

**OODUA PEOPLES CONGRESS AND THE PROTECTION OF OIL PIPELINE  
INSTALLATIONS IN SOUTHWESTERN NIGERIA, 2006 -2019**

**BY**

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## **CERTIFICATION**

I certify that this research was conducted by **SULAIMAN AKANBI BELLO** in the Department of Peace, Security and Humanitarian Studies, Faculty of Multidisciplinary Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan under my supervision.

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## **DEDICATION**

This research is dedicated to Almighty Allah (swa) the Omniscience for the strength and endowment to complete my doctoral programme and the blessed memory of my dear parents, Alhaji Mohammed Kolawole Bello and Alhaja Seliat Akanke Agbarigidomo, as they have passed on to His glory prior the commencement of this programme.

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## ABSTRACT

The vandalisation of oil pipeline installations remains a major problem bedevilling the oil industry in southwestern Nigeria. The menace has led to economic loss, environmental degradation and fire explosion resulting in loss of lives. In a bid to address the challenge, the Nigerian government contracted the protection of oil pipeline installations in the region to Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC). Scholars have focused attention on militancy and disruptions of oil installations but with limited considerations of strategies for protection of the facilities. The study examined responsibilities for pipeline protection, challenges faced by OPC in protecting the facilities, collaboration mechanisms between the government security agencies and OPC, and implications for security in southwestern Nigeria.

Hodapp and Cannon's Conspiracy Theory constituted the framework while exploratory research design was adopted. The study was conducted in four southwestern states: Lagos, Ogun, Oyo and Ondo which were purposively selected due to the high-level incidence of oil pipeline vandalism in the areas. Data were obtained from primary and secondary sources. Primary data was purposively sourced through in-depth, key informant interviews and focus group discussions. In-depth interviews were conducted with National leaders of OPC (2), Zonal coordinators of OPC (4) and community leaders (4). Key Informant Interviews were conducted with stakeholders including Nigeria Police Force - NPF (4), Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC 4) and Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR 4). Focus group discussions (4) were also conducted with community youths and women groups. Secondary data were derived from relevant publications. Data were content analysed.

The NSCDC has the statutory responsibility for pipeline protection with support expected from the NPF and other relevant security agencies. The challenges faced by the OPC were threats from state security agents, media, sabotage and corruption in the protection of pipelines. Collaboration and partnership between government security agents and the OPC initially resulted in the reduction of vandalism; however, lack of trust associated with joint policing led to rivalry and casualties; hence, the contractual policy failed. Collaboration between the OPC and government security agents reduces vandalism and oil spills incidence in the region.

In southwestern Nigeria from (2006 - 2019) government policy of partnering Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps with Oodua Peoples Congress in the protection of oil pipeline installation was initially effective but could not be sustained. The Conspiracy between communities, few security agents as government officials, with vandals that resulted into compromise of oil facility could be surmounted through partnering with traditional leaders for information gathering and collaboration within the security architecture in the southwestern Nigeria where mutual trust and cooperation are commanded.

**Keywords:** Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Oil pipeline protection, Oil pipeline vandalisation, Oodua Peoples Congress.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page	i
Certification	ii
Dedication	iii
Acknowledgements	iv-v
Abstract	vi
Table of Contents	vii-ix
List of Tables	x
List of Figures	xi
List of Plates	xii-xiii
List of Abbreviations	xiv-xv
<b>CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION</b>	
1.1 Background to the Study	1-10
1.2 Statement of Problem	10-12
1.3 Research Questions	13
1.4 Aim & Objectives of the Study	13
1.5 Scope of the Study	14
1.6 Significant of Study	14-15
1.7 Justification of the Study	15
1.8 Operational Definition of Terms	15-16
<b>CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW</b>	
2.1 Conceptual Clarification	17-19
2.2 Literature	19
2.2.1 Review on Vandalism	19-23
2.2.2 Global Vandalism Challenges of Pipeline Installation	23-24
2.2.3 Pipeline Vandalism Challenges in Canada	24
2.2.4 Pipeline Vandalism Challenges in India	25
2.2.5 Pipeline Vandalism Challenges in the Caspian Region	25

2.3 Nigeria Boundaries	25-35
2.3.1 Causes of Oil Pipeline Vandalism in Nigeria	36-39
2.3.2 Effects of Oil Pipeline Vandalism in Nigeria	40-44
2.3.3 Measures Adopted in Curbing Vandalism	44-47
2.3.4 Constraints Encountered During Anti-Vandals Drive	47-51
2.4 Oodua Peoples Congress OPC	51-57
2.5 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation NNPC	57-59
2.6 Department of Product and Research DPR	59-62
2.7 Pipeline and Product Marketing Company PPMC	62-63
2.8 Oil Pipeline Protection and its Challenges	64-67
2.9 The Establishment of Non State Armed Group in the Society	67-73
2.10 The Relevance of Security in the Society	73
2.10.1 Security	73-78
2.10.2 Nigeria Security Agencies	79-84
2.10.3 National Security	85-86
2.10.4 Nigeria's Grand Strategy for National Security	86-88
2.11 Government Initiatives and Interventions	88-90
2.12 National Security Objectives within the Framework of Vision 2020	90-92
2.13 Law Enforcement Agent and Community Policing	92
2.13.1 Military	92-93
2.13.2 Nigeria Police Force	93-94
2.13.3 Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps	94-96
2.14 NSCDC and Crime Prevention	96-100
2.15 NSCDC and Vandalism	101
2.16 Deviant Behaviour	101-102
2.17 Community Policing and Oil Pipeline Right of Way	102
2.18 Critical Infrastructure Protection Model	102-103
2.19 Theoretical Framework	104
2.19.1 The Queer Leader Theory	104
2.19.2 Conspiracy Theory	105
2.20 Concluding Literature	106-107



### **CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

3.1 Research Design	108
3.2 Study Area	108
3.3 Sampling Size	109-110
3.4 Sampling Technique	110-112
3.5 Method of Data Collection	112-113
3.6 Instrument of Documentation	113
3.7 Validation of Instrument	113
3.8 Non-Participant Observation	114
3.9 Method of Data Analysis	114
3.10 Ethical Considerations	115

### **CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

4.1 Presentation of Research Findings and Discussion	116
4.2 The Responsibility of Protecting Oil Pipeline Installations	116-122
4.3 The Challenges of Protecting Oil Pipeline Installations	122-131
4.4 The Impact of Collaboration and Partnership	132-138
4.5 The Lesson Learnt on National Security	139-142
4.6 Discussion of Major Findings	143-147

### **CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

5.1 Summary	148-152
5.2 Conclusion	152-153
5.3 Recommendations	154
5.4 Contribution to Knowledge	156-157
5.5 Limitations of the Study	154-156
5.6 Agenda for Further Research	157
Reference	158-164
Appendices	165-194

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Vandalism and Deaths Toll in the Southwestern Nigeria	21
Table 2.2: Vandalised Prone Areas in the Southwestern Nigeria	22
Table 2.3: Incidence of Pipeline Explosion in Southwestern Nigeria (2006 to 2016)	50
Table 3.1: Respondent in an Interview Session	111
Table 4.1 Respondent's Summary Opinion of the Agencies with Mandate to Protect Pipeline Installations in Southwestern Nigeria	121
Table 4.2 Respondent's Summary of Challenges faced by OPC in course of Oil Pipelines Protecting	131
Table 4.2.1 Private Company and Allocation of Segment for Surveillance	135
Table 4.3: Summary of Collaboration and Partnership between Governments Security Agencies and OPC impacted on the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria	138
Table 4.4: Summary of implication of lessons learnt National Security	142
Table 5.1: Respondent in the Interview Session	167

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Nigeria map and international boundaries.	28
Figure 2.2: The network of pipelines in Nigeria	30
Figure 2.3: Map of the Oil, Gas Fields and Refineries in Nigeria	33
Figure 2.4: Oil and Gas Pipelines south-western states of Nigeria	35
Figure 2.5: The Grand Strategy Framework	.87

## LIST OF PLATES

Plate 1.1: Avenger a non state actor blown up pipeline in Forcados	3
Plate 1.2: NNPC Vandalised pipeline in Forcados, Burutu LGA of Delta State, Nigeria	6
Plate 2.1: Nigeria Pipeline installations design	31
Plate 2.2 Fire explosions at Forcados pipeline installation	42
Plate 2.3 NSCDC, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps.	45
Plate 2.4 OPC in rampage in Lagos, Nigeria	54
Plate 2.5 OPC form of vandalism by destroying political posters along Ikorodu Road, Lagos	56
Plate 2.6 Nigerian Army (NA)	81
Plate 2.7 Nigerian Navy (NN)	82
Plate 2.8 Nigerian Air force (NAF)	83
Plate 2.9 Nigeria Police Force (NPF)	84
Plate 4.1 Repairs of Vandalized pipe at Lagos by NNPC Engineers	119
Plate 4.2 Southwest Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC)	125
Plate 5.1 Researcher with the National Coordinator of OPC, Otunba Gani Adams The Aare-Ona Kankanfo of Yoruba Land, Dated, 03- 05 -18	168
Plate 5.2 Researcher with Zonal Coordinators of OPC from Southwestern Nigeria Dated, 03- 05-18	169
Plate 5.3 Researcher with Ewusi of Sagamu Makun, Ogun State, Oba Timothy Oyesola Akinsanya, Dated, 04-05-2018	170
Plate 5.4 Researcher with Traditional Chiefs of Olopete of Opete, Queen Olopete Ajawa in Oyo State Dated, 20-03-2018	171
Plate 5.5 Researcher with Ogun State DPR Controller of Operations Mrs. Muinat O. Bello Dated, 04-05-2018	172
Plate 5.6 Researcher with Ondo State DPR Controller of Operations, Mr. Oseni M.A. Dated,4-4-2018	173

Plate 5.7 Researcher with Ondo State Commissioner of Police, CP Olugbenga Adesanya Dated, 4-4-2018	174
Plate 5.8 Researcher with Ogun State Police PRO- ASP Abimbola Oyeyemi represent CP Ahmed Iluyoesu psc+, Dated, 04-05-2018	175
Plate 5.9 Researcher with Lagos State Commandant of NSCDC Commandant Tajudeen Balogun Dated, 02-05-18	176
Plate 5.10 Researcher with Oyo State Commandant of NSCDC Commandant Aboluwoye John Adewoye Dated, 20-03-2018	177
Plate 5.11 Researcher with Ondo State Commandant of NSCDC Commandant Pedro Idiaba Date: 4-4-2018	178

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

OPC	-	Oodua Peoples Congress
MP	-	Miscellaneous Provision
CSO	-	Civil Society Organisation
MEND	-	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta
MASSOB	-	Movement for Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra
DSS	-	Department of State Services
GFI	-	Global Financial Integrity
IFFs	-	Illicit Financial Flows
FGD	-	Focus Group Discussion
FHQ	-	Force Headquarters
CJD	-	Criminal Justice Decree
PHCN	-	Power Holding Company of Nigeria
NITEL	-	Nigeria Telecommunication Limited
NPC	-	National Population Commission
NDA	-	Niger Delta Avengers
ROW	-	Right of Way
EFCC	-	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
NPF	-	Nigeria Police Force
PA	-	Petroleum Act
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
STASCO	-	Shell Trading and Shipping Company
NNPC	-	Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation
NPDC	-	Nigerian Petroleum Development Company
NGC	-	The Nigerian Gas Company
SBU <sub>s</sub>	-	Strategic Business Units
MNC <sub>s</sub>	-	Multinational Oil Companies,
PPMC	-	The Products and Pipelines Marketing Company
DPR	-	Department of Petroleum Resources
IDSL	-	Integrated Data Services Limited

NETCO	-	National Engineering and Technical Company Limited
HYSON	-	Hydrocarbon Services Nigeria Limited
WRPC	-	Warri Refinery and Petrochemical Co. Limited
KRPC	-	Kaduna Refinery and Petrochemical Co. Limited
PHRC	-	Port Harcourt Refining Co. Limited
NAPIMS	-	National Petroleum Investment Management Services
COSD	-	Crude oil Sales Division
IDLS	-	Integrated Data Services Limited
IDI	-	In-depth Interview
IGP	-	Inspector-General of Police
NSCDC	-	Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps
CG	-	Commandant General
JOC	-	Joint Operation Centre
JTF	-	Joint Task Force
KII	-	Key Informant Interview
LFN	-	Laws of Federation of Nigeria
MDAs	-	Ministries, Department and Agencies
MOPOL	-	Mobile Police
NA	-	Nigerian Army
QLT	-	The Queer Ladder Theory
NPC	-	National Population Commission
NLG	-	Nigeria Liquefied Gas
PZ	-	Paterson Zochonis
KPD	-	Kilo Barrel per Day or Thousand Barrel per Day
BPD	-	Barrel Per Day

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background to the Study**

Nigeria discovered crude oil in 1956 by Shell D'Arcy Petroleum at Oloibiri of Eastern Niger Delta, the present day Bayelsa State. Over the years, Nigeria has emerged to be the biggest crude oil producer in Africa. Crude oil has become the dominant source of the nation's revenue. Reporting the importance of crude oil to Nigeria's economy, the Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative NEITI, (2016) asserted that exporting petroleum product plays the leading role in Nigeria's economy which accounted for 90% of her gross revenue income.

As the revenue from crude oil continued to oscillates, issues related to oil exploration such as crude oil theft through vandalism continued to rise in Nigeria. Aghalino and Okolie-Osemene, (2014) emphasised the increasing incidence of vandalism in Nigeria noting that in many parts of Nigeria, vandalism of oil pipeline installations has become a common trend in the socio-economic and environmental experience of the citizenry. Basically, pipeline vandalism involves the malicious destruction or defacement of crude oil pipelines in Nigeria. The pipelines are operated under the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). According to Bala-Gbogbo, (2010), between year 2000 and 2010, 398 breaks of pipelines representing 2.5% were damaged due to ruptures, while vandal's interruption accounted for about 15,685 breaks which translate to about 97.5 % of the total number of pipeline breaks in Nigeria. It is worthy of mention that oil installations are national assets which usually become soft targets for vandals with the intent to sabotage the government for attention or theft of product to make money. Vandalism of oil installations is part of the impacts of crude oil related issues that goes beyond oil producing areas and also affects areas and communities situated along pipeline Right of Way (ROW).



Oil pipelines serve as effective means of transporting petroleum products to depots and other hinterland. The pipelines are networked to transport oil produce to different jetties and platforms, with relative benefits over other system of transporting the product in terms of cost and speed. These pipelines are however poorly secured despite various efforts put in place by government for the purpose of efficient service delivery; the danger seems to be at an alarming rate thereby making them points of repeated attacks by the vandals. (Udofia and Joel, 2012)

Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, (NSCDC) having the mandate of protecting critical infrastructure and national assets through NSCDC Act No. 2 of 2003 as amended Act 6 of 4<sup>th</sup> June 2007 laws of federal republic Nigeria, (LFN) on anti-vandals drives from 2010-2018. NSCDC recorded arrest, prosecutions and secured convictions of vandals in Nigeria in the year 2014 given the highest conviction of 168 cases from civil defence yearly bulletin notwithstanding this record, ‘the non state actor especially the Niger Delta Avengers agitation have been noticed to persist in countering the effort of the government in fighting vandalism with an accurate attacks on numerous oil pipeline installations in the country.

Plate 1.1 shows the outfit of the avengers in military uniform with sophisticated weapon to drive home that they are daring and ready for business.



**Plate 1.1:** Avenger anon state actor blown up oil pipeline installations in Forcados, 2016  
**Source:** montageafrica.com

Plate 1.1 depicts the avengers as a farmed non state armed group that continuously negotiate with government through coercion and wanton destructions of oil pipeline installations especially in Forcados in the Niger Delta.

After the Kiama declaration in the 70s on resource control, the agitation become more brutal with every successive government in Nigeria struggling to put up policies to calm the situation or even to ameliorate the hardship suffered by the people as to the negative effects of the exploitation of oil and other natural resources. It was noticed since 1988 that the Niger Delta region of Nigeria exhibits ethnic and regional self determination struggle with violent confrontations between local community youths who transformed to a non state armed group and the state agents of the federal government including oil companies that did extraction and exploration of oil in the area. A mere agitation had later transformed into civil struggle that goes against the multinational oil companies, MNCs.

The non state armed groups used to give ultimatums in their demands after it has snowballed from pure development issues to overtly political restructuring federal system, resource control and national conference of ethnic nationalities. The various agitations are based on the right of the people to own and control the natural resources within their native land. The youths in the area has constituted the vanguard of the Niger delta conflict nationalists that chart course of different strategies with such vitality of hate speech which encourage conflicts in the area. This led to the non state armed group in the Niger delta that are fairly trained as youth militias using speed boats in the swamps, estuaries, creeks, rivers at the coastal region of the area. They engaged the military and seized oil facilities, ships barges, workers and equipments are freely commanded by them. They sometime kidnap the foreign nationals and asked them for ransom. Undoubtedly they have become criminalized within the region that resulted into economic crimes, violence and war similar to the 1966 declaration of Niger Delta Republic against the Nigerian state. This witnessed the massive deployments of the Nigerian Army, Navy and other security agencies with devastating effects on the local and national security stability and global oil and gas related economic growth in the country. This type of history especially the resource control will definitely not favoured endorsing any non state armed group in Nigeria be given the award of security contract concerning the Nigeria oil pipeline installations.

Principally, oil pipeline vandalism is carried out by criminals who break into the oil pipe and siphon products for financial gains and amass wealth. Other factors that encourage vandalism include petroleum product scarcity, widespread poverty, ignorant and illiteracy, easy access to pipeline and inadequate pipelines protection or simply poor policing by government agents. (Vidal, 2011) The consequences of vandalism are not farfetched as the country experiences a high economic loss and leakages which has serious implications on Nigeria economic growth and development. The country usually experiences environmental degradation as a result of oil spill during especially during or after vandalism which put the land into jeopardy and the vegetation of the affected area. These experiences are noticed in anguish over losses of farmlands, wild lives, aquatic animals, quality water and air. It impacted negatively on community health and safety of the people. Nigeria pipeline explosions with fire disaster have been the most catastrophic effects oil pipeline destruction in 2014, as several lives and property have been recorded lost. (Ugwuanyi, 2013). For example Ojere, Ogunmakin Idun in Obafemi Owode in ogun state, Amuwo-odofin, ilado-odo in Lagos, Agbabu-okitipupa and Akotgbo in Ondo state.



**Plate 1.2:** NNPC Vandalised pipeline in Forcados, Burutu LGA, Delta State, Nigeria

**Source:** the nation newspaper, [nonlineng.net](http://nonlineng.net)

Poor and damaged pipeline installation is a contributory factor to huge loss experienced in transporting oil product in the country. An example of a damaged pipeline in Forcados, Burutu LGA of Delta State is shown in plate 1.2.

The emergence of Oodua Peoples' Congress (OPC) is often linked to the annulment of 1993 Nigerian presidential election by military government under General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, IBB. After a long transition programme, Chief Moshood Abiola, the acclaimed winner of the election was prevented from taking over office and later imprisoned in 1994. The annulment of the 'June 12' election in 1993 made the Yoruba protest against the regime of Sanni Abacha military government. The Yorubas united under different umbrella organisations such as the Campaign for Democracy (CD) and the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO). In July 1994, shortly after Abiola's arrest, the Oodua Liberation Front (OLF) was founded, followed in September 1994 by the Oodua Youth Movement (OYM) and a range of other ethno-nationalist organisations, many of which evoked the name of the mythical founder of human civilisation in Yoruba land, Oduduwa or Oodua. OPC was founded by late Dr. Fredrick Fasehun in 1994 as a socio-ethnic militant pressure group and a pan-Yoruba political organisation that emerged essentially with the purpose of championing Yoruba causes and interests as result of the annulment of late Chief MKO Abiola's presidential election victory on June 12, 1993. Subsequently, the fundamental agitation for autonomy and social liberation of the Yorubas' OPC in 1999, during former president Obasanjo's administration changed this fundamental objective to crime-combating activities and settlement of individual disputes within their immediate community (Akinyele, 2001). This was suspected by the public to have been motivated by the fame of other so-called Bakassi Boys vigilante in the southeast Nigeria.

OPC could not be fully discussed without mentioning these two important characters of Dr. Fredrick Fasehun and Iba Gani Adams. Their history and formation of OPC are considered synonymous. Frederick Isiotan Fasehun was born on 21<sup>st</sup> September, 1935. He was a medical practitioner, hospitality manager and frontrunner of the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC). He studied at Blackburn College from where he proceeded to Aberdeen University College of Medicine. He was also at the Liverpool Postgraduate School and thereafter obtained Fellowship of the Royal-College-of-Surgeons. He later enrolled for acupuncture

in China under a collaborating World Health Organization(WHO) and United Nations(UN) Development Scholarships Package in 1976. He thereafter established an Accupuncture Unit at the Lagos State University Teaching Hospital(LUTH) where he resigned in 1978 and immediately set up his own Besthope Hospital and Accupuncture Centre in Lagos. Fasehun was detained for a considerable length of time from the month of December-1996 to June 1998 during the tactical regime of General Sani Abacha, which finished eighteen-days afterward Abacha demise. He later gave up the ghost at the emergency unit of Lagos State University Teaching Hospital on December 1, 2018 at 83 years old. The personality of Iba Ganiyu Adams was equally relevant for mentioning here. Chief Ganiyu Adams was born on 30<sup>th</sup> April, 1970. He is a freedom fighter and the 15<sup>th</sup> personality to assume the traditional position of Aare Ona Kakanfo of Yoruba kingdom. In 1992, he was noticed as a functioning supportive of leftist by lobbying for majority rules system with his tussle to deflect tactic standard in Nigeria. The struggle however, landed him a nomination as the image maker of Mushin Local Government Division of Civil Liberties Group, CLG in 1993 which is a gathering that seeks after the advancement of basic liberties in the country. He was additionally a dynamic member of Oodua Youth Development, OYM and part of the pioneer members of the Oodua Peoples Congress in the year 1994 when he was 23years old. He was the main Public Representative Facilitator and afterward the current Public Organizer of Oodua People groups Congress. Aare-Gani was the head of a group of the Oodua People groups Congress at one time before reconciliation with Fasehun main body of OPC. He rose to cross country notoriety after the then Inspector-General of Police; Musiliu Smith announced him needed in the year 2000 with a monetary prize of N100, 000(One Hundred Thousand Naira) for his group association in vicious conflicts. Aare-Gani was at last captured on August 22, 2001, however was subsequently delivered in the wake of being detained in prisons in Abuja, Lagos and Abeokuta (Babawale T., 2003).

The OPC has been involved in many urban conflicts with 54 riots between October 1998 and February 2002 either by fighting police or other ethnic militia groups (Mare- Anthonie de Montcles, 2015). For example ethnic clashes at shagamu, ketu/mile12 market, Alaba market, Ajegunle, Idi-araba, in Lagos. Vigilante violence, killings of policemen, arrest, detention and torture of OPC leaders and rank and file members including extrajudicial exections in 2003 are noticed. Their roles in trying to police the southwestern Nigeria cities

frequently resort to extra judiciary executions with the urban dwellers popularity, testify to the crises in Nigerian Crime control System (Akinyele, 2003). Beyond this, Mare- Anthonie de Montcles (2015) noted that the development of private security organisation in Africa should not be seen as an action against the state but as a way to supplement its deficiencies in crime prevention and control.

Recognising the fact that primarily the objective of any state is safety of lives and properties of populace, this has not been achieved by relevant government agencies responsible for security, hence the strife to seek other mediums of protection in Nigeria. According to Thomas Hobbes(1972) in his classic book, *The Leviathan*, those invested with the state's authority (members of executive, legislature and judiciary) are to protect the weak people from the strong where the life of man will no longer be threatened by loneliness, poverty, and physical violence.

Public Private Partnership (PPP) is a model that encourages the public sector to connect the dexterity that the private sector can provide to deliver definite services usually procured and delivered by public sector. Multi-sectored concerted alliance is practised on a variety of private to public in diverse degrees of execution according to the need, point in time and the concern at hand (Weimer and Vining 2005). It must be noted that in some cases, non-state armed groups were seen as protectors of the laws who preserve, protect and defend the constitutions as seen in the United States (Hodgson and Thomas, 2007). In order to save cost, the use of private security company was given contract to fight the war of Iraq and Afghanistan in partnership with the government. Could it be possible for OPC to collaborate for the benefit of the state using the advantage of acclaimed local charms to protect the oil pipelines installations in the southwestern Nigeria?

Crude oil worth trillion of naira is stolen from Nigeria yearly from the activities of vandals which are sold in the international markets through cash laundering, deferred payments, intermediaries, shell companies, tax havens, bank officials inducement, recycling currency through supposed justifiable investments and money purchase of magnificent goods. According to the NNPC, (2016) America, Thailand, China, Brazil, Balkans and Indonesia are the major destinations where stolen crudes oil from Nigeria is sold. Also, The Nation newspaper (2016) citing the Global Financial Integrity reported in 2014, posited that crude



oil theft through vandalism remains Nigeria's main problem as 92.9% of total Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) from Nigeria are recorded to be oil connected.

Over the years, the Southwestern region of Nigeria has continued to witness increased incidences of vandalism and its impacts as witnessed in Arepo in year 2015 (Ogun state), Abule-Egba in 2008, 2016 and 2018 (Lagos state). Vandals have become more daring in activities and operation with many brandishing sophisticated weapons to display strength and capacity. The activities of vandals have had implications on Nigeria at large and the southwestern states in particular, these include: financial loss to the government, loss of lives of the civilians and security agents, destruction of properties as well as sabotage to the economy. These implications necessitated the government co-opting the OPC in the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwest Nigeria. This study therefore examined the OPC and the protection of oil pipeline installations in the southwestern Nigeria.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

The problem of pipelines vandalism is not new in Nigeria; focussing on the 21<sup>st</sup> century, record shows that the first experienced point along Niger river passes through Ondo, Imo, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwalbom, Abia, Cross river and Delta states whereof community are mainly peasant farmers (legit.ng 20017). This was highlighted by the impacts of the menace on Nigeria's national income and economy, the environmental degradation, fire explosion as a result of oil pipeline disaster, media political propaganda against pipeline protection, corruption and conspiracy among government officials. Recognising these problems, the federal government enacted the Petroleum Production and Distribution Act in 1975, also known as Anti-Sabotage Act (Miscellaneous Provision) as a law punishable by death or 21 years imprisonment. (Phil-Eze, cited in Onuoha, 2007) which has not debarred vandals from the criminal act.

In furtherance to this, former president Goodluck Ebele Azikiwe Jonathan, GEJ (2010 to 2015) in 2013 awarded security contracts of the country's waterways and surveillance of national infrastructure like the oil and gas pipeline. The Movement for Emancipation of Niger-Delta (MEND) was awarded the contract to watch over the country's coastline and fight against piracy and the Oodua Peoples' Congress (OPC) got awarded 4billion naira

contract for the surveillance of the oil and gas pipeline installations in Southwestern Nigeria (People's Daily, March 24, 2015). In spite of the contending relevance of the non state armed group, in crime control their ways is uncivil due to their aggressive and inexplicable form (Nolte, 2007: 219). Almost all members of these groups are affiliated to religious, ethnicity, regional and sectional goals that portray threat to a moderate society. There has not been an intensive effort to study the role of the NSCDC in managing pipeline installations vis-à-vis the overlap of statutory functions, institutional mandate and area of jurisdiction before involving the OPC in the security duties.

Over the years, (Isirimah et al 2006, Egberongbe, et al, 2006) had emphasised that disruption from the non-state armed group especially Niger Delta area is one of the core basis of oil spillages in Nigeria. They deal in illegal oil bunkering and destroy pipeline to siphon oil. Records has shown that 50% of damaged pipes is as a result of corrosion, about 28% to sabotage, about 21% to oil production services, while only 1% of the spills is owed to tragedy drills, failure to efficiently manage oil wells, machine faults and insufficient control in loading and offloading oil vessels. Some of these pipelines are obsolete. Oil pipes that supposed to be replaced every 15 to 20 years are being used for up to 20 to 25 years, making them subjected to corrosion and leakages. Many of the oil passages are laid ordinarily on land surface devoid of any shield whatsoever which expose them to wear and tear due to climatic damages. Vandalism had resulted into road haulage for petroleum products in Nigeria which was previously conveyed through pipes. This concern has elated the pressure of passage on the road network as well as massive strain on its lifespan across Nigeria. Furthermore, the increased incidence of vandalism has resulted to human loss and annihilation of resources value at millions; environmental contamination and destruction of marine life as well as sabotage to the economy of the southwestern states in particular and Nigeria at large.

Extant studies related to oil pipelines exist; Chao-feng and Mei-ting, (2009) noted that most part of the world, networks of pipeline infrastructures have become economically viable because of its ease and convenience. Writing on oil pipelines in Nigeria, scholars (Brume, 2007, Nnah and Owei, 2005) wrote on the distance and vast tracts of land across Nigeria occupied by oil pipelines. Onuoha, (2009, 2008) placed attention on the foundation and

regularity of vandalism which occurrence had been enlarged since its reportage in the early 1990s. Fadeyibi et al., (2009) posited that more than 500 lives were reported perished in a single pipeline explosion. The fire outbreak that occurred in another scene at Abule-Egba suburb of Lagos in 2008 was also reported.

After the approval of OPC involvement it was expected that government security agents will maintain status-quo despite the fact that they are not always on the same page. This move which was perceived to instigate partnership in securing the national assets of oil pipelines supposed to be noble but dangerous at the same time. This kind of arrangement has never been experienced on such sensitive security assignment to secure national critical infrastructure of oil pipeline installations before in Nigeria. The Vanguard Newspaper disclosed that vandalism in the oil industry is orchestrated by the same militants and kidnap of foreign oil workers to show seriousness of coercion and blackmail in the demands. (legit.ng 20017) Some even consider the assignment as politically motivated. That's why academic focus on it in the past can be considered not adequate as it looks as if the government is asking the mouse to take charge and care for the cat.

Studies which have focused on the OPC largely examined the origin of the group as well as its aim, objectives and the successes achieved combined with public perceptions about the groups. For instance, Duruji, (2010) did a comparative assessment of OPC in southwest against MASSOB in southeast, Nigeria. From the foregoing, it is observable that little of these studies covering the phenomenon of non state armed groups in Nigeria examined the involvement of OPC and the protection of oil pipeline installations around southwestern Nigeria and. Existing studies have as well deserted the area of partnership and collaboration with a private group in the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria. These are some of the gaps that the current study wishes to address.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

The following questions were raised during the course of field survey, to guide the collection of data for this study:

- i. Who is responsible for oil pipeline installations protection in southwestern Nigeria?
- ii. What are the OPC's challenges over the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria?
- iii. How has collaboration and partnership between government security agencies and OPC impacted on the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria?
- iv. What are the implications of the lessons learnt on National Security?

### **1.4 Aim and Objectives of the Study**

The aim of the study is to examine the Oodua Peoples Congress and the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria from 2006 to 2019. The specific objectives are as follows, to:

- i. Determine who is responsible for oil pipeline installation protection in southwestern Nigeria
- ii. Ascertain OPC's challenges over the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria.
- iii. Identify the impacts of collaboration and partnership between government security agencies and OPC on oil pipelines protection in southwestern Nigeria
- iv. Explore the implications of lessons learnt on National Security.

### **1.5 Scope of the Study**

The geographical scope of the study is the southwestern states of Lagos, Ogun, Oyo and Ondo that are purposely selected due to regular recorded incidence of vandalism and the area of OPC operations. Osun and Ekiti were excluded from this study because Osun has

its pipelines submerged under river as its on shore which is not easily accessible to vandals and Ekiti oil pipelines are sited on a hilly terrain that make it inaccessible to vandals. On an arrangement of the time scope, 2006 – 2019 was adopted. This period witnessed the peak period of oil pipeline protection in the southwestern Nigeria by OPC which was introduced by the federal government contract of 2013.

### **1.6 Significance of the Study**

The significant of the study was anchored on its ability to have established the role and capacity of non-state armed group like OPC in the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwest for the sake of returning peace and safety to the Nigerian citizenry that the country deserved. Such knowledge was a new departure from traditional approach to a foreign approach of securing Nigeria oil pipeline against vandalism. Hitherto, state apparatus were the only constitutionally empowered agents of government that protect and secure oil pipelines but the motive behind the role of non-state actors like the OPC in protecting oil pipeline installations in Nigeria was a new experiment in the field of security architecture that is not sufficiently covered in studies before now. It had also identified useful measures upon which government and a non-state armed group, OPC can be more strategically partner with local communities living along the right of way ROW to consolidate on peace process in the region. This was very important because the crusade for peace and security had obviously gone beyond the government alone or any single institution for that matter to handle without the collective multi-sectarian institutions and stakeholders participation. Measures identified by this study intend to provide the basis and background for collaboration among which can increase our understanding on the nature of relationship between the non-state armed group and the security sector like the military, the police, civil defence and other paramilitary agencies in the country.

In addition, as oil has become a global issue, the study was further significant on the grounds that it identified some of the causative factors that threaten the consolidation of peace in southwestern Nigeria concernig the transportation methods of products along oil pipeline networks or through road. This is necessary because diagnosis of identified threats of vandalism is perhaps the first step toward the consolidation of peace, safety and security in Nigeria.

## 1.7 Justification of the Study

The study was justified in the following ways:

- 1) The study stood to benefit among others, the Nigerian government, security agencies, communities where government oil and gas pipeline installations are situated, policy planners, the local and international investors in oil and gas sectors as they will find it as useful tool in understanding the operations and role of NSCDC in catching up with some of the security challenges on oil pipeline installations protection facing the citizenry.
- 2) It will also seek to expand on the growing debate of the moral justification by incorporating informal security outfits such as OPC, into mainstream of security sector.
- 3) It will contribute to the existing and growing literatures on activities of Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps.
- 4) The study could be of immense benefit to scholars and researchers as a key reference material and an instrument for further research initiatives.

## 1.8 Operational Definition of Terms

The definition of concepts was operationally aligned as follows:

**Oodua Peoples Congress, OPC:** The meaning OPC as used in the study referred to members of non state actors, non-state armed group or militia in southwestern Nigeria. They are awarded security contract by the Nigerian government for the surveillance and protection of oil and gas pipeline in the southwestern Nigeria.

**Oil pipeline Installation:** These are the facilities that enable oil companies to carry out the activities of production, circulation and marketing of petroleum products across the country.

**Vandalism:** means an act of deliberately destroying or defacing oil pipelines either for the purposes of sabotage or theft of crude oil content.

**Partnership and collaboration:** means private stakeholder with public institution, whose cooperation was much desired in the safety and upkeep of the oil pipeline installations against vandalism in a criminal turbulent and unstable environment like Nigeria.

**Criminal offence:** Oil pipeline vandalism was a criminal offence that are harmful act which was not only to some people but the whole community, society or state and punishable by law.

**Security:** Could be described as the measure of struggle respond to threat or the fortification from harm. It applies to any person, important state asset such as Oil pipeline installations, nation, or organisation assets.

**Protection:** the act or process that kept the oil pipeline safe from vandalism and crude oil theft through detection and prevention of threats with the use of policies, strategies and technology as response strategy.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

The chapter reviews the relevant literature to the study and describes theoretical framework which includes the Queer Ladder Theory and Conspiracy Theory that provides guidance in explaining the issues under investigation. The review that is within the purview of OPC was based on the concept of partnerships and collaboration with recognised security agents of government to protect the nation oil pipelines installations in southwestern Nigeria. This describes the key concept that is critical to the study.

#### **2.1 Conceptual Clarification**

The conceptual clarification of key concepts caught the attention of the study in this section. The essence is to refocus on relevant concepts within the context of the study. The following key concepts are explained briefly below with the purpose of offering details in the literature section.

- i) Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC)  
NSCDC here refers to the social, paramilitary agency of the Federal Republic of Nigeria(FRN) that was established in 1967 after the Civil war of secessionist, Biafra as a voluntary and humanitarian agents under the former Federal Ministry of Internal affairs now Federal Ministry Interior with an Act 2003 that placed them in the mainstream as fully fledged security and law enforcement government agents (ministryofinterior.gov.ng 2021) similar in outfit to Nigeria Immigration Service NIS, Nigeria Customs Service NCS, Nigeria Correctional Services, NCs and Nigeria Fire Service NFS including the Nigeria Police Force NPF.



ii) Oil pipeline protection

The essence of securing oil pipelines is therefore to scare vandals away from such location. This can be done by communities, civilians and security agents depending on the level of threat. The pipeline protection needs physical security through surveillance of the right of way for proper monitoring and sanctioning perpetrators through prosecution of offenders.

iii) Oil pipeline vandalisation

Pipeline vandalisation includes acts of illegal bunkering, destruction of oil pipeline installations to siphon fuel, scooping fuel from busted oil pipes and deliberate operation of oil terrorism (Onuoha, 2007). It refers to pipeline vandalism as wilful destructive act of damaging petroleum pipeline installations aimed at crude oil and related petroleum products theft.

iv) Non State Armed Group

The militia aspect of non-state actors also known as non state armed group including OPC, is seen as paramilitary forces not controlled by the state. According To Williams (2008:10), a militia can be understood as an “irregular armed force operating within the territory of a weak and/or failing state. They exist due to man’s desire to protect his interest. They are involved in different activities in every society where they are found. Most of these activities are either positive or negative and the types of activities they execute depend on their goals. The interest they have driven is based on their actions notwithstanding the public perceptions on them as terror and hoodlums. Some were even believed to belong to cult groups.

## 2.2 Literature

The literature review ran through vandalism as a major problem confronting the pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria. The concept discussed challenges overseas, Africa and Nigeria was dissected. The understandings of the space known as Nigeria and its neighbourhoods came to bear. Causes, effect, constraint and the curbing of vandalism was reviewed. The non state armed group including Odua Peoples Congress also came up. The

oil companies including NNPC, PPMC, DPR and the likes with their vision and mission also came up. Oil pipeline installation challenges and establishment of non state armed group are discussed. The relevance of security in the society, government initiatives and interventions with National Security Objectives are considered for review. The role of the Nigeria Security agencies and the National Grand Strategy was reviewed. The role of the Nigeria Security and Civil defence corps with its mandate on pipeline installation protection in fighting vandalism was critically dissected. The review concluded after examining the issue of community policing and pipeline vandalism.

### **2.2.1 Review on Vandalism**

Vandalism is a concept that is applicable to this study mainly because it occurs before stakeholders begin to start the protection that affected oil pipelines. Vandalism is a criminal act of damaging or defacing the property of others or culture jamming on smuggling; an example of vandalism includes destruction of graffiti art, billboard and possibly crop circles (Gadekar, Dhakne, and Chavan, 2013). Vandalism occurs when people destroy or spoil with impunity, those things that ought to be preserved (Adukwu-Bolujoko, 2011). Vandalism is a situation where youths or people deliberately carry out acts which pave way for the destruction, defacement or damaging of public infrastructure. In fact vandalism is an act of hooliganism against the state and demands timely intervention by policy makers because it undermines the actualisation of sustainable development. Vandalism is caused by vandals who are According to Okere (2011:6), seen as “people that deliberately destroy or disfigure natural or manmade work”.

Pipeline vandalism, refers to the wilful destructive act of damaging petroleum pipeline installations aimed at crude oil and related petroleum products theft. Pipeline vandalism includes acts of illegal bunkering, destruction of oil pipeline installations to siphon fuel, scooping fuel from busted oil pipes and deliberate operation of oil terrorism (Onuoha, 2007). Nigeria pipeline vandalism could be considered as sabotage which is capital offence under the Petroleum Act and Criminal Justice Decree of 1975 (Miscellaneous Provision) (Phil-Eze, cited in Onuoha, 2007). Pipeline vandalism linked with explosion has generated

severe danger to ecosystem, oil spillages, ecological contamination, farmland's damage, loss of lives and property within the pipeline host communities called pipeline right of way.

Records have shown that over 2,258 pipeline vandalism incidents were recorded between 2003 and early 2005 with areas of repeated pipeline breakages within the same range of time. This massive level of vandalism was reduced to unnoticeable figure in year 2006 due to the new operational strategies adopted by the leadership of NSCDC, and its vow to stamp out vandals in Nigeria society. Within this period of time, over 150 vandals has been discovered, arrested, investigated and handed over to relevant security agencies for more investigation and prosecution (Progress Report of NSCDC).

Former Nigeria Petroleum Minister of State, Ibe Kachikwu revealed the country had a record of over 3,000 pipeline vandalism in year 2010 and 2015; up to 643 million litres of petroleum products costing N51.28 billion was at loss in the year 2015. It was gathered that from January to June, 109 million litres of petroleum products and 560,000 barrels of crude was declared as loss in 1,600 cases of vandalism. Also, 850 million standard cubic feet of gas production was lost from the chaos and electricity outage experience from 2,700MW to 3,000MW (Daily Post, 2016). In fact, incessant vandalism of gas pipeline installations is responsible for the drop of 2,800 megawatts in the power sector.

**Table 2.1:** Vandalism and deaths toll in the southwestern Nigeria

<b>Year</b>	<b>Causes of incident</b>	<b>Deaths</b>
2006	Oil distribution	0
2007	Oil distribution	1
2008	Oil distribution	0
2009	Oil distribution	2
2010	Oil distribution	2
2011	Oil distribution	0
2012	Oil distribution	3
2013	Oil distribution	40
2014	Oil distribution	0
Total		48

**Source:** Nigeria Watch, 2014

**Table 2.2:** Vandalised-Prone Areas in the southwestern Nigeria

S/NO	STATE	VANDALISM PRONE AREAS
I	Ogun	Abujana, Shagamu, Ojere, Ogunmakin, Isa Idun in Obafemi OwodeLGA
Ii	Lagos	Amuwo-Odofin, Ilado- Odo Village,
Iii	Oyo	Iresa Area
Iv	Ondo	Akotogbo Beach in Irele LGA and Agbabu-Okitipupa

**Source:** The Defender, Vol.1

Table 2.2 describes states and villages that are prone to vandalism areas in the southwestern Nigeria where pipelines distribution right of way passes through. Vandals find their ways to these remote areas to cause havoc and even steal oil products from the pipelines except Osun state where vandalism is not much because the pipelines are laid beneath Osun rivers. It has been observed that some states of the federation are more prone to vandalism while critical infrastructures are all over the country Nigeria.

### **2.2.2 Global Vandalism challenges of Pipeline Installations**

It was discovered that multinational pipeline transportation is a valuable, safest and environmental affordable ways of haulage the petroleum products to an expanse space, locally or globally. (Dey, 2003) The networks of pipeline installations in the world have become economically crucial (Chao-feng and Mei-ting, 2009). External interference had been noticed as a hindrance which is caused either by nature or human interruption. (Dey et al., 1996) The bulk haulage of petroleum products in America are through network of pipelines (Morrow et al., 2006). In the North and South America uninterrupted operation of network petroleum transportation had become the practice so much so that their economy depends on it. Just like in the USA, over 68% of petroleum produce are said to be conveyed through their pipeline installations. This can guarantee cost of man-hour and availability of the product across the country. The popular use of transporting petroleum product through pipeline installation in America has not been without their challenges which are considered as natural, operational and terrorist attack. Tectonic activities are used to detect the challenges faced from pipeline product haulage across America which was due to majority of disruptions experienced in the product transportation. The damaged to oil pipeline due to operational factors are rated as secondary in the scale of challenges in America. It was also gathered that damaged to oil pipeline installations due to terrorist attacks are rare in America. It was only suggested through simulation exercise conducted after the 9/11 attack that terrorist are likely to aim at national infrastructure including oil pipeline installations system so as to invoke a huge magnitude of damage in the country so that supply of the product can become a scarce commodity. Moteff (2005), the 9/11 commission of enquiry in the United States of America called for robust evaluation of all critical infrastructural administration plan and also recommend measures to safeguard diverse systems of haulage

in the country including central support to both the state and local government specifically for safeguarding national infrastructures like the oil pipeline installations through adequate provision of budgetary allocation. The pipeline networks in America are so huge, multifaceted and interconnected that the perceptiveness of how they operate, develop faults, fail and continued became a significant challenge. Although advanced technologies are developed to support the designing, planning, managing and maintenance of all public and private infrastructures such as oil pipeline in the United States but rapid advances in connectivity create major challenges. The level of cooperation of the immediate communities where pipelines traverse known as right of way ROW lies as a key factor to the success of the product transportation. The strip of land that is up to 18 m (60 ft) broad is the ROW in Canada which allows oil workers access to pipeline inspection, testing and maintenance. It also allows the space to be identified for restriction in order to protect the public, land owners and their families from potential hazard that may occur due to pipeline failures.

### **2.2.3 Pipeline Vandalism Challenges in Canada**

Canada Emergency Management Board, CNEB has established 30 meters safety zone on each side of pipeline ROW. There are also permanent markers on the road, rail and other infrastructures along the ROW. This will show approximate location of buried pipelines in order for people to avoid activities that may jeopardise or compromise the buried pipelines. There are variations in the depth and location of the pipelines that traverse many ecosystems from across rivers, cultivated farm land and sub arctic tundra to urban settlements. (Dey, 2003) The CNEB provision of 30-metre safety zone on both sides of the ROW is that pipeline installations network can be adequately protected from the challenging environment and 60 meters safety zone is prohibited for the use of explosives which must be reported immediately in case of mistakes.

#### **2.2.4 Pipeline Vandalism Challenges in India**

The Indian authority carefully reviews available modes of transporting oil product with a view of finding the most effective and safest means to be through pipeline installations. Therefore India product transportation failures are considered infinitesimal when evaluated with related rail and road transport which has witnessed adverse failure within the environment. The Indian experience on the petroleum pipeline installations are natural problem such as landslide, upheaval and other tectonic factors within the earth crust which is different from the act of man-made nature of vandalism like the one going on in Nigeria.

#### **2.2.5 Pipeline Vandalism Challenges in the Caspian Region**

Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan that are Caspian region pipeline installations are subjected to international politics (Starr and Cornell, 2005). The activities and administration of pipelines includes multinational interest which spread across Europe. Apart from the economic benefits derived from the pipelines in Azerbaijan, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline installations is an asset to the country due to its sustainable management interest which is considered to be beyond its national boundaries. The pipeline installations in this area relies less on foreign territories for export of the oil product as basis for an economic, cultural and safety ties with Turkey as well as Western Europe. This measure has ensured no high risk of vandals around the pipeline ROW as strict supervision of constituted authorities has zero tolerance to the act.

### **2.3 Nigeria Boundaries**

Nigeria as it was before describing the southwestern Nigeria in a geographical mapping is a federal republic divided to 37 states including the Federal Capital Territory which was further subdivided into 774 Local Government Areas. The country is located in West Africa with a total land mass of 923,768 square kilometres or 356,668 square miles (sq. mi). Nigeria shares its international borders of 4,470km (2513 mile) having Benin Republic in the West but the boundaries shared in the East are Chad and Cameroon while in the North is the Niger Republic. The Atlantic Ocean, extending to the Gulf of Guinea, forms the southern boundary to the sea. Other immediate neighbours to Nigeria include the Republic of Equatorial



Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe, which are of strategic significance to Nigeria's security and territorial integrity. Besides the strategic location and contiguity of these countries, Nigeria shares close affinities and historical, cultural as well as ethnic links with all these countries. (nigeriaembassyusa.org 2013)

Nigeria is considered to be the largest inhabited black nation in the world, with inhabitants of about 140 million, National Population Commission (NPC, 2006:56). The country constitutes many ethnicities with the three most influential ones is the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba. Its population is split into almost half within the Muslims and the Christians while a relatively small minority are undertaking traditional believes as well as other non-Christian and non-Muslim religions.

Nigeria situates entirely within the tropical zone, there exists indication of widespread climatic discrepancy across the country. When we observed closely to the coast, the seasons are not roughly defined, the temperatures rarely exceed 32°C (90°F), but humidity is extremely high. Moving up into the land, there are two observed separate seasons which is the rainy season around April to October, with generally low temperature and the dry season from November to March and a midday temperature that surpasses 38°C (100°F) but relatively cool nights. In the south, it has lowlands that climb and hills and plateaus in the central part of the country. In the south east, there are mountains while the north consists mainly of plains. Thus, the south is tropical while the north is arid.workmall.com (2012).

Aiyede (2006:45) states that Nigeria is operating the presidential system with three distinct and complementary arms of government named Executive, Legislative and Judiciary. At the federal level the executive arm consist of the president and commander in chief of the armed forces with the vice president and ministers as the Federal Executive Council members while at the State Executive Council there is the Governor, Deputy Governor and Honourable Commissioners. It was also observed that at Local Government Council there are the Chairman, vice chairman and councillors Equally in government at the federal level are the legislatures with 109 senators at the Senate and 360 honourables in the House of Representatives with the two combined to form the National Assembly which can compared to be the American Congress. The state level legislatures considered as the House of Assembly. All the executive members and legislators except the ministers at federal level

and the Commissioners at state level are elected into office for four years term. In the country the judiciary is the one that construe the laws and arbitrate between the executives and the legislators in case on conflicts. The Supreme Court is known as the highest court, with Court of Appeal as the next, while Federal High Court, magistrate court, and Customary Court follow in descending order. (Yagboyaju, 2003:12-19). It would be hazardous for product loss with risk of loss of containment, fire incidence and environmental destruction. It is highly necessary to conduct pipeline risk assessment as strategy to develop the right way and policies for safety measures from danger.

**Nigeria map and international boundaries**



**Figure 2.1:** Nigeria map and international boundaries  
Source: Cartography Dept., University of Ibadan, 2016


Figure 2.1 above presents Nigeria showing the international boundaries and the 36 States of the federation. However, the southwest states include Lagos, Oyo, Ondo, Ekiti, Osun and Ogun State. This study concentrates only on pipeline vandalised prone areas of the southwestern Nigeria which consist of Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, and Ondo states which exclude Osun and Ekiti States. The population of the south west region is estimated at 32.5 million people. The region is dominated by Yoruba ethnic group who make up approximately 21% of nation population.

The figure 2.2 below presents the map showing various networks of pipeline installations within the Nigeria territory.

Figure 2.2 is showing the network of pipeline installations used in carrying product that are Premium Motor Spirit, (PMS), House Hold Kerosene, (HHK) and Automated Gas Oil, (AGO). The systems are arranged with five operational regions. NNPC operates 5001 kilometers through PPMC that is ancillary of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. Five refineries in Nigeria include the one in Kaduna, Warri, and the other two are situated in Port Harcourt having 438,750 billion b/d. The refinery in Kaduna is connected to the Escravos terminal bypass Warri via the products installations.

Oil pipelines are considered to be the safest ways of transporting crude oil in Nigeria instead of road truck and takers that used them as alternative transportation of the liquid products.

## Network of oil pipeline installations in Nigeria



**Figure 2.2:** Network of oil pipeline installations in Nigeria

Source: NNPC Headquarters Abuja, 2016



**Plate 2.1:** Nigeria Pipeline installations design  
**Source:** [sw.aveva.com](http://sw.aveva.com)

Above design of plate 2.1 shows the expression of oil pipeline installations network in Nigeria. The complex network notwithstanding as they are faced with the challenge of vandals attacks. The following geographical expression indicated the various positions of oil fields, gas fields and the Refineries in Southern parts of Nigeria.








Figure 2.3 above is a sectional map of Nigeria showing Oil field and Gas fields with refineries in the Niger Delta as major critical infrastructure support to the country economy but are susceptible to vandal's attacks.

Figure 2.4 provides the general view map of oil and gas pipelines in Southwestern states of Nigeria. Major oil and gas blocks are distinctly indicated with the associated downstream network which includes LNG facilities, pipelines, refineries, gas processing plants and tanker terminals. These are susceptible to vandalism as demonstrated on 12 July 2016 when suspected Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) threatened earlier to extend their attacks on oil facilities from Niger Delta to Lagos State; they vow to cripple the Nigerian economy. Akinloye (2016) reported that alleged Niger Delta non state armed men had blown up a gas pipeline in PZ estate around Ogijo in Ogun State. He recalls that the militants have carried out the attacks under the pretence that they were officials of the NNPC on maintenance patrol. They destroyed oil facility that served 11.4 distribution lines in Ikorodu, Lagos state. This infrastructure is crucial for the country. This is part of non-state actor's strategy to coerce the government in bending policies to favour their community for an economic gain. It is noteworthy that they were the same group now charged to protect the oil pipelines against vandals.

## Oil and Gas Pipelines in Southwestern States of Nigeria



**Figure 2.4:** Oil and Gas Pipelines in Southwestern States of Nigeria

Source: Cartography Dept., University of Ibadan, 2016

### 2.3.1 Causes of Oil Pipeline Vandalism in Nigeria

- i) **Widespread Poverty and Ignorance:** Onuoha (2007) reveals that poverty can be used as a consequence to vandalism in the areas terms of ambiguity of oil pipeline blast, which pointed to the fact that the poor are hardest hit in the case of oil pipeline blast in the country. He argued further that the rich vandal's are backing these threats to human's life security and are concealed as well as the material situation of the victims plus the sophisticated technology that needs to be deployed in the nefarious acts. He also argued that the current situation not only accounts for the regular pipeline vandalism but provides reasons for government failure of compensating victims of pipeline explosion and evolves proactive disaster response strategies. He therefore advocates the integration of disaster management framework into government's overall effort of poverty reduction in Nigeria. Abolurin (2008) corroborates the fact that poverty is a major cause of pipeline vandalism by scooping bussed pipeline to steal fuel. Also, he identified greed and grievance as causes of pipeline vandalism in Nigeria as well.
  
- ii) **Faulty and corrosive pipelines:** The easily accessible pipes, which often run through slums and informal settlements in burgeoning cities, are tempting to desperately poor communities, who often have no electricity and must rely on oil lamps for lightening and power (Vidal, 2011),The outdated pipelines are known to have been laid for long above it expiring date. Possible faulty unrepaired pipelines for long are contributory to its vulnerability to vandalism. Deterioration of pipelines used in transportation networks, makes these pipelines susceptible to punctures, breaks and exposure for vandals that are with the sole purpose of stealing petroleum products.
  
- iii) **Unfulfilled expectations and promises:** The Federal Government and oil producing companies were hopefully expected that they would develop the Niger Delta by providing social amenities such as employment, healthcare, road networks, electric power, youth empowerment programs, and community development. However, little or no development came from them, which leads to mass poverty of

this region. Illegal land acquisition, neglect and misuse of special development funds are observed causing lots of uprisings. These eventually make vandalism as a reaction to sabotage the government with the added insecurity within the community.

- iv) Environmental degradation of the hosting communities:** After thirty years of pilferage of the Niger Delta in 1990s, militia groups began to protest against population displacement, environmental degradation and eco-system damage of their communities. This damage of the eco-system on the farmlands, water bodies in the terrain without adequate and appropriate clean-ups results to low economic activities and access to clean water of the host communities are contributory factors to vandalism.
- v) Corrupt leadership and bureaucracy:** Amidst the oil boom of 1970s, the power groups monopoly of the oil sector set in. “Special rewards” of oil resources went to affiliates of political elites, these special rewards were perpetrated through briberies of Federal, State, local communities and clan leaders causing an unequal distribution of oil wealth resources amongst certain well privileged 1% of Nigerians.
- vi) Greed and youthful exuberance:** Some die-hard young individuals are of the delusion to get rich quick through this scheme. This occurs when wealthy overlord criminals meddle on these youth minds by deceiving them through provision of tools for breaking oil pipeline for their own selfish interests and in turn provide cash rewards to promote vandalism of the pipelines. Inordinate ambition to amass wealth also sets in for the youth by looking at these overlords as role model.
- vii) Scarcity of petroleum products:** Nigeria continues to experience artificial scarcity of petroleum product due to vandalism of pipeline installations and the criminals are allowed to smile to the bank. The scarcity will definite affect the living standard of the people in various ways. This includes increase cost of transportation; social unrest; faulty electric power; high cost of food items; fuel adulteration and low standard of living. This problem had affected the price of the product that vehicle

owners cannot afford it. The NNPC demonstrate neither resources nor facilities to meet the fuel demand of the country. It hasn't storage facilities or the necessary network of distribution that is required to ensure steady flow of fuel across the country. Most of the fuel normally came through the Apapa port needed to be distributed throughout the country since pipeline installations distribution is longer attainable because of the problem of vandalism. Over time it was notices that it is very profitable to smuggled fuel to neighbouring countries of Niger, Ghana and Benin republic that has higher price for fuel than allowing the product within the country. The fuel smugglers had taken advantage of this situation to divert loaded fuel tankers to boarder service stations at these border towns in order to benefit in the high price syndrome. Fuel meant for Nigeria consumption is invariably supplied to other countries for consumption because of the love for money above all other interest in the country and lost out to them.

**viii) Poor policing /protection of oil pipelines:** The world considers Nigeria as oil endowed state, an example of a petro dependent economy with oil wealth and petroleum resources which accounted for about 75% of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings, thus, justifiably to say the stronghold of the country's economy. (Okoli, Al Chukwuma 2016).It doubled as a centre for the primitive accumulation of wealth as well as platform for criminality. Corrupt politician and cohorts has seized the opportunity to mess up the fuel in this sector. The significant of recognising oil wealth in Nigeria has shown some contradictory signal since we don't know whether to call it blessing or bad luck. Facing reality, the oil rich nations that have the tendency squander their oil wealth against development will never abuse or mismanage it.

Oil pipeline vandalism takes the form of sabotage that motivated for political reason or simply theft. It can also be argued that industrial uprising, militancy and terrorism which can be described as physical or technical in nature. The sabotage of oil is seen as the physical when many of the prime targets have physical presence at the oil and gas infrastructure site. This scenario looks like a vicious cycle of criminality due to

grievances against state and oil companies over resources. The non state armed group in the Niger Delta has taken arms and damaging pipeline installations as a vocation of recent. This action from them in the 2000s almost condemns petroleum infrastructure resources within their local community. The importance attached to the situation compel the federal government to resort to peace bargain with irate of the non state armed group having a deal that end up with amnesty programme.(Okoli, Al Chukwuma and David, Nachanaa 2016). The Amnesty programme was design to demobilise, demilitarise and reintegrate the youth of the Niger Delta in Nigeria. It is perceived that the cost of indulging in vandalism and other crimes with impunity is higher than the reward as if cautions are not taken, future destruction awaits the criminal and losses to the government are imminent.

**ix) Oil black market Flourishing:** The former political sabotage of the Niger Delta non state armed men have changed to an organized crime of recent who now vandalise for the purpose of oil theft in order to enrich their pockets. They organize oil theft through paying some group to break into the pipelines and scoop thousands liters of it in gallon. They can even gather all they could scoop in badges and export it out of the country with the help of corrupt bureaucrats including officials of the oil facilities and some of the security forces. (Global Journals Inc. (US) 2013).This depicts compromise and conspiracy among others.

### 2.3.2 Effects of Oil Pipeline Vandalism in Nigeria

The effect of pipeline vandalism includes a huge economic loss from the shutdown plant against pollution, fire disaster that kills in thousands, scarcity of product due to shortages in supply and decrease in electricity with the attendant economic problem. Nigeria petroleum product are transported through the network of oil pipeline across the country but are poorly secured making them the target of vandals. Various strategic steps have been taken in the past by government to proffer solution but the problem persisted with a noticed increase. The effects are further enunciated as follows:

**i). Huge economic losses:** Nigeria economy will continue to be in shambles if pipeline installations are not given adequate and required protection against vandalism. It was discovered that several barrel of oil on daily basis were lost without remorse from the vandals who translate to the fact that Nigeria economy will continue to suffer.

Prince Haruna M from PPMC could recall that NNPC lost to pipeline vandals over ₦165 Billion between 2009 and 2012 due to theft of the petroleum product from installations. Recently the figure of losses to vandalism rose to over ₦1.011 trillion due to oil theft. ([www.legal-com/news.asp%3fmonth...](http://www.legal-com/news.asp%3fmonth...)). NEITI (2013) also present reports that Nigeria loss of 10.9 billion US Dollars due to oil theft and vandalism within the time of 2009 to 2011. The high loss indicated that Nigeria growth and development are being hampered and by implication will tell on her national security.

**ii). Pollution:** Freshwater pollution, air pollution, chemical pollution, soil and land pollution, unsustainable agricultural practice such as fish farming, biodiversity depletion, habitat and ecological systems loss and insecurity caused great damage to the Agricultural farmlands in the regions due to oil Pipeline vandalism. Majority of the public health issues are linked to aftermath effect of oil pipeline installations vandalism within the community living not too far away from ROW. Oil spill due to vandalism of pipeline can caused serious public hazard from contaminated water within the community. The government is expected to give support in form of health care facilities by assisting the affected communities.

**iii). Fire outbreaks and explosion:** The negativity impacted from vandalism of pipeline installations in the country is enormous. This can result into enormous fire disasters at large

scale to destroy cash crops such as cocoa, coffee, palm trees, rubber among others, which could have been harvested and sold for income. Human security is affected due to oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria. Lives and properties that are lost to explosions from pipeline vandalism were over 2,500 in the past 15 years. The plate below gives a good picture to drive home the scale of destruction at Forcados explosion.





**Plate 2.2** Fire explosions at Forcados pipeline installation

**Source:** [thisdaylive.com](http://thisdaylive.com)

**iv). Scarcity & shortage of petroleum products:** Fuel is used in a variety of activities ranging from production, mobility, cooking, electricity, supply and sources of foreign exchange. Business activities were brought to a light because there was no fuel, long queue of vehicles in the filling stations, Commuter stranded in the various bus stops with no hope of motor coming to take them to their various destinations and prices of commodities sky rocketed beyond the reach of the buyers. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) appointed Shell Trading and Shipping Company (STASCO), mobile producing Nigerian unlimited, Nigerian Agip Oil Company and EIF Petroleum Products Nigeria Limited to import refined petroleum products into the country. They are to replace Glencore of Switzerland which had handled refined petroleum products importation in the past. The companies are to import virtually all the refined petroleum products needed in the country as almost all the refineries cannot meet the needs of the nation. As the government contends with the choice of sources and suppliers, a seemingly more daunting task lies in the distribution of the products.

**v). Decrease in electricity supply:** Due to incessant pipeline vandalism, power availability was subjected to elements of chance and with undesired outcomes that adversely impact on power generation value chain. Gas pipeline vandalism was a huge threat factor to steady electricity generation and energy materials flow in the power sector of Nigeria. It can be said that the integrity of the gas pipeline occupies the first position in ensuring availability of electricity. However, the major setback with the gas pipeline network was the high vulnerability to attribute failures either by deterioration or deliberate sabotage which is subject to more risk than that of crude oil pipelines failures. Unfortunately, physical attacks on those pipeline facilities have continued to increase in the past decade and high foreign exchange rate has made replacement of damaged components difficult.

To put the consequence of the problem into perspective, Nigeria's installed capacity is put at 8866 MW with calculated available capacity of 6149 MW without the consideration of pipeline vandalism. Vandalism is capable of bringing power generation output to zero. This implies that for each of the vandalism that took place, 1.66 MW of power is lost. For the Nigerian population size of 150 million, this translates to 41 W per capita power requirements being lost on account of gas pipeline vandalism.

### **2.3.3 Measures Adopted in Curbing Vandalism**

The Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, (NSCDC) respond to the issue of pipeline vandalism using three different approaches - preventive diplomacy, use of force and the human security dimension (Abolurin, 2008).



**Plate 2.3:** Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Personnel  
**Source:** NSCDC [financialwatchngr.com](http://financialwatchngr.com) (2020)

**i) Preventive Diplomacy:** This entails application of physical security by posting the Corps for surveillance and presence towards ensuring that pipelines are not vandalised. Men and officers are posted to the communities through which pipelines pass and patrol the pipelines on daily basis.

**ii) Use of Force:** This is applicable where there are indication of pipeline installations vandalism and suspects is detected. In this respect, arrests are imposed with minimum force thereafter they are taken away for prosecution purposes.

**iii) Human Security Dimension:** In the case of fire outbreaks during pipeline vandalism, the Corps engages in disaster management to rescue and relief victims. As such, many have been saved by the quick intervention of the Corps members during cases of infernos resulting from pipeline vandalism.

Also, the Commandant-General of the Corps bought over 10,000 machines and launched “Operation Wipe out Vandals” in the 36 states of the Federation including the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (*The Defender*, Vol.1). With above machineries inn place, over 900 suspected vandals of petroleum products pipeline, PHCN transmission lines and NITEL and other telecommunication cables were arrested, investigated and handed over to relevant government agencies for further investigation and prosecution, such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Nigeria Police (Progress Report from NSCDC).

Furthermore, about 200 officers and men of the Anti-Vandal Department have attended various trainings and workshops to enhance their efficiency and productivity. The officers and men of this Department both at the National Headquarters and the thirty-six (36) states of the Federation have undergone vigorous training on techniques and skills on how to combat vandalism of PHCN, NITEL, Water and NNPC pipeline installations.

In the last one year, the Corps has impounded various tools used by vandals such as generators, drilling valves, pumping machines, welding machines, drilling/pipe machines, hoses and nozzles, shovels, diggers, surface tanks, drums, jerry-cans, vehicles, motorcycles,

sewing machines, including fifteen (15) boats and over one hundred (100) tanker loads of products from vandalised pipelines (Progress Report on the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps).

#### **2.3.4 Constraints Encountered During Anti-Vandals Drive**

Despite the fact that the NSCDC is trying everything possible within its powers to totally wipe out vandals of PHCN, NITEL, Water and NNPC pipeline installations, some setbacks were encountered which if not adequately addressed could cause a quagmire in effective job performance. Some of the encountered setbacks include the following:

- (1) **Frequent Arrest and Harassment of NSCDC Officers:** Frequent disagreement between the Corps and some other security agencies over the arrest of vandals has been a very serious problem. Some security agencies believe that the arrest of vandals is their function, but it is evidently clear that the NSCDC has been empowered and has the legitimate right to arrest and investigate vandals of oil pipeline, government infrastructure and public utilities as entrenched in the NSCDC Act, 2003, and the Amendment Act 2007 (The Defender, Vol. 1).
- (2) **Lack of Fire Arms:** The sophisticated nature of vandals' activities is of great concern, where they carry along with them state-of-the-art weapons with the aim of killing, maiming or injuring whoever comes their way in the process of vandalism. It has been noticed in several operations carried out by the Corps, where arms and other dangerous instruments were arrested with vandals. Sometimes, armed security agencies were seen assisting vandals and were equally arrested. Since the fire arms being used by the Corps in some cases could not match with that of the vandals in their operations, it has been a difficult task.
- (3) **Collaboration between Vandals and NNPC/PPMC Officials:** Engineers of PPMC/NNPC have been co-collaborators to vandals' activities, throughout the country. Vandals receive detailed information from such engineers about petroleum product transportation through pipelines in the country than the Corps which is fed with very

little information about what is to happen, what is happening and what has happened in the oil sector. Information is fed to vandals on the weak parts or portions of the pipe so that they can siphon fuel from the burst pipes to get the product.

- (4) Lack of Operational Equipment: This is a teething problem. Equipment or materials like vehicles, motorcycles, bicycles, impark jackets, guns, combat boots, batons, protecting helmets, rechargeable touch, binoculars, rain caps, jack knives, hand scanners, shocking buttons, handcuffs and leg chains, camping tents, camp beds, portable gas cookers, treated mosquito nets, first aid boxes and dressings, cutlasses, hoes, diggers, shovels, axes, portable gas welding machines, Turaya telephones, HF, walkie-talkies, GSM handsets, etc., are some of the problems affecting effective operations (Ibid).
- (5) Ineffective Supervision and Monitoring of Filling Stations: Filling station owners sponsor vandals to supply petroleum products which they use as an avenue by which they can increase their gains. Some of these filling stations are not registered and operate as if they are above the law. They do not obey any of the existing petroleum laws neither do they see anything as barrier to their operations, since they can buy their way through any security obstacles that they encounter.

Again, most of these illegal operating filling stations are built on top of petroleum pipeline where some tap the main pipe to their filling stations, thereby siphoning the product without public knowledge. This is a problem for NSCDC, because the monitoring agency whose duty is to what and how filling stations operate, supervise and monitor them, are overwhelmed. These filling stations are aware of the fact that the NSCDC is not Department of Petroleum Resources, DPR empowered in the area of supervision and monitoring of filling stations, different criminal behaviours are thus exhibited but then checking of vandalism is implied. Despite all these anomalies, however, the NSCDC has been able to curb the menace of pipeline and other government critical installations to a reasonable extent.

The essence of securing oil pipelines is therefore to scare vandals away from such location. This can be done by communities, civilians and security agents depending on the level of threat. Vandals took higher risk of vulnerability when mistake of pipeline explosion follow their exploit and they end up setting a disaster of which magnitude cannot be comprehended judging from lives and properties of innocent neighbourhood and that of theirs on suicide mission that may be lost. This could be figured from the table below:



**Table 2.3:** Incidence of Pipeline Explosion in Southwestern Nigeria (2006 to 2016)

<b>MONTH/YEAR</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>STATE</b>	<b>IMPACT</b>
May, 2006	Inagbe Creek	Lagos	over 200 people reported dead
December 2009	Arepo	Ogun	Reported death and environmental destruction
December, 2010	Idu, near Ijegan	Lagos	Reported death and environmental destruction
January, 2013	Arepo	Ogun	Reported death and environmental destruction
June, 2013	Ijeododo in Ojo Local Government	Lagos	Reported death and environmental destruction
June, 2014	Takwa Bay Beach	Lagos	Hundreds of people were killed

**Source:** Pilot study, 2016

Table 2.3, for an example presents the pipeline explosions in Southwestern Nigeria from the year 2006 to 2016. Taken Inagbe Creek in Lagos State, over 200 people lost their lives to vandalism in May 2006. At Arepo in Ogun State by December 2009 there are people reported dead and the environment destroyed. In addition, there are people reported dead and the environment destroyed at Idu, near Ijegun in Lagos State by December 2010 and Ijeododo in Ojo Local Government of Lagos State by June 2013. Hundreds of people killed at Takwa Bay Beach, Lagos in June 2014. To this extent, the appreciation of the incidence of vandals exploit in southwestern Nigeria is a reoccurrence decimal,

#### **2.4 The Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC)**

The emergence of the OPC often linked with the 1993 Nigerian presidential election annulment by the former military president General Ibrahim Babangida. After the Nigeria military government long transition programme, Chief Moshood Abiola, the acclaimed winner of the election and a Yoruba speaker, was prevented from taking office and later imprisoned in 1994. The annulment of the 'June 12' election made the Yoruba to protest against Abacha military government; united under different umbrella organisations such as the Campaign for Democracy (CD) and the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO). In July 1994, shortly after Abiola's arrest, the Oodua Liberation Front (OLF) was founded, followed in September 1994 by the Oodua Youth Movement (OYM) and a range of other ethno-nationalist organisations, many of which evoked the name of the mythical founder of human civilisation in Yoruba land, Oduduwa or Oodua. The OPC's official fundamental objectives are set out in its constitution. The OPC's aims are:

- a) Identifying the historical and cultural origin of the people in view of bringing alive the past glory and posterity.
- b) Mobilise and educate the Oduduwa descendants for better enlightenment as mention in above immediate paragraph.
- c) Integrating into a collective platform the inspirations and aspirations of all the descendants of Oduduwa values as one Oodua entity.
- d) Monitoring Oduduwa descendants diversified interest with adequate struggle for the protection of these interests.

- e) Pursuing the progress of Oodua civilization by protecting and promoting our values and the intergenerational transmission of same. (Human Rights Watch 2003: 4).

The missions of the group as stated in some of the Nigerian newspapers read:

- i) We remain committed to the struggle that Nigeria is administered as a federal republic where federating units can develop and manage their resources.
- ii) Struggle for the restructuring of Nigeria on the basis of equality of ethnic nationalities.
- iii) Resist the domination of other ethnic nationalities by any group or section of the country.
- iv) Respect the protection of and respect of the interest of ethnic minorities.
- v) Encourage the convention of national conference to produce a people's constitution for Nigerian people and make the government answerable to their people.
- vi) Above all, protecting the interest of the Yoruba people at home and in the Diaspora. (Human Right Watch 2003:4)

The OPC is a non-state armed group that is active in the Southwestern part of Nigeria with a mantra 'to protect the interests of the Yoruba ethnic group'. At formation stage, the group established in 1994 with the aim of overcoming, what it alleged was the political marginalisation of the Yoruba in Nigerian politics. Registered and coordinated by umbrella associations, two dozen and more Oodua organisations emerged in Nigeria during the latter half of the 1990s (Nolte, 2007:222). It was in the light of the trend of event then that the OPC also established by Dr. Frederick Fasheun with the intention of having a socio-cultural organisation that intended to re-centre the Yoruba nation through historical and cultural research to violent confrontation with members of other ethnic groups, and, more recently, vigilante work and crime fighting. Notwithstanding, OPC also got records of rampage as political thug in demonstration.

When Fasheun got arrested by the Abacha regime in December 1996, his deputy, Gani Adams, took over control of the organisation, expanding its activities from politically motivated and cultural work into active political work and security duties such as the

settlement of local disputes and vigilantism. The group since then, evolved in several different directions. Its activities have ranged from traditional political agitation for yoruba autonomy and also the promotion of yoruba culture.



**Plate 2.4:** OPC in rampage at Lagos, Nigeria  
**Source:** dailymail.com.ng (2015)

Plate 2.4, above as reported in daily mail by Sean (2015) that OPC thugs' unleashed terror in the name of political campaigns and caused serious traffic on the road. This could results into serious violent as they wedged weapons and charm to coerce any opposition on the way, invariably damages to Nigeria critical infrastructure of roads and electric poles.



Army protect OPC terrorists as they vandalize Buhari/Osinbajo billboards

**Plate 2.5:** OPC members destroying political posters along Ikorodu road, Lagos  
**Source:** dailymail.com.ng (2015)

Plate 2.5, further shows clearly as reported in daily mail.com.ng by Sean (2015) that OPC terrorist vandalised Buhari/Osinbanjo billboards to support PDP along Ikorodu road, Lagos during campaign on 16<sup>th</sup> March 2015. This actually is a way to work for the pipeline infrastructure contract. Getting non state armed group partisan, this way is a dangerous trend. This defeat their original believes of fighting for their people rather than their pocket. This trend confirmed the public suspicion that the awarded oil and gas security contract of the PDP government to OPC must have got a political undertone. The APC that are in Lagos who controls the press from south west do not help matters as negative propaganda of OPC are made to create more fears in the mind of the Nigerians.

The menace of OPC sometime had created fear, uneasiness, threats to the mind of Nigerian society which made citizen going about their legitimate work in fear and trepidations that will definitely affect productivity of the individual (Shittu, 2013).

### **2.5 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, (NNPC)**

The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation was inaugurated on 1st April, 1977 by the federal government of Nigeria to regulate and participate in the country's petroleum industry. NNPC came up as a merger of the Nigerian National Oil Corporation NNOC and the Federal Ministry of Mines and Steel. NNPC legally was mandated to manages the joint venture between the Nigerian federal government and a number of foreign multinational corporations, which include Royal Dutch Shell, Agip, ExxonMobil, Total S.A, Chevron, and Texaco (now merged with Chevron). Through collaboration with all these companies, the Nigerian government conducts petroleum exploration and production. The NNPC was empowered with operational interests in refining, petrochemicals and products transportation as well as marketing. Between 1978 and 1989, NNPC constructed refineries in Warri, Kaduna and Port Harcourt and took over the 35,000-barrel Shell Refinery established in Port Harcourt in 1965.

It is important to note that, NNPC was commercialized into 12 strategic business units, covering the entire spectrum of oil industry operations: exploration and production, gas development, refining, distribution, petrochemicals, engineering, and commercial investments in 1988.



Recently, the subsidiary companies are the followings:

- i) Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC)
- ii) The Nigerian Gas Company (NGC)
- iii) The Products and Pipelines Marketing Company (PPMC)
- iv) Integrated Data Services Limited (IDSL)
- v) National Engineering and Technical Company Limited (NETCO)
- vi) Hydrocarbon Services Nigeria Limited (HYSON)
- vii) Warri Refinery and Petrochemical Co. Limited (WRPC)
- viii) Kaduna Refinery and Petrochemical Co. Limited (KRPC)
- ix) Port Harcourt Refining Co. Limited (PHRC)
- x) NNPC Retail
- xi) Duke Oil
- xii) DPR

In view of above, the industry is regulated by the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) which is a department under the auspices of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources. DPR ensures compliance with the industrial regulations; processes applications for licenses, leases and permits, establishes and enforces environmental regulations. The DPR, and National Petroleum Investment Management Service, play a very crucial role on day to day activities through the industry life. (*nnpcgroup.com*)

**i) NNPC: Mission, Vision and Core Values**

**Mission**

NNPC is an integrated Oil and Gas Company, engaged in adding value to the nation's hydrocarbon resources for the benefit of all Nigerians and other stakeholders.

## **Vision**

NNPC will be a world-class oil and gas company driven by shared commitment to excellence.

## **Core Values**

- i) Respect for the Individual
- ii) Staff development and growth
- iii) Integrity, transparency and accountability
- iv) Professional Excellence

## **Operators in the NNPC**

### **2.6 The Department of Petroleum Resources, (DPR)**

The DPR is a governmental agency that is charged with the responsibility of regulation and supervision of all the operations being carried out under licenses and leases in the Oil and Gas industries. The operations include the exploration, production and marketing of crude oil and refined petroleum products.

The NNPC is vested with the exclusive responsibility for upstream and downstream development, which entails exploiting, refining, and marketing Nigeria's crude oil. The NNPC through the National Petroleum Investment Management Services was given the mandate of managing the oil and gas investment in the country. Their contribution has tremendously restructuring which made NNPC to be forerunner in its local and international performance. The expansion has allowed them a good performance in the upstream and downstream operations.

All the NNPC upstream operations are presently managed under the Exploration and Production Directorate which consists of the following Strategic Business Units (SBUs) that operate directly under the NNPC:

- a. National Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS)
- b. Crude oil Sales Division ( COSD )
- c. Integrated Data Services Limited ( IDLS )
- d. Nigerian Petroleum Development Company ( NPDC )
- e. Nigerian Gas Company (NGC)

The above mention SBUs are jointly in charge of the site surveys, seismic data collation and interpretation with production, crude oil exploration, transportation, storage and marketing to be among the front burner. In the downstream operation the SBUs also takes care of the crude oil and gas conversion into refine petrochemical substances. The NNPC downstream plants consist of four refineries with capacity of 445,000 barrels per day. There are two of them in Port Harcourt (210 000b/d) with one each in Warri of (125,000b/d) and one in Kaduna and (110,000b/d) capacities. The country is covered with a pipeline installations network of 5000km with storage depot that are twenty one and nine LPG depots. This pipeline network is considered massive and may not be covered adequately for protection against vandals if close attention is not given to it.

It is worthy of note in that the constitution of Nigeria empowers the federal government to possess legally all the properties of gas, minerals and oil on the land of the country.

Looking back at the erratic nature of Nigeria's economy and the ever increasing proportion of poverty and unemployment as well as several criminals on major pipelines, Nigeria have been exposed to the risks of various attacks in the past decade. Most of these pipelines buried underground or in the sea but recent experience has shown that this approach would not secure the pipelines from vandalism or sabotage. The Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation that is placed in charge to oversee the project of oil exploration has no adequate structure and capacity to ensure effective and efficient surveillance of the pipelines. In order

to face this fact on this matter, Nigeria could regard pipeline protection as national security issue for securing one of the country's major critical infrastructures.

This infrastructure is so vital to the nation that incapacitating it by destruction of such assets would have a devastating effect on national security, economy, public health and safety. Most of Nigeria's crude oil transferred through the government oil pipelines to refineries across the nation are the one pumped from the southern Niger Delta region. Nigeria normally pumps 2.5 million barrels of crude oil per day. Nigeria has been rated to be the Africa's largest producer of oil and the fifth-largest source of imports of same to the United States of America. Incessant Pipeline explosions in Nigeria have slowed down to drop in crude oil fortune as the International Energy Agency sharply cut its forecasts from world oil demand. Nigeria's oil wealth comes mostly from the Niger Delta. However, the southern regions of Nigeria were still underdeveloped and pollution from oil spills is widespread. Royal Dutch Shell and ENI have admitted that up to 550 oil spills in a year, in year 2014 alone this was outrageous. Nigeria is a country where terrorism persists from ethnic militia, cult group; pipeline protection is given utmost attention as no amount of money is considered too much in ensuring their protection.

The challenge was enormous as ethno-political undertone observed with strong criminal display of sabotage by boxing the federal government into a corner for self and collective gain through the act of terrorism, kidnapping and wastage of resources. Nigerian non state armed group have kidnapped foreign oil workers to press their demands for local control of oil revenues by inhabitants of the oil-producing south, who feel cheated out of the wealth produced in their backyards. Recently kidnapping had become so common that there is the need to suspect that the foreigners could sponsor some Malian Fulani's to evade the country but around north east to perpetrate this evil plan against Nigeria. It get worse for Nigerians that kidnapping has includes ritual killings and collection of huge ransom with serious Boko Haram terrorism and banditry. It is opined that the Niger Delta activities in the early 2000s must be working against Nigeria and place both government and citizen not to be at peace. Who will bail Nigeria out of the challenges? Somebody is not happy about the amnesty solutions for the Niger Delta militants.

In Nigeria, oil pipeline vandals seem to be perpetrated boldly by some Niger Delta the non-state armed group who loot the country oil products for their personal fortune under the pretence of their community interest. This organised criminal often aided and abated by the state agents, which gives it a semblance of a franchise. This became worse judging from present socio economic and its attendant livelihood crisis in terms of unemployment in the country. The inefficiency of security agencies to enforce punishment against criminals has definitely increased the problem.

It is worthy of mentioning that oil installations are national assets, regarded as critical infrastructure which usually become soft targets of militia that sometimes make use of coercion to force the government in accepting or heeding to their demands. The vandalism of oil installations and power lines is part of the crisis that goes beyond oil producing areas but also affects places that some public infrastructure are situated including pipeline right of way and power line where it passes through certain communities.

## **2. 7 Pipelines and Product Marketing Company (PPMC)**

The Pipelines and Product Marketing Company (PPMC) is an NNPC subsidiary in charge of marketing and distribution of petroleum products which was put in place to offer an outstanding customer services by the haulage of petroleum product to the refineries and moving them to existing and future markets efficiently at low cost through the existing network of pipelines and depots. The company was also established to profitably and efficiently market refined petroleum products in the domestic as well as export markets especially in the ECOWAS sub-region, provide marine services and to maintain uninterrupted movement of refined petroleum products from the local refineries. The PPMC vision is to be the dominant supplier of all refined petroleum products to the existing domestic and growing export markets within the West African sub-region.

The PPMC mission includes:

- a) To ensure security of supply of petroleum products to the domestic market at low operating costs
- b) Market special Products competitively in the domestic and international market

- c) Provide excellent customer service by effectively transporting crude oil to the refineries
- d) Moving petroleum products to the market.
- e) Efficient and effective evacuation of refined petroleum products from the refineries.
- f) Security of supply of petroleum products to the domestic markets.
- g) Competitive marketing of special products.
- h) Safe operation at minimal cost.

The company has continued to consolidate its home market, and has been exploring its pipeline network to neighbouring countries to earn valuable revenue. It consciously minimizes cost of services and other cost elements that go into product price determination. It determines and meets the national level of petroleum products demand. It stimulates the consumption of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) to a significant level in the domestic energy mix. It is also responsible for the sale of special products such as Fuel Oils, Base Oil (For Lubricating Oils) Solvents, Waxes Bitumen and Sulphur, and promotes import substitution of petroleum products.

In order for PPMC to actualize its set out goals, it is reasonable that oil pipelines protection is critically addressed by preventing wastages and theft through the act of vandalism.

## **2.8 Oil Pipeline Protection and its Challenges**

Nigeria as a foremost nation among other African nations discovered oil on Sunday 15th January, 1956 at Otuabagi and Otuogadi in Oloibiri in the present day Bayelsa State by Shell Darcy. From that day, it was true that the spirit of enterprise and competitiveness died, and afterwards Nigeria lost her heart and senses of rightness, justness and wrongness including

of course, universal altruism. Hence, what passes for Nigeria today is the relic of her old self-walking with her head and legs up. (Aduma, 2013)

Undoubtedly, Nigeria pipeline project was a geopolitical ring binder as one of the most important critical infrastructures, which stretched several thousand kilometres and passed through several cities, villages and rural communities across the country. When these pipelines were constructed several years ago, many people, particularly in the rural communities close to pipeline right of way had big hopes and expectations that the pipelines would bring much desired social and economic improvements to their empowered areas. Sadly, it has brought much shock and amazement to note that it brought so much hardship, destruction, conflicts and breach of the existing peace.

Extraordinary levels of coordination of many organizations, public and private, with sound confidential communication system will be required to secure any improved level of prevention, response, and recovery of protecting critical infrastructure. Creating a consistent belief structure and safety-embracing culture could help in producing an auto-adaptive response capability that will enable infrastructure service providers to deal more effectively with adaptive predators and dynamic uncertainty. Large-scale systems like this need to be flexible in adapting to rapidly changing situations of the present dynamic society.

In both public-private and private-private partnerships, the tension between organizational autonomy and the independence of the constituent units of the large-scale system makes coordination crucial. Sustaining watchfulness and the ability to deal decisively with criminals that challenged the safety of lives and properties are pertinent. High-impact events on the nation economy is the single most difficult policy issue facing critical infrastructure providers and security agencies of government today. Critical infrastructural protection needs to be understood as not only deploying a coerced measure, but also developing organizational antibodies of reliability that enable society and its constituent parts to be more resilient and robust in face of the new, dynamic, and uncertain threats in Nigeria National Security.

Technological and managerial procedures may limit the occurrence of a devastating event of pipeline explosion, but some aggressive ethnic militia must still seriously consider the possibility of suffering a larger loss judging from deliberate sabotage of bombing the oil

pipelines by militia and cult members that took a central stage at the Niger Delta area. Should this continue to happen, the question of who should pay for the economic consequences is likely to be the argument after all. The Federal government of Nigeria continue to shy away from such responsibility as government critical infrastructures are also affected. To end the conflict, Nigerian government launched an amnesty programme for militants, which offered them income, work and education. However, the programme is hard to sustain indefinitely as suspected political and ethnic crises continued in such attacks.

Nigeria government that has the primary responsibility of securing the nation must be concerned about the fact that crude oil is responsible for 95% of the country revenue. The rate of vandalism in the country has increased astronomically with so much impunity that almost defies the security agencies including the NSCDC with the mandate to fight the menace. The government in their wisdom thought it wise to use the expertise of cult and militia group in securing the critical infrastructure by monitoring the oil pipelines through partnership with NSCDC looking at what amount are lost on daily basis and how much to be spent as contract for the militias.

Nigeria infrastructural security challenges on critical infrastructure was examined by government in 2013 when the former President Goodluck Jonathan at a stakeholder forum organised by Office of the National Security Adviser appealed to all Nigerians to see the protection of the nation's critical assets and infrastructure as their innate responsibility. The forum was to assess the nation's critical physical and virtual infrastructure, belonging to both the public and private sectors that are susceptible to threats from vandal, terrorist and saboteurs, with a view to adequately protect them. The President also called on the private sector and other stakeholders to update their internal security policies and systems, saying they should collaborate with security agencies to ensure the security of critical infrastructure under their management. Fransisco, (2013)

Pipeline installation vandalism became a national problem in Nigeria following reports of 497 cases of breaks in 1999, which is within that one year. NNPC statistics inform and educate the public about the increase of oil pipeline installation vandalism all over the country. This has shown an increase from Port Harcourt from 600 incidences in 2003 to 1,650 in 2006. Warri reported many incidences of vandalism which escalated from 100 to



600 at that same time. Mosimi axis reported different incidence of vandalism which escalated from 50 in 2003 to 375 within January to September of that year. The country experiences frequent vandalism at the axis that was isolated of which occurrence rarely noticed. For example is the one from Kaduna and Gombe areas.

Indeed, the frequency of the vandals activities all over the country accounted for the high damages recorded due to fire disaster from pipelines in the last decade. Human lives and environmental degradations have been jeopardized around the pipeline incidence area. (Onuoha, 2008e) The causative effect of oil pipeline installations vandalism to population is a catastrophe which has left the country from benefiting an efficient, safe and cost-effective haulage of the product through the right channel of the installations as it's done in the developed countries of United States of America. There are three expected factors to be considered in driving the administration of the risk associated with pipeline haulage in Nigeria. The economic factor, cooperate social responsibilities and government regulations.

There is poor utilization of the ROW which has debilitating consequences from thousands of loss lives, pipeline explosions with the attendant fire disaster, pollution of the environment and the ecosystem, scarcity of products and loss of income by the government. Nigeria different types of pipeline installation system are the one meant to shift from the plants to liquefied natural gas plants in Escravos and Bonny; the one used to move products of crude oil to different parts the country; and the one used for conveying crude oil and its related water and gas from oilfields to the terminals in Bonny, Brass, Forcados, Escravos and Qua Ibno. There are other systems adopted which includes pipelines used in transporting the petroleum refined products from two Port Harcourt terminals, Warri and Kaduna refineries to the distribution depots of Product Marketing Company in the country. Oil pipeline global management challenges has indicated transnational pipeline infrastructure as the reliable, safe and effective means of transporting petroleum product for a long distance and period. Nigeria experience of transporting petroleum product through our road became necessary due to the problem of vandals that is always out to break in the oil pipeline installations causing very costly damages and economic loss both to individuals and the government. Taking the product through tankers and other heavy vehicles on our

road is a painful decision for the government since it affects the life span of road infrastructure and increase road accident that can be devastating.

## **2.9 The Establishment of non-state armed group and their Activities in the Society**

Non-state armed group are as old as human society mainly due to man's desire to protect his interest. They are involved in different activities in every society where they are found. Most of these activities are either positive or negative and the types of activities they execute depend on their goals. The interest they have driven their actions notwithstanding the public perceptions on them. For instant, militia aspect of non-state actors is seen as paramilitary forces not controlled by the state. According To Williams (2008:10), a militia can be understood as an "irregular armed force operating within the territory of a weak and/or failing state. The members of militias often come from the under classes and tend to be composed of young males who are drawn into this milieu, because it gives them access to money, resources, power and security."According to Defence Journal (undated), "most militia follow traditional military lines, the troops at the base and echelons of command up to the leader. This makes it easy for law enforcement to destroy an entire group by arresting its leadership.

In the case of Libya, the revolution and quest for regime change which greeted Arab spring in 2011 led to the formation of militias and rival militias with different goals. Many scholars have examined the phenomenon of militias. A number of studies have identified oppression and the need to overcome marginalisation as the causes of militia formation to challenge the way things are done. Some of such studies rather blamed the colonial experience in some states where boundaries generate conflicts, while there is wide gap between the elites and the ordinary citizens in urban areas (Nnoli, 1978). In Nigeria for example, many parts of the country have witnessed the proliferation of non-state armed groups formed for different reasons ranging from resource allocation to self-determination and security of communities. For example, many of them sprang up in Niger Delta like the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and the Chikoko Movement and recent groups like Niger Delta Avengers. The other regions like Southwest, Southeast and North also had visible armed group like the

Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MOSSOB) and the Arewa Peoples' Congress (APC) as well as Islamic vigilantes called Hisbah in Sharia-practising northern states.

The statement by Nnoli (1995) indicated similarity in what is considered modernisation and political confusion which can easily be linked to the proliferation of militia groups in many parts of Africa and Nigeria in particular because since the late 20<sup>th</sup> Century, many groups have been agitating against perceived marginalisation in the area of development and have gone extra miles to demand for more inclusion in the allocation of resources by the state, or more inclusion in government. In addition, it is believed that one of the ways their voice would be heard is to form militia groups.

Most communities effected by rising joblessness and loss of opportunities due to rising population are already frustrated as many graduate youths have no paid jobs. Even the state has not been able to address some of these challenges. Again, this has greatly contributed to crisis of human needs and crime. The repercussions were felt in unequal levels of unemployment, income and in differing degrees of social status among the communal groups. Attempts by each group to escape the negative consequences of this phenomenon led to the further strengthening of communal associations (Nnoli, 1995). This motivated different groups to seek a way out of their problems by setting up militia groups.

In the context of Bakassi Boys, some groups were formed in Abia state and Anambra in the Southeast in the early 2000s. According to Williams (2007:141) "the primary sole aim of the Bakassi Boys is to combat crime. It is to ensure that criminals do not operate at will. It is to prevent violent crimes such as armed robbery, car snatching, rape kidnapping and abduction, burglary and stealing in the market, as contained in the groups' memorandum of understanding." A number of concerned male youths mobilised themselves and volunteered as security officers within communities. The memorandum of understanding establishing the militias is based on the security need and sets a framework for operation. According to Ukiwo (2007), the activities of Bakassi Boys originated around 1998 when shoemakers in Ariaria international market initiated it as a vigilante group due to the loss of valuables by traders who were dispossessed of their valuables on a daily basis by armed robbers; but the successes recorded by the group in Aba and environs motivated the replication of such

security outfit in other commercial towns of Nnewi and Onitsha where the group became notorious for their audacity in fighting criminals. The endorsement of Bakassi Boys in a state that has different security forces is understandable considering their achievements in reducing crime incident within a short period of time. For instance, majority of the criminals declared wanted by security operatives and proved difficult to apprehend were arrested by Bakassi Boys whose major aim was to get rid of armed bandits.

Ozekhome (2007) in his study of ethnic militias simply described Bakassi Boys, a citizen-initiated vigilante as a child of necessity, given that a group known as the Mafia became a threat to the safety of people and traders to the extent that the situation went beyond the control of the police. The foregoing explains why Adejumo (2007:203) believes that (establishment of) “militias are mere manifestations and frustrated expressions of the dysfunctional structure of the Nigerian federation and the character of the Nigerian state.” However, Ukiwo (2007) also explains that this remarkable role by the group led to the legalisation of the Bakassi Boys through the Anambra State Vigilante Services Law No.9 2000 which provides for the establishment of vigilante groups in the state to augment the maintenance of security in various communities, by assisting the police in crime detection, information gathering about criminal gangs, protect lives and property, arrest criminals, conduct patrols day and night and also mount road blocks within communities at odd hours. This group was constituted and controlled by the Office of the Governor which played oversight functions to ensure operation within the rule of law. The militia group is also legalised in Abia state where it is known as Abia State Vigilante Group

On their modus operandi, Williams (2007) reveals that Bakassi Boys operates on the basis of information and investigation, depending on their intelligence system, with their secret system dominating most of the information they get on crime. Their ability to dish out responsibilities to members and conduct patrols when necessary makes them effective stakeholders of security. Through this initiative, hundreds of suspected criminals have been arrested and handed over to the police for their alleged roles in deviant acts.

The odd side of the militias has manifested in different ways. The first is their involvement in different forms of crime and violence like those in the Niger Delta usually engaged in

resource control agitations in the form of youth restiveness, their involvement in hostage taking, their role in the destruction of public infrastructure among others.

Similarly, some militia groups have also been allegedly involved in armed robberies, political assassinations, extra-judicial killings and jungle justice, by killing suspected criminals without proper investigation or handing them over to law enforcement agencies. For instance, Ukiwo (2007) identifies the terrible role of Bakassi Boys, accused of murdering prominent citizens of Anambra State, as well as Eddie Nagwu, a prophet that was executed by the group for alleged involvement in providing spiritual protection to notorious and wanted criminals who stored arms in his religious centre.

Furthermore, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) has remained a notable and formidable militia group which is believed to threaten the stability of Nigeria. The group's separatist nature which was formed in 1999 by Chief Raph Uwazurike, an Indian skilled advocate makes it a danger to the state. In terms of vision, it seeks to revive the former secessionist state of Biafra, which was created in 1967 by the Igbo ethnic group and ceased to exist after successful surrender by the Biafran commanders to the Nigerian government when the war ended in 1970.

The Biafra intentions are as follows:

- i) The attainment of Biafra national freedom.
- ii) Planning it through peace process.
- iii) Providing cooperation to any person or group that follow the peace process.
- iv) Establishing discussion with any nation who supports Biafra intention including other nations.
- v) Enlighten the rest of the world Biafra nation.

The group informs the public that MASSOB is a non-aggressive self-determination movement which is not welcomed by the government. Since 1999 till date, there have been occasional confrontations between MASSOB and the police to the extent that the military is now involved with the mounting of checkpoints in Onitsha and Aba the most volatile

areas where the group operates. This led to heavy casualty from both sides of the police MASSOB. When the MASSOB decide to seize the fuel tankers going to the north between year 2000 and 2001 the clashes with the police became more intense. MASSOB had accused the government in imbalance in fuel distribution at the shortage of the southeast part that are considered marginalized. By 27 May 2000 Mr. Uwazurike had organize over 10,000 youth with an attempt to inaugurate Biafra as nation. This declaration was not supported by neither the Igbo elite nor the governors of the south eastern states who declared opposition to initiative.(Nigeria First, 2012).

The activities of the OPC are noteworthy as a social cultural pan-Yoruba self determination group that was organized by the founder, late Doctor Fredrick Fasehun in 1995. This group informed the public that they intend to work on the unity and progress of the Oduduwa origins. The group emanated immediately after annulment of 12<sup>th</sup> June, 1993 presidential election of Chief Moshood Abiola that happens to be a Yoruba man as one of the largest ethnic group in Nigeria. Memberships of this group are lead by the middle class that are intellectuals but the bulk of members were mainly illiterates and semi-literate. They also have high profile of patrons including state governors that use the opportunity to instigate them to settle score. The group finances are sustained through contributions from private, commercial bus drivers and residents that seek protection from local thieves or even armed robbers in within their houses. However, the OPC was observed to change its fundamental objectives of self-determination in 1999. The change in focus by non-state armed group must have been inspired by weight of popularity enjoyed by another self-appointed vigilante group from the southeast called Bakassi Boys that can be very brutal to alleged criminals with extra judicial killings. (Nigeria First, 2012) The OPC was noticed by the public to be composed of intellectuals and unemployed youths from Yoruba origin who use different types of local weapon like cutlass, guns and charms to execute their actions. Mbah, (2012).They insists that the Yoruba needs to be treated as equal in Nigeria nation or they threatened to opt out of the Nigeria federation and establish their own Oduduwa republic. This is sequel to their original objective and social emancipation campaign of the Yoruba lineage.

Anon-state actors that was from south-south of Nigeria is the Egbesu Boys of Africa of which memberships are mainly the Ijaw ethnic group of the Niger Delta region. They are found across the state states of the Niger Delta which includes: Bayelsa, Rivers, Edo, Delta,

Ondo and Akwa Ibom. Egbesu of Africa is just the military wing of the Ijaw National congress who considered Egbesu as the mythical god of revenge of their area. They strongly believe and ready to fight oil multinationals and the government on the issue of exploitation of the crude oil that is found in the Niger Delta. The Egbesu Boys activities were reported in Nigeria dailies to be kidnapping foreign nationals and ask for ransom, they are also known for sabotaging oil installations and fighting most of the time the government security agencies in the country. Later their activities were extended to wealthy ones in the society who may need to hire the so called private armies for a particular purpose. The Egbesu Boys are also popular when they issue ultimatum as in citing Kaiama declaration to demand immediate withdrawal of the military personnel by government from Niger Delta areas in December 1998. The boys insist that any oil nationals that employ the service of armed forces to protect its operation would be considered as the enemy of the Ijaw people. (Mbah, 2012). They have also show solidarity to similar non state armed groups in Nigeria which includes OPC and MASOP Movement for the survival of Ogoni People. In driving home Egbesu confrontation with the government and armed forces, they have been able to cause destruction of the place like the Odi and Umuechem communities. The Ijaw youths are known to carry heavy and sophisticated weapons that are suspected to be proliferated through the retired military officers that are indigene of this areas. (Nigeria First, 2012).

The Islamic states from the northern part of Nigeria which includes Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Kano, Jigawa, Katsina and Kaduna for the northwest while Gombe, Yobe, Bauchi and Borno states are for the northeast had included Niger states who established and housed the Hisbah vigilante group. Although it was reported that Hisbah corps are not organized because no central command but they were noticed spearheading violence against Muslims, Non-Muslims and Christians in the north. It was argued that the governors that practice Sharia muslims practice from those states sometimes sponsored Hisbah whose members are drawn from the unemployed youths, (Nigeria First, 2012). In some cases the Hisbah vigilante sometimes display the ability to arrest offenders of the Sharia legal code and even dispense their version of justice without delay especially when offenders are also Muslims. The Hisbah Corps can also be considered as a non state armed group but with support of the government since in most state where they exist are supported with legal framework by their state legislation.

## **2.10 The Relevance of Security to the Society**

### **2.10.1 Security**

Security for entities, such as organisations and especially nations, is a first-order. The concern for the security of a nation is undoubtedly as old as the nation itself (Brown, 1982:21). Over the years, the concern for national security has led to the development of remarkable military and Para-military machineries. Weapons have reached unprecedented levels in size, number and destructive capacity; have increasingly reached a significant part of national resources with both human and material resources devoted to the military sector. Militarisation has become a predominant occupation of virtually all nations of the world. This phenomenon has become impossible to ignore which urgently required thorough understanding and evaluation especially within the African context.

In the past, the word security was defined as a “condition achieved when designated information, materials, personnel activities and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism as well as against loss or unauthorised disclosure” (Raymond, 2007:2). This applies when considering oil pipeline vandalism as a threat to the nation economy through terrorist act.

Various parts of the world are facing different forms of security challenges which threaten peace and stability, Abolurin (2012). Nwolise (2014:47) explains that security connotes protection, meaning the safety of men, groups, nationals and the entire world from harm. The foregoing means that when people are not threatened by danger or crime, they are safe. Anything that exposes man to danger is making him to experience insecurity. According to Craighead (2003), security can refer to the provision of private services in the protection of people, information and assets for individual safety or community wellness (cited in Brooks, 2010: 226). Security is also seen as guaranteed freedom from poverty or want, precautions taken to ensure against theft, espionage or a person or thing that secures or guarantees (Collins English Dictionary and Thesaurus, 1992). Fischer and Green (2004:21), maintain that security implies a stable, relatively predictable environment in which an individual or group may pursue its ends without disruption or harm and without fear of such disturbance



or injury (cited in Brooks, 2010:226). Pogoson (2013:21) explains that “security in Nigeria is usually threatened by menacing measures which flow from the weaknesses of the state and its inability to exercise total control of the territory.” It shows that when a state lacks the capacity to control her territory, there would be increase in criminality and insecurity across the state until measures are put in place to contain such threats. Notably, addressing such problem demands that security sector strengthens its capacity to regulate the flow of small arms and light weapons. In the words of Abubakar (2013:11) internal security operations were traditionally defined as military operations in aid of civil authority to restore law and order in the face of civil disturbances using minimum necessary force. But only the military is the organisation of the security sector believed to have maximum capacity to use force in security operations, therefore using minimum force is not always the case. Mbah, (2012) chronicles the that the leaders of the popular movement are regularly harassed by the security forces through arrests and intimidation as witnessed by the Ijaw ethnic group in Bayelsa which suffered state aggression using security operatives in the Odi killings in 1999, as well as Zaki-Biam massacre in 2000. This development has motivated the formation of more militia groups that practically desire to confront the government in order to address the oppression they are subjected to.

All these conceptualisations of security can be said to commit “crimes” against humanity, and these separate security from development with the exclusion of social, economic, environment, psychological, political, physical, technological, image, legal, and even spiritual variables from security, having sacrificed them at the altar of militarism (Nwolise, 2004:259).

The explanation by Brooks (2007) is very significant to any discussion on militia considering his assertion that security implies public policing, with state employed public servants, while some may also consider security as crime prevention, security technology and risk management or loss prevention (cited in Brooks, 2010: 226). In fact vandalism has created risk in the petroleum industry and requires proper risk management to prevent loss of human and material resources. There are different aspects of security which are all premised on the fact that peaceful and secure social entity is that in which hostility and man’s inhumanity to man have been made both unnecessary and impossible by a new

community that is characterised by esprit de corps. It can be adduced from the above discussions that human security focuses on the prevention and minimisation of threats to human rights, safety and lives (Onuoha, 2007). It considers issues concerning the safety of man in his environment.

Every society desires security for the safety of lives and property. This is because insecurity affects development and sustainable livelihoods. There is corpus of literature on the relevance of security in a state. According to security expert, security is one of the most important basic human needs as people prefer to stay in a place that is not under any threat to stability (Abolurin, 2012). Unfortunately, the nature of human and national security across the world still leaves much to be desired the safety of citizens is not always guaranteed by the state due to rising threats to security. For instance, it is not always easy promoting security in towns or communities that host criminal groups or anti-government groups considering the possibility of confrontations between the actors.

One of the major reasons for the inability of armament to improve Africa's security is the failure of its defence policies to recognise that the continent's instability and insecurity are primarily underdevelopment-induced and that any viable defence strategy must understand security in development terms. Robert McNamara, that happened during time of Kennedy as the U.S. Secretary of Defence observe thus:

There could be direct connection against violence incidents and economic studies of countries afflicted. There is another connection between aggressive communities and backwardness with violence rising up and not going down. If security translates to minimal degree of order and stability in a country without internal development then minimal degree of order and stability is not attainable. This is so because human nature is difficult to be frustrated indefinitely. Human are made to react because they are made to do so. (McNamara, 1968:145-9)

Scholars have attempted to categorise security into active and passive. For instance, Okodoloh (2011:319) in his own submission maintains that active security refers to practical measures taken in security operations involving the use of visible objects such as weapons, security accessories, security equipment most of which are usually capital intensive, while

passive security refers to social, psychological and economic measures taken to protect lives and property. From the foregoing argument, it can be said that active security is more critical as far as securing the citizens and national infrastructures like the oil pipeline is concerned because it requires human and material resources, security accessories, security equipment as well as well coordinated strategy by the security sector.

Olusegun O (1991:14) echoes the same point by asserting that there is a link between the level of poverty in Africa and the level of violence and conflict in the continent. Indeed, as the Palme Commission correctly declares, “security cannot in any real sense be said to exist at a personal or national level in a condition of chronic underdevelopment”. Poverty itself is insecurity (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1989:27).

Protection discuss are seen interwoven with security that bounded people or ideology from any intended threats. It’s also the freedom to pursue the core values and interest of the entity without fear of molestation or rancour. For example the U.S intelligence will not hesitate in the collation of information relating to the economic, political, military, technological, scientific and foreign development that portends threats of any form to their national interest.

Security is the endorsement and protection of the national interest. McNamara further points out the role of negative socio-economic variables, poverty and unemployment in insecurity generation. It therefore needs to be stated that security must be appreciated from both military and non-military dimensions; hence it denotes the security of citizens as well as the state that provides opportunities for the well-being of citizens. In a similar vein, Ogunbanwo (1989:11) contends:

African continent had been deluded with believe of considering security as an external attack. More than 4billion inhabitants in developing countries see security from basic level of struggling to survive. It was the survival of the fittest, with the parochial and archaic long time understanding of security. However, in order to balance up the African traditional security assessment, there is the need to add the non-military dimensions. African security concept is expected to be applied in its broad sense to include but limited economic security, social security, environmental security, food security, the quality of life security and technological security.

For African nation, security means development, and development is security. Development will provide some tangible entities that will give the people the sense of defending something. Where people have difficulty knowing what benefits they derive from belonging to a system, they will have little incentive to fight for its survival. The failure of armaments to achieve real security in Africa can therefore be seen from two perspectives. As a policy, it is not directly tailored to or relevant to the objective security needs of Africa. It is obvious that far more people in the world today suffer from economic than military insecurity. This is especially true for Nigeria and indeed Africa. Even for the many who suffer from direct military insecurity, the chances are that much of that insecurity has an economic dimension. Yet, the overwhelming concern of defence is military. Under those circumstances, no matter how efficient such a defence establishment might be, it is very unlikely to make much difference in the security situation, because it is not relevant to the nature of the threat.

Today security in wider sense includes such variables and incorporated concepts that consist of social class, interest and value but it's just the freedom from anxiety, danger, risk, apprehension with confidence of peace towards safety. In opinion of Okon (1998) who described security as a permanent condition to satisfied the feelings of survival within a world that anarchical in nature. Survival is seen as the first law of nature, primary duty of diplomats for promoting national security. In another development,

There is a global development that suggest dialogue towards expanding security discuss which consist of resource, environmental and demographic representation on issues. Security in this sense covers not only military presence and might but also social, economic and political well-being of the nation.

Security has become an integral aspect of human existence because the fact that not only guns or small arms and bombs threaten lives, but also increase of environmental and socio-economic threats across the world (Abolurin, 2012). The relevance of security explains why most security agencies like the Nigeria Police and others in the paramilitary established special squads to mount surveillance on public infrastructure and patrol the streets for safety

of people (Oguejiofor and Ewurum, 2011). Such efforts are aimed at preventing the activities of criminals who do not stop at vandalism but also make life miserable for people. Inter-agency security operations were set up in most parts of Nigeria like the Operation Hakura was deployed to the oil rich Niger Delta in 1993 to manage agitations, and was replaced by Operation Restore Hope in 2003 that now answers Operation Pulo-Shield that faced various challenges including media operations and civil military cooperation (Abubakar, 2013:23).

### 2.10.2 Nigeria Security Agencies

An agent is someone considered to acts for or manages the affairs of another person, or organisation. Security agents also refer to officers and men in the defence, intelligence, and law enforcement organisations of a state who are often in position to deal or interact with ordinary citizens on their threats. Security agents are found especially in the military, police, customs, NSCDC, immigration, prisons and intelligence organisations. Alemika (2010:10) opines that security agencies are specialised agencies established by law with the responsibility of maintaining law and creating order in an enabling environment for development. Zabadi (2007:3) affirms that security agencies include all those state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion arising from either internal or external aggression. They include:

- (1) Military
  - Nigerian Army (NA)
  - Nigerian Navy (NN)
  - Nigerian Air force (NAF)
  
- (2) Intelligence Services:
  - National Intelligence Agency (NIA)
  - Defence Intelligence Service (DIS)
  - Department of Security Service (DSS)
  
- (3) Security Services:
  - Nigeria Police Force (NPF)
  - National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA)
  - Nigeria Customs Service (NCS)
  - Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS)
  - Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS)
  - Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC)
  - Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC)
  - Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)
  - Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC)
  - Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB)

**Source:** Nigerian Army Headquarters, Abuja, February 2013.

Outside above formal security departments' services, there also exist several private security personnel and institutions, including community-based security outfits, and ad-hoc security units which include Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC), Bakassi Boys, Ohaneze, Vigilante Group of Nigeria but some are not yet recognised by law in Nigeria as such. It is hopeful that the existence of these security and intelligence agencies would guarantee national security. Some of these security outfits perform specifically assigned roles. However, because of the multiplicity of security apparatus and their uncoordinated structure and functional arrangements, their roles sometimes overlap and this breeds violence and confusion within them. While these establishments and outfits are seen as a necessity, others are assumed merely duplication of existing duties and responsibilities of extant security organisations.

It is desirable to describe the following Nigeria security agents that are active in the protection of oil pipelines in southern Nigeria as below:



**Plate 2.6:** Chief of Defence staff; Major Gen. Leo Irabor inspecting Nigerian Army parade  
**Source:** gettyimages.com. (2021)





**Plate 2.7:** Nigerian Navy (NN) personnel on patrol at the creeks in Niger Delta  
**Source:** gettyimages.com (2021)



**Plate 2.8:** NAF personnel caring remains of two pilots in recent air crash  
**Source:** gettyimages.com (2021)



**Plate 2.9:** Nigeria Police Force (NPF) personnel during prosecution of offenders  
**Source:** gettyimages.com

### **2.10.3 National Security**

Previously, the concept of national security was viewed from the angle of military response to conflict and threats. There is emphasis on military power and diplomacy. A lot was invested on defence with the believing that military strength of a state determines the solution to national security. However, recently, it was observed that the concept transcends beyond that but it includes social, economic and political well-being of the people as well as food, shelter, education, and healthcare.

The Reviewed Draft of the National Defence Policy (2002) states that national security is everything in which citizens can live in peace, freedom and safety. It enables citizen's participation in the process of governance, enjoying the protection of fundamental human rights, have access to resources and the necessities of life and inhabit an environment which is conducive to their health and well-being. Nigeria-defence-Policy (1999-2007)

Obasanjo (2001) posits that national security encompasses the safety, security and prosperity of Nigerians and Nigerian institutions living home and abroad on the one hand, and the protection of the country sovereignty and integrity on the other. It further encompasses the commitment of all citizens and institutions to the promotion of security and other vital national assets. This definition identifies the importance of the human aspect of security which is the premise of this study with the OPC.

According to Thomas (1993:3), the concept of 1970 on national security that was now expanded to international economics, the US economics has been seen as impregnable after the deficiencies of the cold war era. The Palm Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (1982) presented that the military action was not acceptable by the people. Therefore, national security issues in terms of military as noted by Gbor (2004:8), arises not beyond the borders of one's own country. Nevertheless, this emphasis is misleading. One, it draws attention away from the non-military threats that undermine the stability of many nations. Two, it presupposes that threats arising from outside a state are somehow more dangerous to its security than threats that arise inside it.


The issue of subjecting security to good governance, development and overall well-being of the people is crucial in Nigerian by ensuring protection on NNPC oil pipelines installations. This arises as a result of no confidence in the security agencies which has prevented the public from shearing valuable information with them. The long time negative image believe about the police has become so deep in the minds of the people that even the good deeds among them seemed unnoticed.

Therefore, national security is building the confidence of the people against trust on the leadership and all her national institutions. Security agents of high and low ranks will promptly obey lawful orders as well as been incorruptible in the exercise of their duties with the provision of adequate training, logistics (good communication equipment, transportation facilities, etc.) and motivation. These would further strengthen the capacities of the agencies. In the management of Nigeria internal security, the role of security agencies (Nigeria Police, State Security Service, Nigerian Prisons Service, Nigeria Immigration Service, Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, Nigeria Customs Service and the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, etc.) is apparently indispensable.

#### **2.10.4 Nigeria's Grand Strategy for National Security**

Obasanjo (2001:2) initiated Nigeria's Grand Strategy for National Security. Figure 2.5 below explains the Grand Strategy Framework:

## The Nigeria Grand Strategy Framework



**Figure 2.5:** The Grand Strategy Framework adapted from 2 Div. Headquarters, Ibadan.

The figure 2.5 grand strategy formulate that the base station that is must meet the national needs and others requirements of international, regional and internal commitment is the defence elements. These commitments are peace, security and prosperity of the nation. Nigeria leader's needs to have high regards for poverty, disease, hunger, unemployment, exploitation of foreign firms and gross indiscipline that threat to national security. Bassey (1989:5) presented that discursion of national security needs to identify fir the source nature and types of threat to a nation before looking at the management capability and policy options of such to the nation. Okunade (2007:3) now discovered that national security ought to be taken seriously because it is crucial in democratic governance and it is indeed the end product for political stability. It can be gathered and unfortunate too that the country is operating on old traditional concept of national security by sending strong coercive machinery to battle any perceived threats in order to deal ruthlessly with anybody that complain about injustice, intimidation or demonstration against harsh policies.

### **2.11 Government Initiatives and Interventions**

Towards the tail end of 2013, the former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan decided to put the Nigeria non state armed group like the OPC in charge of protecting Nigeria's critical infrastructure, such as the oil pipelines as host community policing, through a huge contract. He stated that: report had documented a yearly payment of N5.6 billion to former warlords for pipelines protection thus: 'General' Government Tompolo Ekpemuopolo, N3.6b; Asari Dokubo, N1.44b; 'General Ateke Tom, N560m; and 'General' Ebikabowei Boyloaf Victor Ben, N560m. The figures are exclusive of other OPC leaders including Gani Adams, Dr. Fredrick Fasheun paired with somebody in Ondo state as latter-day additions covering the three zones of the Southwest. That there was no unanimity of facts in the contractors' claims on the deal speaks volume too. While one was sure that the former President gave out the contracts because Nigeria was losing N1.3 trillion every year to vandals another credited NNPC with the contract awards when NNPC was losing N7 billion every month to vandalism.

This situation assumed a heightened proportion with the award of security contract to the non-state armed groups has further questioned the legitimacy and effectiveness of state security agencies, which legally and constitutionally empowered to maintain law and order

within all places of Nigeria's geographical space, including the monitoring and surveillance of critical state infrastructure. These security contracts to non state armed group also raise doubt concerning impunity regarding the status of the group outside the regular state security structure. Non state armed group can act in competition rather than in concert with the state over who has the right to protect citizens and they may also withhold evidence from the state or, conversely, public officers may shun cooperation with their private colleagues in order to protect their own institutional authority. Public and private actors may also compete over skilled personnel, leading to a drain of well-trained individuals from the public to the (often more lucrative) private sector (DCAF, 2015:16). The assignment of oil installation protection needs to be done anyway but the author's view is that any group or community that needs to be involved must follow strictly the law of the land and be legally constituted.

The perennial and cardinal questions was why would a country with so many official security outfits still award the contracts of securing critical national infrastructure to ethnic militia? Why would the government create an army within army or police within a police force? In addition, if, the involvement of the militia becomes necessary, are there ways of crosschecking or managing their operational lapses? What does the engagement of these ethnic militias portend to the moral of the conventional security agencies charged constitutionally and institutionally with the mandate of securing the country? The answer to these questions is the major preoccupation of this study. It is on this note that the study considers the time appropriate to examine the role of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps in managing the cult and militia group activities in the Southwest part of Nigeria.

The incessant occurrence of violence and crime in the Nigerian society is attributable to the insurrection of powerful cult and ethnic militia groups (Onimajesin, 2003:575, Theophilus, 2013:14). Since the transition to democratic rule in 1999, the cult and ethnic militia have become stronger, more daring, less fearful and more determined in the pursuance of their quests (Orosanye et al, 2012). Apart from instilling fear and inflicting pain in the lives of citizens of the country, the propagation of ethnic militia violence can have enormous negative implications on the political order of the Nigerian state.



Some people believe that the activities and actions of these groups pose a major threat to national security, law and order of the country as they engage in various vices ranging from acts of terrorism, assassination, hostage taking and extra-judicial killings. Their mode of operation has driven fear down the spines of innocent, defenceless and well-meaning Nigerians. They have also become pawns in the hands of desperate politicians who have taken undue advantage of some of these groups to further their own self-serving ambitions (Orosanye et al, 2012). The activities of these cults and ethnic militia in Nigeria have gradually turned the daytime into darkness; where violence and other crime related happenings are on the increase. Today, Nigerians live in perpetual fear of private militias causing grave social, economic, political and human cost (Ajala, 2006) due to their unorthodox methods and approach in their daily activities.

## **2.12 National Security Objectives within the Framework of Vision 2020**

National security is a broad concept. It encompasses peace and stability, good governance dealing with crime and disorder, disaster management, regional and international relations and many issues that touch on the well-being of citizens such as justice, the rule of law, human rights, economic emancipation and democracy (The Uganda Document).

National security is concerned with the establishment, advancement and enhancement of peace and stability, order and adherence to the rule of law, good governance and pursuit of peaceful means to conflict resolution and co-existence internally, regionally and internationally. In the words of Mike Okiro, a former Inspector-General of Police, “a secure nation is one that is able to protect and develop itself so that it can promote its core values, meet the needs of its people and provide them with the right atmosphere for self-improvement” (Okiro, 2008). He viewed interest in security as a basic preoccupation of every nation and indeed every community. To him, “security occupies such a pivotal place in the affairs of men and nation as it is only in a safe and peaceful environment that individuals can successfully engage in productive activities and realise their potentials”. Manwaring (2003) views conceptualisation of national security as varying from state to state in direct proportion to their individual willingness to risk, conflict or war at any given time.

In Article 17 of the Constitution of Uganda, it is the duty of every citizen to play a significant role in national security. While the cardinal responsibility of national security is placed in the hands of specific constitutions and organs such as the Uganda People's Defence Force (Articles 208 and 209), the Uganda Police Force (Articles 211 and 212), intelligence services (article 218), National Security Council (Articles 219 and 220), the Parliament and Civil Defence Organisations - Organisations that support the national security institution such as the armed forces and the intelligence organisations. They are community or civilian-based security entities that are usually formed to deal with specific security or national emergencies such as disasters (The Uganda Document). The civil organisations in Uganda include the Local Defence Unit (LDU), Crime Preventers', the Private Security Companies and during insurgency in the North, the *Amukas* and Arrow Boys.

Nine core national security objectives were formulated within the framework of Vision 2020, together with strategies and targets to be reached in attaining them. These stated objectives proposed projects and programmes were to be implemented within the scope of first implementation plan (2010-2013).

The objectives are to:

- i. Enhance funding for operational and infrastructural capacity of the security services
- ii. Enhance funding for training, retraining and staff welfare
- iii. Strengthen the R and D facilities of the security training institutions for optimal innovation and development of new technologies.
- iv. The Defence Industry Corporation (DICON) to produce all the small and medium arms and Equipment for the defence and security services by 2013.
- v. Deliver accurate and timely intelligence through an efficient, reliable and proactive Information gathering system.
- vi. Develop and implement comprehensive social-scientific, effective and efficient crime prevention and control strategy.
- vii. Strengthen relevant security services to respond effectively to emergencies, national, and manmade disasters.
- viii. Improve the administration of Justice, entrenchment of social justice and enhancement of National Security. Improve Public Confidence in the Nigerian Police.

(Vision 2020, First National Implementation Plan, 2010-2013, (2010). Extracts from vision 20-20-20.

The Criminal Justice System in Nigeria was to be arguably unworkable. As a result, criminality that has festered daylight robberies, advances fee fraud (419), oil bunkering and cyber-crimes have become the daily soundtrack of life for most citizens who end up being either victims of some of these crimes or recipients of irrational responses by state agents. State security outfits have been seriously overwhelmed with the task to meet the security needs of the people. Consequently, informal security mechanisms that involve '*Non-State Armed Groups*' (NSAG) in the guise of '*ethnic militia*' are now being employed to fill the power vacuum created by the inability of the state to fulfil its most basic functions. That '*Non-State armed groups*' intervene to provide security for citizens where the state fails to do so points towards the alternate security measures as responses to states' failure or inability to provide adequate security.

## **2.13 Law Enforcement Agents**

### **2.13.1 Military**

The Nigeria military are the Military Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria(FRN). It started as a division the Royal West-African Frontier-Force(RWAF) that developed to Nigeria when independence was attained in 1960. Nigeria Regiment of the Royal West African Frontier Force was renamed the Nigerian Military Forces in 1956, NMF, and in April 1958 the colonial government of Nigeria took over from the British War Office control of the Nigerian Military Forces.

The roles of a country's armed forces are entrenched in her Constitution and Section 217 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. The defence of the territorial integrity and other core interests of the nation form the major substance of such roles. Gideon B 2016 reported through USA, UK News that the Federal Government has launched a special military operation code-named AWATSU against pipeline vandals in the country. Last year, the military took a decision after a meeting between the leadership of the Nigeria National

Petroleum Corporation to maintain a presence at the Arepo area following the killing of four policemen and 11 officials of the Department of State Services by suspected vandals. Abubakar said that the arrests and the seizures made by the military were responsible for the recent call by the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Ibok-EteIbas, for the establishment of special courts to try vandals in the country. He also stressed that the military had done adequate deployment to ensure the protection of the nation's pipelines in the country. The military will make reasonable impact and contribute positively in the quest against vandalism.

### **2.13.2 Nigeria Police Force**

The Nigeria Police (NPF) is the principal law enforcement agency in Nigeriawith staff strength of about 371,800. The NPF is a very large organization consisting of 36 commands grouped into 12 zones and 7 administrative organs. The agency is always headed by IGP Inspector General of Police. According to Onwuemenyi O. (2012) of vanguard newspaper, "The Management of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, NNPC and the leadership of the Nigerian Police have pledged to join forces in combating the menace of pipeline vandalism and security threats to key oil and gas facilities currently endangering the smooth operation of the petroleum industry. This resolution was arrived at after a meeting between the Group Managing Director of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Engr. Austen Oniwon and the Acting Inspector General of Police, Mr. Mohammed Abubakar at the Louis Edet House in Abuja". The outcome of this partnership cannot be ascertained as vandalism continues in Nigeria unabated. The problem is far more rooted in sabotage by few and compromise by some law enforcement agents of the Federal republic of Nigeria. It could be deductible that collective responsibility and accountability will go a long way in reducing pipeline vandalism.

### **2.13.3 Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps**

Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) is formally a voluntary Corps but established in 2003 as full paramilitary agency of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that was primarily given the mandate among others the protection of critical infrastructure in the country.

According to Abolurin (2010), the roles of the paramilitary (otherwise referred to as Civil Defence Organisations in Uganda), on the one hand, include the following:

- (1) Arrest with or without a warrant, detain, investigate and institute legal proceedings by or in the name of the Attorney-General of the Federation in accordance with the provision of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria against any person who is reasonably suspected to have committed an offence or is involved in any:
  - (i) Criminal activities, chemical poisoning, oil spillage;
  - (ii) Nuclear waste;
  - (iii) Industrial espionage or fraud;
  - (iv) Activities aimed at frustrating any government programme or policy; and
  - (v) Riot, disorder, revolt, strike or religious unrest.
- (2) Monitor, investigate and take every necessary step to forestall any planned act of terrorism particularly:
  - (i) Cult and ethnic militia activities;
  - (ii) Criminal activities aimed at depriving citizens of their property or lives; and
  - (iii) Syndicate activities aimed at defrauding the Federal, State and Local Governments.
- (3) Monitor, investigate and take every necessary step to forestall any act of terrorism and report same to appropriate Federal Security Agency.
- (4) Provide necessary warning to the civil population in times of danger.
- (5) Evacuate the civilian population from dangerous areas.
- (6) Provide and manage shelters for civilians during periods of emergency.
- (7) Assist in the decontamination and in taking precautionary measures during any period of emergency.
- (8) Carry out rescue operations and control volatile situation.
- (9) Detect and demarcate any danger area.

(10) Provide intelligence information on any matter relating to:

- (i) Crime control generally;
- (ii) Riot, disorder, revolt, strike or religious unrest;
- (iii) Subversive activities by members of the public aimed at frustrating any government programme or policy; and
- (iv) Individual action and crime aimed at paralysing government activities.

On the other hand, the Uganda Document listed the role of Civil Defence Organisation to include the following:

- (1) *Focused Law Enforcement*: Responding to criminal (or non-criminal) incidents and enforcing the law as unique responsibility of the Police. That does not change in Civil Defence. Focused law enforcement means being more mission-driven, giving top priority to the most serious crimes, as well as those civic types that most concern a particular community.
- (2) *Intelligence Support*: This is the information that is developed into intelligence that is willingly provided by people. Civil Defence Organisations also help in passing vital information and intelligence to the national security organisations.
- (3) *Counter Insurgency*: Civil Defence Organisations help in situations of insurgency such as the one experienced in Northern Uganda.
- (4) *Neighbourhood Partnerships*: This is where police officers and community residents, work together to change those conditions that allows crime and disorder to take place. The strategic objective is to maximise the coordination, cooperation and communication with government agencies, community service providers and neighbourhood and community groups.
- (5) *Empowerment*: This includes the delegation of the authority and responsibility necessary to identify and resolve those public safety related issues confronting communities through training and community involvement. An empowered community shares the responsibility of crime prevention and increases problem solving approaches to reduce the incidence of crime and other national security matters. This does not only help reduce insecurity but also increases patriotism.
- (6) *Enforcement of Laws*: Civil Defence Organisations have auxiliary and specific powers to arrest any person who has committed a crime and produce him to the

police and other security agencies for further legal action. By so doing, they contribute to national security by ensuring the observance of law and order, justice and creation of peace and stability in society.

(7)*Prevention and Detection of Crime:* Crime prevention is the anticipation, recognition and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of pre-emptive action to remove or reduce it. Crime is a big destabilising factor in national security in particular and development in general.

(8)*Conflict Resolution and Response to National Disasters:* Civil Defence Organisations play a vital role in conflict resolution. This may be at personal, family, regional, national or international levels. It is also worth noting that their role in responding to natural disasters, e.g., earthquakes, floods, road accidents, and fire outbreaks contributes significantly to national security and development.

(9)*Good Governance and Democracy:* The role of Civil Defence in elections and campaigns both at local and national levels ensures that good governance and democracy are attained.

These are important benchmarks for national security. Needless to say more, Civil Defence Organisations at local, national and international levels contribute significantly to national security and development. An environment where peace and stability reign is an open ground and avenue for development.

#### **2.14 NSCDC and Crime Prevention**

There are numerous ways in which the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps prevents crime in the Nigerian state. They include the following:

- a. Patrolling is usually a large part of a security officer's duties. Often these patrols logged by use of a guard tour patrol or beat system, which requires regular patrols. Regular patrols of segments of the society by a particular number of officers instituted to frighten criminals. The patrol system however has a drawback because it provides predictability for the would-be criminal, as well as monotony for the security officer on duty. To overcome this, random patrols are easily programmed into these systems, allowing greater freedom of movement and unpredictability. The Global-positioning systems is

also being used as a more effective means of tracking officer movement and patrol behaviour so as to provide quick back up in case there is an encounter with criminals.

- b. Surveillance is another aspect of a security officer's duties. This has to do with keeping a discrete watch over members of the society who are suspected to be criminals or who have ties with criminals. The surveillance activities enable the Security officers keep a Dossier (a document with classified information about the activities including the strengths, weaknesses and general modus operandi of the individuals in question). This assists in crime prevention by forestalling a crime before it is committed and crime detection is to identify criminals after the crime is committed.
- c. Community-oriented policing, refers to the recognition that security officers must act to encourage the public to share responsibility for public safety, specifically by consulting with them, adapting their operations to local conditions, mobilizing volunteer resources, and problem-solving. In this case, the Civil Defence Officer acts as a friend of the populace as such they are able to share information that will assist in the prevention of crime and in the early apprehension of criminals in the society. Programmes like Neighbourhood watch are also aspects of the Community Policing Initiative. In this case the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps assist different communities to train selected members of society in security measures and crime prevention techniques. This places some burden of security provision on the shoulders of members of the society. Members of the society can report criminal activities to the NSCDC at any time and expect rapid response based on their information.
- d. Problem-oriented policing: This involves developing police programs that ameliorate or eliminate conditions that generate problems of insecurity and disorder that security officers are repeatedly called upon to prevent. These includes Civil Defence Officers educating and enlightening youths about the need to avoid crime, training Boys Scout, Boys Brigade and Girls Guide members on the need to discourage crime among their peers.
- e. Designing community assistance programmes like being present in refugee camps, counselling prisoners about living a law abiding life when released, monitoring released convicts, involving youths in community cleaning programmes, counselling married couples against marital violence. Enlightens members of the society about crime and its



consequences with the need to prevent its re-occurrence. The NSCDC also utilises the mass media to enlighten the public about the need to be vigilant against crime and providing them with numbers to call in case of emergency.

- f. Signs-of-crime policing refers to where security officers, drawing on the logic of "broken windows", prosecute minor offences that contribute to the creation of a milieu of incivility. This is sometimes mistakenly identified with "zero tolerance policing". In this case, Civil Defence Officers prosecute individuals who are dabbling into crime severely to discourage them from becoming full time criminals. This is usually done with young offenders or first time offenders with extenuating situation. Also they counsel people who are showing signs of criminality such as delinquents in the school system.
- g. Hot spots policing, meaning the short-lived or episodic concentration of security resources in areas or situations of repeated criminal activity e.g. red light districts, ghettos etc. (Sherman et al. 1989). In Nigeria, security personnel of the NSCDC seconded to patrol places like the Niger-Delta region and some parts of the north. It includes the patrol and monitoring of banks, oil installations, power installations, and other sensitive organisations and places in the society. It also includes the patrol and raiding of red-light districts.
- h. COMPSTAT (for computer-driven crime statistics), is the signature innovation in the development of evidence-based policing (McDonald 2002). Evidence-based security means evaluating security activity by systematically collecting information about criminal operations and their effects. This enables security officers use a database of criminality to apprehend criminals based on mug shots, fingerprints and criminal modus operandi. The NSCDC seems to have come a long way regarding the use of this technique in that a database borrowed from the police coupled with its own collation being used presently to fight crime. All apprehended crooks are photographed (front and side), fingerprinted and blood typed for DNA. This, coupled with typing the modus operandi of the criminal type creates a nomenclature that helps prevent crime.
- i. STOP and SEARCH programs by Police and NSCDC helps to prevent crime because it catches some criminals unawares and aborts their operation before it starts.
- j. Operating Security Checkpoints: Members of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps maintain security checkpoints in conjunction with the military and other

paramilitary forces to forestall crime. This scares off criminals and discourages them from operating. Most security checkpoints are usually sited where lot of road bumps are located to forestall speeding and to discourage criminals in the zone from escaping.

- k. Informed and Discretionary Raids of drinking parlours, red light districts and hotels: Members of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps raid drinking parlours, night clubs, hostels, campuses, red light districts and hotels on the basis of information by residents in order to apprehend criminals operating or visiting such places. This is usually because these places are a hotbed where criminals gather or come to relax. The guard of criminals is usually down in these areas and as such they are easy to arrest and prosecute from there.
- l. Serious in-depth searches in the SEAPORTS, AIRPORTS and BORDERS: Members of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps in conjunction with other military and para-military forces also engage in serious searches at seaports, airports and borders to apprehend criminals and to discourage crime. This scares off criminals and discourages them from operating for fear of being apprehended.
- m. Monitoring electoral proceedings: Members of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps in conjunction with other military and paramilitary forces monitor electoral proceedings, protect the electoral officials, polling booths and ballot boxes. On principles they checkmate the activities of political thugs and other electorally created miscreants. They maintain security during elections.
- n. Monitoring political rallies: Members of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps in conjunction with other military and paramilitary forces monitor political rallies and other political meetings, protect politicians from attack by miscreants and secure government building against vandalism.
- o. Protect the citizenry during chaotic periods: The NSCDC plays the role to Guard victims properties during periods of state emergency through:
  - i. Help to fight fire: NSCDC assists the fire brigade to fight fire and evacuate victims during fire disasters.
  - ii. Help to evacuate victims of flood, fire, oil spillage, chemical pollution, tidal waves, erosion and other hazards: NSCDC assists the National Emergency Management

Agency (NEMA) and other stakeholders to evacuate victims during natural and man-made disasters like flood, fire, oil spillage, chemical pollution, tidal waves, erosion, tsunami, road accidents etc.

- iii. Advise on private guard company registration and inspect their premises: The NSCDC ensures quality control in the standard and calibre of security companies and guards who are given authority to secure the lives and property of members of the populace. Before the advent of the NSCDC, cases abounded in which security guards connived with armed robbers and hoodlums to rob their employers but this is no longer the case because of the serious scrutiny by the NSCDC.
- iv. Also security companies hired just anybody and lacked adequate equipment to make the personnel efficient in security provision. The NSCDC has reduced this drastically by closing security companies that cannot meet the set standard. The NSCDC also assist to train these security guards in security procedure and collaboration.
- v. Monitor the activities of religious and trade unions etc.: The NSCDC also keeps a discrete watch over religious groups and trade unions with suspicious behaviours. This monitoring enables the Security officers forestall religious troubles that might take political dimensions as observed before in the Nigerian state.

### **2.15 NSCDC and Vandalism**

The NSCDC have vital roles to play in curbing oil pipelines, NITEL cables, PHCN cables, Government buildings and infrastructures vandalism throughout the country. This enormous task is one of the functions legitimately assigned the Corps by Act 2003 Part II (e) and Part II (f) (vi) which clearly spelt out that it is the function of the NSCDC to maintain 24-hour surveillance over sites and projects of the Federal, State and Local Governments. Part (ii) (f) indicated that the Corps has the power to arrest and investigate power transmission and oil pipeline vandalism. Before we proceed, it is important to examine the pipelines networks in Nigeria.

From the above, one can infer that adequate measures need to be put in place for protection of pipelines from vandalism. What then do we mean by pipeline vandalism? It refers to “illegal or unauthorised activities that involve the destruction of oil pipelines to disrupt supply or the puncturing of oil pipelines to siphon crude oil or its refined products in order to appropriate it for personal use or for sale in the black market or any other outlets” (Onuoha, 2007). The same thing for vandalism of PHCN cables, NITEL installations and other government infrastructures - they are all illegal or unauthorised activities with negative consequences.

Records have shown that over 2,258 pipeline vandalism incidents were recorded between 2003 and early 2005 with areas of repeated pipeline breakages within the same range of time. This massive level of vandalism was reduced to unnoticeable figure in year 2006 due to the new operational strategies adopted by the leadership of NSCDC, and its vow to stamp out vandals in Nigeria society. Within this period, over 150 vandals arrested, investigated and handed over to relevant security agencies for further investigation and prosecution (Progress Report on the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps).

### **2.16 Deviant Behaviour**

Deviance is any behaviour that the majority of given group regards as unacceptable or that typically evokes a collective response of a negative type. The six types of deviance are predation, exploitation, defiance, plunder, decadence, and submission. Predation involves direct physical violence or manipulation to take property which includes such behaviours as theft, rape, robbery, fraud, and homicide. Exploitation is indirect predation, where the exploiter uses others to do the dirty work. Examples are contract killings, price fixing, and political corruption. Defiance occurs when individuals revolt against norms or values, by engaging in such act as violating curfews, vandalism, political protests, and sullenness by a marital partner. Act of plunder are typically undertaken by people without much of social conscience, it is considered to be particularly heinous, which includes destroying fields to hunt for foxes, pollution by oil companies and unrealistic taxes imposed by occupying armies. Decadence refers to behaviour that is unpredictable and viewed by most as irrational; examples are group sex with children, and sadistic torture. Acts of submission involve passive, unthinking, slavish obedience to the expectations, commands, or

anticipated desires of others. Examples are eating slop on command or allowing self to be sexually degraded.

### **2.17 Community Policing and Oil Pipeline Right of Way**

Community policing believes that powers and responsibility of policing to the neighbourhood should be shared between the police and the community. It is a paradigm shift from the traditional policing model of centralised power and protection. The police ways of receiving orders from above to that of making decisions as situations arises within the community is a welcome phenomenon. The slow pace of development of community policing in Nigeria is due largely to the police history that is built on a semi military command structure, where they are used to the use of force and brutality rather than on the spot assessment and reasoning. The community policing acceptance by the police will reduce crime rate because the public will become the eye of the police which will assist the police in fighting crime. Non-state actors supporting their host community in securing critical infrastructure give credence to better methods without necessarily working on distrust. They need to be properly guided to avoid jungle justice.

### **2.18 Critical Infrastructure Protection Model**

Cavelty and Suter (2009) and Assaf (2008) have proposed the governance model for critical infrastructure protection, with the assertion that critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is currently seen as an essential part of national security in various countries across the world. Advocates of the national security model and business continuity model focus on the values that aim at protecting infrastructure or reducing risks (Assaf, 2008). This model is in tandem with the national strategy for critical infrastructure protection which encourages partnerships and sets the framework for strengthening the resiliency of critical infrastructure in Canada, and emphasises on the resilience aspect of critical infrastructures as the ultimate goal to be achieved. It also incorporates the critical infrastructure protection decision support system as a risk assessment tool for information and decision support for the protection of critical infrastructures, and accounts the probability of a threat, vulnerabilities and impact for all hazards and different types of infrastructures (Giannopoulos, Filippini, and

Schimmer, 2012). In this regard, policy makers map out strategies and identify needed human and material resources to protect the infrastructures concerned. According to Cavely and Suter (2009), the model of public private partnership in securing critical infrastructure is an inevitable endeavour that must go beyond government's monitoring to involve coordination.

This model is apt because it encourages public-private partnership in securing critical infrastructure from the conspiracy of vandals in the society. It is a useful and necessary endeavour considering the rising threats to the safety of various facilities that the communities and cities require to make life enjoyable. The model points to the fact that the government has a crucial role to play in collaborating with the private sector especially in the areas of leader-motivator role and monitoring. It should be added that monitoring in this regard can prevent abuse by non-state actors in the process of executing this task of protecting critical infrastructure.

## **2.19 Theoretical Framework**

This study is anchored in theoretical framework of Conspiracy where individuals or group like the militias conspire in taking advantage of security lapses to operate and create anarchy by vandalising the oil pipelines.

### **2.19.1 The Queer Ladder Theory (QLT)**

The Queer Ladder Theory (QLT) is relevant as the concept of vandalism can be viewed as an organised crime against the state. The main concept of QLT can be summarised thus:

- i. Organised crime is an active behaviour which tends to show means to an end.
- ii. It is also a mechanism of socioeconomic advancement.
- iii. It is a way to gather wealth and make power to self (Mallory, 2007).

This theory are considered on the basis that organised crime progress where government capacity for sanctioning criminals are weak, where corruption of public is endemic and legitimate livelihood are slim. (Nwoye, 2000; Lyman, 2007) These circumstances placed incentives to indulge in crime as high and deterrence to criminality very low. This creates room for criminal impunity and franchise. Applied QLT will situate the prevalence of

organised crime and other acts of criminality in Nigeria. In this regard, it is to be noted that the incidence of oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria has been driven by ‘rat-race’ for material aggrandizement. This has been made worse by the prevailing socioeconomic malaise and concomitant livelihood crisis in the country. The inability or failure of the country relevant government agencies in ensuring efficient enforcement of appropriate sanctions against crime in Nigeria has complicated and accentuated the problem. The theory is establishing vandalism as an organized crime which demonstrates among criminals as strategy for social climbing for an economic empowerment when it comes to vandalising oil pipelines installations in the country.

### **2.19.2 Conspiracy Theory**

The theory that adequately explains the phenomenon of insecurity on the Protection Oil Pipeline is the conspiracy theory. It offers more insight into the activities of people that target public infrastructures for different reasons associated with their intention to undermine the interests of the state. Conspiracy theory generally attributes extraordinary powers to certain agents – “to plan, to control others, to maintain secrets and a notable attribute of conspiracy theories is resistant to correction, through direct denials or counter speech by government officials” (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2008:5). It is noteworthy that based on the operational strategy of the perpetrators, this theory is closely linked with the queer ladder theory to explain the phenomenon of an organised crime that is seen as an instrumental behaviour and a means to an end (Mallory, 2007; cited in Okoli and Orisanya, 2012). Such aims are not only criminal as they sometimes involve agitation and group interest.

In their study, Hodapp and Von Kannon (2008) assert that conspiracy theory gives the idea that people tend to act secretly with the aim achieving power, influence or other benefits. Some of these benefits can be economic rewards accrued from the act or just to be heard by policy makers when a particular group becomes a threat to public peace. In this case, there are times when individuals or militias conspire to take advantage security lapses to operate and create anarchy or even destroy some critical infrastructure. The relevance of this theory is that the people that vandalise public infrastructure conspire with organised groups to carry

out their nefarious activities. Conspiracy theory remains relevant for adoption to the study given that vandalism is regarded as crime against the state. According to, Okere argues thus: “whatever the reasons given, the fact still remains that vandalism is a crime and those who engage in it are criminals” (2011:6). The foregoing explains why militias are becoming instrumental to the war against vandalism in the society. A significant instance of conspiracy against the state and critical infrastructures is the mutual existence and cooperation between government officials, non-state actors and some civilians in various communities to vandalise oil installations and power lines. The partnership that leads to the identification of points that can easily be destroyed without apprehension is a conspiracy from vandals.

## **2.20 Concluding Literature**

The recent spate of vandalism through malicious destruction and defacement of oil pipeline installations for the purpose of product theft or sabotage in southwestern Nigeria calls for adequate attention. There are huge economic losses, fire disasters, loss of lives, and properties, air/water pollutions from oil spill with its attendant ecological and environmental degradation. The literature pointed out that the importance of oil pipeline installations product transportation cannot be overemphasised compared with the oil haulage through heavy truck tankers on the road by examining what is obtainable in America, China, India and the Caspian region.

Nigeria with vast land mass consists of southwestern states where NNPC operates 5001 kilometers pipeline through PPMC its ancillary. These are susceptible to vandalism as demonstrated on 12 July 2016 when suspected non state armed group the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) that earlier threatened to extend their attacks on oil facilities from Niger Delta to Lagos state vowed to cripple Nigerian economy. They destroyed oil facility that served 11.4 distribution lines in Ikorodu, Lagos state. This was the adopted strategy to coerce the government in their policies in favouring Niger Delta community for an economic gain through the amnesty programme. The causes, effect, constrain and curbing vandalism are sincere approaches to protect the oil pipeline installations using collaborative strategy of the stakeholders which includes the security agencies, the traditional chiefs and the community of ROW to work together under trust and patriotism. In this context the



Army, Navy, Air-force, Police and NSCDC were identified as relevant security agencies that needs to work together. Nigeria pipeline vandalism is regarded as sabotage act that attracts capital offence under Petroleum Act which is covered by Criminal Justice Decree of 1975 Miscellaneous Provision. Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps with the mandate of the act2003 as amended with the Act2007 under the law of the federation LFN, employed many methods to detect, arrest, investigate and prosecute vandals had made little impact in reducing vandalism of oil pipeline installations in the country.

The emergence of OPC, a non-state armed group was linked with self-determination objective during the June 12, 1993 Chief Moshood Abiola presidential election annulment but recently had shifted to settling disputed and fighting crime within the southwestern Nigeria. The Oodua organisation could be daring when in operation as they wedged weapons of destruction which includes cutlass, knife and pump action which sometimes led to problem of uncertainties, uneasy calm, threats and anxiety that befall Nigeria citizens before the federal government pipeline installations contract in 2015. Despite this background the OPC and government like private public partnership develop tension between organizational autonomy and sustaining watchfulness with the ability to deal decisively with criminal elements that vandalize the pipeline. Oil pipeline installations protection needs to be understood as not only deploying a coerced measure but also developing organizational antidotes of reliability that enable society and its constituent parts to be more resilient and robust. Technological and managerial procedures that are enduring may also limit the incessant occurrence of pipeline installations explosion in which the federal government is expected to sponsor and take responsibility of the protective mechanism.

The concept of Nigeria grand strategy for national security objectives can be achieved through consultation and coordination of the resources while government are expected to deviate from its traditional ways of building strong coercive and combat sources to deal ruthlessly with citizens and group that complain about injustice, intimidation or demonstration against harsh policies.

The study anchored Conspiracy theory where people tend to act secretly with the aim of achieving power, influence or other benefits which can be economic rewards or be heard by

policy makers and become threats to public peace. A significant instance of conspiracy against the state on oil pipeline vandalism is the mutual cooperation between government officials, non state armed group and some civilians in various communities. The partnership that identifies points that can easily be destroyed without apprehension is conspiracy.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Research Design**

This study adopted an exploratory research design which was preferred because the researcher does not find an adequate past data on the problem. Employing the services of the alleged group like OPC to protect the pipelines against vandalism and there is little earlier similar situation to be referred for forecasting a result (smstudy .com 2016) The purpose is to obtain experience on outcome inquiry when research problems are at preliminary stage of investigation. Exploratory design can be employed to create a perception on the best way to proceed and the best methodology to be employed that could effectively gathered information about the problem.

#### **3.2 Study Area**

The study area was the southwestern Nigeria, specifically the states that have accessible network of pipelines installations to vandals. However, the southwest states include Lagos, Oyo, Ondo, Ekiti, Osun and Ogun State. This study concentrates only on pipeline vandalised prone areas of the southwestern Nigeria which consist of Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, and Ondo states excluding Osun and Ekiti States that cannot be easily accessed by vandals since the majority of pipeline in Osun are off shore inside Osun river and that of Ondo is in a hilly terrain. Therefore, the vandals abandon the area and no record of vandalism was noticed from these two states hence it was out of the study area. The approximate population of the southwestern region of Nigeria is estimated at 32.5 million people (National Population Commission, 2006). The region is dominated by Yoruba ethnic group who make up approximately 21% of the national population.

### 3.3 Sampling Size

The people identified as the stakeholders are:

- Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC).
- Ex President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan GEJ and officials
- Community Leaders or Traditional chief around (ROW).
- NNPC Officials represented by the (DPR).
- Security Agencies that includes, NSCDC and NPF.
- Youth Leaders and Women groups in community living along ROW.

The population of the study will be drawn amongst the different categories of members of the OPC, the NPF and NSCDC operating in the southwestern part of Nigeria. The military is excluded from the stakeholders because they are not directly charged with internal security except when the threat escalated beyond the attention of NPF and NSCDC. Nigeria ex-President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan GEJ and few federal government officials were also proposed to understand provide an insight into the award of the security contract to the group. The president could not be reached and the three officials of the federal staff are not ready to disclose anything since they have sworn to oath of secrecy. The president of recent has been engaged in international awards of honour and celebrations even after leaving office. He remains the most honoured Nigerian president with series of international honours and engagement as he is celebrated till date as the icon and hero of democracy. Till date all efforts to get his attention prove abortive. It is essential that the target was the OPC members charged with the surveillance of pipeline on contract basis selected for interview are the Founder, the National co-ordinator and from each state are the Zonal coordinators. A total of the target population of 6 respondents were purposively selected from the OPC leadership. They deserve to be examined by the researcher because they are directly involved, Community leaders or traditional chiefs living around pipeline right of way are of great importance among others because they are the custodian of culture, environment and the people. One community chief from four states makes up the targets population to be 4. The security agents especially those that share similar responsibility of law enforcement on pipeline vandalism are the Nigeria Police Force and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence corps who can also from their professional experience, shed light on the matter and proffer

operational collaboration with the OPC where possible. The state leadership of NSCDC and NPF from each state gives 8 respondents that are State Commandants and Commissioners of Police. The NNPC that is represented by DPR officials operating within the study area of Lagos, Ogun, Oyo and Ondo States were adopted for this study because they are the oil facility operator who was considered to own the oil pipeline installations. The target population is 4 considering the Operational Controller of DPR leadership in each state. Also adopted are the Youth Leaders and women group living along oil pipeline right of way because they are the host community whose observations are on the spot assessment. It is essential to note that the selected participants for this study will be considered based on their involvement and experiences in curtailing the crime of pipe line vandalism, illegal crude oil bunkering, and oil theft around the study area. The focus group discussion was done with 10 respondents for each group comprising of youths are 5 five youth leaders and 5 community women purposively selected from the four states will make 40 participants but 4 FGD.

### **3.4 Sampling Techniques**

Table 3.1 below provide further details on the interview templates:

**Table 3.1:** The Respondent and the Interview Session

S/NO	IDI	KII	FGD
1	2 OPC (i.e. the founder and the national coordinator) 4 OPC leaders Zonal coordinators (one from each state of Lagos, Ogun, Oyo and Ondo).	4 DPR State Coordinators Officials (one from each state).	4 Youth Leaders and Women Groups living along ROW (one group of ten from each state)
2	4 Traditional Chiefs (one from each state).	4 Commissioner of Police (one from each state).	
3		4 State Commandant (one from each state).	
TOTAL	10	12	4

Source: Fieldwork, 2018

In the above table, 10 IDIs were carried out which includes the OPC leadership and traditional rulers; 12 KIVs considered to be professional among the security agents and DPR officials representing the NNPC were also interviewed. 4 FGD taking 5 youth leaders and 5 women living along ROW from each state of Lagos, Ogun, Oyo and Ondo were considered for the group discussion. The above strategy was adopted for the qualitative data collection due to the nature of the study. It will go a long way to make the researcher to achieve all the set objectives with room for further findings.

The researcher enlisted the services of two assistants who operated the audio tapes, took notes and photographs. This is to ensure that information recorded at site can be recalled and reviewed later during collation of data. The researcher also secured the consent of the respondents before recording the interview proceedings .A pilot study was conducted in Oyo state using the stakeholders of community group, the police and traditional leaders. The interview duration lasted a maximum of one hour, thirty minutes while the FGDs lasted maximum of two hours. Also, the interviews were held in the offices of the respondents while the FGDs held in either the houses of community leaders or vandalized site within the study area that were visited to make observations. The pilot study is to put in practice and observe likely problem for adjustment before the full study are undertaken.

### **3.5 Method of Data Collection**

The study employed primary and secondary sources for answering the research questions. Observation and interviews methods are adopted for the collection of primary data in this study. Visiting the pipelines right of way within the study area and making direct contacts for interview with stakeholders were to make on spot assessment. The investigator collected the primary data on a first hand basis, which was presumed to be more accurate as it reduces the distortion of information and facts normally experienced from a third party. The collection of the primary data also engages youth leaders and women groups living in ROW were engaged in group discussions with regards to the oil pipes protection that traverse their area in order to share their experiences. The researcher used interviews to collect data directly focusing on the aims and objectives with the research questions. The interview procedures also guide with prospect to collect additional clarification on the questions to

the interviewee if need be and even took advantage of asking for additional noble questions that could lead to the drawing out of more quality information. The primary sources are data retrieved from interviews conducted during field investigation. Details of the interview guide/protocol utilised for collection of primary data are provided in appendix 1.

The Secondary source of data collections were from already current and active literature such as books, newspapers, journals source, magazines government policy papers and internet. The researcher decided to employ and sought documents under statutory authorities through a formal application.

### **3.6 Instrument of Documentation**

The data for the study was gathered together through structured interview questions and focus group discussions. The interviews include key informant interviews KII, in-depth IDI, and focus group discussions FGD with the different groups in the four states of the study areas. These IDI, KII & FGD are transcribed and analysed according to thematic areas and the documents sourced were content analysed.

### **3.7 Validation of Instrument**

In an effort to ascertain the validity of the instrument used on the face and content validity as well as the format of the questionnaire developed give credence to source for expert opinions from the supervisor. The errors in the text were identified and corrected with several innovative ideas discovered in the course of this study. These corrections and observations further provided the basis for improving the items in the questionnaire that was made from validation exercise.



### **3.8 Non-Participant Observation**

Non-participant observation is an additional strategy for the researcher to practically observe the pattern of vandalised site in order to make on the spot assessment of damaged pipelines and environment within the study area. Also it gives opportunity to the FGD respondents that make such site as venue relevant observable questions. Audio and video tape recorder and field notes were used to capture the observed details. These enabled the researcher to determine recommendations required to address their present environmental issues, economic adversities and the deplorable health conditions of people within the right of way in the study area.

### **3.9 Method of Data Analysis**

Deductive content analysis was used to transcribe and analyse data generated in the course of the study which means data collected was analysed from the more general view to specifics. They were also categorised accordingly. The research findings were discussed thematically.

One of numerous research methods used for analysis to interpret text data from a predominately naturalistic paradigm is known as the deductive content analysis. The researcher analyse all evidences found from journals, policy documents, books, news paper, internet source and reports of enquiry. The qualitative data from the IDIs, KIIs and FGDs was transcribed and also categorised accordingly to substantiate the different sources from particularly relevant information. Invariably inconsistent and conflicting oral data and responses were discarded. Responses from the text were organised into content categories which according to Hsieh and Shannon (2005) are the patterns that honestly articulated the text or derived from them through analysis. Thematic framework was also employed to emphasize, pinpoint, examining and recording patterns or themes within the data. This method of analysis aided the determination of the nature of OPC engagement in protecting oil pipelines installations.

### **3.10. Ethical Consideration**

The processed primary data was collected in a way of being civil without threat to respondent's sensibilities. At the beginning of each sessions of interview a cautionary words were presented to the respondent based on introduction of the researcher and the university with assurance that all information exchanged and recorded through various instruments are solely for research and academic purposes (Appendix 1). The consent of respondents was also sought and secured at each occasion where tape recordings and photographs of site were done during interview.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

#### **4.1 Presentation of Research Findings and Discussion**

This chapter present the result of the analysis with responses from an In-depth Interview IDI with the founder, coordinator and zonal coordinators of Oodua Peoples Congress. The Key Informant Interviews KII, was conducted with the officials of Department of Petroleum Resources DPR, a subsidiary under the National Petroleum Resources, Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources, the Nigeria Police Force, Ministry of Police Affairs and Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Ministry of Interior., also conducted was the Focus Group discussions FGD with Youths leaders and Community women group living along the right of way, ROW.

#### **4.2 The Responsibility of Protecting Oil Pipeline Installations**

##### **Objective 1: To determine who is responsible for oil pipeline installations protection in southwestern Nigeria**

The majority respondents from field work unanimously submit and agreed that NSCDC, Police, Navy, Air force and other security agencies was discovered from the research findings to be responsible in southwestern Nigeria for oil pipeline protection. Oil theft, illegal bunkering and oil pipeline vandalism can be reduced drastically by the agencies of government mentioned above except the Nigerian Army who only interject when this trend become escalated. In one development the Ogun State Police PPRO reported that the command arrested the suspected killers of the police during the vandalisation of oil pipelines in Arepo and Abule Oba area in Ogun State. The Ondo commissioner of police also submitted that the force had arrested many vandals in the past but now slow down arrest since the coming of The government has encouraged a joint task force initiative and has

approved the participation of private companies to be involved in the protection of oil pipelines in order to give support where necessary for the sole purpose of national security network, considering the local content approach.

Information collected from DPR emphasised that they have an unquestionable responsibility of providing best approach in ensuring oil pipelines safety and security against vandals. In a short and brief highlight of this view, the state operation controller of DPR stated:

... We are conversant with the mandate of the DPR and its responsibility in the safety and protection of the oil pipelines in Nigeria just as the NSCDC has similar mandate but you will agree with me that the facility owners has more concerned on this. That is why we employed different strategy like the involvement of OPC to assist in securing the oil pipeline facilities which is yielding good result... (The DPR Operation Controller, Akure, Ondo State on 4-4-2018).

DPR also agreed that the issue of oil pipeline vandalism and spillages is a challenge which prompted them in the provision of oil spill contingency plan from further findings. First 9 ‘defence’ are well articulated for all oil companies in Nigeria they are expected to follow and activate the oil spillage contingency plan which is known and called “Trace”. The engineers of NNPC repairs damaged pipes as it was observed at Lagos in picture 4.1 below.



**Plate 4.1** Repairs of vandalized pipe at Lagos by NNPC Engineers  
**Source:** field work (2018)

Most of the interviewed respondents generally established that the oil pipelines protection especially in southwestern Nigeria is a majorly the responsibility of NSCDC according to the Act 2003 Part II (e) and Part II (f) (vi) LFN with every possible support from the NPF and other equally relevant security agencies of the federal government. This responsibility rested on NPF before now but it is being gradually withdrawn following the mandate shift to NSCDC as noted by a respondent. It was also gathered from findings that other legally accredited bodies or agencies could lend a supportive role through their wealth of expertise and experienced services. However, proper screening of any private institution or group for the purpose of effectiveness and productivity is highly recommended:

**Table 4.1 Respondents' summary opinion of the agencies with Mandate to protect Southwestern Nigeria oil pipelines.**

1	NSCDC (Major role)
2	Nigeria Air force (Supportive role)
3	Nigeria Navy (Supportive role)
4	NPF (Supportive role)
5	OPC (Supportive role)

**Source:** Fieldwork, 2018



Most of the respondents interviewed are of the opinion that NSCDC has a major role to play in the surveillance of the Nigeria oil pipeline installations looking at their roles and the mandate given to them by the federal government. However before the law of 2003 to the NSCDC, the military especially the Nigerian Air force and Nigerian Navy has been given supportive role in curbing the excesses of the vandals on the oil pipelines. The Nigeria Army will only be involved when the issues escalate beyond other forces. Very significant role has also being given by the Nigeria Police Force on surveillance of the oil pipeline installation. Expectedly the OPC can also give a supportive role since the contributions of private partnerships and collaboration cannot be overemphasised.

#### **4.3 The Challenges of Protecting Oil Pipeline Installations.**

##### **Objective 2: Ascertaining OPC's challenges over the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria.**

The OPC's main challenge in the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria is the distribution from the contract to shareholders and the lack of adequate required human capital resources. Therefore emergency recruitment of any available youths was done as the information was gathered during the fieldwork. There are serious reportage of disagreement and quarrel over stipend sharing among the OPC members. The zonal coordinators during field work complained bitterly that most of those they engaged in an emergency work of putting surveillance on the oil pipeline installations were either not paid or the payment is inadequate compared to the agreed undocumented sum at the beginning of the assignment. They believed fifty thousand naira agreed upon initially was later reduced to thirty thousand naira monthly. This brought a lot of disaffection as the national coordinator explained that the contract sum was reduced seriously by President Buhari administration and later brought to a stop. We need to recall that the contract was given by President Jonathan time but payment was not done at the time. More so the contract was suspected to have political undertone in order for the OPC to act as thugs in support of the ruling PDP. They eventually lost the presidential election to APC who is now to decide whether to make the payments or renew the contract. This outcome is expected when compared with the former report thus: further shows clearly as reported in daily

mail.com.ng by Sean (2015) that OPC terrorist vandalised Buhari/Osinbanjo billboards to support PDP along Ikorodu road, Lagos during campaign on 16<sup>th</sup> March 2015. This actually is a way to work for the oil pipeline installation protection contract. Getting non state armed group partisan, this way is a dangerous trend. This defeat their original believes of fighting for their people rather than their pocket. This trend confirmed the public suspicion that the awarded oil and gas security contract of the PDP government to OPC must have got a political undertone.

The menace of OPC sometime had created fear, uneasiness, threats to the mind of Nigerian society which made citizen going about their legitimate work in fear and trepidations that will definitely affect productivity of the individual (Shittu, 2013). The Buhari administration is even considered generous to done that reduced payments. This had caused a lot of division among the OPC, though structured but not trained or

There are reported threats and intimidation from police and other security agencies of the government due to duplication of function and lack of trust emerging from community policing. Findings revealed that threats and intimidations from the security agencies had been a challenge for the OPC. One serious incidence in October 2000 gathered that OPC played central role that recorded more than 250 deaths when clashes between Yoruba and Hausa went on for several day at Ajegunle in Lagos. It was also reported by New York time that OPC members publicly execute and criminals in the course of doing vigilante work. They were reported killing police officers also. OPC are considered by public to be a victim and at the same perpetrators which is human rights abuse. The brutish nature of Nigeria police that led to arbitrary arrest, torture, prolong trial, extrajudicial execution, and detention of hundreds of OPC members are indication as revealed by the findings in this study field work of 2018. The Nigeria police are often display the habit of frequent raid of OPC especially where there is no reportage of any criminal engagement by them which led to no reasonable prosecution of member or their leaders is found responsible for any violence. The use of violence against violence cannot solve the problem threat and intimidation rather it will strengthened it. Human Rights Watch said some state governments are supporting the OPC since they failed to publicly condemn them against the use of violence in their operations. (hrw.org 2003) Nigeria: OPC a Continuing Threat to Security. New York, February 28, 2003.

The media negative reportage is also confirmed from the field when OPC national coordinator complained about thinking it was a plan to discourage the federal government by revoking the contract. The APC that are in Lagos who controls the press from south west do not help matters as negative propaganda of OPC are made to create more fears in the mind of the Nigerians.

The Lagos state commandant during interview with the researcher complained bitterly about the sophisticated vandals weapons. This was seen also as a challenge by OPC zonal coordinators who revealed that some law enforcement agents of the government are overwhelmed by vandal's sophisticated weapons which definitely may affect their own operation. The state commandant further believed that vandals are being sponsored by some highly influential individuals who benefited from the loot of the oil products. He appealed to the Federal and state government to come to their aid in procuring better weapon to fight back as they are losing corps members to the hands of death on daily basis. The commandant further suggested that the military and other security agencies must combine forces to put an end to the illicit business of the criminal elements.

Findings has also show from group discussions that most of the time when OPC were sited at the ROW as they could not be quickly identified by the host community since they lack western model structure bureaucracy and regimentation. They always appeared not as a uniform group. This became a challenge because they are often questioned by police on not taking permission before visiting a vandalised spot. The Ondo state commandant reasoned with the police by not recognising the OPC as a legal entity or even a private guard security company since they have not been able to register as one with NSCDC.

The following plate 4.2 depicts militant nature of OPC in preparation for an outing in Lagos state.



**Plate 4.2:** Southwest Oodua People's Congress (OPC)  
**Source:** elevatenews.com (2016)

Chief Federic Fashehun the founding leader of OPC stated on phone, about the challenges confronting his members thus:

...many challenges are encountered in the course of oil pipeline protection duties given to us. While the Federal government of Nigeria caused some these challenges the vandals and their collaborators resulting into (conspiracy) are daunting. There are serious negative issues experienced from the operators and regulators like the NNPC and DPR. One can boldly comment that the sector is intriguing for the more you look the less you see syndrome. Lack of constitutional legal cover is the most frustrating challenge the OPC faced on the contract agreement since no one can be arrested legally when the vandals strike. We only need to seek the assistance of NSCDC or the Police to help in this area. We sometimes experience serious clash from police threats... (OPC Founder from Okota, Lagos State on 3-5-2018)

Otunba Gani Adams, the national coordinator of OPC and Aare ona-kakanfo of Yoruba land supported above view in his comment thus:

...the OPC discovered that the local communities where oil pipeline went through tried to accommodate vandals among them. This gave difficulties in identifying the vandals from operating in the midnight. The community children turned vandals will never be exposed as they will always want to shield and protect them. Most of the vandals apprehended on security raid of the area in Lagos were largely the unemployed restive youth. These youths are capable on puncturing the oil pipe or wait to take advantage of stealing oil from damaged pipeline. The vandals will now store the stolen petroleum product in plastic containers buckets, drums and jerry cans for the purpose of selling them at the oil black market. Although the system adopted is quite simple by the use of drilling tools, plastic hose and funnel to siphon the oil but can be very dangerous as any mistaken spark could aggravate in enormous fire incident and disaster... (OPC National Coordinator from Ojota, Lagos State on 3-5- 2018)

The OPC count the issue of intimidating threats from legally constituted security agents of the government as most challenging. NPF, NSCDC, Nigeria Navy, Nigeria Air-force and Nigeria Army are among the agents that sometimes even threatened to shoot them at sight or arranged and chased them away from the oil pipeline site they wish to protect. An interviewed respondent present his views thus:

...when OPC was given the security contract on oil pipeline installations protection, we decided to monitor the it by putting our men on surveillance but to be honest with you sir, we are made to surfer punishment from the military which include the army, navy, air-force, NSCDC and the Nigeria Police as they threatened to kill us at the site. Police they threatened, vandals sponsored also threatened with their sophisticated weapons. If not that we are bold we would have ran away and refuse to come back to site... (OPC Zonal Coordinator from Ondo State on 22-5-2018)

Findings also revealed respondent reporting another challenge which indicated nepotism, segregation, god-fatherism, conspiracy, corruption and compromise. These problems can never allow vandals to be brought to book or succinctly say they will always escape justice. There are instances when government officials will claim and prevailed on vandal's arrested case for release as an "Order from Above". It is an understatement to assume that these criminal elements use godfathers or ethnic affiliation with certain influential powerful political leaders that can intimidate the officials thus:

...traditional rulers and the political terrain sometimes dictate high level of corruption practices in the country. We can rightly observe their influence when the people caught after operation belongs to certain influential individuals who will prevail to side track justice. The political godfathers usually come forth to pervert justice without shame or remorse. These so called godfathers sometimes go further to influence and facilitate transfers for government officials that refuse to compromise. You will equally understand that our power stops on arrest of vandals level but we handover to the police sometimes for prosecution purpose. Corruption and compromise within the government officials in the country most times spoil the work... (OPC Zonal Coordinator from Abeokuta, Ogun State on 22-5- 2018)

The bulk of respondents in the research finding revealed that inadequate funding was a big challenge militating against the oil pipeline contract. The respondent noted that lack of modern pipeline machinery; insufficient funds and inadequate training of people to protect the oil pipeline are the problem. The major issue in this context is that computerised equipment and adequate training are lacking there they ill equipped. The government could not even make money available at the first three months contract awards as planned. No tangible result expected anyway from this assignment. It was purely apolitical.

The interviewed respondent see conspiracy as major panacea influencing the success of fighting vandals who collude with some government officials including some security agency to frustrate the protection of oil pipeline installation in south western Nigeria. Going over this point by an officer from NPF wonders how come vandals have the effrontery to attack the police who answered thus:

...the community living around Elebute in Obafemi Owode Local Government Area of Ogun State yesterday were reported to have fled their residence in order to avoid being victim of crossfire between police and vandals. He supported above statement from vanguard he was holding that yesterday that the vandals fight policemen in a shootout for an hour in order to rescue the two vandals that were injured and arrested in the shootout. They were also reported of an attempt to deflate the Armoured Personnel Carrier but such attempt was frustrated by the Ogun state Police command. Despite this some of the police vans were badly damaged but no life of any police was lost. At the following day afternoon, three Armoured Personnel Carrier were reported stationed at the junction of Ibafor area manned with over 50 fully armed personnel of the Army, NSCDC and the Nigeria Police who patrolled the place.. (The representative of Commissioner of Police, PPRO from Ogun State on 3-5- 2018). 02027812286

In a focus group discussion respondent at the interview has seen oil pipeline ruptures as a big challenge that deserved attention. It was discovered that the ruptures contribute immensely to oil spill incidences in the southwestern Nigeria. Old oil facilities such as oil pipeline installations corrosion and leaked storage tanks with lack of adequate maintenance culture and regular inspection by facility owners reduce the quality and quantity of product. The oil fields are considered to be in small sizes of which corrosion is encouraged an oil spill regularly. Massive network of pipeline installation between narrow fields with many other smaller oil pipe networks lines could really promote leaks severally.



The respondent submitted thus:

...the estimated 15 years life span of oil pipelines in Nigeria is old now and liable to corrosion. A major challenge facing the network of these pipelines is deliberate sabotage and the damage that are compromised by some security agents of government. The pipelines are susceptible to oil spills, leakages and fire inferno. Sabotage of oil pipelines in Nigeria are adequately backed up the law of the Federation Section 2 of the Petroleum production and distribution anti sabotage act stated that any person or group of persons found convicted of this act is sentenced to death or a maximum terms not less than 21 years imprisonment. This penalty has not deterred vandals from operation. What else can stop vandals? (Youth Leaders and Community women group from Akure, Ondo State on 4- 4- 2018)

A senior officer from Nigeria Security and civil defence corps also spoke along in the same way thus:

...the Civil Defence provision of the act 2, 2007 with severe penalty to discourage an economic saboteur and the high drive of enforcement level by the corps do not deter vandals from vandalising. The corps has complained bitterly of lack of cooperation among law enforcement agents of government, taking differences in training, different communication signals and uniformity in our modus operandi are roots of the challenges. The police are already accustomed to fighting vandalism before empowering the civil defence corps display rivalry instead collaboration. I wish to state that credits on pipeline protection must not be given to a single security operative rather a collective efforts and joint responsibility can be encouraged to fight vandalism Nigeria... (State Commandant of civil defence corps, Ibadan, Oyo State on 19-3- 2018)

**Table 4.2 Respondents' summary of challenges faced by OPC in the course of Oil pipelines Protection in Southwestern Nigeria.**

S/NO	OPC CHALLENGES	S/NO	OPC CHALLENGES
1	Threat from law enforcement agents of government	2	Tacit delay in payment of the contract sum for remuneration.
3	Lack of security training, lack of security equipments, and inadequate manpower	4	Inadequate press support from negative media report.
5	Sophisticated vandals weapons	6	Compromise of rules and regulations (Conspiracy theory)
7	Constitutional back-up is unavailable	8	Host community Sabotage thereby causing death and loss of properties (Conspiracy theory)
9	Insubordination and indiscipline of few OPC members (Conspiracy theory).	10	Corruption, nepotism and god-fatherism (queer ladder theory)
11	Illegal use of fire arms and ammunitions.	12	Lack of western model structured bureaucracy and not regimented.
13	Conspiracy between host community and few security agents as government officials with vandals which resulted into compromise of oil facility operators. (Conspiracy theory)	14	Irregularity in the use of uniform resulting in difficulty of identity recognition on field operation which resulted to cross fire problem with security operatives
15	Non recognition of OPC as private security companies or records to show as security guard company.	16	OPC is considered by public as a private non-state armed ethnic militia whose ideals may not usually on the same page with government.

**Source:** Fieldwork, 2018

#### **4.4 The Impact of Collaboration and Partnership**

##### **Objective 3: Identify how collaboration and partnership between government security agencies and OPC impacted on the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria**

Findings have showed that the Nigeria government award oil pipeline protection to OPC on 15<sup>th</sup> of March, 2015 through the NNPC for three months. This precedent was laid down as basis for collaboration and partnership on Nigeria oil pipelines installation protection. A respondent recapitulates in this way:

...OPC has observed the recognition of government in the award of securing oil pipeline installation contract as amazing achievement since this will be the first time ever that we will enjoy such patronage. At the beginning the government has misunderstood the aims and objectives of the OPC. They now realize that we now have followers in all nooks and crannies of the country especially in the southwestern Nigeria where we operate. It also confirmed that private companies can also contribute meaningfully to the nation's security. It demonstrates that private organization has important role to play in complementing the legally constituted security agencies of the government. One can see that every individual or group has something meaningful to contribute to the nation's development... (OPC National Coordinator, Ojota, Lagos State on 3-5-2018)

Findings in objective 3 pointed to collaboration and partnership in order to strengthen oil pipeline protection in the southwestern Nigeria. This collaboration became necessary due the shortage of manpower of the security agencies and lack of enough understanding of the local terrain in the hinterland where the pipeline passed through. The federal government contract to OPC on securing and protecting the oil pipeline installations in Nigeria only give credence to collaborative partnership expected among the local communities that must be based on trust and understanding to reduce fire and environmental pollution. Another respondent's view as follow:

...as an OPC man within my locality has been partnering with the police and other security agents of government to wage war against pipeline vandals which is yielding very good result. There was one time when OPC jointly with Police and Civil Defence went out for operation to capture vandals at Arepo, Ebute in Ogun State. I can comfortably say that collaboration and partnership with other security agencies is an effective innovation that will reduce oil pipeline fire disasters and environmental pollution in southwestern Nigeria... (OPC Zonal Coordinator, Ogun State, on 22-5- 2018)

Another respondent opined that collaboration of OPC and that of the government security agencies can impact both in positive and negative way. He observed that it was for this reason of partnership that the local community builds trust in them and readily gives vital information that could lead to more arrest of vandals. The community now shows interest in the OPC and they are now working for the goods of the people. The partnership has also brought employment opportunity to the youths who are placed on surveillance along the oil pipeline installation and will attract remunerations thereby reducing unemployment and restive youth agitations against the government. The partnership invariably has reduced poverty level among community living along ROW of the oil pipeline in southwestern Nigeria. It has also reduced the workload of the security agents since any illegal movement noticed along the ROW are reported immediately to them. The respondent observed thus:

...the OPC involvement in securing the oil pipeline is very beneficial to us because this gesture has made us to reduce the manpower we have on the field on patrol and surveillance of the oil pipeline.... We now redeployed our men for other equally important security duties. Alternatively, the OPC alert us security agents in case of any suspicious criminals especially when vandalisation is ongoing, (Commissioner of Police, Ondo State Command, Akure, Ondo State on 12 -4- 2018)

The OPC national coordinator commended the idea of collaboration and partnership initiative of the federal government of Nigeria. The idea of government and OPC collaboration has many advantages. The national coordinator opined thus:

...the changing world we are today must encourage us to change along the positive life gradually so as not to be left behind in the progressive trend. Security of lives and properties has left the exclusive list of the government alone facing the challenge. Rather joint efforts of partnering with government and private organization are main thing nowadays. You will readily agreed that in the united states the government engaged private firms who shows capacity and experience to be involved in some security matters which is why Nigeria needs to look into this and where necessary especially on the protection of our oil pipeline. I boldly inform you that our coming into securing oil pipeline on contract basis has yielded dividends since it has reduced the occurrence drastically and this means reduction of economic loss... (OPC National Coordinator, Ojota, Lagos State on 3-5- 2018)

In another development where a community chief viewed those incidences of pipeline vandalism that caused oil spill and pollution has been reduced considerably within the short period. The grievances against the government and oil companies have also gone down. The traditional chief view is as follows:

...the government and OPC is an ideal partnership in the sense that it defined responsibility for stakeholders which includes government, companies and host community that contributes towards the same goal. For instance, oil spill reduction means maximum production to oil companies, safety against fire disasters for the community and most importantly maximum product, minimum loss at no additional cost of production and more income on tax and profit shares for the government... (Traditional chief Olopete, Opete, Oyo State on 20-3- 2018)

Some of the respondents are against partnership because seven private companies got allocation of segments of oil pipeline installations as follows:

**Table 4.3.1 Private Company and allocation of segment for surveillance by NNPC**

S/NO	COMPANY	ALLOCATED AREAS
1	Egbe Security River One	Bayelsa
2	Gallery Security	Mosinmi-Ore
3	Close Body Protection	Edo State
4	AdexEnergy Security	Rivers
5	Donyx Global Concept	Lagos and Ogun
6	Oil Facilities Surveillance	Delta
7	New Age Global Security	Mosinmi-Ibadan

**Source:** field work 2018

Engr. Molokwu of the Nigeria National Petroleum Company under Energy and Technical Department was appointed to coordinate in the table 4.3.1 allocation above. These contracts above demonstrate that government is shying away from their responsibility in the protection of oil pipeline installations in Nigeria. The respondent argues on above assertion thus:

...the owners of some of these companies are the militants of the Niger Delta and the founder of Oodua Peoples Congress Dr. Frederick Fasehun, including Otunba Gani Adam the OPC national coordinator. Sincerely, how on earth can government that is serious give out such sensitive issue like security contract to those militant who always incite public against government? What are the security agents doing which includes civil defence, police and whatever agencies...? (DPR, Operation Controller, Akure, Ondo State on 12 -5- 2018)

Another respondent still believe in the negativity of the use of private group to man sensitive security duties thus:

...I continue to wonder on the rationale behind the contract given to non state armed group who are militants and private organization on our oil pipeline that is the national life wires of the country. I have nothing against OPC as a group but I felt it is inappropriate to allocate such sensitive duties to them. The implication is that the criminal minded individuals that have mixed with them in looting properties before may take advantage of the contract and end up becoming vandals in other to steal crude oil and also buy sophisticated weapons to fight the state in the nearest future... (Traditional chief, Makun of Shagamu, Ogun State on 20-5- 2018).

Findings have revealed that respondent reaction is spontaneous said corruption and conspiracy of few government officials may influence the decision of allocation security contract to the militant to protect the nation oil pipeline installation in the country. He wishes to know about the responsibility that was given by law to the military, the Police and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps. The respondent continue to be surprised on how

the government could come out with this idea describing it as irresponsible act and money allotted for such contract should have been used to equip the nation security architecture especially imploring high technology to secure the pipeline and enhance operation.



**Table 4.3 Summary of collaboration and partnership between government security agencies and OPC impacted on the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria**

<b>S/NO</b>	<b>RESPONDENT VIEW</b>	<b>S/NO</b>	<b>RESPONDENT VIEW</b>
1	Fire disaster reduction through partnership	2	Environmental pollution reduction
3	Reduction in pipeline vandalism is enhanced through collaboration.	4	Economic loss reduction
5	Citizen grievances reduction to the government	6	Poverty reduction
7	Youth restiveness reduction	8	Improve community policing
9	Reduction of grievances against the oil company	10	Reduction in environmental degradation

**Source:** Fieldwork, 2018

## **4.5 The Lesson Learnt on National Security**

### **Objective 4: Exploring the implications of lessons learnt on National Security**

In this findings respondent it was deduced that the implication of the lesson learnt on national security are based on challenges encountered in planning protection of the oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria. Oodua Peoples Congress coordinator narrated his experiences on the three-month pipeline protection contract thus:

...I believe we have made a tremendous impact in reducing the national economic loss following the three months pipeline installation contract. The introduction of OPC around the pipeline installations makes some of the vandals run away. You can see that some of the press propaganda is sponsored by vandals strengthening conspiracy between them. The contract that we collected from the federal government is genuine and correct and nothing illegal as being painted in the media. The government 30% payment has confirmed its legality. All hands of the OPC members have been on deck to actualize the assignment the protection of the oil pipelines installations in the southwestern Nigeria... (OPC National Coordinator, Ojota, Lagos State on 3-5- 2018)

The national coordinator of OPC further insinuate that circumstances around each community and surveillance along oil pipeline installations calls for multi-disciplinary techniques which may be difficult for a single agent of the government to achieve easily. Joint efforts of and partnership of both public institution and private organization are recommended for the efficiency and effectiveness of the assignment on protection of the pipeline installation in southwestern Nigeria. It is therefore in his opinion to insist on joint task force within the security agents while the use of private security companies to complement the efforts of the security agents for sake of the policy on partnership.

...Restructuring clamored for is capable of the introduction of state and local government police or security apparatus. I have in the past strongly advocated for democracy in the country. Although the federal police are trying their best but the best has not been accepted as the standard considered in Nigeria therefore the state and the local police known as the sheriff in some western world. Nigeria has been bedevil with serious security challenges like the killer headsmen, vandalism of oil pipelines, banditry, kidnapping, ritualism, cultism and Boko Haram. For instance in 2017 the Nigeria Army at Lagos work in partnership with two hundred number of OPC, who followed them to enter the forest and end up destabilizing the shrine of Ijamido who used badoo and voodoo methods of kidnapping their victims were stopped. You can see from this scenario that the OPC are working hard enough to protect not only the pipeline but the whole community... (OPC National Coordinator, from Ojota, Lagos State on 3-5- 2018)

The respondent insist that there is the need for public institution to partner and collaborate with private group in order to complement the conventional security agencies which effort are not enough and manpower are not sufficient for the public good and magnitude of national security. Another respondent generally observed that, Nigeria National Petroleum Company lost heavy money through pipelines vandalism in recent times during this Buhari administration because of the stoppage of OPC pipeline protection contract. He spoke further thus:

...this work of protecting the pipeline was formerly given to Kings' security company who also employed the services of OPC. This demonstrates that even before now everybody are aware of what the OPC could offer. The government is urged to formulate policies that can showcase us on the security contract for the purpose of pipeline installations protections and other crime in other to upgrade national security in Nigeria... (OPC Zonal Coordinator, Abeokuta, Ogun State on 22-5- 2018)

The Police Commissioner observed that to reduce oil spill, pollution and vandalism in the country indicate good signal for the nation security. This will reduce the stress and burden on the security agents and definitely improve national security as follows:

...vegetation damage, micro organisms, toxic ground water pollution, chemical poisoning, inhalation and exposition through skin damage and eye contact are some of various problem that is associated to oil spills challenges. Oil spill on land or water in an environment will impede the growth of crops and cause bush burning disaster. Lower incidence of vandal's activities will reduce oil spill and minimum risk of fire explosion which can result into loss of lives and properties of innocent citizen that is close to oil installations. Such incidences often occur for days in villages of ROW with the consequence very grievous. The problem of vandalism in Nigeria is always a national loss and it deserves the attention of meaningful right thinking stakeholders in particular and Nigerians in general... (Commissioner of Police, Ondo State Command on 4-4- 2018)

Oil pipeline vandals usually visit the location of ROW in the middle of the night as reported among the focus group discussion participant in Arepo, Ogun state community. This is useful intelligent information to assist the security agents strategising to arrest the vandals on the spot as they will be caught in the act. Patrols by security agents are also expected to extend to that time in the night which could also prevent them from their criminal ways.

**Table 4.4 Summary of the implications of lesson learnt on National Security**

S/NO	IMPLICATIONS	S/NO	IMPLICATIONS
1	Insufficient security agencies to carry out the assignment effectively, but needs of private guards companies complement them.	2	Fire explosion is a serious challenge that destroy living organism, water and environmental pollution with damaged vegetation and ecosystem disruption
3	Partnerships and collaboration between government agent and the private guards company could reduce the threats of vandalism	4	Special attention on the use of technology like drones and cameras could reduce oil theft and make better economic empowerment for the country

**Source:** Fieldwork, 2018

#### **4.6 Discussions of Major Findings**

The study had found out that protection Nigerian's national assets, lives and community safety remain central to Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps' mandate. The NSCDC three core pertinent mandates include:

1. The protection of country national assets,
2. Provision and licensing the private guards company.
3. Disaster support management.

Findings indicated that Nigeria Security and Civil Defence corps work in partnership and collaboration with other security agencies of government includes the military, Police and others such as Immigration, Corrective service, Fire service and Road Safety Corps.

Findings from the study show that the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation has the mandate to implement any way they deemed fit to protect oil pipeline installations in Nigeria. In order to carry out this mandate they ensure through her relevant unit engage local communities to monitor and watch the activities going on along the oil pipeline ROW and prepare some allowances for the youth used on temporary monthly basis. This they are affected in a way with the use of private guards company considering to be OPC that are non-state armed actors in partnership with government for protecting the oil pipelines.

Partnership and collaboration that was introduced into the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria is a welcome idea. While the local communities are conversant with the topographies and terrain of ROW the government security agencies complain of inadequate manpower, insufficient resources and equipment. The study findings has revealed that a memo from the former president Goodluck Jonathan directed the involvement of all alleged ex-militant which was led by Ekpemupolo aka Tompolo, Mujaheedin Asari-Dokubo and Chief Bipobiri Ajube aka Gen. Shoot-At-Sight. They are assigned the protection of oil pipeline installations on the waterways and pipeline along the Niger Delta region which was given to the OPC for the ones in the southwestern Nigeria. (People's Daily, March 24, 2015).

The existing literature has confirmed the same challenges which are obtained globally irrespective of weakness or strength to national security outfit. In various parts of the world that are facing different forms of security challenges that threatened peace and stability of the affected country. Comparatively Nigeria securities were usually threatened by the menace of the existing conspiracy that is caused by the weakness of state and its inability to take total control and own her territory. It had shown that states that lack the capacity of controlling her territory had subjected self to increased crime and insecurity across the length and breadth of the country until efforts are put in place by the federal government to deal decisively with such threats. To address this problem demands that security sector competency needs to be strengthened and regulations of small and light weapons must be in place.

The Nigeria Police Force and Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps has major role to play among security agents that are expected to fight oil pipeline installations vandalism which has led to the joint task force initiative to support national initiative. Another national security issue bothers on the federal government initiative of involving available local communities and private companies in complementing the efforts security agents to jointly stop vandalism of oil pipeline installation in Nigeria. It is significant to discussions on non-state armed group like OPC support as community policing are considered along with state employed public servant.

Vandalism has been seen creating lots of risk on both the public and the government for vandals taken suicide mission most of the time. Therefore, it will be necessary that petroleum industry in the country will require proper risk assessment management to prevent loss of human and material resources all over the country.

The followings are different types of security system which are spiritual, technological, physical, image, territorial, legal, human, treasury, and global security which centred on peaceful and secured society where inhumanity and hostility has been made impossible. This negative trend has been made impossible and unnecessary in a new order of community which imbibe the character of esprit de corps. It can be gathered from above that human security must focus on a preventive system and reduction of threats to uphold human rights

and safety. These facts of social insecurity negate human development and sustainable livelihoods. There are mass literatures on the relevance of security to a state. Security experts opined that one of the basic needs of people is security and adequate protection mechanism because human always prefer to reside in place that is not under any threat to peace and stability. On this note this study concludes that the oil pipeline installation protection must involve the approach of multiple stakeholders to jointly discuss about the menace of vandals that are characterised as organised criminals.

The study findings supported the theory of conspiracy for the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria. It focuses more on organised criminals that made public infrastructures and national assets as their target to amass illegitimate wealth. This move gave credence to an interest of undermining the interest of the state. Conspiracy theory generally attributes incredible powers to some agent in the country as to having plan in controlling others and retains secrets within their circle. Notable attributes among others in conspiracy theories is its resistance to correction through direct denials or opposition speech against government officials.

In the study of Hodapp and Von Kannon (2008) of which it is asserted that conspiracy theory had given ideas that people tend to act in secret with the aim of acquiring influence, power and other benefits. Some of them could be economic rewards accrued or just to be heard loudly by policy makers when a particular group becomes a public threat to peace and security. There are times when individuals or non state actors conspire to take advantage of insecurity in order to operate and create anarchy by destroying some critical infrastructure. Based on the operational strategy of perpetrators, conspiracy theory is closely linked with queer ladder theory to explain the phenomenon of an organised crime that is instrumental to behaviour and the means to an end (Mallory, 2007; cited in Okoli and Orisanya, 2012).

Environmental degradation is a major concern of government on repeated attacks on oil pipeline facilities in the country. It also destroys farm land and economic losses are huge in terms of revenue generation. The study discovers that factors like poor governance, poor management and coordination with weak legal system in the country contributed to oil pipeline installations vandalism. It therefore recommends proactive governance in the



provision of infrastructure, efficient and effective environmental management among others to reduce reasonably oil pipeline installation vandalism in southwestern Nigeria.

A quarrelsome relationship among various oil companies, the host communities and government encourage oil pipeline sabotage which is damaging to the three stakeholders. This research focus on community-based vandalism taking place at accessible oil pipeline installations within the ROW borders. In this process an agreement was made with the FGDs and KII respondents to take a holistic approach by using a community-based oil pipeline installation vandalism that can chase away the current benefits of vandals. There must be an environmental protection strategy through the development of local institutions and economies by reducing poverty and unemployment because partnership and collaboration tendency provides job opportunities and socio-economic independence.

This study believes that multiple stakeholders and multi-various framework are necessary in addressing the problem confronting pipeline vandalism. Alemika (2010:10) opines that security agencies are established as specialised agencies to maintain law and order in an enabling environment for development purposes. Zabadi (2007:3) affirms that security agencies are state agent with the mandate in ensuring safety of the citizenry against any forms of hostilities and threat arising from both internal and external aggressions.

In order to buttress above Mike Okiro, former Inspector General of Police words is apt, by saying that a secured nation is normally the one that protects and develop itself and promotes its core values, in order to meet people's needs and provide right atmosphere for self-development. (Okiro, 2008). He further submitted that security interest is a preoccupation of every community and the nation at large. Security occupies a crucial place in the affairs of a nation only in a protected orderly atmosphere where individuals will effectively engage in fruitful activities and realise their potentials. Manwaring (2003) waved in to say that conceptualisation of national security varies from place to place which is directly proportional to individual readiness to face threat, conflict or war.

In Nigeria of today partnership and collaboration has capacity to address national security issues. It is considered as an utmost concerned that private security company are well regulated and monitored by relevant security agencies of government. It can further be

argued that partnership and collaboration with community policing has become the Nigerian agitation such that it can be adopted as a precursor to follow.

In summary these findings has suggested that the involvement of OPC in the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria was viewed as unconstitutional, but in contrast the OPC activities brought a reasonable calmness to the vandal's ravaged areas in the southwestern areas such as Ikorodu, Arepo, Iju, Ilaje etc notwithstanding the conspiracy and organized criminality of vandals. Therefore, it was discovered by the study that the major challenge confronting OPC in the protection of pipelines in southwestern Nigeria is due to lack of constitutional backing and regimentation for the assignment. It was Indeed this lacuna that made the incumbent government of President Muhammed Buhari, PMB to cancel the pipeline contract and re-award it to another private firm called King Security Ltd. The study revealed that the most effective form of protection services could only emanate from collaborative partnership between and among NSCDC, Nigeria Police Force, Navy, Air force, etc and the traditional Institutions as multi-stakeholders. This is necessary in order to put serious check against oil pipeline installation's vandalism and other social vices ravaging the southwestern Nigeria.

Collaboration and partnership between government security agents and the OPC initially resulted in the reduction of vandalism and oil spills incidence in the region; however, lack of trust associated with joint policing led to rivalry and casualties; hence, the contractual policy failed. In southwestern Nigeria from (2006 - 2019) government policy of partnering Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps with Oodua Peoples Congress in the protection of oil pipeline installation was initially effective but could not be sustained. The Conspiracy between communities, few security agents as government officials, with vandals that resulted into compromise of oil facility could be surmounted through partnering with traditional leaders for information gathering and collaboration within the security architecture in the southwestern Nigeria where mutual trust and cooperation are commanded.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1 Summary**

OPC and the Protecting Oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria were conducted in four study areas of Lagos, Ogun, Oyo and Ondo states. The exploratory research was conducted with data gathered using interviews and focus group discussions. The data collected was analysed through deductive content analysis while twenty-six interviews of ten In-depth interviews, twelve key informant interviews and four focus group discussions were conducted. The population was purposely selected from the following stakeholders of OPC, NSCDC, NPF, DPR, traditional chiefs, and Youths leaders & Women groups on ROW except for the ex-president GEJ and staff that could not be accessed for the interview.

The OPC is widely assumed to be an important factor for maintenance of peace within the southwestern region of Nigeria in view of this, adequate attention has been directed towards building and strengthening them through the awarded oil pipeline contract by the federal government of Nigeria. The country directly afterwards experience situations of armed conflicts over the incident of OPC versus the Niger Delta Avengers at Lagos. In such situation, OPC was seen playing important role in reducing violence and facilitating the conditions necessary to build a sustainable peace. Despite this ever-growing emphasis on the role of OPC in peace building, little systematic research has been undertaken to empirically support this assumption due to their background formation and lack of constitutional backing. In an effort to contribute to the existing body of knowledge and stimulate further research in that area, this study therefore examined the capacity of OPC in supporting the overall process of peace consolidation in the protection of pipeline installations against the criminal conspiracies of some government official and vandals.

The study has been designed to answer the following research questions which include: Who is responsible for oil pipeline installations protection in southwestern Nigeria? What are the OPC's challenges over the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria? How has collaboration and partnership between government security agencies and OPC impacted on the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria? What are the implications of the lessons learnt on National Security? The following specific objectives were also set: To determine who is responsible for oil pipeline installations protection in southwestern Nigeria; to ascertain OPC's challenges over the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria; to identify how collaboration and partnership between government security agencies and OPC impacted on the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria and to explore the implications of lessons learnt on National Security

The research methodology for the study principally took three forms for adoption: i) Desk-based review of the relevant literature, ii) field visit to the study area (vandalised site), and iii) respondents interviews at their abodes or offices depending on time and place of convenience. The field visit enabled the researcher to interact with and collect data from OPC (2), Zonal coordinators of OPC (4) and community leaders (4), Nigeria Police Force - NPF (4), Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC 4), Department of Petroleum Resources DPR (4), Youth leaders and Community women group (4) making 26 correspondence. They are critical actors who are involved in the general process of peace consolidation for the survival of the local community against menace of pipeline installations vandalism. The scope of organizations covered by the study included: the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, Nigerian National Petroleum Resources, Department of Petroleum Resources, Ministry of Police Affairs, Nigeria Police Force, Ministry of Interior, Nigeria Security & Civil Defence Corps and Educational/Research Institutes. Data was collected through the use of structured questions, interview and focus group discussions guides (Appendix 1).

The research findings had identified and highlighted a number of issues. Firstly, the report noted on research question 1, objective 1 that the involvement of OPC in the protection of oil pipeline installations for southwestern Nigeria was viewed as unconstitutional, but in

contrast the OPC activities brought a reasonable calmness to the vandal's ravaged areas. Other identified threats to peace as further noted by interviewees and group discussants included: weak judicial system; corruption of officials of security agencies, NNPC and DPR; government's inability to provide the basic amenities needed like light, water and road infrastructure for the citizenry; entrenched culture of impunity among the local communities; significant level of illiteracy and exposure to enlightenment, poverty and unemployment. The findings further indicated that the primary agency with mandate to protect oil pipelines in southwestern Nigeria is the NSCDC with supportive partnership role and collaboration from the NPF, Navy, Air force and the local host communities including private security companies. Despite NSCDC effort and mandate on pipeline protection, OPC remains private and unregistered organisation that are not always on the same page with the government which had led to violence and extra judicial killings.

Secondly, the report also acknowledges on research question 2, objective 2 it was discovered by the study that the major challenge confronting OPC in the protection of pipelines in southwestern Nigeria is due to lack of constitutional backing, illegal acquisition arms & ammunitions and lack of regimentation for the assignment. This lacuna makes their efforts unpopular and therefore gives under reportage from the mass media. The study findings on objective two further revealed that the OPC faced major challenge of threats and intimidations from government security agents who consider them as meddling interlopers. Other challenges are the lack of constitutional backing, sabotage, compromise, conspiracy, corruption, and media misrepresentation. The policy initially worked out as OPC openly challenged Niger Delta Avengers that were allegedly to be the vandals who have killed a number of persons in Ikorodu area of Lagos state. However the OPC claimed that the Police took them as criminals. (Daily post newspaper, July 21, 2018) This misunderstanding has resulted in several losses of lives of the OPC and security agents of government. Based on this, the policy somersaulted and failed.

Thirdly, the report established on research questions 3 objectives 3 revealed that the most effective form of protection services could only emanate from collaborative partnership between and among Nigeria Security & Civil Defence Corps, Nigeria Police Force, Navy, Air force, etc and the traditional Institutions as multi-stakeholders. This is necessary in order

to put serious check against oil pipeline installation's vandalism and other social vices ravaging the southwestern Nigeria. collaboration and partnership between government security agents and the OPC initially resulted in the reduction of vandalism and oil spills incidence in the region; however, lack of trust associated with joint policing led to rivalry and casualties; hence, the contractual policy failed. In the southwestern Nigeria from (2006 - 2019) government policy of partnering Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps with Oodua Peoples Congress in the protection of oil pipeline installation was initially effective but could not be sustained. The conspiracy between communities, few security agents as government officials, with vandals that resulted into compromise of oil facility could be surmounted through partnering with traditional leaders for information gathering and collaboration within the security architecture in the southwestern Nigeria where mutual trust and cooperation are commanded.

Fourthly, the report noted on the research question 4, objective 4 that that the lessons learnt and its implication on national security indicated partnering with OPC and government is commendable. Efforts must be put in place to ensure that non state armed actors providing security of the oil pipeline installation for government must be regulated and monitored by appropriate security agencies. Partnership between OPC and government agents needs to be well monitored since OPC is a non-state armed group who could not be a regimented body.

## **5.2 Conclusion**

Finally, Government foray into OPC partnering statutorily mandated security agency in the protection of oil pipeline installation was ineffective and not sustained. Therefore, there is the need for NSCDC to develop a central command and control system as well as structured and effective monitoring mechanism for groups such as OPC and any other private security firms that may be engaged in the protection of oil pipeline and national assets through adequate communication system and command where OPC cooperation will be guaranteed.

The Conspiracy between communities, few security agents as government officials, with vandals that resulted into compromise of oil facility could be surmounted through partnering with traditional leaders for information gathering and collaboration within the security

architecture in the southwestern Nigeria where mutual trust, synergy and cooperation are commanded.

There must be an environmental protection strategy through the development of local institutions and economies by reducing poverty and unemployment because partnership and collaboration tendency provides job opportunities and socio-economic independence. The concept of Nigeria grand strategy for national security objectives can be achieved through consultation and coordination of the resources while government are expected to deviate from its traditional ways of building strong coercive and combat sources to deal ruthlessly with citizens and group that complain about injustice, intimidation or demonstration against harsh policies.

Oil pipeline installations protection needs to be understood as not only deploying a coerced measure but also developing organizational antidotes of reliability that enable society and its constituent parts to be more resilient and robust. Technological and managerial procedures that are enduring may also limit the incessant occurrence of pipeline installations explosion in which the federal government is expected to sponsor and take responsibility of the protective mechanism through adequate provision of infrastructure, equipment, increased manpower, provision of incentives and better fire power.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

The followings are hereby recommended:

1. Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps can be encouraged to update its technology in fighting vandalism with the use of helicopters, drones and fighter jets for aerial surveillance and the protection oil pipeline installation.
2. The need for constitutional back-up for OPC is paramount to promote community mobilisation and training on intelligence information gathering if at all it is necessary to use them.
3. A constitutional amendment required to incorporate partnership and collaboration in security related matters such as oil pipeline protection in Nigeria.
4. The government is advised to incorporate in her national security architecture policy plan on availability of sophisticated weapons when the need arises to fight organised crimes by security agents on oil pipeline installations vandalism in the country.

### **5.4 Contribution to knowledge**

Given the limitations of this study, the following are the contributions to knowledge as it marks a new departure from traditional approach to a foreign approach in US of securing Nigeria oil pipeline installations against vandalism. Hitherto, state apparatus were constitutionally empowered to protect and secure oil pipelines. The motive of non-state militia group like the OPC is a new experiment in security architecture that is not sufficiently covered in studies, especially in Nigeria. The work will contribute to studies on Southwest region particularly the management of security matters by stakeholders and enhancement of our understanding on partnership and collaboration.

Nigerian government took the needful initiative and motivated private sector on partnership with other security agents to take responsibility in the protection of oil pipeline installations against vandals and made it harder for any intension of terrorist to enlarge damages on which effective response depends on other elements destroy many in the cities. The right combination of private organization strategic moves and that of public is expected to



provide reliable and resilience services in a long term plan. Despite the urgent threats from vandals and the challenges of dealing with natural or vandalised disasters, the best way to protect oil pipelines against any form of attacks in Nigeria has not yet emerged.

The effectiveness and efficiency of all these institutions are yet to be attainable due to lack of interagency partnership, intelligence sharing, supremacy rivalry, recognition, reasonable fairness and consideration of what is justice. These contribute in no small measure to the reason why Nigeria oil pipeline is still under serious siege of vandals unabated. Several studies have examined violence by OPC, the development and activities of militia groups, how they receive training from states, the role of former security operatives in the formation of armed groups, how the government mobilises security forces in protecting Oil pipelines to prevent vandalism, preventing an unauthorised access and restrict trespassing (Tar, 2005; Felbab-Brown, 2015; Ehidiemen, 2007). In another development, non-state armed group considered as protectors of the laws who preserve, protect and defend the constitutions of the country as seen in the United States (Hodgson and Thomas, 2007).

Additionally, studies are replete with anti-government activities of OPC, their engagement in the creation of anarchy by portraying themselves as defenders of their people from organised crime or marginalisation, as well as engagement in informal and illegal businesses to the extent that they are portrayed as merchants of violence and instigators of ethnic clashes (Dowd, 2012; Adams, 2007; Ehidiemen, 2007). Could this contract to OPC turn around the popular enemy of the state to friend after all?

In Nigeria, some of the studies rather examined how militia groups usually capitalise on poor infrastructure to perpetrate crime, unleash terror on the people and vandalise oil facilities, as well as the involvement of militias in ethnic conflicts. These studies gave little consideration to the challenges involved when OPC is charged in the protection of Oil Pipelines within the Southwest region of Nigeria where vandalism has become so prevalent. The studies disregarded the increasing mobilisation of human and material resources to equip OPC in protecting Oil Pipelines which draws them away from their primary goal of group mobilisation to a national assignment, by working for the state. This has public-private partnership value in line with legally constituted security agency of government

protection model. Sstudying the institutional responsibility of the challenges in protecting Oil Pipeline in Southwestern Nigeria between 2007 and 2018 as case studies and the involvement of Oodua People's Congress OPC in order to enhance public private partnership despite the existence of various governmental security agencies is timely.

In addition, since oil is considered a global issue, the study will increase our understanding on the nature of relationship between the militias and security sector like the military, the police, NSCDC and other paramilitary agencies in the country. It will be relevant for scholars studying the activities of militias like OPC across the world especially those that intend to compare the cases in Nigeria with those of other countries of the world. The study will reveal the implications of engaging militarized OPC by the security sector and the country in general. The study will also impact on policy makers who may wish to come up with solution to turn a perceived enemy to friend.

### **5.5 Limitations of the study**

This research has limitations associated with it in the following areas: The study was limited as the ex-president Goodluck Ebele Jonathan GEJ and some security officials that served during his time 2010-2015 could not be accessed for interview therefore getting an insight on purpose of giving out oil pipeline contract to non state armed group like the OPC could not be ascertain. It only allow researcher to believe that the reason is political as insinuated by different consulted literature. This study narrowed down its focus on Nigeria Police Force, and Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps hence could not capture other security agencies like the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, Air force, State Security Service, Nigerian Immigration Service, Nigerian Correctional Service and the Nigerian Customs Service in protection of oil pipeline installations in Southwestern Nigeria. This is because it may be practically impossible to study all such agencies in a single research due to bureaucratic secrecy tendencies within those security services. More so, they are more prominent in external protections for the country than internal one except when NSCDC and police are overwhelmed and need quick intervention of the military, therefore, limits the extent of generalisation of the results. However, it provides a reasonable pointer to the

actual roles, strategies and challenges of security agencies in the protection of oil pipeline installations in southwestern Nigeria.

Additionally, the non-use of quantitative technique and randomisation were limitations because the use of qualitative method was considered most useful and appropriate to ensure in-depth probing and insights into the new phenomenon of using the alleged vandals of a militia group provide protection to the same pipeline installations in Nigeria. However, these limitations do not affect in any way the credibility and validity of the findings as those legally constituted security agencies were used whom the researcher believe has in-depth knowledge of this study.

### **5.6 Agenda for Further Research**

1. There is the need to undergo further study on the contribution of other legally constituted private security that are involved in pipeline installations protection especially in the Niger Delta
2. Further study of KING's Guard who has been awarded the pipeline protection contract in the southwestern Nigeria needs to make further find out and understand its expertise and *modus operandi*.
3. Mobilisation in the use of local charms as in traditional vigilantes as a means to protect critical infrastructure and national asset needs to be understudied for possibility of being regulated and for positive impact on national security.

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## Appendix 1

### INTERVIEW GUIDE

#### Introduction

This interview is being conducted as part of academic requirements for the award of PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies, of the Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

You are please kindly requested to volunteer response to the listed below questions, as all information gathered will be used solely for the purpose of academic studies. I humbly seek your kind permission to record on tape and take pictures with you at the end of the interview. My name is Bello, Akanbi Sulaiman

#### QUESTIONS

1. Kindly introduce yourself, your position and the organisation you represent? (IDI & KII)
2. When and why your organisation was created and for what purpose? (IDI & KII)(IDI, [PKII & FGD)
3. What do you think, outside your framework that can be done to protect the oil pipelines in the southwest? (IDI, KII & FGD)
4. What role if any for traditional institution, women association, OPC, NPF, NSCDC, NNPC, PPMC and other stakeholders can play in this process? (IDI, KII & FGD)
5. Are there any specific challenges that OPC face in fulfilling their contract roles in Oil Pipeline protection? (IDI, KII & FGD)
6. What are these specific challenges of OPC in the area of logistics, financing, legal framework, training etc.? (IDI, KII & FGD)
7. The use of Private security forces on community policing due to supernatural nature of their powers, is desirable but can there be any way of control without the prevalent suspected jungle justice? (IDI & KII)
8. Is there any lesson gained from the experience of Oil Pipeline protection in the Southwestern Nigeria?(IDI, KII & FGD)
9. Kindly proffer other workable solutions, if any, which you may wish to, add for solving the perennial problems of pipeline vandalism in Nigeria. (IDI, KII & FGD)

Thank you very much for you

## **Appendix 2**

### **DETAILS OF RESPONDENTS SCHEDULED DATES OF INTERVIEW**

#### **OPC LEADERS**

1. DR. FREDRICK FASEUN, THE NATIONAL CONVENER OF OPC DATE: 05-05-2018
2. OTUNBA GANI ADAMS, NATIONAL COORDINATOR OF OPC AND ARE ONA KANKANFO YORUBA LAND.  
DATE: 03- 05 -2018

#### **TRADITIONAL RULERS/ COMMUNITY LEADERS**

1. OLOPETE OF OPETE AJAAWA, OBA SAMUEL OLUWATOYE BAMIGBOYE OGBOMOSO OGO - OLUWA LG OYO STATE  
DATE: 20-03-2018
2. EWUSI OF SAGAMU MAKUN, OBA TIMOTHY OYESOLA AKINSANYA OGUN STATE  
DATE: 04-05-2018

#### **DEPARTMENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES**

1. CONTROLLER OF OPERATIONS OGUN, MRS. MUINAT O. BELLO  
DATE: 04-05-2018
2. CONTROLLER OF OPERATIONS ONDO, MR. OSENI M.A.  
DATE: 4-4-2018

#### **POLICE**

1. CP ONDO STATE, MR. OLUGBENGA ADESANYA  
DATE: 4-4-2018
2. POLICE PRO OGUN STATE, ASP ABIMBOLA OYEYEMI  
DATE: 04-05-2018
3. CP OYO STATE, MR. ABIODUN ODUDE  
DATE: 07-05-2018

#### **NIGERIA SECURITY AND CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS**

1. STATE COMMANDANT LAGOS, MR. TAJUDEEN BALOGUN  
DATE: 02-05-2018
2. STATE COMMANDANT OGUN, MR. AYODELE PHILIPS  
DATE: 10-05-18
3. STATE COMMANDANT OYO, MR JOHN OYEDOKUN ADEWOYE  
DATE: 19-3-2018
4. STATE COMMANDANT ONDO, MR. PEDRO IDEBA  
DATE: 4-4-2018

### Appendix 3

**Table 5.1 Respondent in the Interview Session plan for action**

S/ No	Name of Agency/Organisation	Name Of Interviewee with Designation/Rank	Instruments used and no. of respondent	Contacts	Dates of Interview
1.	OPC	Dr. Frederick Fasehun – Founder OtunbaGani Adams - National Co-ordinator Zonal Coordinators	IDI - 1 IDI - 1 plus to make 2	Country Hotel, Ago Palace way, Okota, Lagos PA - 08053662070 08033002661 or +2348024444409 CSO – 08037122191	3/5/2018  3/5/2018
2	Traditional Institution/Community Leaders	Community Leaders within the oil pipeline right of way	IDI - 1 from each state to make 4 making 10 IDI	Oyo State- Oba Samuel Oluwatoye Bamigboye, Olopete of Opete- 08122802323 Ogun- Oba Timothy Oyesola Adesanya, Ewusi of Makun Kingdom, Shagamu, 08032369345	20/3/2018  4/5/2018
3.	Security Agency- Nigeria Police Force (NPF)	Nigeria Police Force (NPF) - Commissioner of Police	KII - 1 from each state to make 4	CP Oyo-08035952070 Abiodun Odude CP Ondo – 08096551171	4/4/2018  4/5/2018
4.	Security Agency- Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC)	Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) - State Commandant	KII - 1 from each state to make 4	Lagos - Balogun- 07039465381 Ogun - Ayodele Phillips 08022078806- Ondo – Pedro Ideba - 08037784471 Oyo - John Adewoye - 08056560453	2/5/2018 19/3/2018 4/4/2018 16/03/2018
5.	Oil Facility Operators- NNPC/PPMC/ DPR	DPR Official	KII - 1 from each state to make 4	Ondo-DPR- Oseni MA- 08033017726, Onaji Anthony – 0803314420, Okwekwe Stanley O – 0803563606 Ogun DPR- Operation Controller Mrs Muinat. O Bello, 08084175222	4/4/2018  4/4/2018 4/5/2018
6.	Community Youth Leader and women group	Community Youth Leader and women group living along oil pipeline right of way	FGD - 10 from each state to make 40	Oyo- Ajawa OPC Community Youth Lagos- Obawole Iju Ishaga LGA Ogun- Makun Shagamu	20/3/2018  3/5/2018

Source: Fieldwork, 2018.

## Appendix 4



**Plate 5.1:** Researcher with OtunbaGani Adams, National Coordinator of OPC and Aare-OnaKankanfo of Yoruba Land. Date: 03- 05 -18



**Plate 5.2:** Researcher with some Zonal Coordinators OPC from Southwestern Nigeria  
Date : 03- 05 -2018





**Plate 5.3:** Researcher at Ogun State with Ewusi of SagamuMakun, Oba Timothy OyesolaAkinsanya Date: 04/05/2018





**Plate 5.4:** From left; Researcher with Traditional Chief Olopete of Opete with Queen Olopete and 3 traditional Chiefs of Opete Land in Oyo State, Date : 20/3/2018



**Plate 5.5:** Researcher with Ogun State DPR Controller of Operations Mrs. Muinat O. Bello Date: 04/05/2018





**Plate 5.6:** Researcher with Ondo State DPR Controller of Operations, Mr. Oseni M.A.

Date:

4/4/2018



**Plate 5.7:** Researcher with Ondo State Commissioner of Police, CP. OlugbengaAdesanya  
Date : 4/4/2018



**Plate 5.8:** Researcher with Ogun State Police PRO-ASP AbimbolaOyeyemi representing CP Ahmed Iluyoesupsc+, Date: 04/05/2018





**Plate 5.9:** Researcher with Lagos State Commandant of NSCDC Commandant Tajudeen Balogun DATE: 02-05-18



**Plate 5.10:** Researcher with Oyo State Commandant of NSCDC Commandant Aboluwoye John Adewoye Date: 20-03-2018



**Plate 5.11:** Researcher with Ondo State Commandant of NSCDC Commandant Pedro Idiaba Date: 4/4/2018