a rejection of Western civilization

Pronouncement was used by the Christian clerics to conceive BH as being against Western civilisation which it largely associated with Christians, hence their desire to eliminate Christian presence so as to have an 'Islamised' northern region. Western civilisation is also associated with the government, hence the attack on government agencies or structures. The view of one of the Christian clerics is cited to buttress this point.

Excerpt 27

Muslims also have been killed in all these that have happened but I have said it many times that the primary target of Boko Haram is to kill government agents, including security agencies, and destroy schools because they believe it

is a sin to go to school and churches because churches, to them, are also tied to the western ideology.

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, September 25, 2013)

In the text above, the textual voice concurs with the proposition that Muslims have been killed by the insurgents as one dialogic possibility in the discourse to close the dialogic space for further views in that wise. It immediately follows this with the counter-expectancy *but* to put forward its subjecthood with regard to the actual targets of BH. The reiteration, *times without number*, implies that the authorial voice is endorsing and advancing a view that it construes as common knowledge between him (the speaker) and the audience that the group's goal is to eradicate anything connected to western ideology which is characterised by government agents because the democratic government or principle is from the West; the school, because it teaches Western ideas; and the church, because it was introduced by the Western world into Nigeria. Christians then become the targets because they are the major patronisers of these institutions. The interpretation of the cleric is not far-fetched from the meaning of the name of the group itself "Boko Haram" which is an Hausa expression translated as 'Western education is forbidden' (see Agbedo, 2012; Purcek, 2014). This kind of belief is socio-cultural in the sense that it is shared among the people of a particular society (the Muslims in the northern part of Nigeria) and guides their beliefs and activities among others. According to the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, culture is the beliefs [philosophy], a way of life, art, and customs that are shared and accepted by people in a particular society. This explains why the level of education (Western education) is lowest in the North-east region of the country, why churches are not given certificates of occupancy and why Christians are killed more in that part of the country where BH operates as its headquarters (see section 4.2.1). This feature is also social because it affects how that part of the country is organised with discriminatory attitudes against Christians in that region.

Dialogically, here, the textual voice is also in confrontation with any contra position that will translate the areas of attack as not being selectively aimed at these institutions that are representations of Western influence. Therefore, the dialogic space is being contracted and the interpersonal cost increased for anyone with opposing views. Next is the belief about the nexus between BH and economic conditions. On the contrary, however, one Muslim cleric construes rather, the lack of education as the driver for Boko Haram by calling for the engagement of the children in schools: "We must take our children off the streets to the classrooms" as a precursor to

peace ... “Then and only then will peace and stability be restored not only in the North but in the entire country” (Abubakar: *Vanguard*, December 10, 2011). This call for education counters the prior viewpoint that the group is against education (which is not clear whether it is Western education or Islamic education that is clamoured for as the second type holds sway in the north). The preference of the latter over the former is, however, explicit from the statement of Gumi that the primary reason for the establishment of the JNl by the Sardauna and Sheik Gumi was to foster Islamic education. However, after 50 years it has not even a mushroom university, resulting in loss of grip on the psyche of Muslim youths in particular thereby exposing them to fanaticism (Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, May 8, 2014). This contention is further neutralised if one goes by the English translation of the name of the group, ‘Boko Haram’, which means ‘Western education is forbidden’ (Agbede, 2012; Purcek, 2014). Both excerpts used pronouncements to present the formulations. The next fundamentalist conception has socio-political background.

b. Boko Haram as a demand for *Talakawa* ideology

One of the two Christian clerics is of the view that Boko Haram is a demand for a popular northern ideology, the *Talakawa* ideology. This is a (populist) ideology, a political belief or movement for social justice for the common people. It was enunciated by the late Aminu Kano who mobilised the people to know their rights and to stand up for these rights (*Premium Times*, Monday, February 27, 2017). The word *Talakawa* referred to the common Nigerians who worked but were exploited and alienated by the elites; and who lived in poverty as a result. The philosophy also incorporated the almagiris (destitutes) in the fight for social justice. Boko Haram is conceived as the demand for this philosophy by one of the clerics. It is constructed with endorsement as demonstrated in the example.

Excerpt 28

Turning this injustice was at the heart of the late Aminu Kano’s philosophy, theology and politics throughout his life. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that Boko Haram is another name for the vacuum created by the absence of the *Talakawa* genre of politics enunciated by Aminu Kano.

(Kukah: *Information Nigeria*, November 29, 2015)

The textual voice in this excerpt holds the view that one of the motivations for the insurgency in the north is the group’s crave for social equality. This is based on the political sensitisation that

was created by the late Aminu Kano; a leadership gap in the north where the masses are alienated from the government. By the use of the word, *indeed*, the textual voice represents itself as upholding its subjective view which had earlier been expressed within the context of the terrorism by BH, *I have argued elsewhere* The verb *argued* itself signals the understanding that the speaker had contended before now, a position that possibly gives Boko Haram an identity other than what is being referenced. Principally, it endorses itself to advance the earlier conveyed subjecthood on the discourse that describes Boko Haram as being another name for the vacuum left by the nonexistence of the *Talakwa* philosophy. Deploying a ‘self-endorsement’ act, the authorial voice makes a proclamation by investing its heightened subjecthood in this viewpoint and is at the same time interested in advancing it against other opposing viewpoints. It is also important to note that the speaker is advancing this position as a dialogic possibility while opening up space for other opposing views to be advanced. In other words, it is entertaining alternative interpretations of what the group is. Within the discursive context, therefore, it can be concluded that the speaker construes BH activities as a desire for the implementation of the ‘*talakawa*’ philosophy; an interpretation which is supported by its prior position that Boko Haram is a revolt against the propaganda of the northern elites (see anti-northern elites’ political propaganda, section 4.3.1). Another social and economic dimension to the terrorist crisis identified by the Muslim clerics and one of the Christians is that the absence of what makes for better living is also a factor in the crisis.

4.1.3.2 Boko Haram as a demand for improved social and economic conditions in the north

This captures the Muslim clerics’ position that BH is prompted by the demand on the government. This presents three features: improved economic conditions, that is poverty alleviation; better infrastructure in the north; and equity. These are constructed as the responsibility of the government, the lack of which brings the group into a confrontation with the government. Some of the views either countered or proffered by the Muslim clerics (including one Christian cleric) is indicative of the fact that poverty and the poor or absence of infrastructures in the north are part of the reasons for the terrorist activities. These are realised via denial, counterand pronouncement, and are discussed separately.

a. Boko Haram as a demand for improved infrastructures in the north

The support for this viewpoint to the insurgency is more graphically constructed by a Christian leader and it is intertextually employed in the present context to strengthen the viewpoint of the Muslim clerics, hence, it presents this point as a somewhat intersubjective position. This is exemplified below.

Excerpt 29

So, this problem is not about resolving Boko Haram matter. It is about first of all, aggressively dealing with the problems of corruption, which tragically seems to be in reverse. It is about massively rolling out infrastructure. Believe me, I can tell you that the day that you have a train from Abuja to Sokoto, from Kaduna to Calabar, the day you have those things, the people you are talking about will have no place.

(Kukah: *The Sun*, April 15, 2013)

The adversative, *So*, that introduces the text is a linguistic marker that shows that the textual voice is in contention with a dialogically opposing view to that which is proposed in the current context (sentences 2 and 3) as possibilities in the context of discourse. The propositions to be entertained by the audience as positive dialogic alternatives are advanced through denial with the negative marker, *not* in the phrase, “not about resolving Boko Haram matter” conveys the understanding that the speaker is contesting a dialogic position that BH is the problem the government of the country needs to tackle to have a peaceful society. The act of counter in the present context helps the textual voice to put forward its positive propositions as dialogic possibilities which should be entertained in the desire for peace which are: dealing with corruption, and rolling out of infrastructure. The rhetorical twist in the sentence, (*It is about massively rolling out infrastructure.*) is to say that the authorial voice construes the problem of the insurgents as one necessitated by the ‘absence or poor state’ of infrastructure. The heightened investment of the subjecthood of the speaker is linguistically obvious in the verb clauses, *Believe me and I can tell you* This means that the textual voice is highly committed to the position it is advancing, that is, availability of infrastructure will bring an end to the violent action of the group. In other words, the violence of Boko Haram is an agitation over a lack of infrastructure.

b. Boko Haram as a demand for equity

The view that the government does not give equal treatment to the northerners as they give to people from other regions of the country is expressed by the Muslim clerics. In this instance,

reference is made to privileges of the government that contrast the north with other parts of the country in order to highlight injustice. The instantiation that follows demonstrates this point.

Excerpt 30

Muslims want and also demand to be treated with equality, with justice, with fairness and inshi-Allah [God's willing] things will turn around.

(Abubakar: *Vanguard*, June 3, 2014)

The view that the violence in the north is as a result of the absence of equity to the northerners on the part of the government is implicitly presented by the textual voice through pronouncement. The subjective investment of the speaker is conveyed by the use of the hedging device, *inshi-Allah*, interpreted as 'God[s] willing' which in addition to the categorical assertion, *Muslims want and also demand to be treated with equality* shows the certainty of the speaker to his opinion. The certainty of the authorial voice is also supported by the use of the futuristic modal verb, *will*, as he personally predicts what will happen when Muslims are treated fairly, thereby reinforcing his commitment to the proposition. In other words, in the subjecthood of the authorial voice, the unrest in the north is a reaction to the government's unfair treatment of the northerners. This is made more obvious in the same speaker's demand for amnesty for the members of Boko Haram where he solicited for the kind of amnesty that stopped the crisis in the Niger Delta region for the culprits (Boko Haram) in the north, while simultaneously pleading for dialogue with the terrorists rather than warring with them (Abubakar: *Vanguard*, March 6, 2013). This demand is informed by the speaker's recourse to his mental model of unrest and killing in the Niger Delta region of the country. This emphasises the view of the speaker that the government has or is not treating the northerners as they treat some others. To say it differently, he implicates that the government is unfair to the northerners and this is part of the reason for the violence in the north. In other words, the violence is a resistance to or is heightened by the government's inequality. The third feature in this perspective is considered next.

c. Boko Haram as not being driven by poverty

This captures a Christian cleric's reaction to the view by Boko Haram apologists, who attribute the insurgency to hunger necessitated by poor economic conditions in the northern region of the country. While this view is stated by the Muslim clerics in reports outside the selected data sources, the counter position of one of the Christian clerics invoked this position to show that it has been considered as a factor in the terrorism. The instantiation below demonstrates this.

Excerpt 31

Boko Haram is fueled by extreme religious ideology and not poverty because they have not come out to tell us that they are killing people because they are poor or hungry.

(Oritsejfor: *Vanguard*, September 25, 2012)

The belief that BH is driven by an economic factor, poverty, is a view that is brought into the current context through denial. By this, the current speaker sets its utterance up as operating in a form of dialogic operation with a positive view that describes the actions of Boko Haram as being motivated by poverty. This positive position is declaimed in the first clause, *Boko Haram is fueled by extreme religious ideology and not poverty*. This negation is further heightened in the second clause that presents hunger as an attribute of poverty that can spur people into negative action, following the axiomatic expression, "A hungry man is an angry man". The fact that these people are not driven by hunger is also supported by the fact they have not made such pronouncement but rather the demand for a Sharia state and for Islam to be upheld as the religion of the region, and by extension, the entire country. In addition, the textual voice indicates outright disalignment with the imagined audience with regards to considering hunger as a factor in the insurgency. The holder of this negative view is hence, presented as being ignorant of the declarations of Boko Haram or has deliberately decided to ignore the group's pronouncement for some reasons. The current speaker's rejection of hunger as a reason for terrorist actions is made more logical through the use of a series of the absolute negative marker 'not' that further heightens the subjectivity of the authorial voice with instances that contradict the invoked claim. This is evident in his words in a referenced source, *Newswatchtimes* where he says:

Boko Haram is propelled by a religious ideology, it is not poverty. Anyone who tells you it's poverty is not telling you the truth. It's not poverty. When you blame it on poverty, it is an insult to poor people. There are poor people everywhere even Christians all over the north. Bin Laden was not a poor man. He is from a rich Saudi Arabian family. The Nigerian boy, who almost blew up a plane on Christmas day, is a son of one First Bank chairman and he is still

one of the richest people in Nigeria today. Boko Haram insurgency is an ideology. People are being radicalised by an ideology.

(Oritsejafor: September 21, 2014)

In this extract, the ubiquitous nature of poverty, especially in the country, is exploited as a strong ground to debunk the view that associates the terrorist acts with poverty. Put differently, terrorism should be a phenomenological event everywhere the poor are found. The inference is that there are the poor in every nation of the world, yet not all nations experience terrorism. The current viewpoint is also set up in a heteroglossic environment as indicated by the reference to the pronouns, *anyone* and *you* in the first two sentences. By substantiating his standpoint with the explicit examples in the sentences, *Bin ... from a rich Saudi Arabian family* and *The Nigerian boy, ... one of the richest people in Nigeria today.*, sums up the disclaimer to poverty in the insurgency and foregrounds the subjectivity-invested viewpoint of the textual voice that it is ideological and not poverty, thereby committing itself in advancing this viewpoint and putting any dialogic opponent as negotiating an interpersonal 'risk'. The next conception of BH is situated within the context of violence and criminality.

4.1.3.3 Boko Haram members as enemies of Nigerians

Within this view held by the two sets of clerics, Boko Haram is constructed as a group (social actors) whose actions are against the healthy co-existence of the entire Nigerian populace without regard to religious disposition. This viewpoint is an intersubjective construction by all the clerics selected for this research. The resource of pronouncement and entertainment are used in establishing this angle to the insurgency. An instance is selected from each set of clerics to expound this.

Excerpt 32

The unfortunate menace of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is indeed an accident beyond religion which affects every Nigerian directly or indirectly and upon which no passing of bulk can be logical.

(Abubakar: *Sahara Reporters*, April 13, 2013)

Excerpt 33

I want to use this opportunity to remind Nigerians of the need to continue to unite in the fight against terrorism in our land, it is an act that we all must denounce and fight with all that we have got, probably the emirs were attacked for their condemnation of Boko Haram but this must not deter us.

(Oritsejafor: *Information Nigeria*, May 31, 2014)

A common ground is negotiated by the clerics in the two excerpts in constructing Boko Haram as a common enemy that threatens the face of all Nigerians with regard to their collective or corporate existence. The linguistic choices in this view all appeal to the commonality of the speakers as people in the Nigerian geographical space with a common interest – the unity of all. In excerpt 32, the textual voice advances its position through the resource of pronouncement. This is evident in the use of the adverb, *indeed*, which indicates that the authorial voice is highly committed to the proposition that *Boko Haram insurgency is an accident beyond religion* The expression, “affects every Nigerian directly or indirectly” portrays the all-encompassing nature of the problem of the group on all Nigerians to label the group as enemies of every Nigerian. Similarly, the textual voice in the next excerpt makes a pronouncement against the insurgents, which is the need to fight against them as contained in the first sentence of excerpt 33. Also, the heightened subjecthood investment of the speaker is vivid in the use of the modal of obligation, *must*, which equally relates his commitment to the view that everyone has a role to perform in denouncing and fighting terrorism. However, the modality adverb, *probably* in the last clause of the same sentence, conveys the lack of commitment on the part of the speaker to the proposition on the killing of the emirs. In other words, it presents that as one dialogic alternative that is worthy of consideration in the context of the killing of the emirs. The use of the self-inclusive pronoun, *our*, *we* and *us* (Nigerians) agrees with the adjectival phrase, *every Nigerian*, in text 32 to bring out the intersubjectivity or the shared interest of the authorial voices in their construal of BH as an enemy to all Nigerians. It is obvious that all the clerics condemn the group and instigate resistance in the rest of Nigerians against them for the purpose of restoration of peace in the country. This is very apparent in the utterances of all the clerics, knowing their responsibilities to the people as spiritual leaders in a religious society like Nigeria. The interpersonal function of language in establishing a social relationship is also manifested as the textual voices fulfil the positive face want of each other (of the two religions) and in the interest

of the citizens of the country. Similarly, the pronouns *and every* in the two texts conjures the same function in addressing every Nigerian as a stakeholder in the peace project. The discussion in this section establishes the common stance of the clerics that Boko Haram is an enemy to all Nigerians and one which needs to be stopped. We turn to the last perspective to the insurgency.

4.1.4 Security perspective on Boko Haram

Two viewpoints are intersubjectively expressed by both the Christian and the Muslim clerics within this perspective. These are Boko Haram members as terrorists, and Boko Haram members as killers and criminals. As terrorists, they are involved in acts identified as dangers to lives and properties such as killing, kidnapping, burning of churches and houses among others; while as killers and criminals, they are in addition to taking lives, engaged in a robbery. The positions are constructed through counter, concurrence, endorsement, and pronouncement. The viewpoints are discussed separately in the sub-sections below.

4.1.4.1 Boko Haram members as terrorists

Both the Christian and the Muslim clerics intersubjectively construct Boko Haram members as terrorists. By terrorists, they are presented as abductors, killers, bombers, perpetrators of fear-provoking activities among the civilian population. To frame Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation, the clerics orient to the actions of the members of the group. This viewpoint is established with pronouncement and discussed presently.

Excerpt 34

This abduction is an end game for whoever is responsible for the killings, bombings and terror all over in general. The abductors – whoever they may be – are confined in space and time for the first time. The abducted girls are known, therefore, lies will have to end. The abductors must be identified. These girls hold the answers to all the melodrama that is called war against Boko Haram.

(Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, May 2, 2014)

Excerpt 35

His Eminence said he wrote a letter to the ISIS. ... But I want to appeal that you also write to Boko Haram because Boko Haram is worse than the ISIS. They have killed more people than the ISIS, they have caused more atrocities than the ISIS, they need to be written to as well, it is very important; it will help.

(Oritsejafor: *The Punch*, November 25, 2014)

In the two excerpts in this section, both speakers make categorical or bare assertions in which their subjecthood is invested. Put differently, they make overt claims through the resource of pronouncement. In the first instance, although the agent is suppressed, (that is unidentified) by the use of the universal pronoun, *whoever*, the textual voice is committed to the fact that they will be exposed because of their captors who are identified members of their community. The second speaker's subjectivity is embedded in his personal evaluation of the group with the use of the evaluative adverb *worse*, and the evaluative or judgmental comparative adjectival phrase *more atrocities than ...* in sentence two and three respectively, in example 35. In both instantiations, the actions carried out by Boko Haram that make them be classified as terrorists are overtly marked. These acts are *abduction, killings, bombings and killed*. Other linguistic elements that are associated with terrorist acts used in the examples above are *abduction, terror, abductors, atrocities and war*. These elements situate Boko Haram within the context of terrorism. Another strong indicator of terrorism is the reference to ISIS in excerpt 35. The verbal phrase in the excerpt... *have killed more people ...* have a hyponymous relationship with the nominal element, *atrocities*, which in turn is a hyponym of *war*. Thus, there is a contextual coherence between the choice of words and the social situation that is portrayed. In text 35, the acronym *ISIS*, in the social world, is an Al Qaeda splinter group in northern Iraq. It is known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant which is in pursuit of an Islamic state across Sunni areas of Iraq and in Syria (*Fox News*: 2014; Lister, 2014). The group has been globally acclaimed as a terrorist organisation that has wreaked serious havoc on its people. By juxtaposing Boko Haram with ISIS, the textual voice intends to express the view that Boko Haram is a more terrible terrorist group than ISIS who the speaker considers as bad enough as to be written to stop its atrocities. Hence, the appeal to write to Boko Haram.

In excerpt 34, the textual voice conveys heightened investment of its subjecthood with bare assertions: *This abduction is an end game for whoever is responsible for the killings, bombings and terror all over in general. The abductors – whoever they may be- are confined in space and time for the first time*. There is a construal here that the identity of Boko Haram has been an issue of contention. This is captured in the appositive, *whoever they may be*, and in the sentence, *The abducted girls are known, therefore, lies will have to end*. By this act of pronouncement, the

speaker advances his personal view within an heteroglossic environment regarding the identity of the terrorist group. Hence, the view that the abduction of the girls will expose the identity of the group is advanced as a dialogic possibility among alternative views. There is also the construal by the authorial voice that there has, since, been an exaggeration of the activities and personality(ies) involved in the story of BH as the culprits have never been identified (not real actors) as probably portrayed. However, the involvement of real people (the abducted girls) in some form of a fairytale, “the melodrama that is called “war against Boko Haram”, will only serve as an end to a dramatised situation by what the girls will say about their abductors. In text 35, the subjecthood of the speaker is foregrounded in its endorsement of the action (writing) of a dialogic participant, *His Eminence*. While the textual voice aligns with the action of the opponent, it advances its view that Boko Haram also needs to be written to. This appeal is informed by the mental model of the speaker who construes Boko Haram as a worse terrorist group than ISIS because their manner of killing and atrocities outweighs that of the group that has been written to. The appeal to write to BH as ISIS has been written to is an indication of the fact that they are equally identified as terrorists as the other group. Put differently, the commonality of the linguistic choices used to describe Boko Haram shows that the speakers are both orienting to the actions of the group as terrorism, thus, they are terrorists. Having established the terrorist dimension in the discourse, we turn to the point of divergence of the clerics in this perspective.

4.1.4.2 Membership composition of Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation

While both the Christian and the Muslim clerics present BH members as terrorists, there is a divergence in opinion regarding the composition of the membership of the group. The Christians attribute it to the northern Muslims and their international allies, while the Muslims construe it as having a cross-religious membership, and as comprising Nigerian security agents. Counter, endorsement and, pronouncement are deployed to realise these viewpoints. Each of the angles is demonstrated next.

a. Northern Muslims and their international allies as members of Boko Haram

In this view held by the Christian clerics, Boko Haram is comprised of Muslims who are indigenes of the attacked areas or from a wider angle, Muslims from the northern region of the country who are supported by other nations. Counter and pronouncement are used in this regard. Instances are presented below.

Excerpt 36

... That Boko Haram, its disciples and victims are localized to northern Nigeria should be instructive. What this calls for is an honest review of the root causes. We need to ask what it is about the past or the present that has led us to this ugly and deadly path.

(Kukah: *Information Nigeria*, December 25, 2015)

Excerpt 37

President Jonathan should review the amnesty deal for Boko Haram in view of the bravado by the sect leader, Mallam Shekau. Boko Haram is not only a local terrorist organization. It has a ring of international connection to it.

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, May 10, 2013)

The construal that the members of Boko Haram are from the north is explicitly captured in Excerpt 36 by the adjective, *instructive* as used in the sentence, ... *localized to northern Nigeria should be instructive*. The authorial voice is presented as being in dialogic opposition with a presumed audience or opponent by countering an invoked view that possibly indicts non-northerners as making up the membership of the group. The sentence which is a categorical assertion gives off the understanding that the speaker is certain about his claim. Though implicitly stated, what that means is that the fact that all the social agents, the performers of the actions and the sufferers of the actions, are all situated in the north gives a lot of information that the members of the group are internal. This is supported by the call for a review of the situations in that part of the country. In other words, the disgruntled people in that part of the country are those who constitute the group. Since this is a subjective view of the speaker, it can only be but one of the dialogic possibilities. That is to say, this view is one that should be entertained within the context of understanding the composition of the group. This reading to the text is further reinforced by the use of the possibility modal verb, *should* which implies that the likelihood of the members of the group being from the north where the event takes place is one that is expected. The perspectives of the Muslims in this wise are considered next.

The disalignment in the membership composition in excerpt 37 obviously indicts foreigners as BH members. This excerpt is one possible divergence that interprets Boko Haram as a multi-nation based terrorist group. Through this responsive act, the stance subject evaluates the object

as *not only a local terrorist organisation*, but affiliates them with other (terrorist) nations. By the obvious positioning of self within an epistemic knowledge to which he is highly committed, he equally validates his position by referencing the sect leader, Mallam Shekau. The following meanings are constructed in the text: (1) it is true that Boko Haram is a terrorist group, and (2) they are internationally supported. The bare assertions are used to make a pronouncement in which the subjectivity of the textual voice is highly invested. In other words, it shows a high level of certainty to the propositions expressed. The negative adverbial phrase, ...*not only* is an element of counter that also intensifies the formulation that they are terrorists used in the context.

b. Cross-religious membership of Boko Haram

This view is advanced by the Muslim clerics and it accounts for the composition of the group as being made up of Muslims and Christians (non-Muslims). It is realised through counter and endorsement as instantiated in the excerpts below.

Excerpt 38

You have taken note of what I said about violence in the North-east. I did not mention Boko Haram because most of the violence is not caused by Boko Haram. So we have to ask ourselves why there is violence in the northeast? Those who cause the violence, who are they? The government must fish them out and say look we know you are the cause of this thing from day one.

(Abubakar: *Information Nigeria*, August 31, 2011)

Excerpt 39

Nobody knows that this Boko Haram, from the few the army was able to kill, were mercenaries from Chad. There are even some non-Muslims among them. ... There are Christians in Boko Haram. A soldier came to us here from Bita, which is very close to the Zambisa forest. He said when they went freshly with ammunition they were able to repel the first attacks of Boko Haram. When the Boko Haram were withdrawing, he heard them say Victor, Amir, John, Mohammed e.t.c. Boko Haram are not only Muslims.

(Gumi: *Vanguard*, November 01, 2014)

In 38, there is a reiteration of a position that absolves BH from the violent activities in the region. The concessive conjunction, *because*, shows a dialogic confrontation with an invoked position

that holds Boko Haram responsible for the violence by presenting a counter position, that, ... *most of the violence is not caused by boko haram*. The selection of the determiner, *most*, in that expression is an implicit entertainment of a contending view that attributes the violence in the North East to Boko Haram. Thus, while referring to a deleted subject as also responsible for the violence, he expands the dialogic environment to anticipate opposing views from the government. The rhetorical formulations implicate that non-BH members, in other words, non-Muslims, a people whom the government knows about are involved in the violence in the North East. By negotiating this position, the buck of identifying and unveiling the culprits is pragmatically passed to the government. This act contextually accomplishes two intentions. First, it downplays the role of religion (BH as a religious sect) in the violence. Second, it transfers the responsibility of ensuring the security of the region and the country at large, to the government. This is confirmed in another statement made by one of the Muslim leaders under study, who expresses the feelings of the entire Muslim leaders regarding the insecurity in the country and apportions responsibility to the government in ensuring protection for all in every part of the country (Abubakar: *Vanguard*, 6 March 2013). The formulations of the textual voice in 39 on the membership composition of BH are foregrounded through the endorsement of the report of an external source, who is a soldier in the context of speaking. The verbs *said* and *heard* are signposts for the attribution that foregrounds the endorsement. However, the obvious position is that the members include both Christians and Muslims. This is contextually derived from the reference to the names mentioned by the external source, which are *Victor, Amir, John, Mohammed*. While the names 'Victor' and 'John' can be generically associated with Christians, 'Amir' and 'Mohammed' are associated with Muslims. This upholds the point that the textual voice is negotiating the position that the membership of Boko Haram is cross-religious (in Nigeria, Islam and Christianity are the two main religions), hence Boko Haram comprises people from both religions. This stands in dialogic contention with the view of the Christians that BH members are northern Muslims. Nevertheless, there is a covert confirmation of the claim by the Christians that foreigners are in the membership of the insurgents. This is captured in the noun phrase, *mercenaries from Chad*. There is also a subtle alignment with the Christian indictment of Muslims as members as conveyed by the concessive, *even*, in the sentence, *There are even some none-Muslims among them*. It is also worthy of note that the place of reference, 'Zambisa forest' in whose neighbourhood the soldier came from is the camp of the members of BH in the real social world.

This further strengthens the fact that those so labelled are the actual insurgents, not others who may have been possibly, innocently arrested as members. Dialogically, what this means is that the speaker is fending off any opposing alternative that will present a contra-membership viewpoint to the composition of the group. The discursive implication of this is that since the members are from different religious groups, then, the insurgency is not religion inspired or precisely, it is not Islam motivated to reinforce an earlier position in the religious perspective that distances Islam from the actions of the group and rather holds government and its agency as well as criminals responsible for the insurgency. In a nutshell, the two clerics co-construct the view that the membership of Boko Haram includes Muslims and non-Muslims.

4.1.4.3 Boko Haram members as killers and criminals

The intersubjective position here, the Christian and the Muslim leaders, conceive Boko Haram members as killers by the unlawful taking of lives. However, only the Muslim clerics describe them as criminals. Concurrence and pronouncement are deployed to establish this position. The following instantiations clarify this point.

Excerpt 40

This was the same day that the Emir of Fika in Yobe State, was attacked. The Shehu of Borno, had been attacked a month earlier. So, we can understand that the Muslims being attacked are those singled out for killing because of their critical stance against the activities of the sect. We utterly sympathize with the families of the clerics killed by the sect members because they stood for the truth. May the Almighty God grant them aljanafidasi.

(Oritsejafar: *Vanguard*, November 16, 2014)

Excerpt 41

There are those using it to destroy Islam, criminals attacking banks in the name of Jihad. There are those using it to attack Muslims in mosques. After attacks you will just see somebody with turban and guns belonging to the West, denting the name of Islam. Because of this we should be careful. There is Boko Haram and some fake ones, pure criminals. The real Boko Haram can be changed with sermon. Our malams should stand up to tell them there is no justification for killings. Don't be afraid. They are killing Muslims and the infidels we have agreement to live in peace with.

(Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, December 30, 2012)

The view that Muslims are also attacked by BH is one that is concurred by the textual voice in excerpt 40. The use of concessive, *So*, at the beginning of the second sentence implies that the textual voice is confirming the claim that Muslims are also being killed by Boko Haram. The first two sentences in the extract reinforce the killings by the group, ... *the Emir of Fika in Yobe State, was attacked. The Shehu of Borno, had been attacked* The speaker who (in section 4.2.1, excerpt 1) had said that the group kills only Christians, here agrees with a dialogic opposition that even Muslims are being killed. Nevertheless, he makes a distinction about the kind of Muslims killed, ... *those singled ... because of their critical stance against the activities of the sect.* In excerpt 41, the textual voice presents a subjecthood opinion about the group and pronounces them (BH) as *those using it to destroy Islam*, which supports the earlier view that BH is enemy to Islam. It also represents them as criminals who disguise with the Islamic act of jihad to rob financial institutions, and as killers of Muslims (attack Muslims in mosques). The stance of the Christians that BH is ideology-oriented is buttressed by the current authorial voice's description of those attacking banks as belonging to the West, *After attacks you will just see somebody with turban and guns belonging to the West, denting the name of Islam.* This communicates the point that there is a religious divide between Islam and the West (Christians), (see section 4.3.1.1, Boko Haram as a rejection of Western civilisation). Thus, there is an overt distinction between two types of BH, the fake ones or pure criminals and the genuine BH, those that can be changed by sermon, which is, the religious sect. However, the sentence, *Our malams should stand up to tell them there is no justification for killings.*, contains a rhetorical twist which makes the referenced Boko Haram in this context as denoting Muslims. This implies that even those criminals who use the name are Muslims, to support the Christians' view that the members of BH are Muslims as was earlier seen in the membership composition.

4.2 Summary of analysis and analytical structure

A summary of the analysis in this chapter is presented in a table. The table categorises the news sources beginning with the ones that are exclusively online (*Information Nigeria* and *Sahara Reporters*), followed by the ones that have print versions for which only the online (e-versions) are utilised, namely, *Vanguard* and *The Punch*. Under each news source, the dates of the reports, are stated alongside the clerics quoted and the perspective presented by the application of the engagement resources within the appraisal framework (theory). In addition to the broad

perspectives – religious, political, social and economic and security; the main viewpoints presented are highlighted as well as their other sub-caegorisations, that is, the subviews and the manifestations. Furthermore, the number of the excerpts are analysed are also provided. The table is as shown below:

Table 4.1 Analytical table for chapter four

S/N	Date	Subject	Perspective	Main View	Sub-view	Manifestation	Chapter/ Excerpt
INFORMATION NIGERIA							
1.	May 13, 2014	Pastor Oritsejafor	Religion	Islamisation Crusade	Violence against Christians	Abduction of Christians	3
2.	November 30, 2015	Bishop Kukah	Religion	Islamisation Crusade	Propagation of Islamic tenets	-	4
3.	February 10, 2013	Sheik Gumi	Religion	Boko Haram as misrepresentation of Islam	Incomplete knowledge by BH members	-	12
4.	March 27, 2013	Sheik Gumi	Religion	Boko Haram as misrepresentation of Islam	Enemies-motivated misrepresentation	-	14
5.	November 29, 2015	Bishop Kukah	Political	Boko Haram as a revolution against democratic governance	Anti-northern elites' political propaganda	Other agents' activities	17
6.	November 30, 2015	Bishop Kukah	Political	Boko Haram as a revolution against democratic governance	Anti-democratic activities	Other agents' activities	18
7.	November 29, 2015	Bishop Kukah		Boko Haram as a revolution against democratic governance	Anti-northern elites' political propaganda	-	19
8.	March 27, 2013	Sheik Gumi	Political	Boko Haram as government motivated activity	Concealed identity of culprits	Present government's inefficacy	24
9.	May 17, 2014	Pastor Oritsejafor	Political	Boko Haram as government motivated activity	Concealed identity of culprits	Jonathanian government's inaction on information about BH members in his cabinet	25
10.	June 17, 2015	Sheik Gumi	Political	Boko Haram as government motivated activity	Concealed identity and involvement of culprits	Obasanjorial government's inaction on information about BH	26
11.	November 29, 2015	Bishop Kukah	Political	Anti-Western civilization	BH as a Demand for <i>Talakawa</i> ideology		27
12.	December 30, 2012	Sheik Gumi	Security	Boko Haram as killers and criminals	-	-	33
13.	May 31, 2014	Pastor Oritsejafor	Social and economic	Boko Haram as enemy to Nigerians	-	-	35
14.	May 2, 2014	Sheik Gumi	Security	Boko Haram as terrorists	-	-	36
15.	December 25,	Bishop Kukah	Security	Boko Haram as	-	-	39

	2015			terrorists			
16.	August 31, 2011	Alhaji Abubakar	Security	-	Cross-religious membership	-	40
SAHARA REPORTERS							
17.	August 31, 2011	Alhaji Abubakar	Religious	Boko Haram as misrepresentation of Islam	Enemies-motivated misrepresentation	-	15
18.	August 11, 2012	Sheik Gumi	Political	Boko Haram as government motivated activity	Concealed identity of culprits		22
19.	April 13, 2013	Alhaji Abubakar	Social and economic	Boko Haram as enemy to Nigerians	-	-	34
VANGUARD							
20	May 10, 2013	Pastor Oritsejafor	Religious	Boko Haram as an <i>Islamisation</i> crusade	Violence against Christians	Attacks on Christians, their communities and institutions	1
22.	December 28, 2014	Pastor Oritsejafor	Religious	Boko Haram as an <i>Islamisation</i> crusade	Violence against Christians	Attacks on Christians, their communities and institutions	2
22.	November 16, 2014	Pastor Oritsejafor	Religious	Boko Haram as an <i>Islamisation</i> crusade	Propagation of Islamic tenets	-	5
23.	April 1, 2012	Bishop Kukah	Religious	Boko Haram as an <i>Islamisation</i> crusade	Discrimination against Christians	Exclusion of Christians in possession of landed property	6
24.	November 16, 2014	Pastor Oritsejafor	Religious	Boko Haram as an <i>Islamisation</i> crusade	Discrimination against Christians	Denial of leadership positions	8
25.	November 16, 2014	Pastor Oritsejafor	Religious	Boko Haram as an <i>Islamisation</i> crusade	Discrimination against Christians	Discrimination in public offices and social institutions	10
26.	December 28, 2014	Pastor Oritsejafor	Political	Boko Haram as a revolution against democratic governance	Anti-democratic activities	Boko Haram's declaration	16
27.	November 10, 2014	Sheik Gumi	Political	Boko Haram as government motivated activity	Concealed identity of culprits	-	20
28.	November 16, 2014	Pastor Oritsejafor	Political	Boko Haram as government motivated activity	Concealed identity of culprits	-	21
29.	November 29, 2015	Bishop Kukah	Political	Boko Haram as government motivated activity	Unmatched declarations	Present government's inefficacy	23
30.	September 25, 2013	Pastor Oritsetjafor	Social and economic	Boko Haram as a product of fundamentalism	Anti-Western civilisation	-	28
31.	September 25, 2012	Pastor Oritsetjafor	Social and economic	Boko Haram as a demand for improved social and economic conditions	Poverty (poor economic condition)	-	29
32.	June 3, 2014	Alhaji Abubakar	Social and economic	Boko Haram as a demand for improved social and economic conditions	Poor or absence of infrastructures in the north	Demand for equity	31
33.	November 16, 2014	Pastor Oritsejafor	Social and economic	Boko Haram as killers and		-	33

				criminals			
34.	May 10, 2013	Pastor Oritsejafor	Security	Boko Haram as terrorists	Northern Muslims and international allies as members of Boko Haram	-	39
35.	November 01, 2014	Sheik Gumi	Security	Boko Haram as terrorists	Cross-religious membership	-	41
<i>THE PUNCH</i>							
36.	November 25, 2014	Pastor Oritsejafor	Religious	Boko Haram as an Islamisation crusade	Discrimination against Christians	Exclusion of Christians in possession of landed property	7
37.	October 12, 2014	Bishop Kukah	Religious	Boko Haram as an Islamisation crusade	Discrimination against Christians	Discrimination in public offices and social institutions	10
38.	December 27, 2014	Alhaji Abubakar	Religious	Boko Haram as misrepresentation of Islam	Incomplete knowledge by BH members	-	13
39.	November 25, 2014	Pastor Oritsejafor	Security	Boko Haram as terrorists	-	-	37

CHAPTER FIVE

STANCE TYPES, PRAGMATIC STRATEGIES AND PRAGMATIC FUNCTIONS IN CLERICS' PERSPECTIVES

5.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the stance types that characterise the perspectives and the pragmatic strategies used to achieve different pragmatic functions directed at the stance objects in the discourse. The stance types are adopted from Biber's (2006) concept of stance. Broadly, three stance types, namely, epistemic, evidential and affective stance are identified in the data with various realisations in the perspectives. Affective stance is in addition to Biber's linguistic markers, supported by Martin and White's (2005) typology of affect and their devices. The pragmatic strategies are adopted from van Dijk's (2006) ideological strategies. The transitivity system in systemic functional linguistics by Halliday (1985), complemented by grammatical markers of stance provides the linguistic underpinning for the analysis.

5.1 Stance types, pragmatic strategies and pragmatic functions

This section examines the three stance types: epistemic, evidential and affective, identified in the study, the pragmatic strategies that characterise the stance types and highlights their pragmatic functions in the clerics' discourse on Boko Haram. In each stance type, the strategies and their functions are categorised under general names and instantiated from the data. Epistemic stance in this research refers to the knowledge of the clerics with regard to Boko Haram. Evidential stance deals with the proofs advanced by the clerics to support their construal of stance objects, while affective stance examines the attitude of the clerics towards Boko Haram, their activities and the roles of other stance objects in the discourse on Boko Haram.

Each of these stance types employs a different number of pragmatic strategies to achieve different pragmatic functions in the subjective views of the clerics or in the intersubjectively constructed

viewpoints. The pragmatic functions, referred to as practs, are accounted for by the pragmatic act¹ theory of Mey (2001). The pragmatic act has been used as a supplemental intervention (Odebunmi, 2018) in this study.

Twenty stance features are generated from the data: eleven epistemic, seven evidential and two affective demonstrate the three stance types. Two manifestations of affect are found to be common to all except the political perspective. Put differently, the strategies have different ways in which they foreground the perspective. Within the stance features, nine pragmatic strategies are differently used to perform ten pragmatic functions. These strategies adopted from Teun van Dijk's (2006) ideological strategies account for the pragmatic imports of the clerics' interventions in the BH discourse. The transitivity system in systemic functional linguistics (SFL) complemented by grammatical markers of stance served as linguistic tools. Each manifestation of stance, the characteristic strategy and function are discussed under sub-headings with instantiations.

5.1.1 Epistemic stance, perspectivisation strategies and informing practs

In this study, the epistemic stance refers to the clerics' knowledge about Boko Haram. Both the Christian and the Muslim clerics exploit epistemic stance to reveal what they know about Boko Haram. Two categories of knowledge, namely authority-based knowledge and experience-based knowledge are identified. Epistemic stance is demonstrated in all the perspectives and utilise seven pragmatic strategies namely, authority, religious self-glorification, exemplification, metaphorisation, categorisation, norm expression and comparison. These strategies are differently used by both the Christian clerics and the Muslim clerics to realise the pragmatic functions of blaming, reinforcing, condemning, exonerating, advising, and indicting. The linguistic elements that typify this stance include Verbal, Material, Mental (of cognition and perception), Existential, Relative Processes; and modal adverbials. In addition, obligation and necessity modal verbs are used to express what they know or believe should be done in the situation.

¹Pragmatic act theory is a theory of context that accounts for the limitations of the speech act theory which was considered as being atomistic. A pragmatic act consists of two parts, the activity part and the textual part that interact to produce a pract. A pract is an instantiation of a pragmatic act, that is, what an utterance is used to accomplish in a context. It is the illocutionary force in an utterance. The realisation of a pract depends on the participants' knowledge of the context of the interactional situation and what the pract is likely to achieve in the context. Practs are used to foreground a pragmeme which is a generalised pragmatic act and the core of Mey's pragmatic act theory.

Perspectivisation strategy is the general category that captures all the strategies within this stance type. Informingpract is a term used to classify all the pragmatic functions in this stance type. The types of knowledge, the strategies used and their functions are discussed presently.

5.1.1.1 Authority-based knowledge, perspectivising strategies and informingpracts

Authority-based knowledge captures the source of knowledge or information the clerics have from influential social agents such as high-profile personalities, authoritative books or institutions such as government. Six pragmatic strategies: authority, comparison, categorisation, exemplification, metaphorisation and norm expression are utilised within this stance to perform four pragmatic functions: blaming, condemning, indicting and reinforcing positions. Three types of knowledge sources are identified: third-party information (TPI), knowledge from government action (KGA) and insider knowledge of the Islamic religion (IKIR). Instances of these are demonstrated below. By authority, speakers make mention of authorities (important members of society, or even other reliable informants) to support their case or to negotiate a viewpoint. It is characterised by Verbal Processes (involves quoting sources), and Mental Processes. In the religious perspective, NCCs used it to reinforce the position that BH is an *Islamisation* crusade; in political perspective, both sets of clerics used it to condemn government action. while in social and economic perspective, NCCs used it to indict Boko Haram of killing.

a. Third party information (TPI), authority and reinforcing

TPI captures the clerics' information from reliable personalities which serve as the basis for the knowledge of the stance object in the perspective. This is realised in the religious perspective and it is deployed by the Christian clerics. Instances are demonstrated below:

Excerpt 42

What I know from what some very devout Muslims have *told me* is that when a Jihad starts, they don't stop. The Jihad has to be completed. They either die or they achieve their goal. And the goal is to Islamize Nigeria.

(Oritsejafor, *Vanguard*, November 16, 2014)

Excerpt 43

As we are talking now, it has been reported by the Catholic Diocese of Maiduguri that about 185 churches have been burnt by Boko Haram. So, how else can we remove a religious dimension to this?

(Kukah: *The Punch*, October 12, 2014)

The epistemic positions of the two speakers are overtly captured in the two instances by attribution to TPI. The informants are captured in the noun phrases, *some very devout Muslims* and *the Catholic Diocese of Maiduguri* are the bases for the investment of the subjectivity of the stance subjects (stancetaker/speaker). In the first instance, the stance subject is the Beneficiary of the Verbal Process, *told*. This is confirmed by the use of the first person pronouns, *I* in 'I know ...', where the knowledge of the stance taker is conveyed by the Mental Process (cognition), *know*. In the second instance, what the stance taker knows that informs the religious position he has taken is attributed through a Verbal Process, *told*, to *the Catholic Diocese of Maiduguri*. In text 42, the stance subject's epistemic position is overtly inscribed by the epistemic or cognitive verb 'know', while in excerpt 43 it is implicitly denoted. In both cases, the source of the knowledge is a third party or external sources. The stance taker in text 42 commits himself to two propositions namely: *when a Jihad starts, they don't stop* and *They either die or they achieve their goal* which all drawn from TPI to pragmatically reinforce his certainty that "the goal is to *Islamize Nigeria*, hence it is an *Islamisation* agenda. In the second instance, the speaker rationalises the Verbiage, *that about 185 churches have been burnt by Boko Haram*, (what he heard from TPI) to draw an inference to reinforce his view that the insurgency has a religious undertone which cannot be ignored. Hence, the NCCs construct the view that Boko Haram is a group that is religion-motivated, whose aim is to make Nigeria an Islamic nation based on the use of the pragmatic strategy of authority. The word, *jihad*, in example 42 is a contextual cue that situates the group within the Islamic religion. Thus, it can be inferred that the NCCs construct the view that the insurgency is Islam motivated. The Relational Process, *is*, in the last sentence of excerpt 42 intensifies the connection between the identifier (the goal of BH) and the identified (Islamise). In both excerpts, linguistic elements *is*, and the concessive adverb, *so*, are indicators of certainty which commits the stance subjects to the information they have and have also believed to help the formulation of their perspective.

The reference to jihad syncs with the position that BH is a war against Christians. "... It is considered as a declaration of war on Christians and Nigeria as an entity." (Oritsejafor, *Vanguard*, December 29, 2011). Relying on shared situational knowledge with his putative audience, that in war each party fights to be victorious, he summarises BH insurgency as one to achieve their *Islamisation* plan, *They either die or they achieve their goal*. In Excerpt 43, the reference to the number of churches burnt pragmatically validates the idea of war against Christians. The rhetorical question, *So, how else can we remove a religious dimension to this?* is an indirect speech act to blame the religion for the actions of BH members.

b. Insider knowledge of Islamic religion (IKIR), religious self-glorification and exonerating

Religious self-glorification in this discourse means positive references to or praise for one's own religion, its principles and practices. Basically, the Verbal Process is used to refer to what the clerics know with regards to Islam, which constitutes their epistemic stance. The excerpts below are instantiations of religious self-glorification used by NMCs to exonerate Islam from the activities of BH.

Excerpt 44

We have said it times without number that any act that breeds violence like the one being exhibited by Boko-Haram has no basis in Islam. As you are aware, our religion, Islam stands for peace as its name denotes. So let us remain peaceful always, so that we may live a peaceful life here and be accommodated in the home of peace in the life to come.

(Abubakar: *The Punch*, December 27, 2014)

Excerpt 45

Islam has seriously condemned the unauthorized killing of souls. The authority in Islam only belongs to a government duly elected by the consensus of the Ummah. We, therefore, see that except for very few instances, Muslims do not commit murder. The rampant murder committed in the west is as a result of the irreligious life the west has adopted and bears little with the clamour of gun control. In Yemen, the populace is armed yet such murders are not an occurrence because Islam instils in the individual the discipline of self-restraint and control and forbids the taking of one's life and that of the others too. This cannot be said about the other religions.

(Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, December 27, 2012)

In text 45, the speaker expresses his knowledge of Islam as a member of the religious community to distance the faith from the actions of the insurgents by re-echoing it. The Verbal Process, *have said*, implies the verbal rejection of the acts of BH by the Muslim community (as stated by the stancetaker who is the spokesman for all Muslims in Nigeria). The rejection is targeted at the Receiver, who is anyone with a contrary view regarding Islam and Boko Haram. The Verbiage contains the exoneration strategy. The proposition, *that any act that breeds violence ... has no basis in Islam*, distances the religion from Boko Haram while the positive references to or praise of the religion: *our religion, Islam stands for peace and ... the home of peace* is a manifestation of the pragmatic strategy of religious self-glorification. This pragmatic act is directed at the holder of the counterstanced (Du Bois: 2007) position to disabuse his mind from associating the religion with the insurgents. The speaker deploys voice as the president of the umbrella association of all Muslims in Nigeria, one with institutional authority to make a proclamation that exonerates the religion from BH actions. The expression, *As you are aware, our religion, Islam stands for peace as its name denotes*, exploits psychological act to make the perpetrators of violence restrain from their actions as well as to hope for a better life. In addition, the reference, *the home of peace* is a shared situational knowledge between the speaker and the addressee, who are all Muslims and equally share common knowledge of it as a place outside the current home (the earth).

The self-inclusive pronoun, *We*, signifies that the speaker is expressing the view of his ideological community (an ingroup). The Range function of the Verbal Process, *time without number*, marks the reinforcement of the current position. In the second sentence, the referent, *you*, is ambiguously used as it is inexplicit if the speaker is addressing the holder of the countered position or if it is a membership categorisation move (Du Bois: 2007). However, this is disambiguated in the next clause where it coheres with the use of, *us*, to signify ingroup identification. This is further strengthened by the first-person plural pronoun, *we*, in the embedded or subordinate clause of the third sentence.

The stancetaker in excerpt 45 makes categorical statements about the positive attributes of Islam which he has knowledge of in order to vindicate it. These qualities that portray the religion in a positive light are that Islam:

- i. condemns unauthorised killings
- ii. has a well-structured order of power assignment

- iii. instils[instils] the discipline of self-restrain [restraint] and control in the faithful
- iv. forbids killing, suicide and murder (only in a few exceptional cases).

All the affirmative social values enshrined in Islam as advanced by the current speaker are to disagree with any view that presents the religion in any light that contradicts these socially acceptable standards. In sentences 1 and 5 of text 45, the Mental Process verbs, *condemned* and *instils* signal cognitive acts which are expected mental states of real Muslims in the situational context; and implies that any Muslim who subscribes to the contrary is not a true Muslim. Therefore, by alluding to his episteme of the Islamic religion that *condemns the unauthorised killing of souls* and by instilling *the discipline of self-restrain [restraints] and control and forbids taking of one's life and that of the others too*, the stancetaker communicates judgement of social sanction on BH as the foregrounding codified rules in Islam. The non-observance of these rules by BH members shows their violation of religious duties for which they are liable to punishment by the religion or the state. The fact that the religion has set these positive rules for the faithful thus warrants the eulogy to the religion and to discredit any negative ascription to Islam. To say it differently, the religion should not be blamed for the contrary behaviours of Boko Haram neither should it be associated with the insurgency of Boko Haram. Pragmatically, the personification of Islam in the first sentence of 45 indicates the use of metaphor with the illocutionary force of making the addressees have respect unto the religion (an abstract concept) as they would to a physical person with authority. It is simultaneously and indirect speech act to pract condemning of the killings by the group. Also, the reference to Yemen and the Muslims there is intended to discourage the killers among the Muslims (BH members) as other Muslims with all their arms do not take lives as Boko Haram is doing in Nigeria.

c. Knowledge from government action (KGA), authority and condemning

KGA accounts for obvious actions of the government based on what they (government/its agents) did or said that makes the clerics conceive the Boko Haram insurgency as a deliberate act of government. Both sets of clerics construct this viewpoint. However, only a Christian used authority from the political perspective to condemn the government's action. Verbal and Material Processes typify this epistemic source. An instantiation is provided presently.

Excerpt 46

The concern of the Christian Community is further heightened by *the admittance by government itself that it has knowledge of the perpetrators of these crimes, unfortunately, there is no convincing high profile arrest to assuage public anxiety over this matter.... The Christian Community is fast lo[osing] confidence in government's ability to protect our rights to religious liberties and life.* The consensus is that the Christian community nationwide would be left with no other option than to respond appropriately if there are any further attacks on our members, churches and properties.

(Oritsejfor: *Vanguard*, December 29, 2011)

In this excerpt, the president is quoted as the informant through the strategy of authority to blame the government for concealing the identities of the culprits in the insurgency. The epistemic stance of the speaker is attributed to what the president had admitted having knowledge of. Expectantly, having made such declaration, it is incumbent on the president to take steps in that direction, to assuage the fear and suspicion of the Nigerian public. However, the Existential Process, *are*, in the clause, ... *there is no convincing high profile arrest* signifies the negative state of things by the government in the insurgency. The expression is an indirect speech act to blame the government for failing in its duty of protecting the lives and properties of its citizens. This goes to mean that the government's failure to prosecute or punish the culprits, which it has publicly pronounced to know, (Excerpt 23: 4.1.2.2) is only a deliberate act, hence the blame and the loss of confidence in the government. The stance adverb, *unfortunately*, speaks to the fact that this deliberate act is regrettable. This speaker's knowledge, based on government's purposive inaction, provokes the stancetaker to say that the Christians all over the country 'would be left with no other option than to respond appropriately...'. The last sentence in the extract is a psychological act and a pract of threat through the declarative speech act to make the government take action against BH. Experience-based knowledge is discussed in the next sub-section.

5.1.1.2 Experience-based knowledge, perspectivising strategies and informingpracts

This epistemic stance sub-category captures the clerics' knowledge derived from their intuition warranted by their interactions with the social world as well as by the physical activities of BH. This category bifurcates into personal-experiential knowledge and action-informed knowledge. Six pragmatic strategies: exemplification, metaphorisation, categorisation, norm expression,

comparison and substantiation were used differently by the Christian and the Muslim clerics to perform the pragmatic functions of blaming, reinforcing viewpoints, indicting and condemning. Each of the manifestations is separately discussed highlighting their pragmatic implications.

A. Personal-experiential knowledge

Five realisations of epistemic stance are presented in this sub-section. These are: personal knowledge about Northern Muslims and Islamic doctrines (PKNMID), personal knowledge of democratization and northern politics (PKDNP), inferences from social and economic conditions in the north (ISeCN), fundamentalism-induced actions (FiA), and common knowledge of evil (CKE). Five strategies are used in this sub-section were deployed to realise personal-experiential knowledge. These are exemplification, metaphorisation, categorisation, norm expression, comparison.

i. a. Personal knowledge about northern Muslims and Islamic doctrines (PKNMID), exemplification and blaming

Exemplification is an important strategy that relies on the provision of concrete examples as ways of proving a point. It takes the form of a vignette by a speaker to make his point count. In the PKNMID (religious perspective), this strategy was used by NCCs to blame the northern elite for Boko Haram's actions. In the KGA (political perspective), it was employed by both sets of clerics to condemn and to blame the government for BH activities, while NCCs used it to blame northern elites. In PKDNP (political), exemplification was used by an NCCs to blame northern political elites for the Boko Haram insurgency; while in KGA, it was used by the two sets of clerics to blame the government for the insurgency. Metaphorisation is a concept adapted from van Dijk's metaphor. It explains a way of making an abstraction receive meaning by directness (saying one thing is another). Only one of the Christian clerics utilised this strategy to blame the northern elite in the religious perspective (PKNMID). PKNMID captures the clerics' intrinsic knowledge of the operations of human mechanisms in such aspects as in leadership, the award of privileges and opportunities as well as knowledge about Islamic doctrines. In this wise, it is exploited to blame the northern elite for the actions of BH in the northern part of Nigeria. Categorisation is used to classify people especially when *Others* are involved. In the social and economic viewpoint, it was used by a Christian cleric to reinforce the position that BH is not a product of poverty. Comparison as a strategy in the data manifests as a speaker's reference to people based on

‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’ to make claims to make their argument more credible by presenting evidence or proof for their knowledge or opinions. In PKDNP in the political perspective, it was used by a Christian cleric to apportion blame to the northern leaders for BH. Norm expression refers to explicit norm statements about what ‘we’ should or should not do. In this study, it covers what the clerics know as for right or wrong to do in the Boko Haram insurgency by making reference to a stance subject or even by self-inclusion. Within the current epistemic stance category, it was used by NCCs to reinforce their position that the BH insurgency is an *Islamisation* crusade in PKNMID, while in the social and economic perspective (ISecN) it was used by the Christian clerics to condemn Boko Haram and to articulate the standpoint that poverty is not the reason for the insurgency. It was also used by both the Christian and the Muslim clerics in CKE (in social and economic perspective) to condemn the actions of Boko Haram. The linguistic features in these strategies include Material, Mental, Relative and Existential Process. Instantiations of the strategies in this epistemic type are discussed by first naming the strategies for explicit illustration. The following examples clarify this.

In the religious perspective, exemplification is established in PKNMID and it is used by the Christians to blame northern elite for BH actions.

Excerpt 47

In your part of the country as in other parts of the world, I hear about families with Christians and Muslims living together, marrying and intermarrying and so on. In the North, this is anathema. Every time I bring this up, I hear people say that this is what Islam teaches, that the religion allows Muslim men to marry Christian girls (and hopefully make them Muslims) while Christian men cannot marry Muslim women. If this is not apartheid in broad daylight, I do not know what it is. If this is not a case of privileging one religious identity and making it superior to another, I do not know what else to call it. If this is not an assumption that Christian men and their women are inferior and by extension their religion, I do not know what else to call it. If this is not a case of assuming that Muslim men, their women and Islam are superior to Christianity, I do not know what else it is. When we take this into consideration, can we then blame the members of Boko Haram which, at least, has had the honesty of following the script to its end by insisting that we all convert to their Islam or die?

(Kukah: *Information Nigeria*, November 29, 2015)

The example is an instance of exemplification used to blame northern leaders, apparently elites (who have influence) who influence marriage decisions using the religion as a basis for the rejection of inter-religious marriages among the Christians and the Muslims. The stance of the speaker is based on the knowledge he has of what northern Muslims do with regards to the two religions. The epistemic stance is premised on orientation to social esteem in the form of oral culture among the northern Muslims on the issue of marriage. It is linguistically constructed with a Mental Process of perception, ... *hear*, which orients to his cognitive knowledge.

To exemplify it, he used a form of a short story about how people contract inter-religious marriages in the south-west (where he delivered the message) as a background information to criticise the northerners for their conduct on marriage. The attitude of the 'people' (who say what Islam teaches) has been mentally processed by the stancetaker to arrive at his epistemic conclusion of the northerners. This is recoverable from Existential Process, *is*, which identifies the Existent (events) reformulated in the excerpt as:

- i. there is 'apartheid' in the north,
- ii. one religious identity is preferred to the other thus making one superior to the other,
- iii. Christian men and their women are assumed to be inferior and by extension their religion,
- iv. Muslim men, their women and Islam are presumed as superior to Christianity.

The stance of the speaker is realised through a negated cognitive process (phrase), ... (*do not know*), governed by the stance subject, *I*. In order to accurately place the blame on the northern elites for BH's actions, the speaker highlighted these issues and to draw a conclusion based on them, that BH was not to blame for their actions because it is a 'script' handed down from the religion by the elites which the insurgents are only acting. The implicit statement in the claim of the 'people' which has been made obvious by BH's action is that everyone is expected to be (convert to Islam) Muslims, hence Muslim men can marry Christian women with the hope to convert them to Islam, while Christian men (who are not converted) cannot marry Muslim women. Apart from in the aspect of marriage, denial or privileges in public offices and opportunities to go on pilgrimage are other areas where Christians in the north are refused because of their religious disposition. The extract is also an instance of categorisation as it differentiates between two types of Muslims with regards to marriage, those who accept Christians-Muslim marriage, and those who do not accept that. It is also important to note from the

context of utterance that the speaker employs an indirect speech act to pract blaming. The act is implicitly directed at the religion through inference from the clause, ... this is what Islam teaches..... This interpretation is recoverable from the anaphoric cotext, blame in the expression, "... can we blame the members of Boko Haram which ...?". Though implicit, however, the action of BH is here attributed to Islam. The series of rhetorical formulations governed by the conjunction If, is to pragmatically substantiate the authorial voice's blame of the group's action equally on the religion.

Excerpt 48

[The soldiers] know where Boko Haram is because they have their telephone numbers and are interacting with them on the Internet. ... I read in the papers that this American woman came and said that they cannot use force and fight Boko Haram. And we know they will say sweet things in public and continue conspiracy underground.

(Gumi: *Sahara Reporters*, August 11, 2012)

The excerpt above demonstrates exemplification in KGA. In this instance, the stancetaker expresses his subjective knowledge about the interaction between the agent of the government (the soldiers) and BH members, as well as what he read in the papers about an American visitor to commit himself to the fact that government is deliberate in its 'inaction' towards the group. He describes it as 'sweet things in public' and mere conspiracy. The epistemic verb (Mental Process), *know*, governed by the plural pronoun, *we*, gives the meaning that it is common knowledge what role the government is playing in the insurgency. By stating that the soldiers communicate with the members of BH and by orienting to a common knowledge about government's conspiracy as concrete instances, the speaker brings to bear in the discourse, his epistemic knowledge via the strategy of exemplification to blame BH's activities on the government. He also shows unhappiness with the acts of the government and its agents who know the appropriate things but do not execute them.

i. b. PKNMID, norm expression and blaming

Norm expression as used in religious perspective is realised as PKNMID and it is used by the Christian clerics to blame Islamic doctrines for the activities of BH. An instantiation is provided.

Excerpt 49

What are the doctrines that these terrorists around the world believe in? The doctrines they are teaching, are they not coming out of this Wahhabi and Salafi doctrines? Boko Haram is basically an ideology. To defeat an ideology, you need a superior ideology. Many of our Muslim brothers have come to say to those of us who don't know much about Islam that these people are not Muslims. Alright, but what are these people preaching? Is it not from the Quran? Now you say you have the real thing that this is not the real thing. Then match the real thing with the unreal thing or with the fake.

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, November 16, 2014)

In the above instance, the stancetaker refers to two Islamic doctrines, *Wahabi* and *Salafi*, as well as the Quran, which he knows as the basis for the actions of the insurgents and so challenges the 'Muslim brothers' to produce the counter-narrative that will silence the insurgents if the doctrines and the holy book do not give impetus to those actions. The Existential Process (be-verb), *are*, is deployed in rhetorically stating the presence of the doctrines that engineer the acts put forward by the group. The question in the first sentence is an indirect speech act that blames the religion for BH's action as the reference, *Wahabi* and *Salafi* are doctrines in the Islamic religion. The inference that the doctrines are the drivers of the activities of BH thus warrants the speaker's conclusion that the insurgency is ideology motivated. The categorical assertion, *Boko Haram is basically an ideology*, is also linguistically connected to Existential Process, where *an ideology* is the Existent. The stance adverb, *basically*, shows the heightened certainty of the stance subject to strengthen his epistemic position. In the context of this discourse, which is a response to the claim of the Islamic leader who says Boko Haram has no place in Islam (*The Punch*, December 27, 2014), both the religion and the apologists are blamed for the actions of the terrorist group. The rhetorical questions, '*What are the doctrines that these terrorists around the world believe in? The doctrines they are teaching, are they not coming out of this Wahhabi and Salafi doctrines?*', present the speaker's belief, which forms his knowledge about BH that is counter-stanced by the other stancetaker. These rhetorical questions are equally used to represent a feeling of dissatisfaction with the reasons advanced for the Boko Haram insurgency. The stance subject's belief that BH is ideological is buttressed by his reference to the leader of the group who proclaims that their crusade is aimed at establishing an Islamic state and to bring about freedom for their fellow Muslims for which they will be rewarded with paradise as contained in Chapter 9

verse 111 of the Holy Qu'ran(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, May 10, 2013).However, the counter-stance adverb, *Now*, indicates an attempt at altering the epistemic position of the authorial voice which may only be possible when they(Muslim leaders) counter the fake narrative with the real one.This seeming challenge licenses norm expression in placing a demand on the referenced religious leaders to do the right thing in the situation to negotiate propriety. Put differently, in the current stance, until there is a counter-ideology presented to BH to make them cease from their actions, the doctrines and the Quran are liable for BH insurgency because what the group preaches is from these sources. The lexical items, *convert*, (*Wahhabi* and *Salafi*) *doctrines*, *preaching*, *Quran*; and the analogical reference to *Cain* and *Abel*, in the preceding excerpt, all situate the views of the clerics within the religious perspective.Another strategy in personal-experiential stance is examined next.

ii. a. Personal knowledge about democracy and northern politics (PKDNP), categorisation and blaming

Another strategy deployed in personal-experiential stance is categorisation. Categorisation in the political perspective is realised in PKDNP and it is deployed by a Christian cleric to blame northern political elites for the Boko Haram insurgency. This is illustrated in the sample that follows.

Excerpt 50

Muslims in northern Nigeria cannot accept democracy and reject the inclusive nature of its philosophy as it is the case today. The driving force of democracy is that it presents us with the best instruments for managing our diversity, creating inclusiveness and breaking down the boundaries of exclusion. Unfortunately, northern Islam has continued to privilege religion as a source of identity, power and control. A hypocritical elite continues to believe that it can claim the benefits of democracy but use it only to consolidate its hold on power. This is what has laid the foundation for what is now Boko Haram.

(Kukah: *Information Nigeria*, November 29, 2015)

Excerpt 51

I was reading about a *prominent man* I've always respected in Kaduna, an elderly man *saying* that insurgency is a creation of government or somebody just to win election. I just sat down and was shocked that an educated man, elderly man could

be talking like this with what we are seeing with our eyes. It's unbelievable. Is it that all these people don't know the truth? They do know the truth, but we just pretend or wickedly don't want to touch the truth. If you try it, then they shout. That's what some of us are suffering. If I'm nice and accept everything, I will be getting awards left and right and getting tons of money, they will recommend me to become this and that, hailing me all over the world, while my people are dying.

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, November 16, 2014)

In this excerpt, the speaker, exploring the relevance of his mental model or subjective working knowledge of the concept of democracy as a system of government that takes all the varying groups within a country into consideration; and as a government that upholds the principle of fairness and equality to all its constituent parts; the stance subject invokes the violation of this principle by the northern elite. He does this by using categorisation to identify the Actors as *Muslims in northern Nigeria*, to implicitly differentiate the northern Muslim politicians' attitude from Muslim politicians from other parts of the country. The stancetaker also defines democracy as all-encompassing as evident in the noun phrase, *the inclusive nature of its philosophy*. The view that democracy is inclusive is made more apparent in the Material Process in the second sentence, ... *creating ... and breaking down ...*. Democracy is highlighted as the Carrier of the attributes, ... *the best instruments ...*, *creating inclusiveness*, ... *breaking down ...*. These attributes show the connection between democracy and the ideas or ideals it upholds. However, these tenets of democracy, according to the stancetaker, are infringed by northern Muslims who privilege religion over democratic tenets. In other words, exclusion, which is an anti-democratic practice, is privileged in the guise of religion. This possibly brings to light the fact that non-Muslims, in particular, Christians (based on the stance subject's institutional and religious identity), have been discriminated against in governance. This attitude of the northern elite is given a negative value position by the use of the stance adverb, '*unfortunately*'. This understanding thus helps the stancetaker's conviction and negotiation of the position that the negative attitude contextually realised by the indexical element, *This*, which sets the basis for Boko Haram, thereby blaming the northern political elite for the insurgency. The negative attitude of the northern elite that has licensed the activities of the group is shown by the Mental Processes: *accept ...*, *reject ...*.

In text 51, the subjective knowledge of the current stancetaker on the political dimension of the insurgency is brought to bear and apportions blame to an actor he refers to in the noun phrases, *asa*

prominent man, an elderly man and an educated man. These descriptions earned the stance object the speaker's respect. However, in the present context, the speaker is disappointed with the reference because of what he *read (was reading)* about him, and one which the stancetaker construes as a possible driver of the insurgency in the country. The Verbal Process, *saying*, is the signpost for what the current stancetaker knows in the context. Exemplification is also exploited here, as the speaker tells a kind of story about what he had read in the newspaper. Implicitly, the stance subject expects the revered man to speak to palliate the insurgency rather than inflame it by saying what the speaker terms as falsehood. The stancetaker's knowledge about the falsehood that strengthens Boko Haram is highlighted in an assertive expression, *If you try it, then they shout.* This situation supports the propagandist nature of the northern elite for which blame is apportioned to them on the insurgency.

The last sentence in Excerpt 50, *This is what has laid the foundation for what is now Boko Haram.*, is a metaphor that associates the political practice of the northern elites with what BH is currently unleashing on the government (by its demand for an Islamic state). The metaphorisation is, therefore, a pract to blame the elites. The speaker further explores shared situational knowledge between him and the Muslims in Nigeria, who know about democratic principles just as he knows, but who deliberately disregard the principles, to blame them for the problem Boko Haram is causing in the north. This blaming pract is made quite explicit in example 51, where the speaker makes direct reference to a specific *prominent man*, who shifts the blame to the "government or somebody just to win election".

ii. b. Personal knowledge about democracy and northern politics (PKDNP), metaphorisation and blaming

Metaphorisation strategy in personal-experiential knowledge is found in personal knowledge about democracy and northern politics (PKDNP) which is the subjective position of one of the Christian clerics that accounts for speaker's invocation of the principles of democracy and reference to politicking in the north. Metaphorisation in this context is used to blame northern political elites for the Boko Haram insurgency. An instantiation is presented below.

Excerpt 52

When you deny Christians chances to go on pilgrimages; when you build hundreds of mosques and deny Christians lands; when you deny non-Muslims

places in the bureaucracy or in public life, what are you saying to your children? When you privilege one group and make the other feel inferior, you are opening the window and the people growing up can see the difference between Cain and Abel. ... The children of Boko Haram have been fed by this sour broth of hate. This is what has bred the bitterness that the northern Christian minorities feel, and time is running out.

(Kukah: *The Punch*, October 12, 2014)

The discrimination angle presented by the Christian clerics is heightened by the metaphoric reference to *Cain* and *Abel*, analogically drawn from the Bible, where the former was dispreferred by God but the latter enjoyed God's acceptance because of their sacrifices. By deploying this abstract concept to make his point concrete, the elites are metaphorically presented as 'God', who decides who is favoured and should be accepted, and who is disfavoured and should be rejected (hence, killed by BH). The concept of denial of privileges is conveyed with a cognitive Process (Mental), *deny*, whose Senser is *You*, (referring to northern elites) realising the Phenomena – go[ing] on pilgrimages, denial of land, denial of bureaucratic positions, whose Beneficiary function is assigned to 'Christians'. This indicates the speaker's feeling of displeasure and goes to say that the discriminatory attitude of the elites that presented Christians as inferior served as the implicit conception that fueled BH's killing of Christians and orients to impropriety. The authorial voice further buttresses this discriminatory attitude that has led to the killing of Christians by deploying another metaphor '*The children of Boko Haram have been fed by this sour broth of hate.*', where the attitude of discrimination (hate) is referred to as *broth*, and the imbibing of the attitude as being *fed*. By this metaphorisation, the *children* refer to the products of the Boko Haram sect among the northern Muslims. Therefore, the northern elite who exhibit such discriminatory act in the bureaucratic system or public administration is blamed for the actions of Boko Haram. In other words, the elites *fed* the BH members. The passivation of the sentence de-emphasises the Actor role to foreground the Goal, which is the selective killing of Christians in the north. This supports Ayo Oritsejafor's claim that Christians are the targets in the BH insurgency. The first two sentences in this excerpt pract blaming by performing an indirect speech act through questioning. The illocutionary intention of the speaker is to point out the acts of discrimination which he wants the potential audience to provide, thus making his analogical references, *Cain* and *Abel* relevant in the context. The sub-section that follows explains norm expression and its functions in different perspectives.

iii. a. Inferences from social and economic conditions in the north (ISeCN), norm expression and advising

ISeCN is an epistemic feature in the social and economic perspective in which the Muslim clerics used norm expression to advise the government. Norm expression in ISeCN as discussed here covers the Muslim leaders' claim of BH as a demand for fairness, justice and transparency by the government. ISeCN accounts for what the clerics know, based on prevailing social factors such as lack of education and injustice, lack of social amenities, criminality; and unfavourable economic conditions (poverty), which the clerics conceive as some of the factors responsible for the insurgency. These are exemplified in the next instantiations.

Excerpt 53

We must take our children off the streets to the classrooms. Our leaders, especially the political leaders, must lead with justice, fairness and transparency while dealing with the masses. Then and only then will peace and stability be restored not only in the North but in the entire country.

(Abubakar: *Vanguard*, December 10, 2011)

Excerpt 54

The space is Sambisa forest – a must- since there are confirmed cases of escapees from it. The time is also against the criminals. Encircle all outlets from the forest, take aerial surveillance – shouldn't we wonder now if the drone purported to have been manufactured in Kaduna Air Force base was not really a dummy? – or get the help from United States.

(Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, May 2, 2014)

In the first instance, lack of education is presented in the obligatory statement, *We must take our children off the streets to the classrooms.*, where classroom contextually refers to education and *the streets*, could imply idleness. Educating the children in this situation could, therefore, implicate, engaging the minds of the 'children' with positive thoughts/things to replace violence which pervades the region. Also, justice, fair leadership and transparency are identified as appropriate socio-political conditions that could help in quelling the insurgency. By highlighting these issues, the stance subject pragmatically deploys inference to predicate that the lack of peace in the north is as a result of lack of education and injustice. The pragmatic import of the utterance orients to a practice of advising the government via the use of norm expression to explicitly mention

what the state (government) should do for its citizens and how to treat them. It also thrives on shared situational knowledge of what ignorance (lack of education) can result in to achieve the pragmatic import. The obligatory modality, *must*, in its two occurrences is used to signal the stance of the stancetaker and orients to his knowledge of what will engender the restoration of peace in the region. Education is therefore seen as a panacea to the insurgency as captured in the last sentence of example 53. In other words, it is the absence or lack of education, among the others earlier mentioned, that is responsible for the insurgency the nation is experiencing.

In excerpt 54, the occupants of *Sambisa*, who in the real world of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria are the members of Boko Haram, are referred to in this text as criminals. Norm expression is also used to advise government agency (possibly the military) on military strategies to adopt in apprehending the insurgents. The Material Processes *Encircle* and *take* in the imperative sentence, *Encircle all outlets from the forest, take aerial surveillance*, linguistically signal actions expected of the government and doubles as a declarative speech act with the illocutionary force of pointing out the failure of the government. However, the speaker simultaneously expresses doubt (insecurity affect) about the genuineness of the military apparatus, *drone* to support his earlier accusation of the government as not having sincere intention to quell the insurgency, "... if the need to crush BH is genuine, it would have been achieved since" (Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, March 27, 2013), thereby practicing the act of condemning the act of the government. The stance adjective, *purported*, indicates the stancetaker's uncertainty of the genuineness of the drone made in Kaduna Air Force base. The speaker's stance expressed is one of doubt towards the intention of the government. Of importance in this section, however, is the indirect reference to the culprits as criminals rather than explicitly identifying them as Boko Haram members associated with the insurgency. Nevertheless, anonymisation of the terrorists is clear from the excerpt as the authorial voice advocates 'use of drone' and 'get help from United States' because a country requires such to fight territorial enemies and not criminals. Fighting criminals is a civil issue that does not require the help of other nations. The expressions consequently depict a state of unrest that demands intervention both internally, with the use of drones; or externally, by the suggested call to the United States for help. Furthermore, the speaker utilises voice as a retired military officer and one who also shares common knowledge with the government that foreign help is usually

solicited when an enemy threatens the territorial integrity of another nation; in this context, Boko Haram versus the Nigerian government.

iii. b. Inferences from social and economic conditions in the north (ISeCN), comparison and reinforcing

Using comparison in this evidential stance feature, a reactionary viewpoint is advanced by a Christian cleric to counter an invoked view that frames BH as a product of poverty. Comparison is used to reinforce the view that BH is not driven by poverty. This strategy as earlier explained involves a speaker's orientation to 'ingroup' and 'outgroup' to make verifiable claims by the presentation of proofs for the knowledge. An instance is provided below.

Excerpt 55

If we agree that poverty, injustice and inequality are the causes of the insurgency by Boko Haram, a largely Islamic group, the question would be: are Muslims the poorest people, the most deprived? What about Christians? Can we say injustice and inequality, as they say, is limited to Muslims alone? Can the claim of poverty be justified if the weapons and arms being used by the Boko Haram sect are calculated in terms of naira and kobo? Where is the justice when the Almajiris have special schools built for them and none for Christian children in the North and South?

(Oritsejfor: *Vanguard*, May 10, 2013)

The speaker in this extract, who is a Christian cleric, employs comparison to reinforce the position that the actions of BH are not prompted by poverty, injustice and inequality as advanced by the Muslim clerics. To achieve this, he exploits the pragmatic tool of comparison to present the fact that even Christians (his in-group) are subjected to all of the social problems identified by the Muslim clerics. He rhetorically commits himself to the following facts to discredit the 'other' position:

- i. Muslims are not the poorest.
- ii. They are not the most deprived.
- iii. Injustice and inequality are not limited to Muslims.
- iv. The Boko Haram sect possesses weapons that cannot be reconciled with poverty, so it is not poverty.
- v. The Muslims have special educational treatment which the Christians do not have (the

Almajiri school).

Points i and iv debunk the poverty claim, while ii, iii and v neutralise the ‘... justice, fairness and transparency’ claimed to be denied the Muslims. Hence, the explication of these facts pragmatically reinforces the current stance subject’s view that Boko Haram is not caused by poverty including the other factors but a product of ideology as presented in excerpts 31 and 49 where Oritsejafor asserts that religious ideology rather than poverty is the driver of Boko Haram because the members of the group have not attributed their actions to poverty or hunger (Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, September 25, 2012). The Mental Process in the first sentence, *agree*, and the Mental Process in the third sentence, *claim*, show the involvement of a perceptive activity. Thus, his personal experience of the conditions in the north which Christians and Muslims alike suffer, aids his conclusion that BH is not driven by poverty. This conclusion is as well an orientation to the inference that poverty is not a sufficient factor for the insurgency owing to the fact that it is experienced by both Muslims and Christians. In other words, poverty is not limited to any religion and should therefore not be used as an excuse for the actions of BH. The questions in the instantiation are pract targeted at nullifying the poverty and injustice claims advanced by the Muslim clerics.

iv. Fundamentalism-induced action (FiA), authority and indicting

Authority is used in the epistemic stance feature, fundamentalism-induced action (FiA) within the social and economic perspective to indict BH of killing in a more general sense. FiA manifest as actions based on strict adherence to original beliefs in the Islamic holy book(s), which the Christian clerics know through appellations of BH and the confessions by the members of the group. Authority is used to indict BH of general killing with respect to their confessions. This is clear from the excerpt below.

Excerpt 56

Hear him: "The fact that we are the warriors of the Almighty and even the security forces are finding it difficult to contain our activities. We want to stress that in our struggle, we only kill government functionaries, security agents, Christians and anyone who pretends to be a Muslim but who engages in assisting security agents to arrest us".

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, May 10, 2013)

As with authority, the statement of Abu Qaqa (BH's spokesman), on August 1, 2012, is cited here which indicts the group of general killing based on the confession of what they believe in (the ideology of the group). Obviously, the group believes that they are *warriors of the Almighty* and that they are engaged in a *struggle*. In this context, the stance noun, 'struggle' means "a hard fight in which people try to obtain or achieve something, especially something that somebody else does not want them to have" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary), which within the discourse implies the creation of an Islamic state (nation) that the federal government does not want them to have. This is confirmed in another reference to the group by one of the Christian clerics (Kukah) where he states that the group claims they are inspired by no other holy book but the Quran and that their motive is to build an Islamic state (Kukah: *Information Nigeria* November 30, 2015). The declaration of the group gives credence to his assertion that they are Muslims. Therefore, their belief in the Quran and the belief that they are in a struggle to build an Islamic state, thus motivate their killing of the named category of people, *government functionaries, security agents, Christians and anyone who pretends to be a Muslim but who engages in assisting security agents to arrest us*. The Christian cleric capitalises on this confession to indict the group of killing. The listing of the kind of people killed by BH according to Abu Qaqa (see Vanguard, May 10, 2013) as cited by the current speaker is an inference that the victims of the actions of the group are those who do not share in their ideology as well as those who try to stop their operations. As discussed in chapter four, the insurgency has both religious implication – by the attack on Christians and Muslims who militate against their actions; and political – by the attack on government workers and agencies. The religious dimension is highlighted in the excerpt by the quoted voice's reference to *the Almighty* which also makes the utterance relevant in the context of religion. The cited claim is in addition, an indirect speech act to mean 'The Almighty' sent us on this mission or 'We are fighting a holy war' which confirms the conception of BH as a jihad by the Christian clerics.

Another epistemic feature is exemplified below.

v. Common knowledge of evil (CKE), norm expression, metaphorisation and condemning

CKE captures the acts of social impropriety by BH and the call to resistance by the clerics. It is a social and economic perspective construct that is informed by the intersubjective knowledge of

the clerics. The Christian and the Muslim clerics deployed norm expression and metaphorisation in CKE to condemn Boko Haram.

Excerpt 57

I want to appeal to all of us to rise to the challenge of building one united country, a country of love, a country where indeed, we are all God's children. We must rise up to build a country where we see ourselves as human beings, citizens with inalienable rights and not allow ourselves to be held hostages by religious bigots. What is today Boko Haram is the toxic waste that years of dubious religious manipulation has produced.

(Kukah: *Sahara Reporters*, December 24, 2012)

Excerpt 58

The unfortunate menace of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is indeed an accident beyond religion which affects every Nigerian directly or indirectly and upon which no passing of bulk can be logical.

(Abubakar: *Sahara Reporters*, April 13, 2013)

Norm expression places a demand on what is the ideal thing to do in a situation. In the two texts here, the expected and acceptable behaviours are: a collective goal in nation building, *rise up to build a country*, and acceptance of responsibility, *no passing of bulk*, which is expected from all citizens of the country and which are all unifying factors. The obligatory modality, *must*, and the adjective, *unfortunate*, are markers of stance used in the two instances. The harmonising function of this strategy to all citizens is encapsulated in the matrix clause, *We must rise up to build a country*, where the self-inclusive pronoun covers the speaker and his ideological community as well as people of another ideological standing that make up the nation (Nigeria). The collective responsibility to curb the insurgency is in 58, referred to as "an accident" that is beyond religion and one which touches every Nigerian. The universal pronoun, *every*, also captures the entire citizenry without recourse to religious inclination. Thus, both sets of clerics call for unity through norm expression to appeal to all Nigerians to do what is right in the situation. The sense of evil which the stancetakers identify or know in the current situation are:

- not identifying human beings as citizens with inalienable rights
- religious bigotry
- dubious religious manipulation
- insurgency

These are co-constructed as evils responsible for the insurgency in the country. That is, what they know that bedevil the nation. The words, *bigotry*, *dubious*, *manipulation* and *insurgency* are contextual cues or linguistic signposts for evil.

Also, metaphorisation is used in the instantiations to condemn Boko Haram as a destructive force. In excerpt 57, the noun phrase, ... *toxic waste* ...and the stance noun *accident* in 58, used to describe Boko Haram's ideology and their activities, respectively, both convey the concept of danger to man (Nigerians). As a religious ideology, the speaker can be inferred to mean that the rising of the group should have been stopped when it started with its religious teachings. This construction coheres with a normative act that would have forestalled the present negative event. In other words, Boko Haram members are people who have perverted religious (Islamic) doctrines to support their fundamentalist tendencies. The reference to an 'accident' foregrounds the damaging effect of the insurgency. The two things that could be possibly destroyed as an inference from the utterance are the religion they claim (Islam) and the corporate existence as well as the peace of the nation. The call to the citizens for a united force against BH is a psychological act aimed at making them conceive a better country build on unity. This inference derives from shared situational knowledge that peaceful existence in a nation depends on the cooperation of its members. The lexico-grammatical choices in these examples also convey the idea of evil which the two sets of clerics reject by harmonising the citizens.

The second type of experience-based knowledge, action-informed knowledge is discussed with instances in the next section.

B. Action-informed knowledge

This refers to the knowledge of the clerics that are deduced from the physical activities of Boko Haram. Three types of actions are identified in this wise. The first is Boko Haram's actions against Christians and Christian institutions (BHACCI) established by the Christians in the religious perspective and used to indict BH of killing Christians via substantiation. The second is

counter-Islamic actions by Boko Haram C-IABH) formulated by the Muslim leaders and used in the religious perspective to condemn BH through norm expression; while the third is (general) actions of the members of Boko Haram (AMBH) exploited by both the Christian and the Muslim clerics to indict BH members as terrorists in the security perspective. Two pragmatic strategies, substantiation and norm expression typify these epistemic stance type. The stance types, the strategies and their functions are separately developed under different headings beginning with the first.

The Muslim in C-IABH employed norm expression to condemn BH in the religious perspective, while it is used by the two sets of clerics to indict BH of terrorism in the security perspective. The Material Process is the dominant linguistic element in this epistemic category occasionally supported by the modal of obligation. An example of substantiation is presented.

i. Boko Haram's actions against Christians and Christian institutions (BHACCI), substantiation and indicting

BHACCI accounts for the actions of Boko Haram suffered by Christians which the Christian clerics are aware of. It manifests as the killing of Christians and the destruction of their institutions and properties, and it is categorically described as a religious war against Christians by one of the Christian clerics.

Excerpt 59

Show us where in Nigeria you have seen Christians fighting and throwing bombs in the name of God. We challenge anyone to show us where Christians have abducted Muslim children in the name of Christianity. We challenge anyone to prove in Nigeria where Christians have taken arms in the name of protecting Christianity or even carry out acts of genocide on helpless and defenseless Nigerians. As far we are concern[ed], it is a war against Christians and Christianity.

(Oritsejafor: *Information Nigeria*, May 13, 2014)

In the current situation, the stancetaker lists the Material Processes (physical actions of BH in an inversion) whose purpose is 'religion', captured by the Circumstantial Adjunct of purpose, *in the name of religion*. The Material Processes are of action; *fighting, throwing bombs, abducting*, and

events *taking up of arms* and *carrying out acts of genocide*. The intended participants are (Boko Haram), having the Actor role while the Christians and their institutions are the Goal. By substantiation, the speaker indicts the group of killing Christians and blames the religion (Islam) for the actions of the group. To establish the war dimension to the insurgency, he foregrounds the group's actions in the socio-cultural context of war in the real social world by listing the actions of Boko Haram that fit a war situation to guide his position. The information is retrieved from the intrinsic evidence or mental model (van Dijk, 1997) of the stance subject. The Circumstantial Adjuncts, 'in the name of God, ... Christianity, ... protecting Christianity' become the Beneficiary of the Material process, *have taken*.

According to Fetzer (2014:335), "By making explicit the source of knowledge or by indexing it, communicators assign the source of knowledge the status of being relevant to a particular purpose at a particular stage in discourse; they may even make it an object of talk". Thus, the object of war in the cognition of the stance subject becomes relevant in the context. The stance object (that is, the actions of the group) is constructed in inversion but can be reconstructed in this context as:

- i. perpetrating violence (fighting and bombing) in the name of God
- ii. abducting Christian children in the name of Islam
- iii. taking up arms in the name of protecting Islam
- iv. carrying out acts of genocide.

These reconstructions, which are the real-life situations with the Boko Haram insurgency helps him to view these activities as 'a war against Christians and Christianity', thereby making his subjectivity count in the discourse. But the view is shared by his own ideological community because, as the president of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), he is the voice of all Christians in Nigeria, hence the self-inclusive pronoun, *we*, which suggests a perspective that is common to him and the people he represents. This use of the pronoun *we* is in contextual agreement with the repeated use of *us* in the directives "show us". The referential import of the impersonal pronoun is retrievable from the immediate co-texts when the activities are considered as encoding a single social action 'a war against Christians'. By using the directives – *show us*, *prove*, the speaker challenges his audience to justify his position and to commit himself to the stance he has taken ... *it is a war*.... The preponderance of verbal phrases in the utterance conveying social impropriety or negative social values that involve violence and killings reinforces the speaker's designation of the activities as those of war, which in this instance is a

religious war because it is done *in the name of God*. However, while the concept of war involves two parties engaged in the same or similar activities, the situation in this context indicates a mono-directional action as the other party is described with the adjectival phrase: ‘*helpless and defenseless Nigerians*’. The declarative speech acts in the first three sentences in the extract perform the practice of blaming, while obviously challenging the Islamic religion for the actions of the insurgents or terrorists. The speaker employs voice as an authority in the Christian community to perform the act of asserting with the last sentence, *As far we are concern[ed], it is a war against Christians and Christianity*. By making obvious reference to the actions of BH, the speaker licenses the strategy of substantiation to provide evidence for his position which indicts BH of killing Christians and destroying their property. Counter-Islamic actions by Boko Haram (C-IABH) is discussed next.

ii. Counter-Islamic actions by Boko Haram (C-IABH), norm expression and condemning

C-IABH refers to the misuse of Islamic rulers’ exclusive religious right which the clerics believe that the members of Boko Haram (BH) have exploited in perpetrating their acts. This feature relies on norm expression to condemn Boko Haram. What the members of BH should not do but which they have done is highlighted to condemn them (the insurgents). An instance is presented.

Excerpt 60

How can then today, people that are neither specialists in Islamic Law nor specialists in Medical sciences go public with such a fatwa in clear contradiction of the Quran. It means the Quran doesn’t pass through beyond their throat. Let us assume, they have the rights to *their jihad*, but that does not give them the license to kill innocent people that see otherwise? When do you kill people on suspicion?

(Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, February 10, 2013)

In the text above, certain lexico-grammatical elements point to the fact that the activities of Boko Haram are not in tandem with Islamic beliefs. This is found in the nominal clause: *people that are neither specialists in Islamic Law ..., contradiction of the Quran, the Quran doesn’t pass through beyond their throat*, and the noun phrase *their jihad*, [not the jihad of true Muslims] which respectively mean that the insurgents are not grounded in Islamic principles and are also carrying out acts that contravene the religion represented by the holy book, *Quran*. This implies that the

members of Boko Haram do not have a good understanding of the Quran which explains why they are killing “un-authoritatively”. In other words, they have not digested the tenets of the Quran, hence, their shallow knowledge of the faith which also makes them not to realise that they do not have the power to declare a *Fatwa* (an official order made by an important Islamic religious leader: Longmans’ Dictionary of Contemporary English), which is exclusive to acknowledged leaders. It is inferable that Muslim leaders do not recognise the leadership of BH as any Islamic position to reckon with and ones whose jihad does not give them the impetus to kill in the name of Islam. This is captured in the negated Material Process ... *does not give* and the Range of the process, ... *the license to kill innocent people that see otherwise*. The Range also implies that neither all Muslims nor people with other religious dispositions conceive the Nigerian situation for which the group is being violent in the same way. The use of norm expression through the understanding of *Fatwa* justifies this negated judgmental attitude of the speaker to condemn the insurgent group for the killing of innocent people through orientation to social sanction. The questioning act in the first sentence performs the pract of exonerating the Islamic religion. Similarly, sentence three which is an overt questioning speech act pragmatically functions as an indirect speech act to condemn the sect’s misrepresentation of the religion. The reference, *people that are neither specialists in Islamic Law*, intermingles with a psychological act to respectively achieve the pract of condemning as well as an intention to make others see BH differently rather than linking it with Islam. The condemnation is recoverable from shared situational knowledge that the declaration of *Fatwa* is the exclusive preserve of recognised Islamic leader.

The stance adjective, *clear*, is used to heighten the degree of contradiction the group has made of the Quran which is the constructed view of the speaker. The cognitive stance verb/Mental Process, *assume* is deployed to mitigate the stancetaker’s knowledge of the group’s right to declare a jihad (a holy war). Put differently, the speaker declines commitment to the group’s claim to a jihad. In other words, the validity of the claim to a jihad by the group is questioned. The stancetaker clearly distances ‘self’ by using a generic term, *people*, to refer to Boko Haram members. The social identity of the speaker (a Sheik) as a renowned Islamic scholar and leader substantiates his knowledge of Islamic laws, thus, warranting his labelling of the Actor(s) as *non-specialist in Islamic laws* and as a *people who do not have the right to declare a fatwa*. This

epistemic positioning points to the fact that Islam is misrepresented by Boko Haram members and hence, condemns the action(s) of BH.

iii. Actions by members of Boko Haram (AMBH), substantiation and indicting

By AMBH, reference is made to physical instances of acts of terrorism by the members of BH. It demonstrates Boko Haram's violent operations. In this stance feature, both sets of clerics use substantiation to indict BH members as terrorists in the security perspective. The following instantiations explain this.

Excerpt 61

I want to thank you for the opportunity today to address this committee and for your interest in the situation in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and especially the increase in terrorist attacks targeting Christians and Christian Institutions. Just this last weekend, 58 people were killed in Christian villages in Jos, including a federal senator and a state lawmaker.

(Orisejafor: *Vanguard*, December 28, 2014)

Excerpt 62

With all the atrocities being committed in this nation by the use of both illegal arms in the hands of terrorists or insurgents or the illegal use of legal arms through extra-judicial killings,

(Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, May 8, 2014)

In the examples above, the basis upon which the clerics indict BH of terrorism is conveyed by the physical acts that are characteristic of terrorists. In particular, it focuses on those of BH. This serves as the source of the clerics' knowledge about the members of the group within this context. Typically, this epistemic stance feature that is derived from actions is characterised by Material Processes: *attacks* and *killed* (in excerpt 61). These negative actions warrant the use of the stance adjective, *atrocities*, the outright use of the words *terrorists* or *insurgents* to describe the group as well as the phrase, *use of illegal arms* (on the part of BH in excerpt 62). All these lexical and grammatical choices are indicators of terrorism as they are aimed at invoking fear in people, which is one of the features of terrorism, a state of insecurity. These activities, as explicated, are instances of the strategy of substantiation that create the context of insecurity in addition to expounding the actions of the group which serve as evidence or proof for their knowledge or

opinions. The cotexts: *terrorist attacks*, *58 people were killed*, *atrocities*, *terrorists orinsurgents* and *extra-judicial killing*; are all references which are contextual cues to a state of insecurity. They also foreground the violence and sense of evil pervading the north axis of the country with a pragmatic intention to indict the perpetrators of the violence. With those lexico-grammatical choices in the context, the speakers appeal to shared knowledge that culprits of such acts are liable to punitive measures, thereby performing an indirect speech act of blaming the government for lack of action against the culprits.

As demonstrated in the examples, both parties consider BH as a terrorist group and support their indictment of the group as such. Terrorism is usually an armed struggle. This is vividly captured in example 62. It also usually involves the killing of a large number of people, in the current example, 61 people. Terrorism is also characterised by the targeting of key players in society, which in excerpt 61 is 'a senator'. The killing of prominent members of the society, who are supposedly protected, thus reveals the vulnerability of the masses in the hands of terrorists, thereby inducing fear of insecurity in them, a situation that strengthens their (terrorist) actions.

The section that follows focuses on evidential stance in the data and discusses the categories of the pragmatic strategies employed by the clerics and their implications in the different evidential manifestations in the data.

5.1.2 Evidential stance, crystallisation of object strategies and authenticating practs

Evidential stance in this research accounts for the types of proofs presented by the clerics to support the positions they take towards the stance objects. The data presents four types of evidential stance namely: verbal, spatio-temporal, documental and experiential evidence. Evidential stance is presented in three perspectives – religious, political and security. Four pragmatic strategies, authority, exemplification, substantiation and vagueness, manifest in this stance feature in the data. As explained in section 5.1.1, speakers use authority by mentioning or quoting important personalities or institutions in society to buttress their points. Exemplification is a strategy by which a form of vignette (short story) is used to support a viewpoint. Substantiation gives reliability to an argument by the presentation of evidence for the opinion. Substantiation is achieved by the inclusion of the source(s) of information which may be through reading, hearing from a trustworthy informant or by seeing it. Vagueness involves the use of an indefinite term as a reference to a stance object.

Crystallisation of object refers to a universal category that captures all the strategies used in evidential stance features in this research. Authenticating praxis is a name for the entire pragmatic functions within the stance type. The dominant linguistic tools are Material and Mental Processes. The stance features, the pragmatic tools licensed and their pragmatic functions are discussed in turn.

5.1.2.1 Verbal evidence

Verbal evidence foregrounds what is being said by the stance objects which the stancetakers (speakers) bring to bear in their constructed viewpoints. Four evidential features discovered are: claims by members of Boko Haram (CMBH), public statement by Boko Haram members and their supporters (PSBHS), victim's report (VR), and security or other report (SOR). Authority, exemplification and norm expression are used in this sub-category of evidential stance. The pragmatic functions here are reinforcing, blaming and indicting. The Verbal, Material and Mental Process are the principal linguistic elements in this feature. The features and the strategies are discussed together in turn.

i. Claims by members of Boko Haram (CMBH), authority and reinforcing

Within religious perspective, CMBH is framed by the Christian clerics to reinforce their claim that Boko Haram insurgency is an *Islamisation* crusade through authority. It accounts for public statements made by Boko Haram with regard to religion, which form cogent evidence that the Christian clerics use to establish and/or support the positions they take. Such declarations may be quoted verbatim or reported and are usually received from referenced or unreferenced sources. This can be seen from the following instances:

Excerpt 63

Mallam Qaqa went further to state, "our crusade is meant to ensure the establishment of an Islamic state by liberating all Muslims from the excesses of the infidels. We strongly believe that Almighty Allah will reward us with his famous paradise in the hereafter as He rightly said in Cha[r]pter 9 verse 111 of the Holy Qu'ran".

(Oritsejafar: *Vanguard*, Friday, May 10, 2013)

Excerpt 64

Boko Haram already claimed responsibility for these coordinated attacks against the Christian community in Jos, and they also reaffirmed their earlier

position saying that “for Christians in Nigeria to know peace they must accept Islam as the only true religion”.

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, December 28, 2014)

In the extracts above, the speaker’s evidences are derived from what the key person in the group, Boko Haram’s representative or official voice, Abu Qaqa, stated publicly about the establishment of an Islamic nation captured in a report in August 2012, as well as the public declarations the group made on certain coordinated attacks. These are captured in reporting verbs (phrases) governed by lexical items that point to Boko Haram, as can be seen in the following instances: ... *state*, ...*claimed* and ... *reaffirmed*. These Verbal Processes vividly indicate that the speakers are orienting to this position based on what the group or their key figure had said which are captured in the Verbiages: ‘*our crusade is meant to ensure ...*’ and ‘*... to know peace they must accept Islam ...*’. The reference to these verbalisations by the members of Boko Haram is to pragmatically reinforce the view of the clerics in the insurgency. Hence, the name of the spokesman and the name of the group mentioned both serve as authority to support the position taken. To further strengthen his stance (63), the speaker inscribes the Sayer; *Mallam Qaqa*, and the ideological position of the group embedded in the Verbiage, *that Almighty Allah will reward us ... as He rightly said....* This is to map a link between the group and their motivating belief. The reference to the spokesman and the belief of the group as stated by him (Qaqa), in addition to the stated aim of the group strengthens the stancetaker’s certainty and provides substantial evidence for the position that Boko Haram’s activities are inspired by religion, and that is to ‘Islamise’ Nigeria. The noun phrase, *coordinated attacks*, shows the speaker’s attitude towards the act of Boko Haram (what they do) that is premised on what the group wants (to Islamise). Contextualising this act within religion, the stancetaker references the sufferer of the action as *Christian communities in Jos*. In the real social world, Jos is a town in the Middle Belt of Nigeria where indigenous Christians match greatly with the Muslim population. By qualifying the Range of the Material Process, as *the Christian community in Jos*, the stance subject further commits himself to his claim that the group wants to *Islamise* Christians, hence the ‘coordinated attacks’ on them (to the exclusion of the Muslim communities). The use of the pronoun *they*, in the reported part of excerpt 64 coheres contextually with the Receiver, *Christians in Nigeria*, which realises the Verbal Process, *reaffirmed* and the Verbiage, *for Christians in Nigeria to know peace they must accept Islam as the only true religion*. The lexical items that contextualise the instantiations within the

religious perspective include *infidels*, *Almighty Allah*, *paradise*, *only true religion*, as well as the quotation from the chapter of the *Qu'ran*. The use of the obligatory modality *must* and the intensified noun phrase 'only true religion', points to the fact that Boko Haram considers Islam as a superior religion that has to be accepted by all Christians in Nigeria. This analytical realisation lends credence to the Islamisation view of the Christian leaders. Also, by resonating the claims by members of Boko Haram in this context, the authorial voice is making an inference that the group is guilty as charged (*Islamisers*).

ii. Victims' reports (VR), authority reinforcing

Victims' reports (VR) is used to capture the statements of individuals or organisations that may have been victimised by Boko Haram. Within religious perspective, it covers what victims report about the group that have religious consequences. VR here is achieved by the Christian clerics via authority and exemplification, and it is used to reinforce the existing viewpoint that BH is an *Islamisation* crusade. In this instance, the victims or authoritative voices are quoted as sources of evidence for the stances taken by the clerics. The examples provided offer support to this explanation.

Excerpt 65

I have several times been vindicated that Boko Haram is not inspired by pecuniary motives, the latest of which is the statement by Robert Fowler, the released former United Nation's envoy to Niger Republic, who said in a BBC programme, 'Hard Talk,' aired on Tuesday, June 4, 2013, that his captors never talked of poverty but *Islamisation* of Africa.

(Oritsejafor: *Information Nigeria*, June 5, 2013)

Excerpt 66

As we are talking now, it has been reported by the Catholic Diocese of Maiduguri that about 185 churches have been burnt by Boko Haram. So, how else can we remove a religious dimension to this?

(Kukah: *The Punch*, October 12, 2014)

The two text sources (65 and 66) vividly make reference to victims that provide evidence for the stance taken by the Christian clerics, that Boko Haram is a religious plan to *Islamise* the country.

The first stance subject attributes his evidential position to what a person with an institutional authority reports about what the group (captors) had said to him. Pragmatically, this is a reference and an instantiation of authority which is deployed to realise the function of reinforcing a previously oriented stance. The fact that these positions were preconceived is indicated by the subordinate clause: *I have several times been vindicated ...*, and substantiates the stand that there is a religious dimension to Boko Haram. In text 65, the stancetaker makes his evidence very plausible to express the certainty of the stance he has adopted and to commit himself to it by the naming and the functionalisation (van Leeuwen, 1996) of his source of information. Simultaneously, he orients to another institutionalised authority (media), BBC to further authenticate the credibility of his evidence. With the precise information about the media, that is, the programme, day and date, the stancetaker presents its information as highly reliable as a way of negotiating a viable space to position his argument that Boko Haram is not motivated by ‘pecuniary motives’ but to Islamise. The noun, *captors*, is anaphorically realised as Boko Haram in the current discourse context where the speaker’s stance on the group is justified by what their victim, Robert Fowler reported, that ‘[Boko Haram] *never talked of poverty but Islamisation of Africa*’. Like the speaker in 65, the speaker in 66 reinforces his evidential stance with the report from a religious institution, the *Catholic Diocese of Maiduguri*, who are personalised as victims because of their religious affiliation with other burnt churches that may not be Catholic denominations. The reporting verb/Verbal Process *said* and the reporting verb phrase *has been reported* point to sources of information while the verb phrases *never talked* and *have been burnt* refer to the actions of the group. *Robert Fowler* and *185 churches* are the affected (objects) acted upon by the insurgents. In the two instances above, the stancetakers base their formulations about the desire of Boko Haram on what people with institutional power reported about them.

The instantiations in CMBH and VR indicate that these evidential stance realisations are premised on Verbal Processes, where BH is identified as realiser of the processes, that is, the Sayer and Christians and are the Receivers (victims). The reference to the burning of the 185 churches is a signpost to the fact that Christians are not secure in the area.

iii. a. Political statements by Boko Haram or their supporters (PSBHS), authority and indicting

This refers to what the members of Boko Haram or their apologists say publicly that have implication for politics. In PSBHS within political perspective, authority was used by the Christian clerics to indict BH of insurgency. Within this purview, authority and exemplification are used to respectively indict Boko Haram of insurgency and to blame northern elites (here represented by one) for the insurgent actions of the group. The two strategies – authority and exemplification are presently instantiated together.

Excerpt 67

Since its creation, the Boko Haram network has never hidden its agenda or intentions. Boko Haram has openly stated that they reject the Nigerian State and its Constitution and seek to impose Shari'ah Law. To this end, Boko Haram has waged a systematic campaign of terror and violence. They seek an end to western influence and a removal of the Christian presence in Nigeria. This is outright terrorism, not legitimate political activity or the airing of grievances.

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, December 28, 2014)

Excerpt 68

I was reading about a prominent man I've always respected in Kaduna, an elderly man saying that insurgency is a creation of government or somebody just to win election. I just sat down and was shocked that an educated man, elderly man could be talking like this with what we are seeing with our eyes. It's unbelievable. Is it that all these people don't know the truth? They do know the truth, but we just pretend or wickedly don't want to touch the truth. If you try it, then they shout. That's what some of us are suffering. If I'm nice and accept everything, I will be getting awards left and right and getting tons of money, they will recommend me to become this and that, hailing me all over the world, while my people are dying.

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, November 16, 2014)

In the extracts above, the speakers' sources of evidence are derived from the open declaration of BH and the published statement of 'a prominent man' who the speaker had hitherto respected. The declaration that they reject the Nigerian state (where 'state' refers to the country) is a political statement which, coupled with the terrorists' acts, indicts Boko Haram of insurgency. Linguistically, this position relies on Verbal and Mental Processes. The *verbstated*, realises the Verbiage, *that they reject the Nigerian State and its Constitution and seek to impose Shari'ah*

Law, to spotlight the proposition that is a declaration against the government. The cognitive verb, ‘seek’ in the Verbiage reveals the fact that the action against the state was first conceived and then acted out.

On the other hand, the Verbiage which is a reported statement of the prominent and respected man, *that insurgency is a creation of government or somebody just to win election*, attracts blame to the Kaduna (northern) elder, which by extension, supports the earlier blame of the insurgency on the northern elite. The positions of the stance subject in the two examples are premised on the Verbal Process: ... *openly stated* and the Material Process *I was reading*.... The cognition verb, *seek*, licenses the expression contained in the verbalisation. The two extracts deploy the strategy of authority by respectively giving the Sayer and the Actor roles to BH and the deleted subject, described as a ‘prominent man’. The recall of what an influential personality had said is an indirect speech act to blame the elites in the north. This is established by common knowledge that the elite has an influence on the less educated and on their society in general. The adjective, *prominent*, indicates that the person is one to reckon with but who has spoken to the disappointment of the stance subject in the current context. The fact that the insurgency is political is captured in the complement clauses or the Verbiages mentioned earlier (sentence 2 of example 67, and sentence 1 of example 68) respectively made by Boko Haram members and the prominent man. The rejection of the Nigerian state means the rejection of democratic governance which the country operates in favour of theocracy; and the rejection of its constitution with a religious constitution (Sharia Law). The Token-value, *outright terrorism*, given to the indexical ‘This’ which anaphorically refers to the activities of BH, confirms the political perspective definition of terrorism by Hoffman (2006), as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.” In the present discourse context, the violence of BH is created with a view to replacing the democratic system with a Sharia system of governance.

iii. b. Political statements by Boko Haram or their supporters (PSBHS), vagueness and anonymising

Vagueness as a strategy is used in PSBHS in the security perspective by a Muslim cleric to anonymise the members of Boko Haram. It is a tacit way of exonerating Boko Haram from the violence. This is illustrated now.

Excerpt 69

You have taken note of what I said about violence in the North-east. I did not mention Boko Haram because most of the violence is not caused by Boko Haram. So we have to ask ourselves why there is violence in the Northeast? Those who cause the violence, who are they? The government must fish them out and say look we know you are the cause of this thing from day one.

(Abubakar: *Information Nigeria*, August 31, 2011)

In this instantiation, the authorial voice, the head of Islamic Affairs in Nigeria, makes reference to his earlier statement, that is, self-report, that the people behind the violence in Nigeria are not the members of BH as claimed in some quarters, especially by the Christian leadership. The Verbal Processes, '*said* and *mention*' are indicators of the self-report to make the statement of the speaker count. However, he opts for the strategy of vagueness on the identity of the perpetrators of the violence in the Northeast. This is captured in the subordinate clause, *Those who cause the violence*, and the indefinite anaphoric pronouns, *them* and *you* in sentence five. The pragmatic implication of this strategy in this context is to anonymise the agents of the acts of violence which, from this investigation of this research, points to Boko Haram. The pragmatic underpinning of the self-report 'You have taken note of what I said ... I did not mention Boko Haram ...' is to implicitly exonerate Boko Haram from the violence and to attribute it to others, which is not made clear from the linguistic choices of the speaker. Thus, he anonymises BH as the cause of the violence in the north of the country while expressing dissatisfaction with the labelling of Boko Haram as the perpetrators of violence in the north-east. In the excerpt, the speaker exploits voice as the representative of an ideological community to make a declarative speech act intended to shift the blame from BH to the government. The expression, *So we have to ask ourselves why there is violence in the Northeast?* infers that the violence in the north is caused by a situation known to all. Hence, the use of the collective pronoun, *we* and *ourselves*. Thus, he coopts everyone into the movement for peace and security in the country.

iv. Security or other reports (SOR), substantiation and blaming

In the security perspective, security or other reports (SOR) is a subcategory of evidential stance. SOR captures sources of information on the terrorist activities of Boko Haram by security agents that prove it as a terrorist group or organisation. It also connects BH insurgency with some media

reports on security threat. Substantiation is utilised as a strategy by both parties (Christian and Muslim clerics) to blame the government of a deliberate act in the BH insurgency. It is used by the Christians to indict northern Muslims and international allies as members of Boko Haram. Verbal and Material Processes characterise this subcategory. Some examples are provided presently. These are separately discussed.

Excerpt 70

As I am just coming now after a long silence of these unnecessary explosions and bombings, we heard an explosion very close to our house. And in the morning today from a senior military security that they have a list of people that were targeted for a terrorist attack and that I am among them. Now the question is the high cadre of our military intelligence know that we are target, and yet this morning I was told and there was a bomb explosion we never heard near our house just by the corner of the main road. So what I am saying is to emphasise that we have serious insecurity problem.

(Gumi: *Sahara Reporters*, August 15, 2012)

Excerpt 71

In January 2012, the United Nations Security Council published a report stating that Boko Haram members from Nigeria received training in AQIM camps located in Mali and Chad during the summer of 2011. That same summer Boko Haram carried out a bold terrorist attack against the United Nations building in Abuja. Boko Haram did not hesitate in claiming responsibility for the attack, nor has it ever hesitated in claiming responsibility for its ongoing attacks against police, military, local businesses, and increasingly churches and Christian institutions.

(Oritsejfor: *Vanguard*, December 28, 2014)

In instances 70 and 71, substantiation, which may happen by references to authority figures or institutions to make an argument or a position more plausible as a form of evidentiality (see section 2.4), is used as the strategy in the evidential stance feature of SOR to indict BH as a terrorist group.

Since SOR entails reported source information as evidence, the Verbal Process is key in this stance feature. Thus, the speaker in example 70 cites ‘a senior military security’ who told or informed him that he is ‘a target for a terrorist attack’. The Verbal Process ‘told/informed’ is only an understood one which can only be recovered if the sentence is restructured perhaps, as: ‘And in

the morning today, I was told/informed by a senior military security that they have a list of people'. This information tallies with the terrorist actions of BH and provides evidence for indicting BH as terrorists.

The expressions, *explosions* and *bombings*, *terrorist attack*, *target*, *bomb explosion*, *insecurity* in text 70; and *AQIM* (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, an internationally acclaimed terrorist group), *terrorist attack*, are linguistic elements that construct the terrorist context through reference and shared situational knowledge between the speaker and the potential audience to support the indictment of BH as terrorists. Also, the fact that the speaker is a high ranking and renowned Islamic scholar, a Sheik, (as in the case of the killed senator in excerpt 61), is enough to elicit fear in other members of the society. As earlier explained, this fits into the features of terrorism. By exemplifying, a strong support for indicting BH members as terrorists is established. Similarly, in excerpt 71, a security source (an international one) is cited to provide evidence and to make more plausible, the indictment of BH members as terrorists. The word, *stating*, is a Verbal Process used to give evidence in text 71. In this regard, Boko Haram's association with a globally acclaimed terrorist organisation is highlighted. That BH has the Beneficiary function of recipient of the Material Process, *training*, by AQIM, which is an abbreviation for Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, an Islamist militant or terrorist group, located in *Mali* and *Chad* - which are also countries fighting for Islamic states - emphasises BH's demand for an Islamic state (see section 4.1.2.1). This demand, therefore, occasions the use of violence, which fits into one of the definitions of terrorism (see section 1.0), against the public places listed in excerpt 71 namely: *United Nations building in Abuja, police, military, local businesses, churches and Christian institutions*. Some of the elements of terrorism identified in excerpts 65, 66 and 70 are also found in the current excerpt. All these support the clerics' view of BH members as terrorists who pose a security threat to Nigeria. In Excerpt 70, the speaker infers that the security agents are fostering the insurgency by concealing information about BH. This is implicitly conveyed by the sentence three, *Now the question is the high cadre of our military intelligence know that we are target ...*. The indirect speech act blames the security, and by extension, the government for not taking action against the insurgents as there was an explosion in the neighbourhood of the speaker who is also a target. His conclusion, *So what I am saying is to emphasise that we have serious insecurity problema* declarative speech act functioning as an indirect speech act to blame the government for not been able to protect its citizens. This

conclusion on insecurity orients to the contextual element of voice as the speaker is a retired military officer, thereby making his conclusion relevant in the context of security. Substantiation is also used in the same security perspective to indict northern Muslims and their international allies as members of BH. This is clarified with the next instantiation.

Excerpt 72

You can see that it is basically a religious thing. Look at the recent statement by the leader of the sect, Alhaji Abubakar Shekau, where he called on like-minded Islamists in other countries, including Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, to join the sect to create an Islamic state in Nigeria. Any Muslim, who gives out information about them becomes an enemy, and they see that person as an infidel and they will go after that person as well. This is why Muslims are targeted, and that is the truth.

(Oritsejafor: *Information Nigeria*, June 12, 2013)

The view of the Christian clerics on the membership of Boko Haram is that it is comprised of northern Muslims but with support from other nations. This position derives from reports at the disposal of the leadership of the Christian Association of Nigeria. In the excerpt above, the authorial voice, which is that of the president of the association, indicts northern Muslims and their international supporters as the members of the terrorist group. By deleting the agent of the report in the matrix clause, *Look at the recent statement by the leader of the sect, Alhaji Abubakar Shekau ...*, he de-emphasises the source of the information to present the information as more important. The action of the leader 'called on ...' is indicative of a Verbal Process, with *Alhaji Abubakar Shekau* as the Sayer, the nations invited - ... *Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq* are the Targets and the embedded clause or the Verbiage, *to join the sect to create an Islamic state in Nigeria* states the intention of BH. In this wise, he employs substantiation to tell his hearer about those who make up the membership of the BH group, using the report on the leader of the group as evidence. The first sentence implies the certainty of the speaker and expresses the affect of dissatisfaction, a feeling of being fed up with any contrary view that removes the religious dimension to the insurgency. Tellingly, he points to the leader of the group, *Alhaji Abubakar Shekau*, (a Nigerian, and apparently a northerner and one used to represent northern Muslims in this context), and reference to the countries whose assistance is solicited, namely, *Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq* (Islamic nations) as the members and to implicate that BH members are terrorists. Through the strategy of substantiation in this wise, he brings to the fore the composition

of the group and simultaneously indicts them of terrorism (aimed at ‘Islamising’ Nigeria). In the same regard, he highlights the targeted-enemies of the group as Christians and any Muslim unsympathetic to their course.

Another evidential stance feature in this perspective, . place and time of action is considered next.

5.1.2.2 Spatio-temporal evidence

Only one type, place and time of action (PTA) is found in this evidential stance feature and it is found in the religious perspective. PTA is employed by the Christian clerics.

Place and time of action (PTA), substantiation and reinforcing

PTA foregrounds spatio-temporal activities of Boko Haram. In particular, this addresses BH’s violent acts on Christians and their churches which crystalise the Christian clerics’ conception of BH as an *Islamisation* crusade through substantiation strategy. Here, the locations and the times of the actions are considered important factors in labelling the act. TPA deploys the Material Process to showcase the activities. An instantiation is provided below to buttress this point.

Excerpt 73

This is why we insist that the primary targets of Boko Haram are Christians and their Churches. If this is not so, why is it that the attacks are *mostly on Sundays when innocent Christians are in their Churches* worshipping. Only *this Sunday*, gunmen as they are also called, attacked members of the *Ekklisiyar Yan’uwa A Najeria (EYN) Church in Jilang village* of Maiha Local Council in Adamawa State, killing 10 persons and injuring 12 others. The gunmen stormed *the church at about 11.00 am while the Sunday Service was on going*. According to one of the Newspaper reports, upon gaining entry, they started shooting at worshippers in the Church, who were listening to the preacher.

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, May 10,2013)

In the excerpt, the portions in italics instantiate the time and place features of PTA. These are references which give support to the opinion of the speaker that the insurgency is a war against Christianity (one of the manifestations of the *Islamisation* crusade), that is, Christians and their

churches in the northern region of the country. The PTA elements in the text are contextually accurate in the physical world and give veracity to the stance of the speaker who is committed to the position by challenging any contrary position by asking the question, *why* The PTA items in the context can be interpreted as follows:

- i. Sunday is the day set aside by Christians to congregate to worship their God,
- ii. the time for worship spans the whole day (from mostly early morning to evening hours), taking the different denominations and their selected hours, hence the quoted time, *about 11.00 am*
- iii. Ekkliyyar Yan'uwa A Najeriya (EYN) in Hausa which can be translated in English language as 'Fellowship of Brethren in Nigeria' is one of the Christian assemblies in Jilang village; where the word 'brethren' refers to "fellow Christians" or "people in church" (COED, OALD).

All these elements of PTA are pragmatically brought into the discourse via the strategy of substantiation to reinforce the position that BH is a war/violence against Christians with the ultimate aim to *Islamise*. The fact that the victims are Christians is further substantiated by the reference of the stancetaker, who is the head of all Christians in Nigeria - the president of all Christians in Nigeria, "...*Reports we in CAN...*)relevant to the position he has taken. Voice is also deployed as the claim is from an institutional authority. The Carrier of the possessive element, *their*, in the Attribute, *their churches*, resonated in the text, and *their homes* attest to the claim that both Christians and their institutions are the Goals of the Material Process, *attacks* conceived in the 'rhetorised' clause, '... why is it that the attacks are mostly on Sundays. The time factor is also presented with the Circumstantial element *when* which introduces the noun clause that describes the people who suffer the attacks as *innocent Christians [who] are in their Churches worshipping*.

The stance verb, *insist* both syntactically and semantically coheres with the complement (that-clause) to pragmatically support the speaker's proposition that Christians and their institutions are the targets of the insurgent group. As is characteristic of evidentiality, the speaker provides facts

by naming the real places of reference indexed by nouns and noun phrases: *Borno, Yobe, Kano; Ekkliyyar Yan'uwa A Najeria (EVN) Church*. Substantiation is also employed with the provision of figures of those killed and injured, 10 and 12, respectively. Through the use of the Material Processes, he foregrounds the actions of the group and the times and places of their activities. The third subcategory of evidential stance in the data is presented next.

5.1.2.3 Documental evidence

This has to do with what the clerics claim as recorded evidence of instances that are connected with the Boko Haram insurgency. Principally, this is drawn from authoritative religious literature and it is found in religious-text based evidence (RtBE), a subcategory of the religious perspective. It categorically captures evidence produced from Islamic texts, such as the Quran and the Hadith as a means of expressing social sanction, to oppose the activities of the insurgents and to make it clear that the group is against Islam. The pragmatic strategy of authority is used in this regard by the Muslim clerics to respectively warn the Islamic community and to condemn BH's forceful conversion. Verbal Process typifies this subcategory as can be seen from the examples provided below.

a. Religious-text based evidence (RtBE), authority and warning

Excerpt 74

In a Hadith, the Prophet said there will come a time – in the end of time- when some youth who are apt to reciting the Quran – but will not pass their throat- will be killing Muslims. Today, you just need to disagree with them, then you become their hit target. Subhanallah! The Ummah has to wake up from its slumber and fish out these evil people. The prophet – peace be upon him said: “if people will see a transgressor and don't clamp on his two hands, Allah will soon engulf them all with his chastisement” Abu dawud. Only the people can cure this evil.

(Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, January 13, 2013)

In the example, which is an instantiation of authority, the fact that BH is a misrepresentation of Islam is presented as a textual derivation or intertextually from the Hadith by the prophet who had forewarned Muslims of this time as captured in the Circumstantial element, *a time will come ...*. The *Hadith* and *the Prophet* are references brought into the context through authority, to, in a

broader perspective, warn the Muslim community. Based on this high-level information, the stance subject warns the *Ummah* (the Muslim community or people) of the potential outcome of Boko Haram, who in the present situation fit into the ‘*some youth who are apt to reciting the Quran – but will not pass their throat- will be killing Muslims*’ to beware of them. The warning also comes with a call to the *Ummah* to ‘wake up from their slumber, in order words, to rise to the task of confronting the insurgents, realising that these are the youths prophesied about so as to ‘fish them out’. To say it differently, the stancetaker warns them of the danger BH poses to the *Ummah* as indicated in the Hadith which they have to be proactive about. The Quran not passing through their throat is a metaphor that implicates that they have no good understanding of the holy book but will protect their misconceptions with violence, *Today, you just need to disagree with them, then you become their hit target*. Relying on the Prophet’s warning as his knowledge base, the speaker resonates this as a warning to the people against the insurgents to give weight to his precautionary position, and also to remind the people (Muslims) that “*if people will see a transgressor and don’t clamp on his two hands, Allah will soon engulf them all with his chastisement*”. The perlocutionary effect expected here is that the ‘Ummah’ will begin to resist the insurgents by openly condemning their interpretation of the Quran and their actions without fear of being killed. The stance of the speaker that ‘Only the people can cure this evil’ is dependent on the evidence from the Hadith. Overall, the evidential stance of the speaker here is one that warns the Islamic community to realise that the manifestation of BH is the fulfilment of the prophecy which they have to beware of. Going by this, it is inferable that the insurgents are still Muslims as conceived in some other quarters, but ones who are not grounded in Islam (see epistemic misrepresentation in section 4.2.2). The circumstantial element of place: *In a Hadith* gives evidential support to the speaker’s position.

b. Religious-text based evidence (RtBE), authority and condemning

Excerpt 75

I cannot force you to accept my religion, the Almighty said so in the Quran. You go your way I go my way and these two ways lead to the Almighty. It is for the Almighty to determine which of these two ways is better to get through to Him and that is not for you and me; so there should be no problem of converting people by force. We preach peace always.

(Abubakar: *Vanguard*, June 12, 2011)

The Quran is also presented as the source of evidence to substantiate the rejection of forceful conversion in Islam in the first sentence which embeds the practice of condemning through an indirect speech act. The Verbal Process *said*, reports the source or the Sayer that informs the stancetaker's negotiation of the position he adopts in condemning the actions of Boko Haram. The stancetaker and the insurgents (who convert people by force) become the Beneficiary of the Process. Again, the condemnation is captured in the third sentence which presents *the Almighty* as the only one that has the power to determine the better way to get to him and therefore does not warrant forceful conversion by humans. The stance subject, while using substantiation to condemn the action of the group, which is converting people by the use of force, implicitly warns them (the group) against acts contrary to the religion by concluding with the last sentence, 'We preach peace always' which is simultaneously a declarative speech act and the strategy of religious self-glorification to vindicate the religion. The reference to *the Quran* points to the source of the evidential stance of the speaker. Another type of evidential stance feature is next.

5.1.2.4 Experiential evidence

One manifestation of evidential stance labelled self or 'other' experience (SOE) is observed in the data to explain experiential evidence. Substantiation characterises this feature and it is conveyed to blame the government for the insurgency.

Self or 'other' experience (SOE), substantiation and blaming

SOE points to evidence which the speakers personally experienced or were experienced by others that strengthen the view that BH is a deliberate act of the Nigerian government. The extracts that follow explain this.

Excerpt 76

Powers were given to them and also huge sums of money. With these huge sums, nobody would have thought that after this long period of fighting Boko Haram we will still be fighting them. Soldiers at the fronts were being eliminated, outnumbered, and many civilians incarcerated. The Army were just there arresting civilians and putting them in prison. There is no military strategy to fight Boko Haram. On the contrary, some of these soldiers cry to me personally. They come to us and tell us stories contrary to what you people hear. Helicopter droppings, tinted glassed vehicles, sometimes with foreigners

in them. Army officers telling me that sometimes they'll pursue them but would be given orders to stop, "don't pursue:

(Gumi: *Vanguard*, November 1, 2014)

Excerpt 77

The Christian Community is fast losing confidence in government's ability to protect our rights to religious liberties and life. The consensus is that the Christian community nationwide would be left with no other option than to respond appropriately if there are any further attacks on our members, churches and properties.

(Oritsejfor: *Vanguard*, November 20, 2011)

The pragmatic strategy of substantiation is realised in the excerpts above to blame the government of the country for the deliberate act and for complacency. The experience of the soldiers reported to the cleric serves as the evidence to say that the government has not made any tangible attempt at arresting the insurgency, hence, it is a deliberate act. This position is reinforced by categorical assertions through the be-verb, *were*, in sentences 1, 3, 4 and *is*, in sentence 5, which shows the speaker's certainty as well as a commitment to his claim. These Existential Processes signalled by the be-verb, *were*, in the first three sentences (excerpt 76) communicate the prevailing situations within the Nigerian army, thereby exposing their inefficiency and leading to the stancetaker's criticism of the government as having no military strategy to combat Boko Haram in the fifth sentence. The first sentence shows that despite the fact that the government gives huge money and power to the military which does not translate into the obvious handling of the situation by the military, which the government is not bothered about. In other words, the government is not worried that the military is not having the desired positive result. Rather, the government is further blamed for this as an intentional act because the military officers who are to order for the shooting of the insurgents are the same people that deter them from shooting at the insurgents. The substantiation with, *Helicopter droppings*, that sometimes have foreigners in them, indicates operations beyond BH insurgents to imply that a higher force is involved in the insurgency. The complacency of the government is implicitly highlighted in the context by the reference to the defeat or losses suffered by the military and the negative consequence on the civilians all on the watch of the 'commanders' who take instructions from the government and pass them to the 'foot soldiers'. The satisfied state of the government with the unproductive

soldiers agrees with an earlier example by the same speaker where he said, “A whole region is made to suffer economically, socially and politically because of this blind war on terror. The present dispensation has everything to gain in refusing the ‘amnesty’ call for political reasons, that is why it is recalcitrant. Otherwise, if the need to crush BH is genuine, it would have been achieved since” (Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, March 27, 2013). This also possibly explains why the Christian cleric’s stance, captured in the Mental Process, *fast losing confidence*, is indicative of a reconsideration of the earlier mental state of Christians regarding the action of the government which was considered as being sensitive to the plight of the Christians to foreground their later realisation (complacency of the government) for which a reprisal attack is threatened.

Within this purview, the experience of the Christians in the north is what is realised through substantiation as evidenced by the CAN president to blame the government of complacency. Going by the discourse content, the inability of the government to bring anyone to book and to punish the offenders is the reason for the lack of confidence in the government. This is strongly substantiated by Gumi’s blame on government’s secret handling of Boko Haram matters by obscuring the persons involved (culprits and sponsors) even after arresting people considered as BH members (Gumi, *Vanguard*: November 10, 2014).

It is interesting to note that the last sentence in Excerpt 76 coheres with the first sentence of the succeeding example to highlight the deliberate role of the government in the insurgency for which it has lost the confidence of its people. The metaphor “some of these soldiers cry to me personally” signifies the hopelessness of even the security agents who take orders from the government. This is succinctly established in the first three sentences of Excerpt 76. The inference generated here is that government is pretentious about its fight against Boko Haram to warrant the blame. This corroborates Gumi’s position that if government’s intention in the insurgency was genuine, they would have defeated them (see Excerpt 24). To differently say the positions of the two clerics, the government is complacent about the killing of Christians and soldiers and it is deliberate in concealing the identities of the offenders. Affective stance features, strategies and functions are considered next.

5.1.3. Affective stance, relationalisation strategies and sentimentalising practs

Affective stance derives from ‘affect’ and it involves the expression of positive or negative feelings or emotions. Both Christian and Muslim clerics express affective stance. Within this

study, affect has been sub-categorised into two: personal affect and communal affect. Affect can be inscribed or inferred (indirectly realised) and it covers feelings of un/happiness, in/security and dis/satisfaction (Martin and White, 2005). This stance is mainly identified with verbs of affection in the Mental Process. The data shows that this stance is linguistically characterised by Mental Processes, especially of perception; Material Processes (of physical actions); and Verbal Processes, largely presented as reported speech.

Relationalisation strategies cover essentially, the way and the kind of connection expressed by the clerics towards their ingroups. Ingroup in this context describes both immediate ideological groups and the Nigerian citizens collectively. Sentimentalising practices foreground the pragmatic realisations generated by the various strategies. It also addresses the feelings of the clerics towards the stance objects.

Affect is expressed in three perspectives: religion, political and security. Seven pragmatic strategies characterise it namely: authority, exemplification, norm expression, comparison, categorisation, vagueness, metaphorisation. The strategies are differently used to perform five pragmatic functions of blaming, condemning, criticising, advising, harmonising. The next sections discuss the two affective stance features and the pragmatic strategies in the perspectives in turn.

5.1.3.1 Personal affect (PA)

Personal affect refers to a stancetaker's expression of his own feelings about a stance object. Religious, political and security perspectives exhibit personal affect. Four pragmatic strategies are connected with this stance sub-type. These are authority exemplification, norm expression and metaphorisation. These differently perform the pragmatic functions of blaming, criticising, condemning and advising. Mental, Material and Behavioural Processes linguistically mark this affective stance type. The strategies and the pragmatic implications are presented one after the other as follows:

i. PA, authority and blaming

In the political perspective, personal affect is conveyed with authority and it is used by both the Christian and the Muslims clericsto blame the government; while the Christian clerics used it to blame BH apologists. The examples below explain this.

Excerpt 78

If you say politicians have failed them, then you are quite right. They are the ones who even arm these people. They give them money. There could be a few cases of religious crises in some places but most of the crises we have in this country (that some people link to religion) are not religious. They are politically motivated and given the colouration of religion. ... very concern[ed] about recent developments whereby politicians use people to create crises and then try to link it with religion. I am very concerned about that.

(Abubakar: *Vanguard*, June 12, 2011)

Excerpt 79

It is shocking that at a time well-meaning Nigerians are praying for the success of our soldiers, Buhari, rather than reflect the mood of the nation in his statements and conducts, is indulging in careless statements without regards for victims of the sect's violence who are mostly Christians.

(Oritsejafor: *The Punch*, June 5, 2013)

Authority is deployed in the two texts by reference to the media (represented by the interviewer), linguistically captured by the pronoun, *you*; and the nominal element, *Buhari*, (then elder statesman but now the incumbent president of Nigeria). The government is the Actor, referenced by the subjective case pronoun, *They*, who perform the Material Processes, *arm ...*, *give ...*, while BH is given the Beneficiary role by the action of the government, that is, those who receive the actions. The modal of possibility, *could* used in the context depicts the uncertainty of the speaker's connection of crisis in the country with religion. In other words, it is used to mitigate his knowledge of what has just been said. These linguistic markers realised through attribution and categorical assertion licence the strategy of authority to condemn the government's role in abating the insurgency. This brings to bear in the situation, the cleric's expression of negative affect of anger (dissatisfaction) that conveys the stance subject's affective stance (personal) which is triggered by the actions of the government. Similarly, the same affective state is expressed by the speaker in 31, who simultaneously expresses a feeling of insecurity, overtly inscribed by the affection verb, *shocking*. The insecurity is engendered by the 'careless statements' of the apologist (northern elite) of Boko Haram, who is assigned the Behavioural Process, *indulging ...*, which conveys both the Mental and the Material Process. The participant role here (Behaver), is

given to 'Buhari' who puts up that behaviour that is criticised by the stancetaker. The feelings of dissatisfaction and insecurity which express anger and anxiety can be seen in the clause that attributes the so-called religious crisis as politically motivated (75) and in the phrase ... *indulging in careless statements*(76).

In Excerpt 78, the textual voice's affective attitude is with the state of being in the political environment where politicians cause problems for the country and disguise them with religion; a situation that is catered for in the view that Boko Haram is a deliberate act of government. The speaker is disappointed with the political class that has failed in its responsibility towards its people but rather deceives them (the citizens) into engaging in anti-social behaviours, so-called religious crisis. In other words, they are being held responsible for the crisis in the country. This emotive state of being in the speaker triggers another negative affective attitude towards this prevailing situation, which is the feeling of worry, captured with the verb, *concern[ed]*. The personalisation of this affective stance is captured in the use of the first person singular pronoun – as stated in the last sentence, *I am very concerned about that*. In text 79, the affect expressed is triggered by the statement of the stance object, *Buhari*, which he feels is a threat to national security. The security dimension is made explicit in the adjectival phrase, *success of the soldiers*, while the feeling of insecurity is embedded in the verb phrase, *indulging in careless statements*.

Working within shared situation knowledge of political activities in Nigeria, the speaker in text 78 employs indirect speech act to blame the government (politicians) for the actions of BH members by describing the action as having *religious colouration*(rather than saying it is political) to drag in Islam in the form a sect (Boko Haram) into what politicians are masterminds. The inference of the previous speaker is foregrounded by the reference, *Buhari* in the next example, who is a northern politician at the time of the insurgency. This makes the reference, *politically motivated* apt in the current context.

Implicitly communicated in Excerpt 79 is the fact that the utterances of public figures in a crisis situation have the potential to either quell or aggravate the situation. This, therefore, makes relevant, the speaker's feeling of disappointment at the utterance of a renowned Nigerian in the text.

ii. PA, exemplification and criticising

Also, PA in the political perspective is used with the pragmatic strategy of exemplification by both a Christian and a Muslim leader to criticise BH supporters. This is instantiated presently.

Excerpt 80

There has grown a strange idea that, somehow, Christianity and the West have a relationship of sorts. Yet, those who hold this theory do not extend the argument further by logically claiming that Islam and Arabism should be the same!

(Kukah: *Information Nigeria*, November 29, 2015)

Excerpt 81

Religious sentiments only service a few, the common man whether Christian or Muslim will continue to suffer with deteriorated security situation, poor development, inadequate and dilapidated health services, falling educational standard and – Allah forbids- Anarchy.

(Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, May 8, 2014)

One of the ideological positions of Boko Haram, the rejection of Western civilization (anti-Western ideology), with which they associate Christianity to warrant their attacks on Christians and their institutions (see section 4.4.1) is one social factor in the insurgency lamented by the Christian leaders. The textual voice metaphorises Christianity and the West versus Islam and Arabism, to infer that everyone has a right to their beliefs, to condemn BH's desire to terminate Christians in the north (see Excerpt 64). The emotional disposition of the stance subject is communicated via the Attribute, 'strange' which is an indication of displeasure that orients to the negative affect of unhappiness. The feeling is a realisation of a mental process or state. There is the expression of emotion of disappointment in sentence two, *Yet, those who hold this theory do not extend the argument further by logically claiming that Islam and Arabism should be the same!* The pragmatic strategy of exemplification is employed in this case to criticise the proponents of such 'theory', who are possibly the northern Muslims, as the stancetaker's position has always been on the northern version of Islam. It goes to mean that the speaker is surprised at the reason for which the insurgents are determined to wipe out Christians in the north. The surprise is also clearly indicated by the use of the exclamation mark – which is indicative of an emotional outburst - in the sentence. The feeling of frustration (dissatisfaction) in the effort of religious

leaders is encapsulated in Excerpt 81 with the affective stance noun, *sentiments*. The speaker, through exemplification, decries the unhealthy living conditions that necessitate crisis in the country where they have so worked hard to ensure peace as spiritual leaders. The strategy is employed to advise Nigerians to unanimously think and desire better living conditions from the government. These conditions are listed in the Circumstantial Adjuncts: *deteriorated security situation, poor development, inadequate and dilapidated health services and falling educational standard*. In other words, the speaker indirectly blames the government for the state of things in the country including the current insecurity problem for which he feels frustrated as a religious leader.

iii. a. PA, norm expression and condemning

Norm expression as a strategy was used in the religious context by the Muslim clerics to condemn Boko Haram's actions. An example is given below from the utterance of one of the Muslim clerics.

Excerpt 82

If you attack Church, where people are worshipping, what is the profit and for what purpose? Is it Allah or Prophet that sent you? Is there any Muslim that said you should attack a church?

(Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, December 30, 2012)

This excerpt conveys an invoked negative attitude that expresses a feeling of anger against the attack of the group who claim that it is done in the name of religion or Allah. This is captured in the Mental Processes, *claim* (sentence 1) and *believe* (sentences 2 and 3). The stancetaker reacts by expressing an unhappiness feeling of anger and displeasure with the group for claiming that their actions are done in the name of Allah. The claim that the killing is done in the name of Allah serves as the emotional Trigger for the unhappiness affect (Martin and White, 2005) conveyed by the rhetorical formulations in the text. The questions which are conveyed through voice, as a religious leader, are with the intention to condemn the attacks. Norm expression is used as a strategy to condemn the killings of BH which the speaker dissociates Islam from and to state the norm in the religion. Although rhetorically formulated, the position of the stance subject is that: 1. Allah is not the reason for the attack on churches, 2. Muslims did not incite the action (attack on churches). That is to say that Boko Haram has no affiliation

with Islam. This implicitly realised stance syncs with that of the other Muslim's view earlier stated that dissociates Islam from violent activities like that of Boko Haram (example 13 in chapter four). The rhetorical formulations in the instantiation, for which the group may possibly have no answer, is a practice to achieve the communication intention of the speaker in the current context (Berman, Ragnarsdóttir and Strömquist, 2002), which is to exonerate the Islamic religion and its community. Therefore, the group is presented as enemies of the religion and its people. This affective stance thus strengthens the already presented view that Boko Haram members are enemies of Islam, that those who provide the group with the weaponry to destroy, erroneously think it is in Allah's interest, thereby making themselves enemies of the religion.

What is obvious from the instantiation above is that the activities of the group attract the negative affect of dissatisfaction and insecurity from the leaders who feel that the insurgents are making their religion a 'whipping boy'. This invoked feeling lies in the subjectivity of the speaker therefore, it is personal affect.

b. PA, norm expression and advising

Norm expression was used in the political perspective by a Muslim cleric to advise the government on what to do about Boko Haram. A Christian leader used the same strategy to advise the traditional and religious leaders in the north. An extract from each of the clerics is demonstrated presently.

Excerpt 83

Boko Haram are armed individuals hiding in a civilian population. They do not control any high fire power to be engaged in a war. Therefore there is absolutely no need -what so ever- to deploy and ultimately exhaust the military in road blocks all over the spheres of their activities. What are needed are very good intelligence, special strike squads and the genuine cooperation of the civilian population which can never be achieved through intimidation.

(Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, March 27, 2013)

Excerpt 84

I am pained by the fact that the attack is coming at a time when the wise counsel of the traditional institution is most needed to fight insurgency in that part of the country and to help check moral decadence in our society.

(Oritsejafor: *Information Nigeria*, May 31, 2014)

In excerpt 83, there is an inscribed or implicit expression of the negative affect of disappointment of the authorial voice towards the action of the government. This action of the government can be seen in the use of the Material Process, *deploy*, a military terminology that means to move soldiers or weapons into a position where they are ready for military action (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary). The action produced the mental process, *exhaust*, to convey the author's personal affect on the state of being of the military deployed to the troubled region of the country. The meaning conveyed in the circumstantial elements, '*Therefore there is absolutely no need - what so ever-...*' is that the action of the government is not one in the right direction in addressing the insurgency problem, a position which he had expressed in the past (see excerpt 24, in section 4.2.2, Boko Haram as government motivated activity). This portrays the speaker's negative attitude of dissatisfaction towards the action of the government as one warranted by their action. However, he proffers the solution in the last sentence, 'What is needed are very good intelligence, special strike squads and the genuine cooperation of the civilian population which can never be achieved through intimidation.' This manifests as norm expression to advise the government on the appropriate action to take. In excerpt 84, the affect of unhappiness (sadness) is expressed towards the attack of the insurgents that resulted in the killing of a traditional ruler, the Emir of Gwoza. The Mental Process, *pained* linguistically corroborates this inference which reveals the feeling of the speaker. In the speaker's opinion, the traditional institution to which the killed emir belongs also has a fundamental role to play in curbing the insurgency, hence, his personal affect (unhappiness) with the attack.

iv. PA, metaphorisation and condemning

As personalaffect, metaphorisation was used by a Christian cleric to condemn the actions of BH in the religious perspective. Here is an example.

Excerpt 85

The key actors, who have turned religion from a weapon of love to an arsenal of fear and savagery, claim that they are acting in the name of religion. They believe that they are acting to expand the frontiers of power and authority of their religion. They believe they are defending religion and working for God. As it is,

they have become the worst advertisement for their religions and how non-believers see both.

(Kukah: *Information Nigeria*, November 29, 2015)

Here, there is an inscribed feeling of disappointment which the stancetaker expresses the action of the insurgents as well as dissatisfaction with the thoughts. There is, in addition, the feeling of insecurity. These are supported by obvious linguistic markers. The nominal phrases *weapon of love* and *arsenal of fear* are metaphorically contrasted to depict what negative religious situation that has been created out of a seemingly 'good nature'. By deploying metaphorisation, the speaker condemns the exploitation of religion by BH. He also orients positively to the religion by giving it a normality (positive) value, *a weapon of love*. However, the stancetaker simultaneously expresses a negative attitude to the way it is being used by the stance object as *an arsenal of fear and savagery*, which is designated an insecurity situation as well as a negative social esteem value. The nominal element, *savagery*, contextually shares the hyponymous referential property with the word *fear*. These negative linguistic inscriptions are heightened by the stance adjective *worst* to further convey the authorial voice's negative feeling towards the religion in its prevailing state. The Actor element (noun phrase), *The key actors* which is the evident stance object, is used as a vague reference to anonymise the social actors as the speaker makes no explicit attempt to name calling for the avoidance of labelling, thereby leaving his audience to infer his reference as Boko Haram or their sponsors. However, this doubt can be disambiguated and the reference recovered as Boko Haram when one brings the entire discourse context to bear on the immediate linguistic context. Thus, their goal, to extend the borders of the influence of their religion [*Islamisation*], and the religion they are acting for [Islam] are both seen as 'normality' in social esteem and impropriety social sanction. This is interpreted by the stance subject's evaluation of the group's action as '*... the worst advertisement ...*' for their religion. The feeling of insecurity is signalled by lexical elements, *weapon*, *arsenal*, *fear* and *savagery*. The anonymised actors are also presented as Carriers of the negative Attribute 'worst advertisement', which both linguistically and pragmatically condemns the group. The stancetaker expresses a feeling of anxiety over a state of insecurity (the Christian clerics) at the way the insurgents have used the name of Islam to wreak havoc in the north.

In the next section, the feelings of the generality of the citizens of Nigeria are communicated by their spiritual leaders.

5.1.3.2 Communal affect (CA)

Communal affect foregrounds the collective feelings of an ideological community expressed through their leaders (the clerics). Five pragmatic strategies: norm expression, comparison, categorisation, vagueness and exemplification differently featured in the religious, political, and socio-economic perspectives, to perform four pragmatic functions, namely: advising, harmonising, condemning, and blaming. Mental, Material, Existential Process and modal verbs are found in CA. This is discussed presently.

i. CA, norm expression and condemning

Norm expression was generally deployed in the religious context to project communal affect which expresses the adversity BH poses to the two religions. This is separately stated by the two sets of clerics to play diverse pragmatic roles. The fact that Boko Haram poses a great emotional concern to spiritual leaders is very obvious from the lexical choices that the clerics select to convey their feelings. In the context of religion, norm expression was used by the Christian clerics to condemn the apologists of BH that seek amnesty for the group. An instance is analysed here.

Excerpt 86

I do not intend to bore you with this issue of Boko Haram. But this is a subject that touches us most today as Christians. Permit me to call on President Jonathan to beware of some Muslim leaders in the North and their very few Christian allies who always go to him in droves to seek regional concessions with religious biases; people who do not see anything wrong in Boko Haram killing Christians but want amnesty for the murderous and bloodthirsty sect members.

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, May 10, 2013)

In this excerpt, the emotion is heavily loaded and conveyed by the affective adjective, *touches*. Among others, the word means being upset (unhappy, anxious, annoyed) and being concerned - worried, afraid and anxious, possibly about the security of the lives and property of Christians. These feelings trigger the reaction of the cleric against government's desire to grant amnesty to Boko Haram, who he thinks do not deserve it because it is sought on the basis of *regional concessions with religious biases*. Therefore, the speaker advice the government to discard the idea of amnesty to insurgents. The speaker

here advice with norm expression by stating that state offenders like Boko Haram do not deserve forgiveness. He partly anonymises with the noun phrases: some *Muslim leaders ...* and *...very few Christian allies*, whose action (advocating amnesty for BH) is also condemned. The unhappiness feeling accounts for the reaction of the cleric against the clamour for amnesty to Boko Haram, who he thinks do not deserve it because it is sought on the basis of *regional concessions with religious biases*. The text directs displeasure at the seekers of amnesty for the group who are negatively described as *people who do not see anything wrong in Boko Haram killing Christians* while also negatively referring to Boko Haram as *murderous and bloodthirsty sect members*. The references are also used to condemn BH members and their sympathisers. The communal feeling is related via the use of the objective pronoun *us* in the expression ‘... *that touches us most today as Christians*.’ In sentence one, the speaker used a speech act of stating to pragmatically get the attention of his audience to the critical issue at hand. Although this is indirectly conveyed, the cotext *beware* draws attention to the seriousness of the subject matter.

ii. CA, norm expression and harmonising

Norm expression was also favoured by the Christian and the Muslim clerics in harmonising Nigerians in the socio-economic perspective as can be seen from the next examples.

Excerpt 87

As Muslim leaders, we feel very concerned and very worried the way things are going on in Nigeria today, especially the insecurity issue in this country. We have problems in the North, we have in the South-East, we have in the South-West and in the South-South. We believe it is the duty of the government to protect all of us.

(Abubakar: *Vanguard*, March 06, 2013)

Excerpt 88

On behalf of the entire Christians community under the auspices of CAN, I wish to commiserate with the families of the victims especially those who lost their lives in the attack. This attack on the people of Kano is an attack on all Nigerians and must be addressed as such; this is the time for all to rise up and act, may God help us all as we make this strong effort[s] at curbing terrorism from our land.

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, May 10, 2013)

Affect is overtly inscribed by the linguistic choices in the examples above to show the feelings of the religious leaders which are expressed on behalf of their religious communities. The fact that the spiritual leaders are affected by the terrorist situation and that it causes a feeling of insecurity (anxiety) for them is captured in Excerpt 87 by the Mental Processes, *concerned* and *worried*. The trigger of this state of feeling is the *insecurity issue in this country*. Norm expression is captured in the last sentence of 87, ‘*We believe it is the duty of the government to protect all of us.*’ to explicitly state what the cleric knows as an obligation of the government (the protection of its citizens) and to pragmatically advise the government to take up its responsibility towards its citizens. The emotional state expressed by the first speaker is substantiated by another Mental Process *commiserate* in the next text. Pragmatically, the word in the linguistic context evokes a feeling of insecurity. However, in 87, the emotional agitation is directed at the government who is held responsible for the insecurity in the country. The stance subject shows frustration, by mentioning the regions that suffer unrest in the country - *South-East, South-West and South-South*. These verbs of affect orient to insecurity and communicate the overwhelming feeling of uncertainty which the *Muslim leaders* are disturbed about. The affection verb, *commensurate*, shows the sympathy of the Christian cleric (and his community) for the Muslim community, triggered by the ‘attack on the people of Kano’. By deploying substantiation, the stancetaker in 86 evidentialises a particular attack, presented with the deictic marker ‘this’, which he considers as ‘an attack on all Nigerians’ thereby calling for harmonisation among all Nigerians. This is signalled by the verb phrase, *must be addressed as such*. The obligatory modality, ‘must’ signifies the inevitable duty for Nigerians in the terrorist attacks. Harmonising is also found in the use of the *all* in the circumstantial adjunct, *this is the time for all to rise up and act*, and in *may God help us all as we ...*. The collective pronoun used in text 88 transcends the immediate ideological community of the speaker (the Christians) to include every Nigerian, especially the Muslims. In other words, he brings his immediate group (Christians) and Muslims together as one sharing the same experience of pains and loss caused by Boko Haram. Linguistically, the collectivity of the feelings is marked by the self-inclusive pronouns, *we* and *us* in 88; the noun phrases, *entire Christians community*, *all Nigerians* and *our land* in 87 and 88, who are the Sensors of the Mental Processes (concerned, worried, commensurate) in the Phenomenon of insecurity/attacks in the socio-economic perspective.

iii. CA, comparison and condemning

Comparison with religious self-glorification was used in CA by the Muslim cleric to condemn the actions of the members of Boko Haram. This is illustrated next.

Excerpt 89

For the Muslims, we are very fortunate that only a small fraction of misguided youth have recently adopted this evil ideology. Islam has seriously condemned the unauthorized killing of souls. The authority in Islam only belongs to a government duly elected by the consensus of the Ummah. We, therefore, see that except for very few instances, Muslims do not commit murder.

(Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, December 27, 2012)

In the text above, the Identifier token-value, *very fortunate that only a small fraction ...*, conveys the positive affect of happiness about what the speaker and his community love about the religion, demonstrated by the intensified Mental Process, *... condemned ...*. The commonality of this emotive state is captured by the pronominal element, *we*. Functionally speaking, the Muslims are the Senser of the Phenomenon (the unauthorized killing of souls) conveyed by the Process. The stance subject is aided by his participant role as the Senser to pragmatically deploy comparison in constructing two groups (in-group and out-group) of Muslims, ‘the well-guided’ and ‘the misguided’ ones, respectively, to condemn the actions of BH. He positions himself within the in-group who are positively portrayed in the utterance with the use of the first person plural pronoun, *we*, while presenting the ‘other’ negatively as ‘misguided youth’. This membership categorisation move (Du Bois, 2007) is in tandem with van Dijk’s ideological square of positive-self representation and negative other representation. In sentences two to four, he presents the positive side of Islam by utilising religious self-glorification and condemns the youths who kill in the name of the religion, thereby distancing the religion from them. Islam is objectified as the performer of the act of condemning rather than the ‘faithful’ or the authoritative text, Quran. This is to further positively present the religion. The last sentence categorically puts a confirmation to the glorification, that “except for very few instances, Muslims do not commit murder”. Sentences three and four in the same text equally orient to norm expression by stating the acceptable behaviour in Islam.

iv. CA, categorisation and blaming

Categorisation is found in the political perspective to be used by a Christian cleric within communal affect to blame the government for fostering the insurgency. For the purpose of explaining categorisation, excerpt 46 is repeated in this section.

Excerpt 90

The Christian Community is fast lo[o]sing confidence in government's ability to protect our rights to religious liberties and life. The consensus is that the Christian community nationwide would be left with no other option than to respond appropriately if there are any further attacks on our members, churches and properties.

(Oritsejafor: *Vanguard*, November 29, 2011)

The cleric's feeling of anger in this extract is as a result of his disappointment in the government for the failure to act appropriately in the state of insurgency by the group. The cognitive process, *lo[o]sing confidence* communicates the disappointment. The ideological community of the clerics are presented as the Emoters of the 'inaction' of the government that triggers this feeling of anger. In the parlance of systemic functional grammar, they are the Sensers of the Phenomenon ('inaction'). The communality of this affect is captured in the following lexical items: *our* (pronoun), *consensus* (noun). The speaker deployed categorisation to differentiate the group of people that share the negative feeling, The Christian community, from other communities that inhabit the northern region of the country. The inscribed feeling of disappointment in this situation, 'fast lo[o]sing confidence', which translates to anger means that the Christians in that part of the country, and in Nigeria in general (represented by the president of CAN), no longer trust the government. This simultaneously invokes a feeling of insecurity which prompts the stancetaker to add that the "*Christian community nationwide would be left with no other option than to respond appropriately if there are any further attacks...*". Put differently, if the government has politicised the insurgency or is unable to guarantee the security of Christians, their churches and properties, then they will have to ensure their safety by themselves, which will implicate a deteriorated security situation in the country. It is deducible that the Christian community is angry with the government acting unexpectedly in the present circumstance by being complacent or 'insensitive' to the plight of the Christians as construed by the speaker, who is the president of all Christians in the country.

v. CA, exemplification and condemning

Exemplification in the political perspective was used by the Christian and the Muslim clerics express negative affect towards the federal government in its politicisation of the insecurity in the country. The strategy is used to achieve condemning. In instance from a Muslim cleric vividly demonstrated this.

Excerpt 91

There's too much secrecy about handling of Boko Haram affairs. Many people were arrested, put in jail and we've never seen the reports. There should be open trials. When there were bombings in Boston Marathon, the press, police and national guards were working hand-in-hand, step by step and when they discovered pictures everybody stepped up the search until the culprits were caught. Everything was open. But in Nigeria, everything about Boko Haram is kept secret. Why not expose them so that they speak and we know who their sponsors are.

(Gumi: *Vanguard*, November 10, 2014)

The first and the last sentences in this instantiation, which are declarative acts, are used in the situation to perform indirect speech act to pract condemning. By contrasting *Boston* and *Nigeria*, the speaker makes vivid the reason why the action of the government is unacceptable. The cotext, *secret*, is a contextual cue to condemn the actions of the government in a terrorist situation. As a retired military officer, he understands that portends more security threat to the nation. The comparison is hence, an illustration of relevance within the context of national security.

This instantiation used exemplification in the form of a vignette by narrating a personal experience to show the role played by the Nigerian government in the insurgency, thereby pragmatically blaming them (government) for fostering the insurgency. The Existential Process, *is* in the noun phrase, *There's too much secrecy*, communicates the negative feelings of the cleric based on the government's failure to react or the lackadaisical attitude of the government in the insurgency which the speaker is disappointed in. The communities of the clerics are presented as the Emoters of the 'inaction' of the government that triggers this feeling of anger. In the parlance of systemic functional grammar, they are the Sensors of the Phenomenon ('inaction'). The communality of the stancetaker is captured in the self-inclusive pronominal element, *we*. From the excerpt, the Muslim cleric expresses negative affect towards the federal government in its handling of the insecurity situation in the country. The feeling of disappointment, a subset of dissatisfaction affect is invoked in the current context by placing the action of the federal government side by side with the action of the

government of Boston in a similar situation. This is linguistically conveyed by the use of the adversative ‘*But*’ in the assertive sentence, *But in Nigeria, everything about Boko Haram is kept secret.*, which contrasts what he had said about Boston with what is said about Nigeria. It also shows the speaker’s surprise over the act of the Nigerian government (which includes its security agents). Surprise in this sense is also indicative of a feeling of disappointment and a state of insecurity for which the government is given the blame. There is again, an expression of a feeling of disappointment with the authority in the categorical matrix clause, ... *we’ve never seen the reports*, which indicates a Mental Process, to challenge the government to produce them so that their sponsors will be exposed.

vi. CA, vagueness and anonymising

A Muslim leader deployed vagueness to anonymise and to partly condemn Boko Haram in the excerpt presented next.

Excerpt 92

You who have hid are cheating our faith. You are not helping Islam but destroying our Ummah. We have been oppressed and you have come with weapons and bombs attacking our society. Because of this, I state that Prophet Mohammed and his people have no enemies more dangerous than they.

(Gumi: *Information Nigeria*, December 30, 2012)

In Excerpt 92, the Muslim cleric decries the misdeeds to their religion by the insurgents through invoked dissatisfaction feelings of anger and frustration captured in the Mental Process, *cheating* and the Material Process *destroying*. However, the reference or subject of the triggered emotion is anonymised through vagueness with the nominal clause, *You who have hid*, which refers to no explicit subject but condemns their actions. The first two sentences generate the inference that those who are hiding are part of the religious community of the speaker. As the representative of the community, voice is deployed to make the declaration relevant as the speaker has the authority to make a pronouncement as evident in sentence four, ... *I state that* The reference, *You who have hid*, refers to Boko Haram members as they are the ones that carry weapons and bombs (see excerpts 55 and 59). It is an indirect speech act with the intention to make them desist from their violent activities, hence it is psychological. The Material Process, *attacking*, carries the affect of insecurity as well. Within the continuum of affectivestance, as

earlier identified, this feeling appeals to unhappiness triggered by the fact that Boko Haram disguises as Muslims to unleash evil on other members of the society to tarnish the image of Islam. This affective stance which is the shared feelings of the speaker and his ideological community is accounted for by the collective pronouns, *our* and *We*. The deployment of these pronouns is indicative of the fact that the speaker is voicing the position of a group he represents by calling Boko Haram enemies of Islam.

5.2 Summary of analysis and analytical structure

This chapter examined the three stance types that characterise the perspectives of the clerics and the distinctive features that demonstrate the stance types. Within each stance feature, the pragmatic strategies employed and their pragmatic functions (practs) were also identified. Finally, it presents a table on the structure of the analysis. The table is shown below.

S/NO.	STANCE TYPE	SUB-TYPE	MAIN FEATURE	STANCE FEATURE	PERSPECTIVE	CLERIC	PRAGMATIC STRATEGY	PRAGMATIC FUNCTION (PRACT)	EXCER PT NO.
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Table 5.1 Analytical table for Chapter Five

1.	Epistemic	Authority-based knowledge		PTA	Religious	NCCs	Authority	reinforcing	42/43
2.				IKIR	Religious	NMCs	Religious self-glorification	exonerating	44/45
3.				KGA	Political	NCCs/NMCs	Authority	condemning	46
4.		Experience-based knowledge	Personal-experiential knowledge	PKNMID	Religious	NCCs	Exemplification	Blaming	47
5.				KGA	Political	NMCs	Exemplification	Blaming	48
6.				PKNMID	Religious	NCCs	Norm expression	Blaming	49
7.				PKDNP	Political	NCCs	Categorisation	blaming	50/51
7.				PKDNP	Political	NCCs	Metaphorisation	blaming	52
8.				ISeCN	Social and economic	a. NMCs b. NCCs	Norm expression Norm expression	advising	53/54 55
9.				FiA	Social and economic	NCCs	Authority	indicting	56
10.				CKE	Social and economic	NCCs/NMCs	Norm expression	condemning	57/58
11.			Action-informed knowledge	BHACCI	Religious	NCCs	Substantiation	indicting	59
12.				C-IABH	Religious	NMCs	Norm expression	condemning	60
13.				AMBH	Security	NCCs	Substantiation	indicting	61/62
14.	Evidential	Verbal evidence		CMBH	Religion	NCCs	Authority	reinforcing	63/64
15.				VR	Religion	NCCs	Authority	reinforcing	65/66
16.				PSBHS	Political	NCCs	Authority	indicting	67/68
17.				PSBHS	Political	NMCs	Vagueness	anonymising	69
18.				SOR	Security	NCCs/NMCs	Substantiation	indicting	70/71/ 72
19.		Spatio-temporal evidence		PTA	Religion	NCCs	Substantiation	reinforcing	73
20.		Documental evidence		RtBE RtBE	Religion Religious	NMCs NMCs	Authority Authority	Warnings condemning	74 75
21.		Experiential evidence		SOE	Political	NCCs/NMCs	Substantiation	blaming	76/77
22.	Affection			PA	Political	NCCS/NMCs	Authority	blaming	78/79
23.				PA	Political	NCCs/NMCs	Exemplification	critising	80/81

24				PA	Religion	NMCs	Norm expression	Condemning	82
					Political	NCCs/NMCs	Norm expression	advising	83/84
25				PA	Religion	NCCs	Metaphorisation	condemning	85
26				CA	Religion	NCCs	Norm expression	Condemning	86
						NMCs/NMCs	Norm expression	condemning	87/88
27				CA	Religion	NMCs	Comparison	condemning	89
				CA	Political	NCCS	Categorisation	blaming	90
28				CA	Political	NCCs/NMCs	Exemplification	indicting	91
29				CA	Religious	NMCs	Vagueness	anonymising	92

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

6.0 Introduction

In this chapter, the perspectives of Nigerian Christian and Nigerian Muslim clerics, the stance types, and the pragmatic strategies employed in their utterances in four online media reports have been examined. The perspectives of the clerics in the online reports were analysed qualitatively using engagement resources by White (2003) within Appraisal theory, namely acknowledgement, concurrence, counter, denial, endorsement, entertainment and pronouncement; and stance markers from Biber's (2006) concept of stance. The investigation revealed four perspectives on the Boko Haram insurgency as conceived by the clerics. These are religious, political, social and economic, and security perspectives. The perspectives have subjective and/or intersubjective viewpoints. The findings are presented and discussed under the following headings:

1. Perspectives of the Christian and Muslim clerics on Boko Haram
2. Stance types in the perspectives
3. Pragmatic strategies and pragmatic functions (implications) in the stance types

6.1 Perspectives of clericson Boko Haram

Four broad perspectives namely religious, political, social and economic, and security were identified in the data. These perspectives have subjective and/or intersubjective viewpoints.

6.1.1 Clerics' viewpointsin the religious perspective on Boko Haram

The religious perspective accounts for the clerics' understanding of how the activities of Boko Haram affect the two main religions, Christianity and Islam. Within the religious perspective, there are two subjective positions: Boko Haram as an *Islamisation* crusade advanced by the Christian clerics, and Boko Haram as a misrepresentation of Islam presented by the Muslim clerics.

6.1.1.1 Christian clerics' viewpoint: Boko Haram is an*Islamisation* crusade

Islamisation is conceived as Boko Haram's use of violence to make Christians in the north accept Islam. It manifests the following sub-categories: violence against Christians, propagation of Islamic tenets, and discrimination against Christians.

a. Features of violence against Christians

The following features of violence were established with four engagement devices: endorsement, counter, concurrence and denial. Violence manifested as:

- i.* Attacks on Christians, their communities and institutions
- ii.* Abduction of Christians

b. Propagation of Islamic tenets

This was foregrounded by endorsement, entertainment and counter.

c. Features of discrimination against Christians

Discrimination was formulated through entertainment, counter and pronouncement. It has three sub-categorisation:

- i.* Exclusion of Christians in possession of landed property
- ii.* Denial of leadership positions
- iii.* Discrimination in public offices and social institutions

6.1.1.2 Muslim clerics' viewpoint: Boko Haram is a misrepresentation of Islam

By misinterpretation, the Muslim clerics referred to the declarations and activities of Boko Haram as flouting Islamic principles thereby, dissociating Islam from the activities of the terrorist group. Denial, counter and pronouncement typified this view.

The following sub-categories illustrated the types of misrepresentation:

- a.* Epistemic misrepresentation by BH members is explained as a lack of adequate knowledge about Islam. This was realised through the utilisation of denial and counter.
- b.* Religious enemies-motivated misrepresentation refers to Boko Haram's action motivated by non-Muslims to deride Islam. Pronouncement was used to achieve this sub-category.

6.1.2 Clerics' viewpoints in the political perspective on Boko Haram

The political perspective captured Boko Haram's activities towards democratic government. It also highlighted the roles played by the past (Obasanjo's) and the present (Jonathan's government as at the time of gathering of the data) Nigerian government that aided the insurgency. Acknowledgement, concurrence, counter, endorsement, entertainment and pronouncement were utilised. The political perspective revealed one subjective viewpoint by the Christian clerics, Boko

Haram as a revolution against democratic governance; and one intersubjective position, Boko Haram as government motivated violence.

6.1.2.1 Christian clerics' viewpoint: Boko Haram is a revolution against democratic governance

This described Boko Haram as an insurgency aimed at toppling the democratic governance in favour of theocracy, where Islamic principles will become the tool for governance. It was subjectively constructed by the Christian clerics and achieved with endorsement, pronouncement and counter. It presented the two features:

- a. Anti-democratic uprising, characterised by endorsement, pronouncement and counter. Anti-democratic activities presented as:
 - i. Boko Haram's anti-democratic declaration makes reference to public statements by Boko Haram members that are against the principles of democracy as well their claims to institute Islamic law (Sharia).
 - ii. Political actions of northern leaders capture actions by northern leaders that fit into Boko Haram's violent actions.
- b. Anti-northern elites' political propaganda constructed with counter and pronouncement.

6.1.2.2 Christian and Muslim clerics' viewpoint: Boko Haram is government motivated violence

Government's motivation of Boko Haram violence accounts for the insurgents' actions that required government's intervention but which were deliberately ignored to portray the government as having fostered the insurgency. Six devices: counter, concurrence, entertainment, endorsement acknowledgement and pronouncement conveyed this intersubjective view. The features are concealed identity and involvement of culprits and lack of action on information about BH by the government.

- a. Concealed identity and involvement of culprits was formulated via counter, concurrence and entertainment.
- b. Lack of action on information about BH by the government. Two feature that typified this viewpoint are:

- i. Jonathanian government's inaction on knowledge about BH members in his cabinet

This refers to the ineptitude of the government of Jonathan in handling the insurgency which was interpreted as a deliberate act.

- ii. Obasanjorial government's inaction on information about BH

From the data, only one Islamic leader projects this angle to Boko Haram through endorsement, acknowledgement and pronouncement to blame BH insurgency on former President Obasanjo's failure to react to a security alert.

6.1.3 Clerics' viewpoints in the social and economic perspective on Boko Haram

In the social and economic perspective, the Christians portray Boko Haram as a product of fundamentalism, while the Muslims construct Boko Haram as a demand for improved social and economic conditions in the north. An intersubjective viewpoint (by both sets of clerics) present Boko Haram as enemies to Nigerians. Five resources concurrence, counter, endorsement, entertainment and pronouncement were utilised to frame this standpoint.

6.1.3.1 Christian clerics' viewpoint: Boko Haram is a product of fundamentalism

Different beliefs of Boko Haram that warranted their actions were spotlighted by the Christian clerics through pronouncement. The manifestations of fundamentalism are:

- a. Boko Haram as a rejection of Western civilization demonstrated with endorsement. It refers to attacks on institutions that denote Western civilization like the church, the security force and national or international organisations.
- b. Boko Haram as a demand for *Talakawa* ideology, framed through endorsement by a Christian cleric. It explains BH's actions as a form of demand for the northern political ideology.

6.1.3.2 Muslim clerics' viewpoint: Boko Haram is a demand for improved social and economic conditions in the north

The Muslim clerics' explanation to Boko Haram as emanating from social and economic issues include:

- a. Boko Haram as a demand for better infrastructures in the north is constructed through endorsement and entertainment by the Muslim clerics and one Christian cleric.
- b. Boko Haram as a demand for equity is advanced by the Muslim leaders achieved by the use of pronouncement.
- c. Through denial, Boko Haram was described as not being caused by poverty by a Christian cleric.

6.1.3.3 Christian and Muslim clerics' viewpoint: Boko Haram members are enemies of Nigerians

The Christian and the Muslim clerics commonly present Boko Haram as being the enemies of the citizens of Nigeria. Pronouncement and entertainment were employed to highlight this opinion.

6.1.4 Clerics' viewpoints in security perspective on Boko Haram

The security perspective intersubjectively presents Boko Haram as terrorists, while the Muslims subjectively captured Boko Haram members as killers and criminals. This position features the security dangers inherent in the Boko Haram insurgency.

6.1.4.1 Christian and Muslim clerics' viewpoint: Boko Haram members are terrorists

It has one intersubjective viewpoint. Both sets of clerics conceive Boko Haram as terrorists by the deployment of the resource of pronouncement.

6.1.4.2 Muslim clerics' viewpoint: Boko Haram members are killers and criminals

The subjective position held by the Muslim clerics within this perspective is captured via concurrence and pronouncement.

6.2 Stance types and features in the perspectives

Epistemic, evidential and affective stance featured in the perspectives having 20 manifestations. Social and economic perspective demonstrated no evidential feature. The affects, PA and CA, appeared commonly in all the perspectives. Epistemic produced 11, manifestations, evidential seven, and affective two.

6.2.1 Epistemic stance and features

Epistemic stance in this study covers the knowledge the clerics have about Boko Haram. This was exploited by both parties to reveal what they know about Boko Haram. Two epistemic features were discovered. These are authority-based knowledge and experience-based knowledge.

6.2.1.1 Authority-based knowledge

Knowledge or information here is derived from influential social agents and authoritative books or government institutions. Authority-based knowledge manifested as third-party information (TPI) by the Christian, knowledge from government action by both sets of clerics (KGA) and insider knowledge of the Islamic religion (IKIR).

- a. Third party information (TPI) accounts for Christian clerics' view on Boko Haram with regards to religion based on what key informants or people with institutional authority said. This featured in the religious perspective.
- b. Insider knowledge about Islamic religion (IKIR) manifested in religious perspective and it refers to what the Muslim clerics know from Islamic authoritative books such as the Quran. It also involves their knowledge principles violated by Boko Haram for which others associate them with Islam.
- c. Knowledge about government action (KGA) as knowledge source featured in the political perspective from what government officials or agents said or did. The two sets of clerics formulated this position.

6.2.1.2 Experience-based knowledge

Two sub-categories manifested in this epistemic stance type namely personal-experiential knowledge and action-informed knowledge.

- Personal-experiential knowledge

The features of epistemic stance are as follows:

- a. Personal knowledge about northern Muslims and Islamic doctrines (PKNMID) is a Christian dimension to the construal of BH in the religious perspective.
- b. Personal knowledge about democracy and northern politics (PKDNP) is constructed by Christians in the political perspective to foreground what they know about politics in the north with regards to democratic principles.
- c. Inferences from social and economic conditions in the north (ISecN) showed as personal-experiential knowledge in the social and economic perspective. It captured

conditions in the north that the clerics perceived as motivating factors for the insurgency. This viewpoint was expressed by the Muslims with the support of a Christian cleric.

- d. Fundamentalism-induced action (FiA) is a subjectively formulated view by the Christian clerics. It attributes the actions of Boko Haram to religious dogmatism in the social and economic perspective.
 - e. Common knowledge of evil (CKE) is a feature intersubjectively formulated based on what the religious leaders know as evil.
- Action-informed knowledge

The three epistemic features were identified. These are:

- a. Counter-Islamic actions by Boko Haram (C-IABH) was a conception by the Muslim clerics in the religious perspective to foreground the view that Boko Haram was acting against Islamic tenets.
- b. Boko Haram's actions against Christians and Christian institutions (BHACCI) was formulated by the Christians in the religious perspective. This stance feature catered for the actions of the group against Christians and their institutions which informed the clerics of what BH is.
- c. Actions by members of Boko Haram (AMBH) was a dimension in the insurgency that both the Christian and the Muslim clerics exploited to declare BH members as terrorists in the security perspective.

6.2.2 Evidential stance and features

The evidential stance provides authentication for the conceptions of the clerics about Boko Haram. It is characterised by four features in the data namely verbal, spatio-temporal, documental and experiential evidence. This stance type is presented in three perspectives viz: religious, political and security. The features are mentioned presently.

6.2.2.1 Verbal evidence

This addresses verbalisations that are connected with Boko Haram activities as uttered by the stance objects. It has CMBH, VR, PSBHS, and SOR.

- Claims by members of Boko Haram (CMBH) is the formulation of the Christian clerics in the political perspective. It is realised through claims by members of the group regarding their activities towards the government.
- Victim's report (VR) covered reports the clerics got from victims of BH in connection with religion. The Christian leaders provided that as evidence for their perception of BH in the religious perspective.
- Public statements by Boko Haram and their supporters (PSBHS) address public statements in relation to Boko Haram and their activities uttered by BH members or their apologists. This evidential stance manifestation is found in the security perspective.
- Security or other reports (SOR) is intersubjectively construed by all the clerics in the security and the political perspectives and captures what is being reported.

6.2.2.2 Spatio-temporal evidence

Only one element, place and time of action (PTA) featured in this stance category. The Christian clerics expressed this stance feature in the religious perspective, capturing physical location as well as the time BH members carried out their action(s).

6.2.2.3 Documental evidence

One feature, religious-based evidence (RtBE) is constructed in the religious perspective by the Muslim clerics. This makes reference to aspects of Islamic religious texts which are violated by BH members as well as provide proofs of what the books say.

6.2.2.4 Experiential evidence

Self or 'other' experience (SOE) is the only feature found in this sub-classification of evidential stance. It is employed by both the Muslim and the Christian clerics to substantiate their viewpoints.

6.2.3 Affective stance and features

The two affective stance features that are found in the religion, political and security are personal affect (PA) and communal affect (CA) which all express negative feelings. Personal affect refers to the individual feeling of the clerics, while CA captures the feelings conveyed on behalf of the ideological communities of the clerics.

6.3 Pragmatic strategies and their functions in the stance features

Three overarching strategies and their central pragmatic functions or practs emerged in the categorisation of the strategies within the stance types. These are perspectivising strategies and informing practs in epistemic stance, crystallisation of object strategies and authenticating practs within evidential stance, and relationalisation strategies and sentimentalising practs in affective stance. These differently deployed nine pragmatic strategies: authority, exemplification, substantiation, norm expression, comparison, categorisation, vagueness, metaphorisation and religious self-glorification to differently realise ten pragmatic functions. The practs are reinforcing, blaming, exonerating, condemning, warning, criticising, advising, anonymising, indicting and harmonising.

6.3.1 Epistemic stance features, perspectivising strategies and informing practs

The eleven epistemic stance features in the data utilised the following strategies to establish the following practs in the perspectives:

- i. In TPI the Christians used authority to reinforce the *Islamisation* view in religious perspective
- ii. The Muslims in IKIR used religious self-glorification to exonerate the Islamic religion from the activities of Boko Haram in religious perspective.
- iii. KGA as knowledge source featured in the political perspective. The two sets of clerics used authority as a strategy to condemn the action of the government.
- iv. In PKNMID, the Christians used exemplification to blame northern elite for BH actions in the religious perspective. Within this same epistemic feature, the Christians also used norm expression to blame Islamic doctrines for the actions of BH.
- v. The Christians in PKDNP deployed categorisation and metaphorisation to blame the northern political elites for the insurgency.
- vi. ISeCN showed as a personal-experiential knowledge. The Muslims used norm expression here to advise the government, while the Christian clerics used the comparison to reinforce the position that BH is not caused by poverty.
- vii. FiA is a feature by the Christian clerics who employed authority to indict Boko Haram of killing.

- viii. CKE feature is intersubjectively formulated. Both parties used norm expression to condemn Boko Haram.
- ix. Within C-IABH, the Muslim clerics utilised norm expression to condemn BH in religious perspective, while the both the Christian and the Muslim clerics used the same strategy to indict BH of terrorism in the security perspective.
- x. The feature, BHACCI was formulated by the Christians. In it, they used substantiation strategy to indict Boko Haram of specifically killing Christians in the religious perspective.
- xi. In AMBH the Christians favoured substantiation strategy to indict BH of terrorism in the security perspective.

6.3.2 Evidential stance features, crystallisation of object strategies and authenticating practs

The seven evidential stance features identified in the data deployed the different strategies to perform different practs. This is presented as follows:

- i. Within CMBH the Christian clerics reinforced their claim that Boko Haram insurgency is an *Islamisation* crusade by using authority as a strategy.
- ii. In VR the Christians also used authority to reinforce the *Islamisation* position.
- iii. In PSBHS vagueness strategy was used by a Muslim cleric to anonymise the members of Boko Haram as an evidential manifestation in the security perspective.
- iv. All the clerics intersubjectively construed SOR in security perspective to indict BH of insurgency through substantiation. In the political perspective, they both used substantiation strategy to blame the government for deliberate action with regard to BH insurgency.

6.3.3 Affective stance features, relationalisation strategies and sentimentalising practs

Two types of affective stance, personal affect (PA) and communal affect (CA) used different strategies to achieve different pragmatic functions. This is presented below:

- a. Personal affect, relationalisation strategies and sentimentalising practs

The following strategies were used in PA to achieve the practs as indicated in the perspectives:

- i. Norm expression strategy was used in the religious perspective by the Muslims to condemn BH activities.
- ii. A Christian cleric in religious perspective made use of metaphorisation to condemn the actions of BH.
- iii. Within the political perspective, authority was used Christian clerics to blame BH apologists in political perspective.
- iv. In the same perspective, exemplification was used by both sets of clerics to criticise BH supporters.
- v. Still, in political perspective, the Muslims used norm expression to advice the government, while the Christians used it to advice northern traditional and religious leaders.

b. Communal affect,relationalisation strategies and sentimentalising practs

Communal affect (CA) refers to the expression of collective feelings conveyed by the clerics for them and members of their faith. The following are the features, strategies and functions in CA.

- i. In religion perspective, norm expression was used by the Christian clerics to condemn the apologists of BH that seek amnesty for BH members. Both parties used it to harmonise Nigerians in religious perspective.
- ii. Also, within the religious perspective, Muslim clerics used Comparison and religious self-glorification as strategies to condemn BH members for their actions.
- iii. Categorisation was employed by a Christian cleric within the political perspective to blame the government for encouraging the insurgency.
- iv. Exemplification strategy was used by both Muslim and Christian clerics to condemn the government's actions in the political perspective.
- v. The strategy of vagueness was used by a Muslim leader to anonymise Boko Haram members.

6.4 Conclusion

This section presents a conclusion on the research on the perspectives, stance types and pragmatic strategies of selected Nigerian Christian and Muslim clerics on Boko Haram by providing its contribution to knowledge, application of the study, limitations of the study and suggestions for further studies.

6.4.1 Contributions of the study

This research has made a contribution to academics by bringing in the perspectives of Nigerian clerics (a very significant social group in Nigeria's religious society) to fill the gap created by Ayoola and Olaosun (2014); Odebunmi and Oloyede (2016); Chilwa and Adegok (2013); Chilwa and Ajiboye(2014) among others, who focused on the perspectives of journalists, social media users and counter-terrorism analysts in the Boko Haram discourse. It has also complemented works like Chilwa and Ifukor (2014) that investigated only an event, #Bringbackourgirls# campaign in the insurgency activities of Boko Haram by spotlighting the different facets of Boko Haram. Furthermore, it has contributed to the literature on Boko Haram by covering a longer period of the insurgency by expanding its periodisation to five years, as against the studies of Roelofs (2014),and Ayoola and Olaosun (2014) that used a single month's media report to draw a conclusion. In the area of pragmatic functions in the discourse on Boko Haram, it complements Odebunmi and Oloyede (2016) who examined the pragmatic strategies and practs by journalists by highlighting the pragmatic strategies and practs used by the clerics. Also, the transitivity processes in the perspectives foreground the connection between language, social phenomenon and social actors.

6.4.2 Application of the study

The research has pedagogic relevance in discourse-pragmatic studies in enriching understanding of how to identify perspectives, how stances can be generated in addition to utterance functions in any discourse. Within the purview of linguistics, it demonstrates how lexico-grammatical features of stance and the transitivity processes can foreground stance objects in any given perspective.

The knowledge from this study can be also be applied in carrying out detailed investigations into religion-motivated crisis in any society with religious divisions like Nigeria. It also gives a better understanding to crisis stemming from the intricate blending of religion and politics in a society. Furthermore, it provides insights into how religious contents can be exploited to perpetrate

violence in a society, as religion itself has been identified as an avenue to commit atrocities in a society. Hence it has relevance in discourse, pragmatic, sociological and religious studies.

6.4.3 Limitations of the study

The study investigated perspectives of selected Christian and Muslim clerics in selected versions of online news sources. While the two religions are the prominent ones in Nigeria, the view of leaders of traditional religions and the atheists and other religious affiliations are not considered. Also, the various denominations of the selected religions were not all covered in this study. In Christianity for instance, the leaders of African initiated churches, such as Cherubim and Seraphim, Celestial Church of Christ, among others were left out. On the other hand, the leaders of the Shite sect were not examined because of their absence in the reports on Boko Haram.

6.4.4 Suggestions for further studies

Further works can investigate the views of the excluded religious groups and sects to give a more accurate representation of religious leaders' and free-thinkers' opinions on the insurgency. In this wise, a research methodology that will give access to the opinions of the Shites can also be explored to know their position on Boko Haram since they are also Muslims.

On the one hand, a comparative study of leaders of the two religions can also offer a better understanding of the aspects of the religions that should be given more public voicing since religious ideology and dogmatism were considered as some of the reasons for the insurgency. In addition, a comparative research on Boko Haram in Nigeria and other African countries, like Cameroun or Chad can be done to see if there are common reasons or features for the activities of the group. Finally, since the current study is focused on content analysis (direct speeches) of texts extracted from reports of the news media, future research can adopt a conversational analytic approach in order to account for paralinguistic features deployed by the clerics to augment the texts. A multi-modal analytical framework will also be resourceful in this wise.

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APPENDIX

ORITSEJAFOR

Vanguard, December 29, 2011

<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/12/bokoharamisislamicjihadonchristianscan/1/>

Boko Haram is Jihad on Christians CAN

“The concern of the Christian Community is further heightened by the admittance by government itself that it has knowledge of the perpetrators of these crimes, unfortunately there are no convincing high profile arrest to assuage public anxiety over this matter. “Having reviewed the pattern, trend and frequency with which these terror crimes occur, it fits into the profile of Islamic Jihad over the years on the christian community, which properly are contextualised. It is considered as a declaration of war on Christians and Nigeria as an entity. “The Christian Community is fast losing confidence in government’s ability to protect our rights to religious liberties and life. The consensus is that the Christian community nationwide would be left with no other option than to respond appropriately if there are any further attacks on our members, churches and properties.

(Excerpt 46/77/90)

Vanguard, September 25, 2012

<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/09/boko-haram-sponsored-by-election-losers-oritsejafor/>

Boko Haram sponsored by election losers – Oritsejafor

By Johnbosco Agbakwuru

“Boko Haram is fueled by extreme religious ideology and not poverty because they have not come out to tell us that they are killing people because they are poor or hungry.”

(Excerpt 31)

Information Nigeria, June 5, 2013

<http://www.informationng.com/2013/06/boko-haram-buharis-a-big-security-risk-to-nigerias-existence-oritsejafor.html>

Boko Haram: Buhari’s A Big Security Risk To Nigeria’s Existence –Oritsejafor

Daniel

“I have several times been vindicated that Boko Haram is not inspired by pecuniary motives, the latest of which is the statement by Robert Fowler, the released former United Nation’s envoy to Niger Republic who said in a BBC programme, “Hard Talk”, aired on Tuesday, June 4, 2013, that his captors never talked of poverty but Islamisation of Africa.

(Excerpt 65)

Information Nigeria, May 13, 2014

<http://www.informationng.com/2014/05/abducted-girls-conversion-to-Islam-war-against-christianity-can.html>

Abducted Girls’ Conversion To Islam, War Against Christianity – CAN

First, these children are Christians and not Muslims and so they cannot be converted to a religion that is not theirs at gunpoint without conviction. Besides, is that how conversion is being carried out? All the children displayed are Christians and that is the motive behind the abduction. “It is simple. Because they are Christians and they represent the church in the eyes of their abductors. Secondly, it smacks of some form of religious persecution. If not, why are their captors converting them to another religion? And if they say they will use them as a condition to negotiate for their men in detention, our daughters are not criminals and cannot be used in any way to free their criminal fighters.

(Excerpt 3)

“Show us where in Nigeria you have seen Christians fighting and throwing bombs in the name of God. We challenge any one to show us where Christians have abducted Muslim children in the name of Christianity. We challenge anyone to prove in Nigeria where Christians have taken arms in the name of protecting Christianity or even carry out acts of genocide on helpless and defenceless Nigerians. As far we are concern, it is a war against Christians and Christianity”.

(Excerpt 59)

Vanguard, June 4, 2013

<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/06/incitingstatementsarrestbuharinowcantellsjonathan/>

Alleged inciting statements: Arrest Buhari now, says CAN

By Caleb Ayansina

“I cannot wish away the outburst of harshly critical statements, especially as some of them are directly related to the defence of the Boko Haram sect whose members have continued to kill, maim Christians and burn Churches. I feel the pain inflicted on Christians living in the north is too deep for us in CAN to ignore any unsavoury statement that tends to portray innocent Christians who have been killed by the sect members as the aggressors.

“It is shocking that at a time well-meaning Nigerians are praying for the success of our soldiers, Buhari, rather than reflect the mood of the nation in his statements and conducts is indulging in careless statements without regards for victims of the sect’s violence who are mostly Christians.

(Excerpt 79)

“I have, several times been vindicated that Boko Haram is not inspired by pecuniary motives, the latest of which is the statement by Robert Fowler, the released former United Nations’ envoy to Niger Republic who said in a BBC programme, “Hard Talk”, aired on Tuesday, June 4, 2013, that his captors never talked of poverty, but islamisation of Africa.

(Excerpt 65)

Information Nigeria, June 12, 2013

<http://www.informationng.com/2013/06/how-post-2011-election-crisis-fuelled-boko-haram-insurgency-oritsejafor.html>

How Post 2011-Election Crisis Fuelled Boko Haram Insurgency – Oritsejafor

Daniel

“You can see that it is basically a religious thing. Look at the recent statement by the leader of the sect, Alhaji Abubakar Shekau, where he called on like-minded Islamists in other countries, including Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, to join the sect to create an Islamic state in Nigeria. “Any Muslim, who gives out information about them becomes an enemy, and they see that person as an infidel and they will go after that person as well. This is why Muslims are targeted, and that is the truth.

(Excerpt 72)

“Muslims also have been killed in all these that have happened but I have said it many times that the primary target of Boko Haram is to kill government agents, including security agencies, and destroy schools because they believe it is a sin to go to school and churches because churches, to them, are also tied to the western ideology.”

(Excerpt 27)

Vanguard, MAY 10, 2013

<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/05/amnestydontwastetaxpayersmoneyoritsejafortellsjonathan/>

Amnesty: Don't waste tax payers' money, Oritsejafor tells Jonathan

By Sam Eyoboka & Caleb Ayansina

“to beware of some Northern Muslim leaders and their few Christian allies who always come to him to seek regional concessions with religious biases. People who do not see anything wrong in Boko Haram killing Christians, but want amnesty for murderous and blood-thirsty sect members”.

(Excerpt 86)

“If we agree that poverty, injustice and inequality are the causes of the insurgency by Boko Haram, a largely Islamic group, the question would be: are Muslims the poorest people, the most deprived? What about Christians? Can we say injustice and inequality, as they say, is limited to Muslims alone? Can the claim of poverty be justified if the weapons and arms being used by the Boko Haram sect are calculated in terms of naira and kobo? Where is the justice when the Almajiris have special schools built for them and none for Christian children in the North and South?

(Excerpt 55)

“Where is the equality when in most government parastatals, the staffing is heavily skewed in favour of a particular religion? With amnesty to the bargain for the Boko Haram sect members, would the Christian youths whose fathers have been killed benefit? Yet justice is an open wound, only truth can heal it.

“For us, Christians in Nigeria, the terrorism that is going on now is in pursuit of jihad. Again, it becomes difficult to separate if we consider the statements of the Boko Haram spokesman, Abu Qaqa, on August 1, 2012.

“Hear him: “The fact that we are the warriors of the Almighty and even the security forces are finding it difficult to contain our activities. We want to stress that in our struggle, we only kill government functionaries, security agents, Christians and anyone who pretends to be a Muslim but who engages in assisting security agents to arrest us”.

(Excerpt 56)

“This was the same day that the Emir of Fika in Yobe State, was attacked. The Shehu of Borno, had been attacked a month earlier. So, we can understand that the Muslims being attacked are those singled out for killing because of their critical stance against the activities of the sect. We utterly sympathize with the families of the clerics killed by the sect members because they stood for the truth. May the Almighty God grant them aljana fadausi.

(Excerpt 40)

“Mallam Qaqa went further to state, our crusade is meant to ensure the establishment of an Islamic state by liberating all Muslims from the excesses of the infidels. We strongly believe that Almighty Allah will reward us with his famous paradise in the hereafter as He rightly said in Chapter 9 verse 111 of the Holy Qu’ran”.

(Excerpt 63)

.... “This is why we insist that the primary targets of Boko Haram are Christians and their Churches. If this is not so, why is it that the attacks are mostly on Sundays when innocent Christians are in their Churches worshipping. Only this Sunday, gunmen as they are also called, attacked members of the Ekklisiyar Yan’uwa a Najeria (EYN) Church in Jilang village of Maiha Local Council in Adamawa State, killing 10 persons and injuring 12 others. “The gunmen stormed the church at about 11.00 am while the Sunday Service was on going. According to one of the Newspaper reports, upon gaining entry, they started shooting at worshippers in the Church, who were listening to the preacher.

(Excerpt 1/73)

“Reports we in CAN get on daily basis from Borno, Yobe, Kano and some of the adjoining states are mind boggling. Do we speak of Christians pushed out of moving vehicles on the highway or those slaughtered like cow? What about those abducted from their homes and nothing is ever heard of them? There are other unreported cases of Christians shot in cold blood. You begin to wonder where these human rights groups are.

“Indeed, the arrogant and deriding manner with which Boko Haram dismissed the amnesty deal coupled with the earlier quoted statement by Abu Qaqa have both reinforced our stance that the sect’s only interest is to eliminate Christians and enthrone an Islamic state in Nigeria. This is why we are again calling on President, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan not to waste tax payers’ money on a futile exercise. “President Jonathan should review the amnesty deal for Boko Haram in view of the bravado by the sect leader, Mallam Shekau. Boko Haram is not only a local terrorist organization. It has a ring of international connection to it.

(Excerpt 37)

“I do not intend to bore you with this issue of Boko Haram. But this is a subject that touches us most today as Christians. Permit me to call on President Jonathan to beware of some Muslim leaders in the North and their very few Christian allies who always go to him in droves to seek regional concessions with religious biases; people who do not see anything wrong in Boko Haram killing Christians but want amnesty for the murderous and bloodthirsty sect members.

(Excerpt 86)

The Punch, November 25, 2014 (Sourced from *OsunDefender*)

<http://www.osundefender.com/sultanoritsejaforclashoverbokoharam/>

Sultan, Oritsejafor clash over Boko Haram

By Ademola Iginla

“His Eminence said he wrote a letter to the ISIS. I have to truly congratulate you for that because that was a very good move. I didn’t know about it until now and I am so glad it happened. “But I want to appeal that you also write to Boko Haram because Boko Haram is worse than the ISIS. They have killed more people than the ISIS, they have caused more atrocities than the ISIS, they need to be written to as well, it is very important; it will help.

(Excerpt 35)

Why should a church in the North for the past 30 years not get a Certificate of Occupancy? Any mosque or church in any part of the country should be able to get C of O. “Why is it that people will want to build a place of worship in a particular part of the country and they will not get land? We must create a level playing for everybody; we must deal with everybody equally.”

(Excerpt 7)

Vanguard, November 16, 2014

<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/11/dont-negotiate-boko-haram-pastor-oritsejafor/>

Don’t negotiate with Boko Haram – Pastor Oritsejafor

By Sam Eyoboka

What I know from what some very devout Muslims have told me is that when a Jihad starts, they don’t stop. The Jihad has to be completed. They either die or they achieve their goal. And the goal is to Islamize Nigeria. The real war is a war between the ideology of Sharia and the ideology of democracy. This is the war that is going on, and it is a worldwide war.

(Excerpt 42)

What are the doctrines that these terrorists around the world believe in? The doctrines they are teaching, are they not coming out of this Wahhabi and Salafi doctrines? Boko Haram is basically an ideology. To defeat an ideology, you need a superior ideology. Many of our Muslim brothers have come to say to those of us who don't know much about Islam that these people are not Muslims. Alright, but what are these people preaching? Is it not from the Quran? Now you say you have the real thing that this is not the real thing. Then match the real thing with the unreal thing or with the fake.

(Excerpt 5/49)

Are we not all aware of what the nice governor of Bauchi State did in Tafawa Balewa and other areas dominated predominantly by Christians? How he went and closed down a girl's secondary school 2011. Most of the students are Christians. He took the Muslim students from there and put them into other Muslim schools and abandoned all the Christian students.

(Excerpt 10)

Are you not aware that Libyans have joined them? Are you not aware that Somalians are among them now? Are you not aware that Tunisians are among them? From different parts, they are there among them now, fighting alongside the insurgents. Our borders are so porous. Not only the land borders, but even the air and sea. What of all the weapons that were found in Lagos, where are the weapons till today? Iran was indicted. Where are those people that were caught? What has happened to them? What about the ones found in Kano? We were later told that they were linked to certain Lebanese people based in Kano and Abuja. What has happened to all those things? What has happened to all those people? Have some of those places not been reopened in Abuja? What are we doing to this country? And we say we want to fight insurgency.

(Excerpt 21)

All these problems are there. If we look at all these things realistically, holistically, genuinely, honestly, with integrity, we may wipe out insurgency and probably, if nothing else, reduce it to the barest minimum.

Do you know that for the past 30 to 40 years, no church organisation has been issued a certificate of occupancy to build a church in the far North? Go to the North of Nigeria and see the suffering of Christians. Are you aware that generally across the North, you cannot be a traditional ruler except you convert? Go to Gwoza. Gwoza is 80 per cent Christians, but they have an Emir of Gwoza. Does it make sense? That a place where 80 per cent of the people are Christians, you start an emirate, and there's an emir who is a Muslim over 80 per cent Christians. Look at Mubi that was just taken over; there was an Emir of Mubi. In a place that is also over 80 per cent Christians. Can it be the other way round? Can you try it? Can you go to Sokoto and say that from now it's a Christian traditional ruler that will rule over a particular area?

(Excerpt 8)

I was reading about a prominent man I've always respected in Kaduna, an elderly man saying that insurgency is a creation of government or somebody just to win election. I just sat down and was shocked that an educated man, elderly man could be talking like this with what we are seeing with our eyes. It's unbelievable. Is it that all these people don't know the truth? They do know the truth, but we just pretend or wickedly don't want to touch the truth. If you try it, then they shout. That's what some of us are suffering. If I'm nice and accept everything, I will be getting awards left and right and getting tons of money, they will recommend me to become this and that, hailing me all over the world, while my people are dying.

(Excerpt 51/68)

Information Nigeria, May 17, 2014

<http://www.informationng.com/2014/05/full-scale-emergency-rule-in-borno-others-best-option-oritsejafor.html>

Full Scale Emergency Rule In Borno, Others Best Option – Oritsejafor

Daniel

“We were told WAEC told the governor that those girls in Chibok Girls Secondary School should be taken to Maiduguri. But the governor was quoted to have said ‘no’, that they were safe in the place. So who do you hold responsible? “Now you are holding the military responsible, but WAEC did not write the military, it wrote to the governor. If a military man was in charge, probably we would not be talking like this”,

(Excerpt 25)

Information Nigeria, November 16, 2014

<https://www.informationng.com/2014/11/lets-stop-the-deception-boko-haram-will-not-negotiate-with-anybody-oritsejafor.html>

Let's Stop the Deception; Boko Haram Will Not Negotiate with Anybody - Oritsejafor

Niyi

“What I know from what some very devout Muslims have told me is that when a Jihad starts, they don't stop. The Jihad has to be completed. They either die or they achieve their goal. And the goal is to Islamize Nigeria,”

(Excerpt 42)

Information Nigeria, May 31, 2014

<http://www.informationng.com/2014/05/cancondemnskillingsfemirofgwozaurgesnigeriansnottobeintimidatedbybokoharam.html>

CAN Condemns Killing of Emir of Gwoza, Urges Nigerians Not To Be Intimidated By Boko Haram

By Daniel

“I am pained by the fact that the attack is coming at a time when the wise counsel of the traditional institution is most needed to fight insurgency in that part of the country and to help check moral decadence in our society.

(Excerpt 84)

“I want to use this opportunity to remind Nigerians of the need to continue to unite in the fight against terrorism in our land, it is an act that we all must denounce and fight with all that we have got, probably the emirs were attacked for their condemnation of Boko Haram but this must not deter us”,

(Excerpt 33)

“you have taken note of what I said about violence in the Northeast. I did not mention Boko Haram because most of the violence is not caused by boko haram. So we have to ask ourselves why there is violence in the northeast? Those who cause the violence, who are they? The government must fish them out and say look we know you are the cause of this thing from day one.”

(Excerpt 38/69)

Vanguard, December 28, 2014

<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/12/threatbokoharamposesnigeriaayooritsejafor/>

The threat Boko Haram poses to Nigeria, by Ayo Oritsejafor

By Jide Ajani

“I want to thank you for the opportunity today to address this committee and for your interest in the situation in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and especially the increase in terrorist attacks targeting Christians and Christian Institutions. Just this last weekend, 58 people were killed in Christian villages in Jos, including a federal senator and a state lawmaker.

(Excerpt 61)

Boko Haram already claimed responsibility for these coordinated attacks and they also reaffirmed their earlier position saying that “for Christians in Nigeria to know peace they must accept Islam as the only true religion.”

(Excerpt 2/64)

Boko Haram is not a northern problem, but a Nigerian problem with global implications. Nigeria is not a country divided by North and South, but a country divided between those who support freedom and equality in the eyes of the law, and those who promote persecution and violence as a means to an end.

Since its creation, the Boko Haram network has never hidden its agenda or intentions. Boko Haram has openly stated that they reject the Nigerian State and its Constitution and seek to impose Shari'ah Law. To this end, Boko Haram has waged a systematic campaign of terror and violence. They seek an end to western influence and a removal of the Christian presence in Nigeria.

(Excerpt 16/67)

In January 2012 the United Nations Security Council published a report stating that Boko Haram members from Nigeria received training in AQIM camps located in Mali and Chad during the summer of 2011. That same summer Boko Haram carried out a bold terrorist attack against the United Nations building in Abuja. Boko Haram did not hesitate in claiming responsibility for the attack, nor has it ever hesitated in claiming responsibility for its ongoing attacks against police, military, local businesses, and increasingly churches and Christian institutions.

(Excerpt 71)

KUKAH

Sahara Reporters, December 24, 2012

Bishop Kukah's Speech At Governor Patrick Yakowa's Funeral In Kaduna

I want to appeal to all of us to rise to the challenge of building one united country, a country of love, a country where indeed, we are all God's children. We must rise up to build a country where we see ourselves as human beings, citizens with inalienable rights and not allow ourselves to be held hostages by religious bigots. What is today Boko Haram is the toxic waste that years of dubious religious manipulation has produced.

(Excerpt 57)

Vanguard, April 1, 2012

<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/04/haba-bishop-kukah/>

Haba, Bishop Kukah!!!

By Sam Eyoboka

Sadly, the knee-jerk reaction of some very uninformed religious leaders has lent credence to this false belief. To complicate matters, some of these religious leaders have continued to rally their members to defend themselves in a religious war. This has fed the propaganda of the notorious Boko Haram and hides the fact that this evil has crossed religious barriers,”

Nigeria is changing because Nigerians are taking back their country from the grip of marauders.... Christians are now publicly crossing the artificial lines created by falsehood and bigotry.”

(Excerpt 6)

Sahara Reporters, November 29, 2014

Christian Association of Nigeria Condemns Friday’s Bomb Attack on the Central Mosque in Kano

By SaharaReporters, New York

On behalf of the entire Christians community under the auspices of CAN, I wish to commiserate with the families of the victims especially those who lost their lives in the attack. This attack on the people of Kano is an attack on all Nigerians and must be addressed as such; this is the time for all to rise up and act, may God help us all as we make this strong effort[s] at curbing terrorism from our land.

(Excerpt 88)

The Punch, via NollyCulture, Friday, October 17, 2014

<http://nollyculture.blogspot.com.ng/2014/10/nigerianorthernelitedeceivepeople.html>

Nigeria Northern Elite Deceive People With Religion, Bishop Kukah

(Sourced from *Punch*, and posted by Chijioke Azuawusiefe)

As we are talking now, it has been reported by the Catholic Diocese of Maiduguri that about 185 churches have been burnt by Boko Haram. I am in touch and know the painful stories of the church under crucifixion. The question is not how many mosques, if any, have been burnt. So, how else can we remove a religious dimension to this?

(Excerpt 43/66)

When you deny Christians chances to go on pilgrimages; when you build hundreds of mosques and deny Christians lands; when you deny non-Muslims places in the bureaucracy or in public life, what are you saying to your children? When you privilege one group and make the other feel inferior, you are opening the window and the young people growing up can see the difference

between Cain and Abel. When you pretend that we are children of the same father, and you openly discriminate against me, one of us must be a bastard.

(Excerpt 9/52)

When our churches became objects of target practice, all these years, the leaders merely looked the other way or stayed in silence or fear. The children of Boko Haram have been fed by this sour broth of hate. This is what has bred the bitterness that the northern Christian minorities feel, and time is running out.

Vanguard, November 29, 2015

<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/11/future-of-religion-in-nigerias-politics-by-matthew-kukah/>

Future of Religion in Nigeria's Politics, by Matthew Kukah

The key actors, who have turned religion from a weapon of love to an arsenal of fear and savagery, claim that they are acting in the name of religion. They believe that they are acting to expand the frontiers of power and authority of their religion. They believe they are defending religion and working for God. As it is, they have become the worst advertisement for their religions and how non-believers see both.

(Excerpt 85)

That Boko Haram, its disciples and victims are localized to northern Nigeria should be instructive. What this calls for is an honest review of the root causes. We need to ask what it is about the past or the present that has led us to this ugly and deadly path.

(Excerpt 36)

It is my considered view that northern Islam has to confront the realities of taking its religion into the modern world of democracy seriously. Muslims in northern Nigeria cannot accept democracy and reject the inclusive nature of its philosophy as it is the case today. The driving force of democracy is that it presents us with the best instruments for managing our diversity, creating inclusiveness and breaking down the boundaries of exclusion. Unfortunately, northern Islam has continued to privilege religion as a source of identity, power and control. A hypocritical elite continues to believe that it can claim the benefits of democracy but use it only to consolidate its hold on power. This is what has laid the foundation for what is now Boko Haram.

(Excerpt 18/50)

We must locate the current crisis of Boko Haram within the context of the inability of the northern Muslim elite to live by their own dubious creed of being Muslim. They preached Sharia Law, but only for the poor. They preach a religion that encourages education, yet their own

people are held in the bondage of ignorance. They came to power on the basis of a democratic society, but they turned around and declared Sharia to generate a false consciousness among the poor that they want a theocracy. They did not wish to live by the same standards, so they decided to live their own Islam in the capitals of the world away from the prying eyes of their own people. Boko Haram began as a revolt against this mendacity, subterfuge and hypocrisy.

(Excerpt 19)

Now, I hear Muslims in northern Nigeria hiding under the cover of the facts by saying: “These Boko Haram people are not Muslims. They do not represent us”. Well, first, they are your own children. You must take responsibility for what has made them what they are today and to the rest of society. They claim they have been inspired by the Quran and no other holy book. They say they want to build an Islamic state. So, they are Muslims.

(Excerpt 4)

After all, from the debates of the Constituent Assemblies of 1979, 1988, and 1995 and beyond, did their fathers and grandfathers not stage walk outs demanding Sharia Law? The promise to institute Sharia has become the most potent tool for political mobilization and organisation. Till date, the tactics may have changed, but the essence has not.

(Excerpt 18)

Should we pretend that a society that allows the forced marriages of its young daughters could frown at the idea of a group kidnapping and forcing young girls into sexual slavery? Islam must have an honest look at the mirror and have an internal discussion.

Turning this injustice was at the heart of the late Aminu Kano’s philosophy, theology and politics throughout his life. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that Boko Haram is another name for the vacuum created by the absence of the Talakawa genre of politics enunciated by Aminu Kano.

(Excerpt 28)

There has grown a strange idea that, somehow, Christianity and the West have a relationship of sorts. Yet, those who hold this theory do not extend the argument further by logically claiming that Islam and Arabism should be the same!

(Excerpt 80)

In your part of the country as in other parts of the world, I hear about families with Christians and Muslims living together, marrying and intermarrying and so on. In the North, this is anathema. Every time I bring this up, I hear people say that this is what Islam teaches, that the religion allows Muslim men to marry Christian girls (and hopefully make them Muslims) while Christian men cannot marry Muslim women. If this is not apartheid in broad daylight, I do not know what it is. If this is not a case of privileging one religious identity and making it superior to another, I do not know what else to call it. If this is not an assumption that Christian men and their women are

inferior and by extension their religion, I do not know what else to call it. If this is not a case of assuming that Muslim men, their women and Islam are superior to Christianity, I do not know what else it is. When we take this into consideration, can we then blame the members of Boko Haram which, at least, has had the honesty of following the script to its end by insisting that we all convert to their Islam or die?

(Excerpt 11/ 47)

The Punch, November 30, 2015

<http://jimidisu.com/northern-muslim-elite-laid-foundation-for-b-haram-kukah-punch/>

Northern Muslim elite laid foundation for B' Haram –Kukah

By Adesola Ademiluyi

“A hypocritical elite continues to believe that it can claim the benefits of democracy but use it only to consolidate its hold on power. This is what has laid the foundation for what is now Boko Haram. “We must locate the current crisis of Boko Haram within the context of the inability of the northern Muslim elite to live by their own dubious creed of being Muslims. They preached Sharia Law but only for the poor. They preach a religion that encourages education, yet their own people are held in the bondage of ignorance. “They came to power on the basis of a democratic society but they turned around and declared Sharia to generate a false consciousness among the poor that they want a theocracy. “They did not wish to live by the same standards, so they decided to live their own Islam in the capitals of the world away from the prying eyes of their own people. Boko Haram began as a revolt against this mendacity, subterfuge and hypocrisy.”

(Excerpt 19)

“Now, I hear Muslims in northern Nigeria hiding under the cover of the facts by saying: ‘These Boko Haram people are not Muslims. They do not represent us’. Well, first, they are your own children. You must take responsibility for what has made them what they are today and to the rest of society.

“They claim they have been inspired by the Quran and no other holy book. They say they want to build an Islamic state. So, they are Muslims. After all, from the debates of the Constituent Assemblies of 1979, 1988, and 1995 and beyond, did their fathers and grandfathers not stage walkouts, demanding Sharia Law? “The promise to institute Sharia has become the most potent tool for political mobilisation and organisation. Till date, the tactics may have changed, but the essence has not.

(Excerpt 18)

ALHAJI ABUBAKAR SA’AD III

Vanguard December 10, 2011

<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/12/bokoharamhasnorthernleadersfoundtheirvoice/>

Boko Haram: Has Northern (sic) leaders found their voice?

“We must take our children off the streets to the classrooms. Our leaders, especially the political leaders, must lead with justice, fairness and transparency while dealing with the masses. Then and only then will peace and stability be restored not only in the North but in the entire country.”

(Excerpt 53)

Information Nigeria, August 31, 2011

<http://www.informationng.com/2011/08/sultanofsokotocondemnsbokoharamsattackonunbuilding.html>

Sultan of Sokoto Condemns Boko Haram’s Attack On UN Building

By Obanor Chukwueze

“We hereby call on the Muslims not to allow themselves to be used by our enemies in achieving their desired goals. We should not allow them to cause us to commit acts prohibited by our religion. We, therefore, call upon all those involved in this nefarious act, to fear God and desist from committing this grievous act,”

(Excerpt 15)

Vanguard, June 12, 2011

<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/06/blame-boko-haram-killings-on-politicians-sultan/>

Blame Boko Haram killings on politicians – Sultan

By Jide Ajani

“If you say politicians have failed them, then you are quite right “The politicians are the ones who even arm these people. “They give them money. ” They arm them. “But like I’ve said, they are in the minority.” The majority of us are peace loving and we are out for a peace-loving Nigeria”.

“There could be a few cases of religious crises in some places but most of the crises we have in this country (that some people link to religion) are not religious. They are politically motivated and given the colouration of religion”. ... “very concerned about recent developments whereby politicians use people to create crises and then try to link it with religion. I am very concerned about that”.

(Excerpt 78)

“I cannot force you to accept my religion, the Almighty said so in the Quoran. You go your way I go my way and these two ways lead to the Almighty. It is for the Almighty to determine which of these two ways is better to get through to Him and that is not for you and I; so there should be no problem of converting people by force. We preach peace always”.

(Excerpt 75)

Vanguard, June 12, 2011

<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/06/blame-boko-haram-killings-on-politicians-sultan/>

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(Excerpt 75)

Vanguard, March 6, 2013

<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/03/declare-total-amnesty-for-boko-haram-sultan-tells-jonathan/>

Declare total amnesty for Boko Haram, Sultan tells Jonathan

By Luka Binniyat

“The type of amnesty that ended militants’ unrest in the Niger Delta will be suitable for the North. Initiating a restoration and

rehabilitation programme that would integrate the terrorists into the larger society will pave the way for dialogue rather than engaging them in an endless war.

“We want to bring to attention of the government our challenges. As Muslim leaders, we feel very concerned and very worried the way things are going on in Nigeria today, especially the insecurity issue in this country. We have problems in the North, we have in the South-East, we have in the South-West and in the South-South. We believe it is the duty of the government to protect all of us.

(Excerpt 87)

“We want to use this opportunity to call on the government, especially Mr President, to see how he can declare total amnesty for all combatants (Boko Haram) without thinking twice. That will make any other person who picks up arms to be termed a criminal. “If amnesty is declared, it will give so many of those young men who have been running and hiding to embrace that amnesty. Some of them have already come out, because we have read in the papers that some have already come out.

Sahara Reporters April 13, 2013

<http://saharareporters.com/2013/04/13/bokoharamhaskilledmoremuslimschristianssaysjni>

Boko Haram Has Killed More Muslims Than Christians, Says JNI

By Saharareporters, New York

The unfortunate menace of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is indeed an accident beyond religion which affects every Nigerian directly or indirectly and upon which no passing of bulk can be logical.”

(Excerpt 32/58)

Vanguard, March 6, 2013

<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/03/declare-total-amnesty-for-boko-haram-sultan-tells-jonathan/>

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(Excerpt 87)

Vanguard, June 3, 2014

<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/06/islambokoharamsultansokotovoyagediscovery/>

Islam and Boko Haram: Sultan of Sokoto voyage of discovery

“Muslims want and also demand to be treated with equality, with justice, with fairness and inshillah [God’s willing] things will turn around”,

(Excerpt 30)

SHEIK AHMAD GUMI

Sahara Reporters, August 11, 2012

<http://saharareporters.com/2012/08/11/sheik-gumi-soldiers-are-fighting-innocent-muslims-not-boko-haram>

By Sahara Reporters, New York

Sheik Gumi: Soldiers Are Fighting Innocent Muslims, Not Boko Haram

“[The soldiers] know where Boko Haram is because they... have their telephone numbers and are interacting with them on the Internet. What we are saying is, Islam does not permit any one to be killed unjustly. We are not talking on behalf of Boko Haram or on behalf of government. Anyone that goes wrong we will not be afraid to say it. “I read in the papers that this American woman came and said that they cannot use force and fight Boko Haram. And we know they will say sweet things in public and continue conspiracy underground. What we are saying is in the spirit of peace; they should remove these soldiers and police on the roads and nothing will happen to us in the name of Allah.

(Excerpt 22)

[The soldiers] know where Boko Haram is because they have their telephone numbers and are interacting with them on the Internet. ... I read in the papers that this American woman came and said that they cannot use force and fight Boko Haram. And we know they will say sweet things in public and continue conspiracy underground.

(Excerpt 48)

Information Nigeria, December 27, 2012

<http://www.informationng.com/2012/12/christiansaremoredangerousthanbokoharamsheikhahmedgumi.html>

Christians Are More Dangerous Than Boko Haram? – Sheikh Ahmed Gumi

For the Muslims, we are very fortunate that only a small fraction of misguided youth have recently adopted this evil ideology. Islam has seriously condemned the unauthorized killing of souls. The authority in Islam only belongs to a government duly elected by the consensus of the Ummah. We therefore see that except for very few instances, Muslims do not commit murder.

(Excerpt 89)

“Islam has seriously condemned the unauthorized killing of souls. The authority in Islam only belongs to a government duly elected by the consensus of the Ummah. We therefore see that except for very few instances, Muslims do not commit murder. The rampant murder committed in the west, is as a result of the irreligious life the west has adopted and bears little with the clamor of gun control. In Yemen, the populace is armed yet such murders are not an occurrence because Islam instills in the individual the discipline of selfrestrain and control and forbids taking of one’s life and that of the others too. This cannot be said about the other religions.

(Excerpt 45)

The more deadly evil, is that evil that camouflage behind the ‘government’s security agencies’ to kill innocent people either to perpetuate power or score some political goals. For instance in Nigeria we have seen how some Christian elements in the Nigerian security apparatus have been killers of innocent Muslims leaders for political reasons. Such elements are deadlier evil than boko haram. They aimed to destroy the Muslims as a whole by decapitating their leadership thus exposing the Ummah to perpetual subservience.

Sahara Reporters, August, 2012

<http://saharareporters.com/2012/08/14/sheikhgumiprophetmohammedmuslimshavenoenemyworsebokoharam>

Sheikh Gumi: Prophet Mohammed, Muslims Have No Enemy Worse Than Boko Haram

By Sahara Reporters, New York

You who have hid are cheating our faith. You are not helping Islam but destroying our Ummah. We have been oppressed and you have come with weapons and bombs attacking our society. Because of this, I state that Prophet Mohammed and his people have no enemies more dangerous than they.

(Excerpt 92)

“How did a 12 year old boy know how explosive bombs are made or affording it? All the money before us here cannot buy explosive bombs. It is the enemies that are giving them weaponry and they...believe that it was sincerely donated in fighting Allah’s cause. Unknown to them, it is all aimed at destroying Islam.”

If you attack Church, where people are worshipping, what is the profit and for what purpose? Is it Allah or Prophet that sent you? Is there any Muslim that said you should attack a church?

(Excerpt 82)

There are those using it to destroy Islam, criminals attacking banks in the name of Jihad. There are those using it to attack Muslims in mosques. After attacks you will just see somebody with turban and guns belonging to the West, denting the name of Islam. Because of this we should be careful. There is Boko Haram and some fake ones, pure criminals. The real Boko Haram can be changed with sermon. Our malams should stand up to tell them there is no justification for killings. Don’t be afraid. They are killing Muslims and the infidels we have agreement to live in peace with.

(Excerpt 41)

Sahara Reporters, August 15, 2012

<http://saharareporters.com/2012/08/15/sheikgumimynamemongthoselistedbeattackedterrorists>

Sheik Gumi: My Name Is Among Those Listed To Be Attacked By Terrorists

By Sahara Reporters, New York

As I am just coming now after a long silence of these unnecessary explosions and bombings, we heard an explosion very close to our house. And in the morning today from a senior military security that they have a list of people that were targeted for a terrorist attack and that I am among them. Now the question is the high cadre of our military intelligence know that we are target, and yet this morning I was told and there was a bomb explosion we never heard near our house just by the corner of the main road. So what I am saying is to emphasise that we have serious insecurity problem.

(Excerpt 70)

Information Nigeria, May 2, 2014

<http://www.informationng.com/2014/05/abduction-of-school-girls-signals-boko-harams-end-game-says-sheik-gumi.html>

Abduction Of School Girls Signals Boko Haram's End Game, Says Sheik Gumi

“This abduction is an end game for whoever is responsible for the killings, bombings and terror all over in general. The abductors – whoever they may be- are confined in space and time for the first time. The abducted girls are known, therefore, lies will have to end. The abductors must be identified. These girls hold the answers to all the melodrama that is called war against Book Haram.

(Excerpt 34)

“The space is Sambisa forest – a must- since there are confirmed cases of escapees from it. The time is also against the criminals. Encircle all outlets from the forest, take aerial surveillance – shouldn't we wonder now if the drone purported to have been manufactured in Kaduna Air Force base was not really a dummy? – or get the help from United States”.

(Excerpt 54)

Information Nigeria, March 27, 2013

<http://www.informationng.com/2013/03/amnesty-for-boko-haram-is-hypocritical-they-out-to-be-crushed-sheik-gumi.html>

Amnesty For Boko Haram Is Hypocritical, They Ought To Be Crushed – Sheik Gumi

Daniel

“The sect has disrespect for the Quran or Hadith or even Scholarly fatwa. They have their own interpretation,” ... “Anything short of that is part of the enemy that should be killed. So on what basis should there be dialogue or amnesty? It is a creed that must be crushed; it is a creed the prophet – alaihis Salam- wished he is alive to exterminate.”

(Excerpt 14)

“a whole region is made to suffer economically, socially and politically because of this blind war on terror. The present dispensation has everything to gain is refusing the ‘amnesty’ call for political reasons, that is why it is recalcitrant. Otherwise, if the need to crush BH is genuine, it would have been achieved since.”

(Excerpt 24)

“Boko Haram are armed individuals hiding in a civilian population. They do not control any high fire power to be engaged in a war. Therefore there is absolutely no need -what so ever- to deploy and ultimately exhaust the military in road blocks all over the spheres of their activities. What are needed are very good intelligence, special strike squads and the genuine cooperation of the civilian population which can never be achieved through intimidation.”

(Excerpt 83)

Sahara Reporters, March 26, 2013

<http://saharareporters.com/2013/03/26/sheikgumikicksagainstamnestybokoharamsaystheyoughtbe-crushed>

Sheik Gumi Kicks Against Amnesty For Boko Haram, Says They Ought To Be Crushed

By Sahara Reporters, New York

“They have their own interpretation, anything short of that is part of the enemy that should be killed. So on what basis should there be dialogue or amnesty? It is a creed that must be crushed; it is a creed the prophet – alaihis Salam- wished he is alive to exterminate”

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(Excerpt 83)

Vanguard, November 1, 2014

<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/11/2015-insist-jonathan-buhari-run-sheik-ahmad-gumi/>

2015: Why I insist Jonathan, Buhari should not run – Sheik Ahmad Gumi

Powers were given to them and also huge sums of money. With these huge sums, nobody would have taught that after this long period of fighting Boko Haram we will still be fighting them.

Soldiers at the fronts were being eliminated, outnumbered, and many civilians incarcerated. The Army were just there arresting civilians and putting them in prison. There is no military strategy to fight Boko Haram. On the contrary some of these soldiers cry to me personally. They come to us and tell us stories contrary to what you people hear. Helicopter droppings, tinted glassed vehicles, sometimes with foreigners in them. Army officers telling me that sometimes they'll pursue them but would be given orders to stop, "don't pursue".

(Excerpt 76)

"There are Christians in Boko Haram" Who can believe that with the kind of wealth that Nigeria has, our soldiers will be given few bullets to face Boko Haram. Nobody knows that this Boko Haram, from the few the army was able to kill, were mercenaries from Chad. There are even some none-Muslims among them. A soldier came to us here from Bita, which is very close to the Zambisa forest. He said when they went freshly with ammunition they were able to repel the first attacks of Boko Haram. When the Boko Haram were withdrawing, he heard them say Victor, Amir, John, Mohammed e.t.c. Boko Haram are not only Muslims."

(Excerpt 39)

"There's too much secrecy about handling of Boko Haram affairs. Many people were arrested, put in jail and we've never seen the reports. There should be open trials. When there were bombings in Boston Marathon, the press, police and national guards were working hand in-hand, step by step and when they discovered pictures everybody stepped up the search until the culprits were caught. Everything was open. But in Nigeria everything about Boko Haram is kept secret. Why not exposed them so that they speak and we know who their sponsors are. There was a time Boko Haram targeted me. Explosives killed two of them when they were planting them. The military took their bodies away till today. They were not exposed for identification."

(Excerpt 20/91)

Information Nigeria, May 8, 2014

<https://www.informationng.com/2014/05/how-can-jni-contribute-to-nigerias-persistent-crises-sheik-gumi.html> 1/

How CAN, JNI contributed to Nigeria's Persistent Crisis – Sheik Gumi

Daniel

"Let the good people of this nation, both Muslims and Christians who want to live in peace join hands to save the situation", ... "Religious sentiments only service a few, the common man whether Christian or Muslim will continue to suffer with deteriorated security situation, poor development, inadequate and dilapidated health services, falling educational standard and – Allah forbids- Anarchy."

(Excerpt 81)

“With all the atrocities being committed in this nation by the use of both illegal arms in the hands of terrorists or insurgents or the illegal use of legal arms through extra-judicial killings.”

(Excerpt 62)

Information Nigeria, February 10, 2013

<http://www.informationng.com/2013/02/kanokillingsthereareterroristsamongstmuslimssheikgumi.html>

Kano Killings: There Are Terrorists Amongst Muslims – Sheik Gumi

By Daniel

“How can then today, people that are neither specialist in Islamic Law nor specialist in Medical sciences go public with such a fatwa in clear contradiction of the Quran?” he queried. “It means the Quran doesn’t pass through beyond their throat. Let us assume, they have the rights to their ijihad, but that does not give them the license to kill innocent people that see otherwise? When do you kill people on suspicion?”

(Excerpt 12/60)

“In a Hadith the Prophet said there will come a time – in the end of time when some youth who are apt to reciting the Quran – but will not pass their throat will be killing Muslims. Today, you just need to disagree with them, then you become their hit target. Subhanallah! The Ummah has to wake up from its slumber and fish out these evil people. The prophet – peace be upon him said: “if people will see a transgressor and don’t clamp on his two hands, Allah will soon engulf them all with his chastisement” Abu dawud. Only the people can cure this evil.”

(Excerpt 74)

Supplementary sources

Leadership, Jun 17, 2015 (Sourced from Nairaland Forum)

<https://www.nairaland.com/2386767/obasanjonotjonathanresponsibleboko#>

34872121

Obasanjo Not Jonathan Responsible For Boko Haram -Gen Gumi -Politics- Nigeria

Sheikh Jaafar Adam (of blessed memory) had alerted the government (of Olusegun Obasanjo) and anyone who cared to listen then that late Muhammad Yusuf was up to some dangerous games in very good time but no one listened to him.” “Consequently, even when Jaafar Adam was mowed down, it could not trigger a suspicion or reaction to use the clergy as the counter narrative solution against the BH group.”

(Excerpt 26)

“Methinks Obasanjo knew the greater implications to the polity and that was why he was bent on a third term to manage it fair enough. When the third term bid failed, Baba Obasanjo could only be scanty to the incoming Yar’Adua/Jonathan’s regimes over the full brief to the Sharia crisis and its logical link with the BH for them to remain clueless in its management.

The Sun, (source from *OsunDefender*), April 15, 2013

<http://www.osundefender.com/howjonathangotitwrongkukah/>

How Jonathan got it wrong—Kukah

Editors Online

we know that the President himself, without anybody provoking him, said that there were Boko Haram members in his cabinet. Nobody has been tried, nobody has lost his job as a minister; so we don’t know. We cannot say we don’t know where they are.

(Excerpt 23)

So, this problem is not about resolving Boko Haram matter. It is about first of all, aggressively dealing with the problems of corruption, which tragically seems to be in reverse. It is about massively rolling out infrastructure. Believe me, I can tell you that the day that you have a train from Abuja to Sokoto, from Kaduna to Calabar, the day you have those things, the people you are talking about will have no place.

(Excerpt 29)

Daily Times, December 26, 2014

Nigerian Muslim leader: “Islam stands for peace,” Boko Haram unIslamic

By Robert Spencer

“We have said it times without number that any act that breeds violence like the one being exhibited by Boko Haram has no basis in Islam. As you are aware, our religion, Islam stands for peace as its name denotes. So let us remain peaceful always, so that we may live a peaceful life here and be accommodated in the home of peace in the life to come.”

(Excerpt 13/44)

