NIGERIA'S NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT, 2007 – 2017

By

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CERTIFICATION

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the framers of Nigeria's National Defence Policy for their patriotism and commitment to the ideals of national security and to all the victims of asymmentric conflicts in Nigeria, particularly the Boko Haram insurgency.

ABSTRACT

Globally, governments evolve their National Defence Policies in order to address conventional security challenges. Countries such as the USA, the UK, France, India, and Kenya have had the need to modify their policies to address contemporary asymmetric security challenges such as terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla warfare and militancy. Although several academic works have been carried out on Nigeria's security challenges and its management, none has given adequate consideration to the National Defence Policy (NDP) in the management of asymmetric conflict. This study was therefore, designed to interrogate Nigeria's NDP, the extent to which the policy addresses asymmetric conflict, and the challenges of operationalising it.

The Raymond Aaron's Peace and War Theory was used as the framework, while an exploratory design was employed. Both primary and secondary sources of data were collected. Six key informant interviews were conducted with two academics who are versed in defence policy, two top military officers who were theatre commanders, one of the drafters of the NDP and a defence policy analyst. Four focus group discussions were held with senior military officers in the office of the Chief of Defence Staff and the National Defence College, Abuja. In-depth interviews were also conducted with community leaders in the North-East and the Niger Delta regions where the NDP was applied. Secondary data, including journals, newsletters were obtained from official defence sources. Data were content-analysed.

Nigeria evolved its NDP in 2006, which was framed largely to deal with conventional conflict. This was however modified in 2015 and 2017 in response to the fledging asymmetric conflict and it contained strategies for dealing with the Boko Haram terrorism (insurgency) in the North-East and militancy in the Niger Delta. However, the application of these strategies remained complex and challenging because it lacked a standard operation procedure. The major implementers noted the lack of political will on the part of successive governments to implement the NDP, a lack of cooperation by military high commands and poor synergistic operations among security agencies, especially military field commanders as some of the major challenges. In-depth interviews revealed that challenges at the operational level included inadequate knowledge on the part of battlefield commanders. about the contents of the defence policies and excessive domination of the Ministry of Defence, which ought to be highly professionalised, by civilian directors who had limited knowledge of defence strategies and operations. Besides, the military was also poorly funded, ill-equipped and rarely supported by community members in the theatres of operation due to poor civil-military relations and trust deficit.

Nigeria's National Defence Policy has not been well implemented from 2007 to 2017 to adequately curtail the challenges of asymmetric conflict due to logistic capital deficit. Therefore, stakeholders should address these challenges to ensure its effective implementation.

Keywords: National Defence Policy, National security, Policy implementation challenges, Terrorism and militancy in Nigeria

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ACRONYMS

AFN	-	Armed Forces of Nigeria
AIRINT	-	Air Intelligence
AQIM	-	Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb
AVM	-	Air Vice Marshal
BH	-	Boko Haram
BHT	-	Boko Haram Terrorist
BNS	-	Border Management System
CCTV	-	Close Circuit Television
CDS	-	Chief of Defence Staff
CJTF	-	Civilian Joint Task Force
CNR	-	Combat Network Radio
DG	-	Director General
DHQ	-	Defence Headquarters
DSS	-	Department of State Services
ECOMOG	-	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
EWS	-	Early Warning System
FGN	-	Federal Government of Nigeria
GPS	-	Global Positioning System
GSM	-	Global System of Mobile
HUMINT	-	Human intelligence
IDP	-	Internally Displaced Person
IED	-	Improvised Explosive device
IP	-	Internet Protocol
IPOB	-	Indigenous People of Biafra
ISIS	-	Islamic State in Syria
IT	-	Information Technology
JIFC	-	Joint Intelligence Fusion Centre
JTF	-	Joint Task Force
LI	-	Lawful Intercept
LMR	-	Land Mobile Radio
MASSOB	-	Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra

MEND	-	Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta
MNJTF	-	Multi National Joint Task Force
MOD	-	Ministry of Defence
MOSOP	-	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
NACTEST	-	National Counter Terrorism Strategy
NASRDA	-	National Space Research and Development Agency
NAWANI	-	Nigerian Army Wide Aerial Network Infrastructure
NDA	-	Nigerian Defence Academy
NDC	-	National Defence College
NDM	-	Niger Delta Militant
NDP	-	National Defence Policy
NDPVF	-	Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force
NDS	-	National Defence Strategy
NDV	-	Niger Delta Vigilante
NERI	-	North East Regional Initiative
NIGCOMSAT	-	Nigerian Communication Satellite
NIIA	-	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
NIPSS	-	Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies
NNDP	-	Nigerian National Defence Policy
NNPC	-	Nigerian National Petroleum Cooperation
NSTF	-	National Security Trust Fund
ONSA	-	Office of the Security Adviser
OPC	-	Oodua People's Congress
ORBAT	-	Order of Battle
OSI	-	Open Source Intelligence
R & D	-	Research and development
RMAC	-	Regional Maritime Awareness Capability
SIGINT	-	Signal Intelligence
SIM	-	Subscriber Identification Module
STF	-	Special Task Force
UAV	-	Unman Aerial Vehicle
USAID	-	United States Agency for International Development
VPN	-	Virtual Private Network

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1   Background to the Study

The first goal of any country is to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. This aspiration is often given a formal expression in its national defence policy, defence strategy, and defence plans. These are usually linked to the country's national security policy, national security strategy, and national security plans. This political expediency gives vent to the popularity and study of defence and security policies around the world today. That a country has a defence policy is not to automatically suggest that the society would be safe. The effectiveness of a nation's defence policy is much tied to the soundness of its design/contents and the extent to which the executive and legislative arms of the government are committed to its true implementation.

If the defence policy of a country is not well designed it might not be able to attain the country's defence and security objectives. But a well-formulated defence policy could as well face some challenges at the level of implementation to the extent that the nation finds it difficult to adequately protect itself from external aggression and conspiracy of internal forces with those who seek to threaten the peace and stability of such a society from outside. Several countries of the world, developed and developing, now face this problem of transnational threats to peace and security, most especially in the age of asymmetric conflict dominated by terrorist organisations. The two leading terrorist organizations promoting this kind of problem globally are al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS). They recruit, train and financially empower citizens of different countries to destabilize their societies. The Boko Haram (BH) terrorist organization in the North Eastern part of Nigeria has working relationship with the two movements and some others like the al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) as well as Al-Shabab in Somalia. These terrorist organizations depend on the modern information technology for organizing their activities (Hayward 2015).

This factor explains why the study of asymmetric conflict is gaining increased currency around the world. The goal of this study is to take a critical look at the emerging scenarios in Nigeria using the BH crisis in the North East and the Niger-Delta Militancy (NDM) crisis in the South-South region as a framework of analysis. It is apt to say that the stability of the Nigerian state has been much under serious threat since the 1980s. It was during this period that the country started facing intense crisis in the oil-rich Niger Delta region starting with the Ogoni crisis which led to the extra judicial execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and some other leaders of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) on 10 November 1995 (Doron et al. 2016). As the security situation in the Niger Delta degenerated leading to the founding of several militant youth movements in the region, other parts of the country started to produce their own kind of violent movements. Emerging from the South West was the Oodua People's Congress (OPC); from the South East emerged the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). There were several religious crises in the North, with Kano being the most disturbed community. In Jos, the Birom, Afizere and Anaguta "indigenes" became locked in horns with the Hausa and Fulani "settlers" in their midst. In almost all parts of the country, Fulani herdsmen are engaged in violent conflicts with local farmers. Thousands of lives have been lost as a result of these crises (Nigeria Stability and Responsibility Programme, 2012).

The most explosive of the crises in the country is the ongoing BH crisis which has led to more than 20, 000 deaths and displacement of over two million people even across international borders. The crisis, which started in 2002 escalated into terrorism in 2009 and has been difficult to end since then. Owing to this bloody crisis, Nigeria is now listed globally as a terrorist producing state. The most current of the problems faced by Nigeria is the drive by members of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and MASSOB to establish a Biafran state from Nigeria as was attempted by the same Igbo speaking people of the South East during the Nigerian civil war that lasted from 1967 to 1970 (Dudley 1973; Achuzia 1983; Falola and Ihonvbere 1985; Madeibo 1980; Momoh 200; Osuntokune 1989). Nigeria is still struggling to package a solution out of this problem. The fact remains however that the country cannot afford another war at this moment when it is contending with the BH crisis which has critically degraded the capacity of the Nigerian military in terms of maneuverability, access to the right arms and ammunition in the international market, morale of the soldiers and support for the

Nigerian military by the communities in which they manage crises. To many Nigerians, the Nigerian peace and security architecture needs a complete overhauling. Lt. Gen. Aliyu Gusau Mohammed (Rtd.) joined those making this kind of call in a speech he delivered in his capacity as Nigeria's Minister of Defence in 2014. He said:

> Recent challenges suggest that the Armed Forces of Nigeria have not met the intent of the Constitution for 'adequate and effective' arrangements for defence against aggression, maintenance of territorial integrity and the suppression of insurrection. Illegality has resulted through the ad hoc creation of armed militias to fill the gaps created by the inadequacy of official police and armed forces...Fresh thinking is required to create an effective policy on national defence to meet the present and future challenges (Mohammed 2014:3).

As Nigeria contends most especially with the BH crisis, the question that students of peace and strategic studies would be tempted to answer would include the following: (i) Where is Nigeria's National Defence Policy (NNDP)? (ii) What does the policy say on how to respond to the deadly conflicts Nigeria faces? and (iii) To what extent are the letters of the NNDP actually informing Nigeria's response mechanisms? These questions are asked in the context of the fact that not many Nigerians believe that the crises in their country are being properly managed. Nwolise tried to answer the questions broadly packaged in his review essay on the NNDP 2006. He identified three problems with the policy: (i) its formulation was not preceded by any widespread consultation as expected (ii) the contents of the policy missed out on a number of key issues and (iii) there seemed to be lack of political will to implement the policy (Nwolise 2011). This issue will be addressed in chapter two at the level of literature review.

The fact remains that Nigeria has a defence policy. It is probably not good enough for an information age of asymmetric conflict. There are several operational problems pointing to this conclusion. Though members of the NDM and BH are widely dispatched, they take advantage of modern information technology (IT) to coordinate their attacks. In the process they easily turn Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) into a weaker party in an asymmetric conflict. For example, in the Niger Delta, the militants engaged in piracy travel into the high seas as far as 200 nautical miles assisted by Global Positioning System (GPS). The world is just getting to understand that this is

possible for criminal elements. Such knowledge was hitherto kept secret by professional seafarers. In some of their operations, BH members use Thuraya phones to organize their attacks. Hence, when the Nigerian state tried to block their communication by shutting down Global System of Mobile (GSM) communication in the North East zone, little was achieved. The developed world has been promising to lend Nigeria a helping hand in dealing with both the BH and NDM crises. What these countries probably have more than Nigeria is the ability to deplore drones to launch attacks or collect intelligence than Nigeria can independently do. To what extent has the NNDP come to terms with these issues?

A key issue in Nigeria's response to the crisis in the land is the preference of the use of military force to the soft approaches to conflict management. The federal government set up the Joint Task Force (JTF) to manage the NDM crisis. A Special Task Force (STF) was set up to manage the Jos crisis. In the North East, a JTF was also set up to manage the BH crisis. It has now become a full Division of the Nigerian Army. What is noticeable however, as harder as the Nigerian military worked to end each of these crises, they remain active.

On the other hand, NDM still attack oil facilities. Illegal oil bunkering, establishment of illegal refineries, and the problem of maritime piracy persist in the region. The Jos crisis is still taking lives. It has also been observed that all of the military operations set up to deal with the crises attract for Nigeria harsh criticisms of the international human rights community, most especially the Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the United States of America. The Nigerian military is often accused of engaging in mission creeps: involving the killing or illegal detention of innocent people in the name of fighting terrorism. The criticisms of the Nigerian military in the communities where the counter-insurgency operations take place are also intimidating. To what extent can the NNDP be blamed for these challenges? To blame the NNDP in this context is to either say that it does not provide sufficient guidance for military operations or it does but that the Nigerian military lacks what it takes to operationalize the policy.

The above questions are asked in the context of the fact that it is now common for any modern nation state to have a defence policy that articulates how it seeks to

legitimately protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity through the building of strong military and paramilitary forces compatible with the country's national interest and development objectives in addition to empowering a prosperous society that appreciates the need for peace. Defence policies are usually statements of intent. The contents depend on the level of the country's development - socially, economically, politically and technologically, most especially in terms of security management.

The document has to be set against the larger international context within which the particular nation exists. Is it having alliances with some other political entities? Is the military disposition of the country committed to some regional interests or normative security frameworks? What are the larger political and economic preferences of the country that could affect how it must protect itself? Does the country have the needed human, material, and administrative resources for pursuing an all inclusive defence objectives? However, a nation's defence policy is not framed in isolation of the people's historical experiences in local and international contexts. While the policy tries to prevent the repetition of a past problem, it rises up to the contemporary challenges of the society and put in place structures for anticipating and preventing future problems. The contents of a nation's defence policy are informed by the kind of security problems it envisages or is going through. The policy also anticipates future problems as a member of the global community. But since several of the problems every nation faces are not totally predictable, it logically follows that a nation's defence policy has to be constantly reformulated to capture emerging problems while at the same time still anticipating some future scenarios.

It is not enough for a country to have a sound defence policy. It must equally have the capacity to effectively implement it. Hence, the expectation is that the letters of such a national defence policy would inform the country's national security strategy and how the society respond to complex national emergencies such as situations of insurgencies, terrorism or any other eventualities that challenges the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. Where a nation fails to deal with emergent security problems well, the first suspect is usually the defence policy. Is it well designed? Is it appropriately implemented? Are those implementing it competent? These broad

questions are apt as the proposed research project interrogates the contents and implementation of NNDP 2006.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The present study is set against the background of the many unfavourable public and academic comments on the management of the NDM and BH crises by the Nigerian state. The general opinion is that the crises are not properly handled and the evidence of this is the length of time it has taken Nigeria to reduce the intensity of the NDM crisis through an amnesty programme started in 2009. Whether the amnesty programme is a good solution is not the subject of the present research. But the fact remains that the government came up with the policy out of the frustration resulting from the inability of the AFN to defeat the Niger Delta militants. The militants never asked for amnesty; the government induced them to accept it and the acceptance seemed to be half-hearted given the emerging security questions in the Niger Delta region now. The problems of sabotage of oil facilities, oil theft and piracy still persist in the region. Something similar seems to be happening to the handling of the BH crisis in the North east which assumed a terrorist dimension in 2009 (NSRP 2012). It is championed by an Islamic sect known as Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad (meaning 'Sunni Community for the propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad'). Like the other crises in the country, this crisis is managed in a manner that raised more questions than answers (BBC 2016). The handling of the crisis has so much dented the image of the Nigerian military in the context of the number of human lives and material resources lost and number of people displaced from their homes even across international borders into Cameroun, Chad and Niger Republic. Nigeria now has to depend on the international community to manage the crisis. To some Nigerians, one of the reasons for President Goodluck Jonathan losing the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria is the way the BH crisis was handled.

Several academic works have been done on both the NDM and BH crises (see Albert, 2005; NSRP 2012; Obi et al. 2011). These studies are critical of the government's handling of the situation but hardly provide any technical details of what really went wrong when it comes to issues relating to military operations. There are two exceptions. The first is the doctoral thesis of Mejabi (2010), which focused on the role of the JTF in managing the NDM crisis. It identified a number of factors responsible

for the failure of the JTF to achieve its objectives in the Niger Delta and made a number of recommendations on how to fill the gaps. The second work is the doctoral thesis of Akanle (2016) that addressed the activities of criminal violence in Rivers state. In the work, he called attention to the role of various security agencies in dealing with the situation. He also drew attention to some operational gaps of the security agencies and how to bridge them.

Both Mejabi and Akanle relied on their membership of the Nigerian security system for obtaining the kind of data they used in their studies. Mejabi left the Nigerian Army in the rank of Colonel. He is now a researcher with the National Defence College (NDC) Abuja. Akanle left the Directorate of State Services (DSS) as a Director of several states. He retired as the Director of the Institute of Security Studies in Abuja. The data used by both of them would not have been easily available for an ordinary field investigator but those still in service with the right level of professional connections. However, their work had nothing to do with Nigeria's defence policy. They simply sought to know how the security management operations in the Niger Delta were doing.

A lot has equally been published on the BH crisis (Adisa 2012, Bello 2013, Onuoha 2014). Most of these existing works focus on the causes of the crisis and its levels of escalation. As usual, the government is accused of mismanaging the problem but it is difficult to find in the studies the technical details of what was done wrongly. One of the most authoritative of these existing works was written by de Montclos (2014). It sets out different aspects of the problem but as usual have not much to say on the fact that the crisis is taking place in an information age that must be properly understood and factored into the solutions. One would have expected the work of Olukolade (2015) to fill this gap given the title of the publication and the fact that he was the spokesperson of the Nigerian military from March 2013 to July 2015. What the publication did rather is to underscore the role of information in the management of a crisis. He called attention to the need for public support for the military in order to defeat insurgents and terrorists but failed to say how those factors affect the management of either the NDM or BH crisis. He concluded the study with a usual refrain: that the media failed to cooperate with Nigeria in managing cases of insurgency and that the media should turn a new leaf.

What the present study seeks to do is to acknowledge the fact that the NDM and BH crises have all the trappings of an asymmetric warfare in which the insurgents and the Nigerian state compete to dominate each other. Obiuosly because of the fact that the Nigerian State is stronger compared to the Boko Haram insurgents, the insurgents have been employing all manner of unconventional methods of warfare to attack people, government facilities and structures. Indeed, in the North-east region of the country, the epicenter of the BHI, villages and farms are being destroyed, innocent citizens are being carted to unknown destinations where they are subjected to all kinds of inhuman treatment and killing. Expectedly, the Nigerian State is responding to the mayhem unleash on her by the insurgents. Thus, our focus in this study is to examine the extent to which the 2006 NNDP addresses the challenge to the nation's security.

1.3   Aim and Objectives of the Study

The aim of the study is to interrogate the Nigeria's national defence policy (NNDP) in the light of the management of the ongoing asymmetric conflict in the country. The specific objectives of the study include the following:

1. To critically examine the 2006, 2015 and 2017 NNDP in relation to asymmetric conflict
2. To examine the application of the NNDP in the containment of asymmetric conflict
3. To discuss the challenges of operationalizing the NNDP to address asymmetric conflicts in Nigeria.

1.4. Research Questions

The following are the core research questions of the study:

1. Does Nigeria's National Defence Policy address the problem of asymmetric conflict in the country?
2. What is the nature of the application of NNDP in containing asymmetric conflict?
3. What are the challenges of operationalizing the NNDP in order to address threats to national security in Nigeria?

**1.5	Significance of the Study**

There is no way Nigeria would ever experience sustainable development given the widespread and levels of violent conflicts across the country. There is none of the six geo-political zones in the country today that is not having one violent conflict or the other. Most of the existing works on the crises focus more on their causes and courses. Knowledge is often lacking on the prescriptions of the NNDP for responding to the situation and the challenges faced in realizing the dreams in asymmetric war situations. There is the need to reclaim this kind of knowledge as part of the conflict prevention, management, and transformation objectives of the Nigerian state. It is hoped that the proposed project would fill the existing gap in the understanding of how the NNDP should address itself to the realities of asymmetric warfare and how Nigeria could gain operational asymmetry over the likes of the NDM and BH insurgents.

**1.6.	Scope of the Study**

The defence policy of a nation addresses the entire gamut of how the society seeks to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The issues addressed by the document are therefore often very broad. The present study focused primarily on the challenges posed to the implementation of the 2006 NNDP by the asymmetric nature of the Niger Delta and BH crises from 2007 to 2015. The 2007 was the year after the 2006 NNDP was put in place by President Olusegun Obasanjo while 2015 is the year when same defence policy was reviewed by the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan. And 2017 is the year when the latest review was done by the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari.

**1.7	Operational Definition of Key Terms**

This is the need to properly situate and clarify the meaning of the key terms that underline the study. This would help to reduce confusion about their connotations. The key terms include the following:

Conflict: It is seen as an uncooperative cum antagonistic social relationships.

Asymmetric Conflict: It is one in which the powers of the parties are not equal. One is more powerful than the other thus necesiating the employment of unconventional methods of warfare by the weaker party to make up for its deficiencies with a view to inflicting maximun damage to the stronger party.

Conflict Management: It refers to all measures taken to mitigate a conflict and prevent its escalation. In other words, it represents all measures and strategies targeted at limiting and curtailing the escalation of a conflict.

National Defence Policy: It is a document that encapsulates the processes and the actions that a nation would take to defend itself against external aggression, establish internal security, and protect its national interest.

National Security: This involves the whole gamut of defence arrangement put in place by a soveign nation to guard or protect its citizens from both internal and external aggression or attacls.

National Interest: It represents the goals that encapsulate the aspirations and dreams of the totality of the membership of a country as opposed to the desires and dreams of subordinate groups to which the nation as an entity always endevours to preserve, protect and secure through her policies, programmes and governance principles.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter has four strategic objectives. The first is to shed light on some of the key concepts to be used in the entire study. The second is to review the contours of national defence policies around the world with a view to establishing the framework for understanding the Nigerian situation. The third focuses on reviewing the contents of the 2006 Nigeria's national defence policy while the fourth provides the theoretical framework for the study. These four areas would provide a smooth understanding of the issues to be studied in the rest of the work.

The core focus of this study is to understand the challenges posed to the implementation of Nigeria's national defence policy by the information age by making the crisis the country faces to be asymmetric in nature. The first challenge here is to clarify how the term "implementation" is to be understood in the study. The term calls attention to the significance of "implementation" in a project cycle. Every well-managed project has five core phases: problem identification, preparation and formulation, review and approval, implementation and evaluation. "Implementation" is somewhere between identification of the problem to be solved and putting in place structures for ensuring that packaged solutions actually produced desirable results.

In this context "implementation" refers to the translating of the defence policy into concrete results in terms of improvement in how Nigeria's sovereignty and territorial integrity is implemented through effective mobilization of the Nigerian military.

2.1 Conceptual Discourse

1. National defence
2. National security
3. Defence management

4. Security management

5. Insurgency

6. Counter Insurgency

7. Information management

8. Terrorism

9. Information age

10. Conflict

11. Asymmetric conflict

12. Defence Policy

2.1.1 National Defence

The fundamental strategic principle of national defence as noted by Latvia Ministry of Defence (2012) is to "minimise the potential for threats to national security, by continuing to improve and modernise the national defence capabilities, by strengthening North Atlantic Treaty Organization's collective defence and by contributing to international security, both bilaterally and multilaterally." The Latvia "State Defence Concept "document further adds that the aim of a national defence is to reduce the risk of external military aggression or an outbreak of other national threats, and, if necessary, to ensure effective deterrence measures. Therefore, for the case of Nigeria, the national defence capacity rests upon its planned, coherent and coordinated political leadership, as well as the cooperation between the state and local authorities, the Nigerian Armed Forces and the society. Consequently, National defence becomes a significant precondition for preventing and defeating threats to national security and for dealing with consequence management. The basis for Nigeria's national defence is the Armed Forces, that is professionally trained and equipped with modern technology and equally strategically positioned as a defence asset to the nation.

2.1.2 National Security

The concept of national security dates back to the Westphalian treaty of 1648 when the idea that a nation-state had sovereign control not only of its domestic affairs but also of its external security (Holmes 2015:17). Furthermore, before attempting to define national security, Holmes (p.17) believes a conceptualization of the terms inherent under national security discourse – power, military strength, and national defence, would be apt. The first is concept of "power", which according to him refers to a

"nation's possession of control of its sovereignty and destiny", and to a large extent the tendency for external aggressors to harm the country. In this regard, power can either manifest either as "hard" or "soft" power. While hard power is largely military power, soft power is mainly about influence, persuasion, and use of diplomacy by a state to achieve its national interest objectives.

Military strength is the second term under national security. As Holmes (p.18) notes, this refers to "military capacity and the capabilities of the armed forces" that may not necessarily be used. In this way, force becomes an instrument of power that should be understood narrowly as an applied instrument of coercion. National defence is the last term which strictly speaking, "refers to the ability of the armed forces to defend the lives of its people" (p.18). Now the question still remains, what is national security? White (2012:1) believes the big ideas underlying national security are the different types of security threats (both intra-state and external) that nations and their citizens face. Also, governments of nations through policies can only manage to eliminate these security threats. It then implies that "politically, security is a potent concept and so inevitably national security is a political as well as a policy construct which shapes the way governments address security challenges."

In consistency with White's position, Holmes (p.20) explains that national security involves guaranteeing the safety, security, and freedom of the citizens of a nation. Consequently, national security both as national defence and protection of geopolitical, economic, and other interests, affects not only defence policy, but foreign and other policies as well. Foreign and defence policies should therefore provide necessary support for projecting a nation's security budget. Typically, threats to national security in Nigeria could be internal or external. Internal security threats manifest in the forms of organized crimes, activities of BH terrorists, NDM activities, poverty, economic sabotage, graft and corruption, and others. External threats on the other hand, can manifest in the forms of growing activities of violent non-state actors and uncertainties affecting both global and regional peace and security, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs). Others include pirates and criminal activities around the gulf of Guinea area, serious economic disparities between rich and poor nations, transnational organized crimes, climate changes, and asymmetric warfare.

2.1.3 Defence Management

Bucur-Marcu (2009:10) defines defence management as "the idea that defence organizations need to turn defence policies into practice, and in so doing, to develop appropriate and sustainable planning mechanisms, support systems, and infrastructure". He further describes the process of defence management as the concept of managing defence in addressing such issues as allocating financial or human resources, and solving strategic or operational problems through a comprehensive approach". These actions are mainly executed through the cooperation, coordination, and collaboration of strategic policy-makers such as top military officers, Ministry of Defence officials, the National Assembly, and other key stakeholders. As a strategic enterprise, defence management therefore requires excellence at all levels and in every department of the Ministry of Defence.

Furthermore, in reality, the achievement of these strategic defence goals requires better allocation of public funds from the policy makers, a more efficient system of utilizing these funds, and a more visible and accountable defence policy. As Bucur-Marcu (p.12) notes, defence management in this way will involve planning, with direct impact on procurement of major military equipment, specific processes of planning and conducting operations, military combat readiness, and development of the military forces. In consistency with Bucur-Marcu's view, Bland (n.d.) posits that policy makers involved in defence management need to ask themselves the question on how they can do more with the limited resources available for their operations. And that in answering the question and selecting a strategy to maximize the outcomes of defence spending is often times complicated by several difficulties. Bland therefore suggests that politicians, military officers, and defence bureaucrats should therefore search for a new conceptual framework and new ways to manage national defence.

At the level of government, it then means that defence management transforms national policy into activities through the collaboration of the agencies of the state and the national economy to the armed forces, usually through the Ministry of Defence. Particularly, at this level, and consistent with Bland's position, defence management is concerned with "civil-military relations, national economics and domestic politics, along with the organization and functions of government" (p.3). At the second level,

Bland (p.3) stresses that defence management is "about transforming allocated resources into military capabilities relevant to and in accord with government policy". Consequently, managing the national defence requires "a policy base, instruments and organizations to perform various and specialized functions, and individuals appropriately trained in defence science, defence economics and finance, law, industrial relations, and government". In the end, the decision by top government politicians, top military officers to choose between different ways of achieving defence outcomes in essence will form the basis of defence management, and also part of the governance and policy process that defines problems and how to address them.

2.1.4 Security Management

According to the Oil and Gas (OGP) report (2014:2), a security management system (SMS) may be considered as:

> …part of the overall management system that provides the structure to enable identification of potential threats to an organization and which establishes, implements, operates, monitors, reviews, and maintains all appropriate measures to provide assurance of the effective management of the associated security risks.

The OGP report further identifies leadership, security risk management, implementation, and continuous improvement as the fundamental elements of security risk management. Meanwhile, effective implementation of SMS will subsequently ensure confidence and optimization in organizations. Succinctly speaking, the OGP report (p.4) believes that the effective implementation of the SMS will also "improve the resilience of the organization, enhance the organization's credibility, and enable the organization to be flexible in managing its response to security challenges".

2.1.5 Insurgency

This is a concept that has been widely interpreted by both experts and pundits. As a matter of fact, a plethora of concepts and words such as irregular warfare, revolutionary warfare, guerilla warfare and terrorism have been used to define insurgency. Thus commonly accepted meanings remain elusive. Essentialy, insurgency captures protracted political-military activity organized with a view to undermine the legitimacy of government of a country and to establish a parallell government in control of a segment/territory of a sovereign state. The US Department of Defense

defines insurgency as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subvention and armed conflict" (US. DoD, 2005). Debates over the causes of insurgency have identified modernization, globalization, poverty, bad governance, religious extremism and ethno-nationalism. Samuel Huntington (1996) advances the violent disruptiveness of competing cultures, embodied in religious and ethno-nationalism and exemplified by Islamic radicalism and al Qaeda as some of the causes of insurgency in the contemporary world.

Insurgencies are largely internal conflicts waged by groups who are opposed to the modus operandi of the government of a geographically defined territory for the establishment of their preferred political, economic, religious, cultural and social philosophy on a sovereign state.. C. B. Mitchell (1998) in his work The Structure of International Conflict articulates the nature of insurgencies when he states : insurgencies reflect a complex, three-dimensional web of actions, structures and beliefs.

2.1.6 Counter-insurgency

As in the case of insurgency, the term counterinsurgency has attracted a variety of interpretations. Generally, it is seen as an integrated set of political, economic, social, and security measures intended to end and prevent the recurrence of armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic, and social structures, and resolve the underlying causes of an insurgency in order to establish and sustain the conditions necessary for lasting stability (Moore, R. S., 2007). Counterinsurgency simply put represents a variety of measures taken by the government of a sovereign state to defeat an insurgent group and enttrone lasting internal security in a [polity. The US DoD, (2005) definition of counterinsurgency captures this : Those military, paramilitary, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat. Though there is no concensus as to the meaning of the term counterinsurgency, scholars and politicians are have expressed similar positions on the components of a counterinsurgency strategy. An effective counterinsurgency, it has been argued consists of several critical tasks, which, when ntegrated, provide a pathway for resolving the insurgency. The tasks include, but not limited to the following: 1) the establishment and maintenance of security, 2) provision of humanitarian relief and

essential services, 3) promoting effective governance, 4) sustanance of economic development, 5) supporting reconciliation and, 6) fostering social change.

Within the context of this study, it is germane to point out that the literature on counterinsurgency emphasis the presence of certain factors- enablers- that facilitate the accomplishment of the tasks of counterinsurgency, which, experts on counterinsurgency have argued must be integrated into a counterinsurgency strategy. The 'Marine Corps Operating Concepts for Changed Security Environment', especially in Chapter six, articulates the enablers as: 1) Clear goals, 2) Civil-Military unity of purpose, 3) Integrated intelligence, 4) Legitimacy, 5) Use of force and, 6) An integrated strategy.

2.1.7 Terrorism

Sandler (2014:1) defines terrorism as "the premeditated use or threats to use violence by individuals or sub national groups to accomplish a political or social objective." Some of the tactics of terrorism according to him include bombing, beheading, downing of commercial airline, and armed attacks in public places. He adds that this approach and tactic is aimed at instilling fear in people and further explain that the three subjects involved in the definition of terrorism are the perpetrators, the victims and the members of public (p.2). In an attempt to create a clear distinction between terrorism and crime, Sandler (p.4) asserts that the political undertones and demands involved in crime is the major factor that classifies such crime as terrorism. Similarly, Gaibulloev et al. (2011:4) state that terrorism basically "aims at intimidating the public into pressuring the government to conceding to demand." They add that terror attacks can be domestic "in which victims, perpetrators, and audience are from the venue country, where the attack is staged" or transnational, which is when a terrorist incidence in one nation involves victims, perpetrators, and audience of another nation (p.5). An example of transnational terror attack according to them is the hijacking of four commercial airlines in the United States of America on 11th of September 2001 now popularly referred to as 9/11(p.5). Mickolus (1989) as cited by Gaibulloev et al. believe that transnational terrorism in some cases are state sponsored. This "involves government supply of resources, intelligence, safe haven, and logistic support for terrorist" (p. 5).

2.1.8 Information Age

What is information age and what are its markers? What is regarded as "information age" today is a logical consequence of the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War. lt has to do with the revolution in scientific and technological affairs in a manner that enabled the general populace to start having access to those information technologies that were hitherto held in privacy by national defence and security institutions most especially in the developed parts of the world. This revolution affects all aspects of human endeavors include defence and security management. The other key areas affected are business and banking, industry and manufacturing, government policy and military affairs, international relations, education and research, social and cultural relations, political affairs, entertainment and news (see Headrick l99l; Holzmann and Pehrson 1995; Shunaman 1979; Terranova 2004).

The information age has positive and negative aspects. The positive aspects include software publishing, the production and wide access to motion picture and sound recordings; the broadcasting and telecommunications industries, and the information services and data processing industries. On the negative side, many of these modern information technologies are used adversarially by insurgents, terrorists and transnational organized criminal groups in a manner that exacerbate global insecurity. Official efforts to fight back have produced what is known as "information warfare". The technologies that are part of the contemporary information revolution include the following: (l) advanced semiconductors; (2) advanced computers; (3) fiber optics; (4) cellular technology; (5) satellite technology; (6) advanced networking; (7) improved human-computer interaction; and (8) digital transmission and digital compression (Alberts, Sapp and Kemp III l997:36). These technologies provide increased speed in the exchange of information, provide greater information and communication capacity, enhanced flexibility in information exchange and management, and have lower costs (pp.46-47).

2.1.9 Conflict

Conflict is a concept that has been defined and engaged from a variety of perspectives-intellectual, ideological and religious. This accounts for conceptions of conflict such as philosophical conception of conflict; sociological conception of conflict; political conception of conflict and Marxian conception of conflict, to mention but a few.. Essentially, conflict is perceived in the light of uncooperative social relationship. It is a social relationship where the goal of an individual or group is seen as being antagonistic to the other.

2.1.10 Asymmetric Conflict

Asymmetry in conflict situations can be defined as "a wide disparity between the parties, primarily in military and economic power, potential and resources" (Stepanova 2008:1445). Hence, an asymmetric conflict is one in which the powers of the parties are not equal: one is more powerful than the other. Of course, every armed conflict is asymmetrical in nature in the sense that the parties do not have the same kind of resources: most especially the number of fighting forces, weapons or external support. The whole essence of the war in the first place is for one to defeat the other. Each party brings into the conflict situation any resources that could give it superiority. In the context of the present study, asymmetric conflict refers to how the use of the modern information and communication technology empowers or disempowers insurgents and the federal government in the NDM and BH crises.

Stepanova differentiates between what is called "power asymmetry" and "status asymmetry". Power asymmetry refers to the extent to which a group is committed to the use of conventional and unconventional force in attaining its objectives. This is quantifiable in terms of military budgets, weapons (arsenals, technological superiority etc.). "Status asymmetry", on the other hand, how to do with the political clout (domestic and international legitimacy) of the parties (Stepanova 2008:l7-19). The proposed project, focusing on information age, has more to do with power asymmetry and the specific issue is the role of technological superiority in crisis management.

2.1.11 Defence Policy

There are several definitions of the term "defence policy". However, there seems to be a consensus amongst these scholars on what the term means and what it does not.

Simply defined, a national defence policy is a document featuring intents on how a nation seeks to defend itself and protect areas of national interest.

Davies observed in a recent study that: "A government's defence policy is not about what it does with its military forces during its tenure; that is a matter of foreign policy or national security policy. Rather, defence policy defines the military capabilities the nation intends to acquire, maintain, or divest and aligns those ends with the necessary ways and means, principally money, over a long time horizon" (Davies 2Ol6:l). In practice, a national defence policy has a long term objective. It has do to with upgrading existing systems and defining future options. For this reason, the defence policy of a country must be formulated with the best of intentions and the work must involve the best of the professionals available to the country at the moment. Where sufficient expertise is not available locally there is nothing wrong with the country consulting experts overseas.

2. 2   Defence Policy Process

A schema for understanding how a defence policy is formulated and implemented has been provided by the DCAF's International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT). It calls attention to the fact that defence policy formulation or development is only one step in a group of interdependent activities that collectively define a country's defence. It identified the following four logical steps that must be properly contextualized (i) National Security Vision and Strategy (ii) Defence Policy (iii) Defence Policy Strategy and (iv) Defence Plans.

2.3   Defence Policy Process Cycle (DPPC)

Each of the five elements in a comprehensive defence system involves several sub-activities and a variety of inputs from different stakeholders. Where anything goes wrong with each of the steps, the contents of the national defence policy might not be appropriate and its implementation might not truly protect a nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity as expected.

The national security vision and strategy phase in the system is the point at which the formulation of the country's defence starts and not necessarily when it is being written.

This has to do with having to conduct a defence needs assessment. This manifests in the form of a broad framework of consultation of relevant stakeholders on the questions: who are we as a nation and what kind of defence policy do we seek to have and for what reasons? Answering these questions would require that workshops are organized, submissions are taken from members of the public, and technical papers are commissioned. Some important individuals with experience on related matters could be consulted on some of the issues. The submissions are then analyzed and then aggregated into the production of an evidence-based "defence white paper" which when approved by the government provides a policy direction for the defence sector to serve the nation within a period of time. The document is then kept under continual renewal as the defence environment of the country changes from time to time and its implementation must be subjected to continuous political, bureaucratic and legislative oversight for effectiveness. An effective national defence policy must also be kept under regular review as the defence environment of the affected country and the international system changes.

The second stage is the emergence of the defence policy itself from the defence white paper. The latter guides the drafters of the defence policy in addressing each of the issues to include. The defence policy when finally formulated constitutes a mere statement of policy directions and decisions. It is no more than a piece of document that cannot implement itself. In order to translate its content into concrete outcomes, two other things have to be done. The first is to produce a "Defence policy strategy" from it. ISSAT defines defence strategy as "the use of military means to achieve higher national or defence policy ends". The strategy is expected to derive from both the national security policies and strategies as well as the overarching defence policy. The questions to be answered by the designers of a national defence strategy are expected to include the following:

1. what policy ends are we trying to achieve?
2. what military resources currently exist to achieve those ends?
3. what further military resources do we need to supplement those we have?
4. how do we want our country to be seen by the international community through the employment of military forces?

The answers generated for these questions then lead to the production of "defence plans". On the other hand, the defence plans involve analysis, planning, programming and the adoption of specific practices related to the policy. ISSAT defines it as "a high-level description of what a country wants to achieve with its armed forces". In this case, the attempt is made to translate the vision leading to the formulation of the defence policy into an operational reality. The plans must have specific aims and must be realistic in the context of available resources and how to use the resources. It must be timely and flexible and take into account the possible influences of external forces and actors. Both the defence strategy and plans inform the implementation of the defence policy and provide more detailed information on what is expected of different stakeholders in attaining the goals of the defence policy.

Though it is the responsibility of the executive branch of government to formulate and implement a defence policy and propose the defence budget, the parliament has the oversight and investigative powers as well as the power of the purse as its most effective means to shape a nation's defence policy in a democratic society. Through such control over budgetary matters, it is possible for the parliament to directly influence everyday defence policy decisions. This could also impact on future review of defence policies. In practice, the formulation of a defence policy and the moderation of its strategy and plans by the parliament make it look as something necessarily objective. The fact remains however that most of the time riddled with political battles and the pursuit of self-interest agendas between agents of a ruling government and those opposed to it. The contests are often more evident at the level of implementing the policies and not necessarily when formulating it as a government would not engage in the formulation of a policy that is antithetical to its primary political objectives.

2.4   Contours of National Defence Policies

Nigeria has a national defence policy (2006), which is actually the core document around which the present study is woven. It is not the core intention of the study to do a comprehensive review of the contents of the document. What is emphasized rather is to call attention to some of its provisions as a framework for raising debates about asymmetric conflict management in an information age. To prepare the grounds for appreciating the direction of this discussion, the attempt is made here to draw some cursory insights from a brief review of the NDP of some developed countries (see

Davies 2Ol6), including China which in humility still regards itself as a developing nation though has all it takes to be ranked among the developed part of the world. The countries to be examined in this context, in addition to China, are France, the United Kingdom, Australia and Italy.

2.5   The Republic of China's Defence Policy

The developed countries, including China which ironically still regards itself as a developing nation, are considered to be "developed" on the account of their advanced social, economic, political and security systems as well as their ambitious future goals. Having mastered conventional warfare, many of them have the capacity to engage in and deter nuclear warfare. These countries are so self-sufficient that they could decide not to relate with certain categories of countries. For example, most western countries can afford to sever ties and relationship with nations that sponsor international terrorism. All of these national interests are often reflected in the countries' national defence policies. Furthermore, the issues captured by the national defence policy of China, according to Heath T.R. et al (2016:vii), include:

> China's leaders are pursing a security strategy to reduce vulnerabilities, cope with threats, and support the nation's revitalization. It includes efforts to shape an international environment more favourable to the exercise of the Chinese growing power, including the pursuit of changes to existing institutions and organizations and the introduction of new ones…Over time, China's defense policy has similarly moved beyond a focus on homeland defence to the cover regional threats and security needs beyond China's immediate periphery.

Hence, China is not just concerned about its internal security needs, but gratitiously articulated defense policies that will keep it in control of East and South China Seas, which its main contender, Taiwan has always contested. Again, China's defence policy is all encompassing and has gained expression in the nation's development strategy, which is encampsulated in the national vision of 'Chinese Dream'. It seeks to pursue economic freedom, continued Chinese Communist Party rule, providing social welfare, promoting communist values and morals and improving the environmental conditions of its citizens in a manner that encourages internal stability. According to Garver (2004), China declared war on India in 1962 because its influence was being threatened in Tibet and as a sharp response to India's 'Forward Policy', which tended

to advance India territorial expansion around its border with China. Renmin (1962:93) summarises thus:

> Nehru's ambition since the mid-1940s was the] establishment of a great empire unprecedented in India's history… [that would] far surpass that of the colonial system set up in Asia in the past by the British empire… [The Indian leadership] took over from British imperialism this concept of India as 'the centre of Asia'…. It is precisely from this expansionist viewpoint that the Indian ruling circles regard China's Tibet region as an Indian sphere of influence…. After India's declaration of independence, the Indian ruling circles regarded as India's those Chinese territories which the British imperialists had occupied and those which they had wanted to occupy but had not yet succeeded in occupying [Tawang]…. Again and again, the Indian authorities arbitrarily and unilaterally altered their map of the SinoIndian boundary to incorporate large areas of Chinese territory into India [Aksai Chin]…. The total area so claimed is about the size of China's Fukien [Fujian] Province, or four times as large as Belgium or three times as large as Holland.

Pardes (2012) contends that the Sino-India war has continued to shape and define China's defence policy towards India till today. Hence, a white paper released on National Defence in the year 2000 by the People's Republic of China, specifically delt with three key issues: the long standing dispute with Taiwan, the US doctrine of Theatre Missile Defence and its relations with its immediate neighbours of which India is key. The White Paper explored the means of implementing a military strategy that supports lean and strong military force by managing the Armed Forces in line with the existing laws and by transforming it from a numerical superiority to a qualitatively viable type. Today, China's defense policy has expanded to include not just military reorganization but a commitment to cyberspace security as advocated by Hu Jintao (cited in Sharma, 2016: 43):

> We should attach great importance to maritime, space and Cyberspace security. We should make active planning for the use of military forces in peacetime, expand and intensify military preparedness, and enhance the capability to accomplish a wide range of military tasks, the most important of which is to win local war in an information age.

Just as the cyberspace opens a wide range of opportunities to individuals, corporate bodies and nations, it is also an object of threats to national security. Hence, most

nations strive to secure their cyberspace in order to protect their national interests, especially with military strategic interest just as Sharma (2016:45) observed that:

> …developed economies is compelling nation states to exercise their power in the cyberspace to secure their interests. The intellectual property, secure communication channels, data partianing to national security and research in strategic areas and technology are at persistent risk from plethoral of threats. The threats and challenges increase manifold when military dimension is added to cyberspace.

As part of a robust defence policy strategy, Chinese President, Xi Jinping has, in 2014 advocated a collective efforts towards developing China's cyberspace to give it a cyber superiority over its enemies. Li (2012) has listed seven elements of cyber power including internet and information technology capabilities, IT industrial capabilities, internet market capabilities, the influence of internet culture, internet diplomacy/foreign policy capabilities, cyber military strength and national interest in taking part in a cyberspace strategy. All these capabilities should be explored and exploited to harness both economic and political national interests. According to Sharma (2016), there many reasons China's drive towards acquiring superior cyber power is imperative. First, the emergence of China as both regional and world's power has triggered competitions with its immediate neighbours and the world's superpowers. Second, China's need to secure energy, metals and strategic minerals to elevate the living conditions of its population; third, China has the largest population of internet users in the world requiring a strong base for users.

Due to its ambition to develop and upgrade its military formations to global's standard, China has consistently invested heavily into the defence sector to the extent that it increases the annual budget allotted to defense by 10% in the last 27 years. The summation of these strides made Cordesman's (2016) to conclude that China is not just a major regional military power in Asia and the Pacific but an emergent global economic superpower.

2.6   France and Its National Defence Policy

The present defence policy of France was deliberately framed to address the long term security objectives of the country and designed to have a reasonable amount of

flexibility for managing future challenges. The policy situates France as a growing power of hegemony in global affairs; defines how its defence policy must adjust to this reality; analyses of the changing global context for defence planning and management; identifies France's strategic objectives and priorities and how to realize them. The policy is based on a thorough analysis of the (then) global and regional security environment that France had to respond to as a leading European country. French defence policy is historically drawn from Charles de Gualle's conception of global dimension driven by independent French defence both as conventional and nuclear power (Helnarska, 2013). In the post World War 11, Charles de Gualle led France to define an independent state by resisting the temptation of aligning with either of the block in the cold war politics. According to Helnarka (2013:269):

> This approach to the independence and security became the basis for the development of the military doctrine of France. The doctrine of and independent defence of France was developed in the mid sixties, and presented for the use of French society and the international environment in a White Paper on defence in 1972.

And of course, the theory of *three French national security circles*, which was formulated by Gen. Lucien Poirier in 1976 centered on defending the independence and soveringty of France, European security and maintenance of political and military stability in Europe and the role that France would play in world politics. These security circles have continued to shape French national interests in international politics. For instance, Terpan (2008) submits that from the beginning of the Fifth Republic up till 1990, the doctrine of sovereignty and independence was considered as the most rational option for Frence to advance its national interest in international politics. This is not to suggest that France isolated itself from the rest of the world but a deliberate foreign policy to reduce its dependence on the world's superpowers, especially the United States of America. French defence approach is guided by its four cardinal foreign policy principles:

- Priotise conflict prevention and arms control, especially through the development of legally binding instruments
- The importance of the international law, the UN Security Council and intergovernmental cooperation

- Solidarity withallies and partners with close links with Africa, military involvement with the Atlantic alliance, cooperation with America and Russia

- The European dimension focusing on Europian Security Defence Policy (ESDP) being the neutral framework of the French defence policy

After the collapse of the Societ in the late nineties, the Europian Union formed the thrust of the French defence policy. The global security mood necessitated it not to act alone but to adopt a collective framework to engage and build into the new security tasks of conflict prevention and peacekeeping in order to facilitate the Europeanization process. Hence, France played a critical role in the emergence of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 (Terpan, 2008). French commitment to NATO was rather concervative. It would prefer to invest more in ESDP as a strategic means of checkmating the undue influence of the United States of America that became the world's empire after the defeat nd final break of USSR in 1990s. As observed by Schumitt (2016:7):

> Characteristically, important parts of the French strategic community pushed for the dissolution of NATO after 1991 and immediately saw the USA as a new empire (heir to the old-arch enemy that was the Holy Roman Empire) which had to be tamed. As such, authors reactivated the old Guallist distinction between the Atlantic alliance (which could be maintained), and NATO as an organization (which could disappear in order to leave room for European defence). For more than a decade, French policy makers hoped for the establishment of a 'European defence' which would, depending on the moment be a European pillar within NATO or a fully autonomous capacity that would make NATO obasolte.

France was initially developed a cold disposition and was unconfrtable about the emergence of the United States as the 'hyperpower' of the international system or could be described as the primary beneficiary of unipolarity. This is simply because the United State's influence in the global politics would naturally challenge or undermone the independence of Europe and by implication, France. In other words, French was largely in support of multipolarity, which would give credence to its traditional call for independence that formed the core of its foreign policy objectives during the cold war (Gordon, 1993).

However, France was left with no ther choice than to cooperate with the unipolar system. In the words of Schmitt (2016), Paris had to re-invent its relationship with the United States in order to play an active role in the new world order. And of course, it implied that France could no longer play the non-alignment card between the US and USSR because of the marked alteration in the power equilibrium of the two countries. According to Alice Panner (cited in Schmitt, 2016:11)\: 'Paris' relation with London and Washington has been profoundly transformed since the end of the Cold War, with France embracing in practice, if not in rhetoric, its integration within the western family'.

Hence, France's participation in NATO has improved considerably. Other topical issues, particularly those that relate to the actions of Russia's conflict with Ukraine, the external instigation of terrorism in France, and the current European Union challenges of refugee management amongst other critical factors. France's change of defence tactic in the nineties is understandable; the tensed security climate of the post world war 11 politics is quite different from the event that occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has become even more imperative for France to key into the various global security cooperations of the West in view of its vulnerability to terrorist attacks lately.

2.7   United Kingdom National Defence Policy

The defence and security policy of the United Kingdom is built around the country's strategic responses to global, regional and local defence environments, which conveniently considered the trends, risks and the role of the British military in engaging with the different level of threat. It is reviewed every five years with the most recent review done in 2015 and the first review happened in 2010 (CSS, 2016). Prior to 2010, all stakeholders including the main political parties-the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats-agreed that there was the need for a radical re-evaluation of the national defence policy. In fact, strategic reviews of the defence policy formed the key component of the campaign promises of these political parties during the 2010 general election. And of course, the Labour Government did not hesitate to implement some of the critical issues that needed to be given priority with respect to the defence policy as observed by the House of Common (2011:4)

> Indeed, the allegagtion that the military had being over-committed under-funded, under-equiped and operating in breach of established harmont guidelines became an increasing feature of the latter years of the Labour Government.

The strategic review had a wide scope and was incredibly emcompassing. This is because the exercise did not just focus on defence policy and Army reconfiguration alone but took a serious congnisance of the issue of budget deficit which had plagued the sector for a number of years. In other to achieve this holistic vision, the National Security Council established directly under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The office was to be coordinated through the appointment of a National Security Adviser. In line with overall objective of overhauling the defence policy, the Strategic Defence eand Security Review (SDSR) was instituted to harmonise all the proposals and views of actors around the the whole exercise. In submitting its report, the NSC and the SDSR identified omternational terrorism, hostile attacks on UK's cyber space, national response to accident or natural disasters and international crises that may involve the UK as major threats the country had to contend with. The reports of the NSS and the SDSR also set key areas of national security objectives. According to Taylor et al (2010), they include the following:

Counter terrorism: It identified terrorism both at local and international levels as major rsik prority areas for the UK. It recognized Al Qaeda and its affiliates as the major threat from international terrorsism.

Cyber Security: A new Cyber Security Programmed was instituted to build a centralized and more comprehensive approach in order to bridge the existing gap. A four-year budget estimate of 650million pound was advanced to achieve this purpose.

Civil Emergencies: The SDSR sought to refocus the efforts that were deployed to limit the risk that are associated with civil contingencies within the UK.

Fragile and Conflict-Affected State: The report advocated the strengthening and deployment of diplomatic and intelligence resources to support states that are recovering from protracted conflict.

Energy Security: The SDSR projected that energy might become a political tool for competition from countries like China, India and Russia. It therefore advocated for priority of energy security development as a critical component of UK' foreign policy objectives.

Organised crime: It projected that organized crime are likely to increase in the next five years due to the invention of new technologies. It then advocated for the setting up of a National Crime Agencies to coordinate the activities of law enfrcement operations.

Border security: The fact that UK is likely to face migration problems through the borders necessitate the establishment of the Border Police Command to complement the work of the National Crime Agency.

Counter proliferation: The NSS was particularly not just interested in proliferations of arms as a threat to national security but consider the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as having the potential to upset for regional and international security.

The National Security Strategy report was officially released on 18 October, 2010 and the then Prime Minister, Mr David Cameron made the following remarks in his forward to the document:

> …the National Security Council has overseen the development of a proper National Security Strategy, for the first time in this country's history. To be useful, this strategy must allow the Government to make choices about the risks we face. Of course, in an age of uncertainty the unexpected will happen, and we must be prepared to react to that by making our institutions and infrastructure as resilient as we possibly can. Unlike the last Government, our strategy sets clear priorities – counter-terrorism, cyber, international military crises and disasters such as floods. The highest priority does not always mean the most resources, but it gives a clear focus to the Government's effort. (House of Common, 2010)

Emphasis was laid on the purposes of the National Security Strategy, which was to deplore national resources to build Britain's prosperity, to expand its influence

globally and to build its national security. This template provided the groundwork and framework for Britain's exit from the EU in 2016.

2.8   Australia and Italy Defence Policies

The Australian defence orientation is not different from those of France and United Kingdom earlier mentioned. It calls special attention to the kind of defence force structure to be built by the country and the military capabilities it aspires for as a member of the global community. The path to institutional reform to be embraced are articulated and aligned with the resources to be acquired and maintained. The Australian policy differs from the others by committing the country to increase defence spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2021 (Australia 2016).

In June 2015, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Italy published a monograph consisting of several short papers on the defence strategy for Italy arising from the country's national defence policy. In the document, it is clearly established that a key objective of a defence state is to match a nation's defence policy ends with the ways and means for attaining them. It seeks to provide a framework of working relationship between political leaders, the armed forces and the public in the imperative of protecting a nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity (see Marrone 2OI5). The contents of this publication go a long way at supporting the schema provided by ISSAT and shows that a defence policy can only work in the context of a well coordinated and integrated network of all relevant stakeholders.

What are the lessons in the foregoing? The first is that the national defence policy of a country is context specific and is based on the principles of self- reliance. It provides the opportunity for each country to define itself and defence aspirations, as it likes; what instrument of state it has for attaining these objectives. The NDP of every country has to articulate how the country sees the rest of the world and seek to engage with it. ls the country having any global or regional leadership aspirations? Does it have the material, human, financial and diplomatic resources for projecting itself as a military power of note? In this context, it is observable that no two countries have the same NDPs. This is because no two countries totally want to be seen the same way. How each country seeks to be seen is determined by its history, social, economic, political, diplomatic aspirations, and level of development. As united as the countries

in the European Union are, they see the world differently and each of them seeks to protect itself in some particular ways that might not necessarily be meaningful to the other.

Two other strategic issues are observable in the NDPs. They did not just consist of statements on how the countries seek to defend themselves in rapidly globalizing world but more importantly addressed the ways and means for attaining these aspirations. For countries willing to build a large military, the question is where do you get the money from? How do you make the best use of the unlimited available resources? Better than the short sentences that NDPs documents usually have on these issues, every country is expected to have a national defence strategy and defence plans that clearly address these fundamental questions.

2.9   Nigeria's Defence Policy 2006

Nigeria did not have a National Defence Policy (hereafter called NNDP) until June 2006 when President Olusegun Obasanjo formally signed it. Several scholars called on Nigeria to deal with this problem. These included Professors Adeniran in 1984 and Ekoko in 1990 (Adeniran l984:6; Ekoko l990:l8). This is surprising for a nation that has been engaging in international peacekeeping missions since the 1960s and had to fight a civil war from 1967 to l970. The regime of President Olusegun Obasanjo started the process of giving Nigeria a defense policy by setting up a committee in 1999 to provide a draft for Nigeria. The document was passed in 2006 but it has a number of problems, which Nwolise pointed out in his own work. He called for a review of the defense policy but in a manner that would enable the gaps in the NNDP that have to be filled through a review of the documents. He criticized some fundamentals of the policy with a view to draw some lessons for strengthening the Nigerian military and called for the review of the policy. This clarion call was not yielded to by the Nigerian state until 2014 when the government of President Goodluck Jonathan had to constitute a presidential panel to take a look at the document in the context of the rapidly changing defense and security environment in Nigeria. The work is still going on.

The 2006 NNDP is a 70 page document with a general outlook of a typical defence policy. It consists of eight chapters. The first, which is the introduction, sets out the

basis for the policy. The efforts giving Nigeria a defence policy is said to have started since the late 1970s though no further details were provided on this. Two factors are adduced for having the policy. The first is Nigeria's determination to make itself conformable to the security of the post Cold war era while the second is the political transition experienced by Nigeria in 1999. Both require that Nigeria develops an effective diplomatic and military backbone strong enough to give the country a respectable future. A prime objective of the 2006 NNDP is for "the Armed Forces of Nigeria...be able to engage in conventional warfare and low intensity conflict, be capable of rapid deployment to counter a wide spectrum of threats at home and abroad and be able to operate jointly to meet the security needs of Nigeria" (NNDP 2006:3-4).

The second chapter reviews the strategic global, regional and domestic environments within which the NNDP is produced. This is done in a way that makes Nigeria to appear like a country that is not only interested in safeguarding its territorial integrity through a constructive use of its military and other national instruments of state power but also committed to global peace and security.

The third chapter sets out the risks and challenges to be dealt with by the NNDP. The first is the need to protect Nigeria's national interests which are said to be derivable:

> ...from the shared values, goals and aspirations of her citizens. These goals and values could be broadly described as territorial, political, economic, scientific and socio-cultural. Specifically, they are the protection of her territory and the well being of her citizenry, democracy and good governance with protection of our values (NNDP 2006:13).

Others are technological development, human dignity, domestic and regional peace. They also include protection of her culture, ensuring the stability of the government, strengthening the domestic economy and participation in the global economic system (NNDP 2006:13). The country's national interests are broken into three in the NNDP to consist of vital interests which has to do with the protection of Nigeria's sovereignty, territorial integrity and commitment to democratic governance (ii) strategic interests which border around the question of using economic, political and diplomatic relations for ensuring regional security, combating terrorism and transnational crimes and (iii) peripheral interests which have to do with Nigeria's general obligations to ensuring

global peace and security (NNDP 2006:14-15). The NNDP argues that these interests can only be achieved by Nigeria through the combined efforts of all Nigerians. In the fourth chapter, the core objectives of the NNDP are mapped out and the efforts are made to shed light on how to attain them. The specific objectives are:

a. Protection of Nigeria's sovereignty, citizens, values, culture, interests, resources and territory against external threats.
b. Provision of defence as well as strategic advice and information to Government.
c. Promotion of security consciousness among Nigerians.
d. Response to requests for aid to civil authority.
e. Participation in disaster management and humanitarian relief operations both at home and abroad.
f. Assistance to government agencies and levels of government in achieving national goals.
g. Protection of Nigerians wherever they may reside.
h. Ensuring security and stability in the West Africa sub-region through collective security.
i. Participation in bi-lateral and multi-lateral Operations.
j. Contributing to international peace and security (NNDP 2006:22-23).

The specific tasks to be carried out by the Nigerian armed forces in attaining the objectives of the NNDP through strategic posturing are:

a. Providing advice and information to government on development in defense worldwide.
b. Protecting the sovereignty of Nigeria through surveillance and control of Nigeria's land and maritime territory as well as airspace.
c. Protecting Nigeria's onshore and offshore strategic assets.
d. Co-ordinating National SAR Programmes.
e. Embarking on non-combatant evacuation of Nigerians in crisis ridden countries in collaboration with the MOFA.
f. Initiating bi-lateral and multi-lateral contacts and exchange with selected countries.

g. Participating in multi-national operations to stabilize any state or group of states in the West African sub-region.

h. Participating in peace support missions sponsored by the AU and the UN.

i. Attaining the capabilities to carry out other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the NASS.

The fifth chapter sets out the responsibility of the executive and legislative arms of the Nigerian government as well as the Nigerian military and para-military organizations in attaining the objectives of the NNDP. The sixth chapter focuses on the nature and processes of having sufficient human, material and technological resources for the policy. The seventh chapter is on civil-military relations and the NNDP is concluded in the eighth chapter on the note that it is founded on the principles of democratic governance and military subordination to civil control and authority.

An assessor of the quality of a NDP would have to take a careful look at three critical aspects of the document: (i) the formulation process, (ii) the contents and (iii) the implementation or usage. Nwolise agreeably, found problems with the three aspects in his review of the 2006 NNDP. He argued first and foremost that the 2006 policy was a submission from an intellectual committee and was hardly informed by any serious consultation of the Nigerian public as scientifically expected. The problem resulting from this includes the fact that the policy is not framed around a popular corpus of national interest. Its conception of "national security" is state-centric rather than place emphasis on human security; it targets a meaningless foreign policy objectives that makes Nigeria to commit soldiers to operations that others take away the resultant political and economic benefits. The document presents a narrow conception of civil military relations (Nwolise 2011: 418-422). He observed that the government was more interested in having a defence policy than implementing it. According to him, "...much of what was intended in the NNDP has not been implemented five years of its adoption. The critical question then is: Can we therefore in all honesty really refer to the NNDP document as a policy in the light of the strong view of John Garnett to the effect that statement of intention or purpose alone is not a policy?" (Nwolise 2011:436).

What Nwolise is trying to say here is that indeed Nigeria has a policy but that the government lacks the will to implement the document. My proposed work will take the matter beyond this point. The proposed work would argue, in the context of the NNDP, that Nigeria is yet to come full terms with the fact that we are now in information age of asymmetric conflict in which wars now have to be fought by non-state actors using unconventional means. The information age (also known as computer age, digital age, network society and new media age) has at least five defining characteristics: globalization of resources and ideas; increasing importance of information technology, innovation transforming processes, networked economies and societies, and constantly changing images and messages. The most salient of these characteristics for security studies is the role of information technology in the attacks of a society by non-state actors and the role of information technology in the defence of the modern state by the state actors. Access or lack of access to these technologies now defines the asymmetric nature of a conflict. Nations that take advantage of the modern information technology in warfare is most likely to gain tactical and operational advances over their adversaries and vice versa. How do we then apply this thinking to the operationalization of Nigeria's NDP?

This question becomes important for Nigeria in the context of how the NDM and the BH sect constantly use access to modern information and communication technology to gain superior battle and publicity advantage over Nigeria in the last two decades or thereabout demonstrate evidences that these non-state actors have access to the ICT as claimed here. For now, no academic work exists on the nature of this problem but it is an apparent problem to those managing the defence and security sector in Nigeria. The issue needs to be studied as part of the larger strategy of making Nigeria a safer country. The proposed study seeks to make a contribution to this process. The work would take a critical look at how gaps in Nigeria's access to relevant information technology weakens the operationalization of its NDP as evident in the problems faced in managing the NDM crisis, BH crisis, Fulani Herdsmen crisis, and cyber crimes in the country. What are the promises of NDP? Can they be realized with the present state of information technology in Nigeria?

2.10   Defence in Information Age

One issue that is evident in the national defence strategy and plans of nations now is increased need to rely on information technology for contending with the challenges of asymmetric conflicts they increasingly face. This is a logical consequence of the ongoing globalization of systems. The information revolution that accompanied globalization increased the significance of information in military capabilities and combat operations which made geographic boundaries to lose their importance to the extent that a problem in one part of the world can be easily shifted to some other parts of the world. There is also the blurring of boundaries between one conventional political space and another. In his work that calls attention to the crucial issue of new threats and risks associated with the information society, Dunn called attention to the terminology "information age conflicts" (IAC) (Dunn 2002). This has to do with the disorderly manner people exploit the modern information technology in conflict and peace. Spillman and Wenger (2002:5) in the preface to the book described IAC as having "substantial consequences for military affairs, politics, and society as a whole".

There is also what is called "information warfare" which several militaries, most especially in the developing parts of the world are still struggling to come to terms with. But as Waltz observed, it is a reality in the modern world. He said Information warfare is real. Information operations are being conducted in many places in the world today. While the world has not yet witnessed nor fully comprehended the implications of a global information war, it is now enduring an ongoing information competition with sporadic conflicts in the information domain." (Waltz 1998, 41) In an interesting paper written on this issue Erwin, Magnuson, Parsons and Tadideh (2012) called attention to the five intelligence forecasts provided to President Obama of the US by the Pentagon's research agencies and their contractors. These are biological weapons (most especially viruses), nukes (large stockpile of nuclear weapons), cyber-attacks, climate change and transnational crime. On cyber-attacks which is closely related to the interest of the present research on information age is said by the White House to be a two-edged sword as suggested by this statement from the US White House:

> The very technologies that empower us to lead and create also empower individual criminal hackers, organized criminal groups,

terrorist networks, and other advanced nations to disrupt the
critical infrastructure that is vital to our economy, commerce,
public safety, and military" (cited by Erwin, Magnuson, Parsons
and Tadideh 2012).

Having issues of information conflict or warfare addressed by the NDP of a country is
better done in the context of what is now emerging as "total defence". By this is meant
the involvement of both military and non-military actors in the management of defence
and security affairs that were hitherto considered to be the preserve of the military. All
actors in the multi-track framework must be part of the process. Commenting on how
to attain this goal, the NDP of Malaysia observed that:

> Total and integrated defence involves many government agencies,
> the private sector, NGOs and the citizenry in all circumstances.
> National defence is not the sole responsibility of the MAF but the
> responsibility of all levels of society. All parties should know the
> role and contribution that they could play in times of disaster and
> conflict...National defence has to be based on self-confidence and
> not depending on external parties. Within this context patriotism
> and nationalism among Malaysians always need to be nurtured
> and with the realisation that national prosperity and peace
> override individual needs and political ideology (Malaysia
> National Defence Policy n.d.,pp. l5-16).

2.11   Historical Contexts of Asymentric Conflicts in Nigeria

The first major assumption of this study, which was clearly established during the
fieldwork, is that this is the age of asymmetric conflict in the history of Nigeria. The
military commanders in the North East fighting Boko Haram and those that served or
are still serving in the Niger Delta blamed the prolong nature of their operations on this
fact of history. The general impression created is that the Nigerian military was not
built for this kind of operation. Constant reference to this period as that of asymmetric
warfare creates the valid impression in the minds of these military officers (as earlier
established in the literature review to this work) that there was a different era(s) in
Nigeria's history that Nigeria experienced conventional warfare.

Since when did Nigeria get into this level of insecurity: age of asymmetry warfare?
Existing knowledge shows that two others precede this "age". The first is the era of the
Nigerian civil war: from 1967 to 1970 and the second is the era of violent communal
conflicts which can be effectively dated since the 1970s to the present. What are the

peculiarities of these two other eras and how are they different from the situations reported in this chapter later? These questions are answered in the discussions that follow.

The Nigerian Civil War: The war lasted from July 6, 1967 – January 15, 1970). It was a conventional (and not an asymmetrical or unconventional) warfare (Heerten and Moses 2014). It was preceded by a number of poorly managed conflict issues: the January 1966 military coup championed by some Eastern Nigerian officers and in which most of the victims were Northern Nigerians; the counter coup of July 1966 championed by Northern Nigerian officers and the victims being Eastern Nigerians; then the anti-Igbo hysteria in the North; the migration of the southerners back to their homeland in the East, and then the declaration of the civil war by Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, a military officer, on May 30, 1967. The key complaint of the Biafrans was that the widespread killings that took place in Northern Nigeria from 1966 to 1967 indicated that their people were not needed in Nigeria. They therefore seceded to have their own country named "Biafra". Nigeria fought back to unite the nation.

There were several issues with the Nigerian civil war. But they were not so strategically significant as to have made Nigeria to have a National Defence Policy (NDP) until 2006 when the regime of President Olusegun Obasanjo decided to give the country one. Hence, when the book *Nigerian Defence Policy: Issues and Problems* jointly edited by A.E. Ekoko and M.A. Vogt was published in 1990 it was not actually to celebrate any existing NDP. As Ekoto and Vogt observed in the introduction to the book:

> For several years after independence, the Nigerian armed forces operated without a formal statement of defence policy. While this is not a very serious omission as there are many countries that do not have a formal defence policy, the more serious problem lay in the absence of effective institutional structures for the formulation of strategic and tactical doctrines that were to inform the structure and use of the armed forces. Some of these problems were addressed during the Nigerian civil war – an experience which can be described as the baptism of fire for the armed forces of independent Nigeria (Ekoko and Vogt 1990:xv).

It seems that Nigeria did not have a NNDP until 2006 largely because the country was under military rule until 1999. The military rulers did not consider it necessary to have a formalized system of defending the country beyond their whims and caprices that served as state policies. A defence policy would also talk about sharing of power between the military and civil authority in defending a country. The Nigerian military was not ready for this until the idea of a NDP was forced on them in 2006. However, the issues addressed in the 2006 document seemed to have been more towards strengthening the subordination of the military to civil authority than dealing with issues of asymmetric conflict as the present study seeks to do.

The second era that preceded that of "asymmetric conflict" is that of communal conflicts across the land. They were not asymmetric in nature but points of disagreement between ethnic and political neighbours over ownership of life sustaining resources such as land, and pasture (see Otite and Albert 1999; Nnoli 2003; Albert 2012). The Niger Delta crisis also occurred at small scale until the extra judicial execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and a few other Ogoni leaders in 1995. Several of these conflicts, most especially the Ife-Modakeke and Warri crises, have relatively died out as a result of various intervention programmes by the British and American governments (see Uwazie, Albert and Uzoigwe1999; Albert 2001, 2007, and 2012). All of these crises have patterns that could be easily understood. The parties could be identified by their ethnic or religious identities and claims. The conflict issues were not difficult to understand and the conflict parties did not resort to any act of terrorism, as we are later to witness in the case of the asymmetric conflicts later to be discussed here.

2.12   From Conventional to Asymmetric Conflict

Following the above-mentioned historic phases in the evolution of violent conflicts in Nigeria is today's "era of asymmetric conflict" which the present study focuses upon. Addressing the nature of this problem requires first and foremost that light is shed on why Nigeria is said to be in an "age of asymmetric conflict" in the study. What constitutes asymmetric conflict? This question was generally answered at the literature review section of this study (chapter two). There is the need to add more flesh to this definition with a view to guiding readers to the findings of the study. An asymmetric conflict is a violent conflict in which there is relative power imbalance between the

belligerents. In practice, it is a form of war between a professionally trained standing army and an insurgent or resistance movement. In this kind of violent conflict, the belligerents seek to win by exploiting the characteristic shortcomings of each other. It is also called unconventional or guerrilla warfare in the sense that the belligerents have to use different types of unusual militarized and non-militarized methods as they seek to get rid of each other.

A good way of establishing how asymmetric conflict is different from conventional warfare is to compare the characteristics of the ongoing Boko Haram crisis and the Nigerian civil war (1967 to 1970). The latter was between Nigeria and Biafra (the former Eastern Nigeria). In other words, the issues in the Nigerian civil war were clearly political and not too difficult for anybody to understand. The battle was between Nigeria and the Biafrans. The latter sought to exit from the Nigerian state having carved the area coloured light yellow below for themselves:

Fig. 1: Map of Nigeria showing Biafra

Source: By Eric Gaba (Sting - fr:Sting) - Own work Background map: NGDC GSHHS and WDBII dataBiafra independent state borders reference maps: UN, Matthew White, Otvaga2004, Travel-Image (originally a CIA map ?), Biafraland and MSN Encarta, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1454719

In other words, in such a conventional war, the war objectives were very clear: for the Biafra to become an independent country and for the Biafra to expand their territories by capturing some parts of Nigeria. It was also not difficult to identify the fighting forces from the two sides. The boundaries between Nigeria and Biafra were also clearly known as expected of any conventional warfare. The battles took place at the borderlines: Enugu axis to the North, Ikom/Calabar to the South, Owerri/Onitsha towards the West. The Biafrans were worsted when they tried to extend their territories to the West (to capture Lagos) through Benin and Ore (Source). The soldiers on the two sides were also not difficult to identify. While the Nigerian army was dressed in green of different make, the Igbo also wore their own kind of green uniform but with the Biafra emblem of a horizontal tricolour of red, black, and green, charged with a golden rising sun over a golden bar as evident below:

Fig. 2: Flag of Biafra

Source:

https://www.google.com/search?q=colour+of+the+biafran+flag&client=safari&channel=iphone

As shown above, the Biafrans had their currency; a National Anthem and a small but effective Air Force whose early inventory included two B-25 Mitchells, two B-26 Invaders, a converted DC-3 and one Dove. Chude Sokey and later Godwin Ezeilo commanded the Biafra Air Force. Both were trained with the Royal Canadian Air Force. In other words, the Biafrans struggled as much as they could to become a sovereign state to be recognized by the international community as a country. Indeed, some countries supported them. The list of countries that recognized Biafra included Gabon, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Zambia. The following did not formally recognize Biafra but provided it support and assistance: Israel, France, Spain, Portugal, Norway,Rhodesia, South Africa and the Vatican City. All of these features manifest in conventional warfare as different from asymmetric or unconventional warfare.

Fig 3: The Biafan Currency

Source: Ikem Nkekere, "10 Things You Should Know About Biafra And The Biafran War", https://www.naija.ng/629644-10-things-need-know-biafra-biafran-war.html#629644

In asymmetric conflict, state forces are often pitched against non-state armed groups lacking in the kind of political and military features described of the Biafrans above. The battle is not in a definite location; it could occur anywhere as the insurgents are often mixed with civilian populations. It is easily noticeable for example that though the BH crisis is located in the North eastern part of Nigeria the insurgents successfully struck outside this area. They attacked Abuja, Jos, Kaduna, and Kano several times. It has been a war with no borders. That is characteristic of an asymmetric conflict. This makes the battle more difficult than the conventional ones to manage and partly explains why it has taken the Nigerian military so long to end the crisis.

Since one of the belligerents (the insurgents) are not uniformed, they are difficult to identify amongst the civilian population and could be anywhere outside the conflict zone. The conflict between such groups and the government are considered asymmetric because they often prove difficult to defeat and could sometimes be said to be strong than government forces as a result of their evasiveness.

In other words, the term "age of asymmetric conflict" used in this paper suggests that Nigeria is competing for military power and influence with the likes of BH and NDM and that the country cannot claim to be the stronger party. Indeed, Nigeria is assumed to be the weaker party in the encounter. Two situations can be easily cited for reaching this conclusion. The country's inability to defeat BH since 2009 it resorted to terrorist tactics and the NDM despite the amnesty granted to them in 2009 is the first indicator of this problem. The second is how the country constantly seeks external support to fight the insurgents. Is this not an oxymoron given the elements of state power that Nigeria is normatively believed to have as a sovereign entity? What makes Nigeria so weak and the insurgents so powerful? Until these questions are answered it is difficult to imagine how the NDP can be made to work in this study.

What are Nigeria's elements of state power? What are the sources of insurgents powers? How does the clash of power between the Nigerian state and insurgents challenge the implementation of the NNDP? There are several existing literature on elements of state power. This study would adopt the position of John R. Mills who in

2006 called attention to the following four key elements of state power: diplomatic, economic, informational and military (Mills 2006). The diplomatic element of state power refers to the sovereign rights of a state in terms of the control over its geographic borders and the rights to negotiate with other nations bilaterally or multilaterally on anything having to do with its national interest. The economic has to do with the economic status of a state and the rights such a country has to decide on the allocation of these resources through monetary policies, money supply and interest rates, and trade agreements. The informational element of state power encapsulates the power of the government to control the ownership and access to all forms of information necessary for state security. It includes the capacity of the government to effectively communicate it's intent and views with a view to winning public support most especially in moments of crises and emergencies. The military element of state power is often the best known and resourced. It revolves around the capacity of a state to monopolize the control of the coercive instruments of the state: control over security agencies, supply of arms in the society, and ability to make laws on the use of force to bring about orderly structuring of the society.

The government is the only one considered to have the right to control these four elements of state power. Subversion or rebellion is alleged when a non-state actor seeks to take over any of these responsibilities from the state. It is in this respect that non-state armed groups come on collision path with the state. They seek to do and even replace the state in carrying out these basic duties of the state. Different insurgents groups have different agendas. Hence, it is necessary to halt here a little to consider the types of insurgent groups that a state might be encountering. There are different ways of categorizing insurgents. The most relevant to the present study is to categorize them according to their objectives. In this respect, five broad types of insurgent movements can be identified. The first are "*revolutionary insurgents*". They seek to overthrow and replace the existing political order in the society most especially by creating new social and economic structures considered to be more altruistic. The problem with this category of insurgents is their belief that they know what the people want and can easily speak for them. The second category is *reformist insurgents*. Unlike the revolutionary insurgents, they do not seek to take over the government but try to compel the government to change its policies or undertake the kind of reforms that would make the society move in a predetermined direction. The third category of

insurgents, the *separatist* type, seeks to exit from a state and create its own from the existing national boundaries and by so doing come on collision path with a government not willing to compromise its sovereignty and borders. *Resistance insurgents*, which is the fourth category, simply seeks to force an occupying force to leave a given territory that was once independent of these external forces. The last is the *commercialist insurgents*. They engaged in insurgencies for pecuniary benefits: to acquire wealth and material benefits (US Government 2012).

Lacking the basic elements of state power, what insurgents do is to create situations of asymmetric conflict by subverting state power by seeking to:

- Undercut the ability of the government to provide the population security and public services, including utilities, education, and justice. An insurgent group may attempt to supplant the government by providing alternative services to the people, or it may be content to portray the government as impotent.
- Obtain the active or passive support of the population. Not all support has to be or is likely to be—gained from true sympathizers; fear and intimidation can gain the acquiescence of many people.
- Provoke the government into committing abuses that drive neutral civilians toward the insurgents and solidify the loyalty of insurgent supporters.
- Undermine international support for the government and, if possible, gain international recognition or assistance for the insurgency (US Government 2012:2).

A government that enables insurgent movements to attain the above objectives empowers them and cast the relationship with the insurgents in an asymmetric mould.

2.13 Theoretical Framework
Raymond Aaron's Peace and War Theory
Peace and war today provide the framework for the unfolding problems in the social order (Thompson, 1968).War situations characterising events in the international political system which propels states to take their strategic needs into account and programmes in order to prevent being victims of both international politics and

internally orchestrated challenge to a country's sovereignty and national interest. This is a theory that recognises the strategic position of states in the international political system to determine their power and protect their territories with all resources at their disposal to ensure they diplomatically engage with other states and engender the enthronement of social peace and national cohesion that is germane to the actualisation of collective goals and socio-economic development of the state. This explains why the author of the theory is of the view that the objectives that preoccupy states actions are centred on security priorities and power in a bid to sustain relevance and influence (Frost, 1996).

With the reality of conflict both at the international and national levels and fact of globalisation and interdependence of states, states are forced to engage with other states in order to promote relations that are supportive of peaceful coexistence within and without. This, undoubtedly, inform Nigeria's spearheading collaborations and partnerships through the Lake Chad Basin Commission member states and the MNJTF, ECOMOG and African Union.

This theory addresses two key important issues – the actions of states and their policy decisions.

With war serving as instrument of policy, compromise is seen as less heroic, but rational and more humane than victory (Wright, 1968). Using the United States as an example, the author recognises the possibility of acquiring more weapons for the prosecution of limited wars and in order to stabilise mutual deterrence at strategic level (Morgenthau, 1967), although the tactical and operational levels of combat must not be ignored in this regard. In other words, it is believed that the ability of states to acquire more weapons could secure them and deter others from threatening them while diplomatically engaging with their rivals to achieve peace.

This theory is relevant to the thesis because Nigeria's National Defense Policy both at the level of its emergence and subsequent reviews was influenced by the reality of war in both international relations and national and group interactions and the imperative of peace to the actualisation of national interest. In line with the position of Raymond Aaron's Peace and War Theory, Nigerian state in its battle with Boko Haram and other security challenges is deploying all diplomatic and strategic resources for the

achievement of the country's national security. The point is that the Nigeria's National Defence Policy, broadly speaking, recognises the reality of war and peace as constitutive elements of both local and international relations.

The essence of a nation's national defence policy can be futher understood from the the letters of the National Defence Policy of Malaysia. Like every NDPs, that of Malaysia defines the national interests of the country to be protected; commits itself to defending these interests on the land, air and waterways and yet observed the need to be strategically positioned for responding to the security challenges in East Asia, South Asia and South East Asia. These notwithstanding, the NDP concludes that:

> Malaysia renounces the use of threat and application of force as a means of settling international conflict and advocates and practice the peaceful resolution of disputes. The National Defence Policy illustrates this through the adoption of a defence strategy based on bilateral and multilateral defence diplomacy achieved through regional and international cooperation. In line with this philosophy Malaysia fully supports the efforts of the United Nations and the international community in preserving universal peace and security. As a member of the international community Malaysia has a moral responsibility and duty to ensure a just, social and economic world order (Malaysia National Defence Policy, n.d. p. l).

At this juncture, it must be pointed out that the relevance of Raymond Aaron's Peace and War Theory as the framework that undergird this study cannot be overemphasized. The theory encapsulates the purposes for which a national defence policy is fashioned and implemented. And the Nigeria's National Defence Policy is not an exception.

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0   Preamble

In this chapter, the methodology used for this study is discussed using the following sub-headings: Design, Population, Sample and Sampling Procedure, Instruments of Data Collection, Procedure of Data Collection, and Data Analysis. From the foregoing, the methodology is therefore the compass through which the study would be investigated.

This research is fundamentally qualitative in nature. The choice of a qualitative approach is informed by numerous reasons some of which will be briefly discussed hereafter. One of this is that a qualitative research study is more of description and relies heavily on the perspective of the participants in the study. Unlike the quantitative approach, a qualitative approach tends to illuminate the understanding and experience for others without the trap of generalizing on it (Silverman, 2016). Boejie (2009) succinctly gave the inherent features of a qualitative study through which the challenges of implementing NNDP as well as getting deeper into understanding the context of 'asymmetric conflict' can be fully explained and discussed. These features include the following:

- Qualitative approach is descriptive in nature.
- Qualitative methodology employs inductive analysis of data.
- Qualitative methodology tends to be more focused on the experience and perspective of the participants.
- Qualitative research also appears to give more emphasis on the process rather than just the result or outcome of the study.

- Qualitative research has an actual setting used as direct source of data for the study.

Furthermore, Flick (2014) submits that qualitative reports are typically not represented through statistics summation but rather in a descriptive manner.

3.1 Research Design

The study employed explorative and descriptive research designs. The adoption means that the researcher would not venture to manipulate the variables of the study. This is because their occurences would predate the period of the field work.

3.2 Study Population

The issues covered by this study are only known to those vast in the knowledge of security management: most especially the political leaders responsible for framing defence and security policies, agents of military and para military organisations responsible for implementing the defence and security policies, and the Nigerian populace that are the end users of the security policies. To that extent the study population are members of the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Navy, the Nigerian Air Force, the intelligence and security communities whose responsibility is to protect the territorial integrity and the nation's national security. The study population also include civil society and the relevant arms of the government of the Nigerian state - the executive, the National Assembly who exercise oversight functions and make laws for the good governance of the nation.

3.3 Sample Population

In qualitative approach, there are numerous sampling strategies being employed. Yet, this approach appears to lean on employing purposive type of sampling. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000) "purposive sampling is applied as a sampling strategy when the researcher needs to gain an understanding of something from a select case without the requirement of making any generalization from the other cases". Whereas, in sampling size, there is no strict rule on its number (Hennink et al., 2010). This fundamentally depends on the time available and on what the researcher needs to know.

In this regard, the number to be included in the focus group discussion are about 70 individuals from the Nigeria's military hierarchy. The researcher believes that this sample population is good enough to expand and gain understanding on the challenges of implementing the NNDP, by the professionals whose duty is to address the developing issue of "asymmetric conflict". Furthermore, in the semi-structured interviews, the researcher interviewed about 6 selected individuals from different sectors that are associated with the formulation, review, and implementation process of the NNDP. Such selected individuals include intellectuals familiar with the framing and implementation of NDPs; individuals involved in the framing of NNDP; Senior military officers who are the operational actors in the implementation of the NNDP; and members of the public who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the implementation of the NNDP.

3.4 Sampling Techniques and Sample Size

Purposive sampling techniques were employed in selecting the representatives of the population. It must be observed that this method is used because of the complex and technical nature of topic of study. Knowlegeable individuals as clearly stated in the sample population were carefully selected to ensure that their opinions were truly representative of the study population.

3.5   Sources of Data

According to Tracy (2012) data collection is a vocabulary employed in order to describe the procedure of collecting, and analyzing data so collected. In this regard, primary and secondary sources of data collection were employed for the study. The primary data were collected through (1) six key informant interviews (KIIs). These are two academics who are versed in defence policy, two top military officers who were thearter commanders, one of the drafters of the NDP and a defence policy analyst. (2) Four focus group discussions (FDGs) held with senior military officers in the office of the Chief of Defence Staff and the National Defence College (NDC), Abuja. (3) In-depth Interviews (IDIs) conducted with community leaders in the North-East and the Niger Delta regions where the NDP was actually put to test. On the other hand, secondary data consisted of relevant books on defence and security studies, journals, internet materials, conference papers, monographs, newspapers/magazines and relevant government documents on defence and security. The choice of primary and

secondary data collection sources enabled the researcher to cover a wide variety of lived experiences of participants in the research data collection process and from written and documented works of scholars in the field of research study. This is in concurrence with Cohen et al. (2000) who posit that employing various sources for generation of data enables varying responses from the participants when presented in a pragmatic and useful manner. This then strengthens the issue of trustworthiness of the research study. Furthermore, it also reinforces the idea that the several sources of information can pave way for a deeper understanding of the issue or phenomenon being investigated.

3.6 Procedure of Data Collection

Data were qualitatively obtained. In gathering the necessary data for this study, the researcher formally wrote to all the concerned organizations, especially the military establishment for permission to interview its key officials in the area of research interest. With the researcher's background in the military profession, it was not difficult to arrange dates of the interviews with the concerned officers. In the cases where the interviews seemed difficult due to tight schedules of the interviewees, the researcher used telephone and emails, depending on the appropriate channel agreed upon to conduct the interviews. During the interviews, the researcher made use of a voice recorder for the discussions. This was however, subject to the express permission and approval of the respondents. The recorded data were thereafter transcribed and used in writing the post-field reports. The researcher also sought the help of two research assistants to facilitate the gathering of the field data.

3.7 Instruments of Data Collection

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and In-depth Interviews (IDIs) were employed in gathering the primary data.

3.8 Method of Data Analysis

Gardner (2009) suggests that data analysis is fundamentally the interaction occurring between the data that have been collected and gathered by the researcher. He further implies that data analysis tends to be a balancing act between creativity and science in the aim of performing a study. The analysis of data is mainly employed in qualitative

approach wherein it is described as the procedure of inspecting, cleaning, transforming, and modeling of data with the objective of emphasizing on the idea of conclusions, and helpful information to decision-making.

Consequently, the data for the research work were content analysed using thematic, descriptive, and narrative styles. Furthermore, the researcher transcribed and coded data collected from the FGDs and KII by utilizing symbols to classify and present them using themes that emerged during the analysis procedure.

CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

In this chapter, the findings of the study are presented and critically discussed. For a logical flow of the ideas, it is necessary here to recall the core objective of the study and the research methods adopted. As earlier stated, the main goal of the work is to understand how the asymmetric nature of the conflicts experienced by Nigeria from 2006 to 2015 poses some challenges for the implementation of NNDP (2006). The Defence Policy was put in place in 2006 to make things easier for Nigeria as the country responds to the mounting security challenges around it. For unraveling this mystery, several existing publications, official documents and periodicals were consulted. Some prominent Nigerians and war commanders were interviewed. There were some elements of non-participant observation of the issues most especially in 2015 when the opportunity was provided to see a presidential panel constituted to review the 2006 defence policy of the country.

The data obtained from all these sources, having been analyzed, are presented and discussed in this chapter. The issues are discussed with reference to the three clearly established objectives that underline this study. They are : 1) to critically examine the 2006, 2015 and 2017 NNDP in relation to asymmetric conflict; 2) to examine the application of theNNDP in the containment of asymmetric conflict in the country; 3) to discuss the challenges of operationalizing the NNDP to address asymmetric conflict in Nigeria .

The discussion in this segment interrogated the 2006 NNDP and the subsequent reviews of the document which took place in 2015 and 2017 with a view to understanding its effectiveness in the management of the asymmetric conflict in the country.

Furthermore, application of the document in the management of asymmetric conflict and the challenges of operationalization of the NNDP would be critically examined with a view to understanding what can be done to strengthen its effectiveness in the containment of asymmetric conflict and promotion of peace and security in the country. The objectives of the study are hereby discussed one after the other.

4.1 To critically examine the 2006, 2015 and 2017 NNDP in relation to asymmetric conflict.

The two insurgent movements studied in this project are of different types. The NDM are basically reformist. Their main agenda is for the economic system in Nigeria to be restructured in a manner that would enable their region to totally control or derive more revenue from the oil resources extracted from their community (Ibeanu 1999; Olowononi 1999; Obi 1999, 2002). However, their insurgency strategies and tactics create the impression that they are also separatist, resistant and even commercialist.

They are separatist in the sense of sometimes pursuing the ambition of being separated from Nigeria. One of their goals is to have a Niger Delta Republic. Indeed, the Niger Delta people were the first to attempt secession from the federal republic of Nigeria. The first attempt happened on February 23, 1966, when a 27-year old former police inspector Isaac Adaka Boro assisted by 159 others formed the Niger Delta Peoples' Volunteer Force (NDPVF) which he intended to use to wrestle his people from what he considered an unstable Nigerian system that had sidelined his people in the grand scheme of things. This happened just for 40 days after the first military coup in the history of Nigeria: January 15, 1966. In his secessionist speech, which must have drawn inspiration from the speech delivered by Major Kaduna Nzeogwu during the January coup Boro observed:

> Today is a great day, not only in your lives but also in the history of the Niger Delta. Perhaps, it will be the greatest day for a very long time. This is not because we are going to bring the heavens down, but because we are going to demonstrate to the world what and how we feel about oppression… Remember your 70-year-old grandmother who still farms before she eats; remember also your poverty-stricken people; remember, too, your petroleum which is being pumped out

daily from your veins; and then fight for your freedom (cited by Tayo 2017).

The rebellion did not last more than two weeks before it was crushed. Boro got arrested and narrowly missed being executed by luck. He was drafted from detention by General Yakubu Gowon to fight against Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. He performed brilliantly but was killed in a mysterious manner. However, his exploits remain a reference point and a source of inspiration to the several militant movements that mushroomed in the Niger Delta most especially since the 1999 transition to civil rule in Nigeria.

The militant groups resisted the oil companies in their communities and fought the Nigerian security operatives sent by the federal and state governments to protect these firms. At a stage in the Niger Delta crisis, the militant groups started to ask for secession from the Nigerian state. From time to time, they asked the oil companies in their region to leave. The latest of such declarations was made by the Adaka Boro Avengers" in August 2017. They gave the oil companies in the Niger Delta to vacate the region before October 1, 2017 when the region would have become a Niger Delta Republic. In statement issued on July 30, the spokesperson of the group, Edmos Ayayeibo, said:

> The October 1 declaration of a republic in the Niger Delta is sacrosanct because Nigeria has lost its unity. To save lives on both sides, the Nigerian government should maintain peace, compose themselves or face total war… We are also using this medium to call on all the multinational corporations to leave the region in their own interests and peace; because their continued stay in the region has not done any good to the people of the Niger Delta… Also to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), kindly withdraw your oil survey teams and your technical workers from our communities, while the tension in the region is boiling up…Failure to adhere to these warnings, we shall leave no stone unturned. Because all Avengers groups in the region are united now and our new focus is on any multinational corporations and any NNPC infrastructures, especially the pipelines and NNPC filling stations across the country (Opejobi 2017).

Each of the armed groups in the Niger Delta equally issues similar threats on excising the Niger Delta region from Nigeria. The following are some of the militant groups:

Table 1: Select Militant Groups Operating in the Niger Delta

Group	Description	Activities
Egbesu Boys of Africa	Militant arm of the Ijaw Youth Council Seeks justice and equity for the oil-bearing Ijaw communities in the Niger Delta ☐Not a cohesive militant movement; members are active in other groups	Egbesu involvement in Ijaw-Itsekiri (Delta); kidnappings attacks installations. conflicts various and on oil
Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Forces (NDPVF)	Led by Mujahedeed Asari Dokubo Founded in 2003 Members mainly Ijaw Demands more control over resources for the Niger Delta states ☐☐Modelled on Isaac Boro's Niger Delta Volunteer Force (1966)	Declared all-out wars vs. Nigerian government in 2004 and was subsequently outlawed; violent confrontation with NDV mid-2003 to late 2004; kidnappings and attacks
Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV)	Led by Ateke Tom Members mainly Ijaw	Violent confrontation with NDPVF mid-2003 to late 2004; kidnappings and attacks
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)	Emerged December 2005 Close links to NDPVF Demands: 100% control of oil wealth; release of Dokubo;	Many of the recent hostage tasking and attacks on oil facilities; armed clashes with security forces between 2005 and January 2006.

	release of Alamieyeseigha	
	☐☐Elusive leadership; Jomo Gbomo communicates with media via email	

Sources: Sesay et al 2003 and ICG 2006b

The point made above which could be re-emphasized is that the militants are separatist when they seek to exit from the Nigerian state by becoming an independent nation. They equally look like a resistant movement each time they fight the security agencies protecting oil facilities and oil workers in their region. They perceive the security agents in their communities as occupier forces of a sovereign community (Osaghae 1995; Dokubo 2004; Saro Wiwa 1993; Ekanem 2000; Ekine 2001; Ikelegbe 2005). The militants also engage in kidnapping and hostage taking for making money. This casts them in the mould of commercialist insurgency movements. By combining all these elements of insurgency, the Niger Delta militants drag Nigeria into what could be called asymmetric conflict requiring multidimensional management. This is because the security management strategies for a revolutionary insurgency is not necessarily the same as that of separatist, resistant or commercialist insurgencies.

However, it is easier to locate and explain what the Niger Delta militants represent than explain what the insurgency of the Boko Haram is all about. By claiming to be interested in overthrowing the present system in Nigeria and making the country an Islamic state, it could be said to be a revolutionary and separatist insurgency movement. However, it has been difficult to see how the group seeks to attain this objective. For attaining its objectives, the insurgents at the initial stage of the insurgency (most especially from 2009 to 2010), focused on attacking Churches and critical state infrastructure. In 2011, it attacked the United Nations building in Abuja. But subsequently, it started to attack mosques, Muslims and Islamic leaders.

Having established that both the Boko Haram insurgents and the Niger Delta militants in the prosecution of their asymmetric warfare against the Nigerian State inflicted enomous damage on the country both in terms of human and material, the obvious implication and perhaps conclusion that could be drawn would be to argue that the NNDP that evolved in 2006 was grossly inadequate in terms of serving as a framework for managing asymmetric conflict. In other words, the 2006 NNDP was more a document targeted at managing conventional rather than asymmetric warfare. The realization of the fact that the 2006 NNDP was deficient in terms of addressing asymmetric conflict necessitated the reviews of the document in 2015 and 2017. Indeed, the 2015 and 2017 reviews of the 2006 NNDP contained strategies for dealing with asymmetric conflict exemplified in the nation's battle with the Boko Haram

insurgents in the North-east and the Niger Delta militants in the south-south of the country.

4.2 To examine the application of the NNDP in the containment of asymmetric conflict.

What makes both the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram a great threat to Nigeria's security system is probably not what they seek to achieve but their insurgency strategies for attaining them. Both of them seek to supplant the present system in Nigeria by creating a country in which they would dominate the others. The Niger Delta militants seek a Nigerian society where they would have the highest dividends if not totally control the oil wealth in the country. On the other hand, Boko Haram works towards a Nigerian society managed according to their own kind of Islamic principles.

Both the Niger Delta and Boko Haram militants use several strategies for attaining their goals. Three of these are very salient: (i) violent extremism, including kidnapping, leading to thousands of deaths and displacement of millions of people even across the international borders as witnessed in the case of Boko Haram crisis (ii) excellent use of information technology for coordinating their activities and demonizing the Nigerian state. The latter combines with the former in making the war against Nigeria an asymmetric situation. It explains the prolong nature of the violent conflicts.

What is the nature of the violent extremism and how does it play out in both cases? What is the level of asymmetric strategic communication and how does it play out? The military and strategic communication methods weakened the ability of the Nigerian state to assert, project, and protect its diplomatic, economic, informational, and military elements of state power. The third problem is the support the insurgents get from outside Nigeria and the problems Nigeria faces in some cases in getting requisite support for fighting the insurgents. These have to be explained more carefully before posing them as challenges for the implementation of the NNDP 2006.

4.2.1 *Niger Delta Crisis:* The insurgency strategies of the Niger Delta militants include blowing up of oil pipelines, taking of oil flow stations and holding the oil workers captive until ransoms are paid or some political demands are met. The

militants also engage the Nigerian military (most especially the army) in open gun battles that end up devastating many communities in the Niger Delta. Their success in engaging the Nigerian military is actively supported by arms smuggling (Okeke-Uzodike and Ojakorotu 2006; Badmus 2010; Anyakwee 2005), which thrives in the waterways of the Niger Delta most especially in the open sea. Illegal oil bunkering and establishment of illegal oil refineries enabled the militants to raise money to continue their struggle.

All of this weakens the effective control of Nigeria's waterways as the militants engage in different forms of sea crime activities. The attacks on oil pipelines, flow stations and oil workers limit the revenue accruable to the Nigerian state from oil (Omotola 2006). In other words, the activities of the Niger Delta militants compromise elements of Nigeria's diplomatic, economic, and even military powers. The capacity of Nigeria to collect actionable intelligence in the Niger Delta was also negatively affected by the fact that the militants often work in collaboration with their communities who share in why they engage in violence. Hence, it has been difficult for the Nigerian state to get the full support of the local communities in managing the youth violence in the region.

4.2.2 *Boko Haram*: What are the insurgency strategies of the BH? BH attacks both soft and hard targets to attain different objectives. The hard targets such as military barracks, police headquarters, highly fortified police formation are meant for demystifying the Nigerian state and enabling the civilian population to believe that the government cannot protect them ((Uzodike, 2012: 91). The attacks of security formation are also to take the battle to these agencies most especially for reducing their chances of convincing the people that they have any power to protect. It is also for taking arms when they run out of supplies.

On the other hand, the soft targets are to gain access to food and other essential supplies; intimidating the civilian population to put government under pressure to negotiate with the group. These attacks include sniper gun attacks, and suicide bombing of individuals, Churches, Mosques, newspaper offices, and public buildings (Uzodike 2012:3). BH is also known for kidnapping innocent school girls. Such kidnappings took place at Chibok in 2014. Government was forced to pay some

ransoms for the release of the girls. Boko Haram also kill women, children and foreigners with reckless abandon (HRW, 2012 and Agbiboa, 2013). All of these are done to achieve two objectives. The first is to further put the government under pressure to negotiate with the insurgents either for finding solutions to the conflict or forcing them to pay ransoms needed for continuing the struggle. Hence, the lesson of the abduction is not only that some innocent girls were taken and probably sexually abused but that the Nigerian state was forced to "negotiate with terrorists". A national defence policy must revisit such issue.

4.2.3 Nature of the Asymmetry Conflicts

The NNDP enumerates the risks and challenges inherent in Nigeria's Defence Strategy (protection of national interests, technological development, human dignity, domestic and regional peace, protection of culture, stability of government, economy – local and global). Laudable as this may seem, the Nigerian Armed Forces have not been able to translate the contents of the document to overcome their war against the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria. What actually are the problems and what are the issues?

It is necessary to observe here that a NDP is a means to an end; it is not an end in itself. It is a piece of policy document spelling out in general terms how a country seeks to respond to its defence challenges. The document could have been produced by the best set of professionals in the world. They are not those to translate it to actionable defence management. The point must also be made that the document does not necessarily spell out in totality how most of the objectives in the policy documents would be achieved. Hence, the usual practice is for countries having a NDP to also have a National Defence Strategy (NDS), which provides more detailed information about how set security objectives are to be achieved.

But this too would not provide all the mission. This was succinctly captured by Tar and Alade. Hence, every security management mission must have its terms of reference and rules of engagement, which those commanding the operation would have to use their own initiative to achieve. Until the September 11, 2001 bombing of the United States of America, most NDPs around the world were written with the

conventional warfare mindset. Several countries are now reviewing their NDPs to capture the reality of the asymmetric conflicts that now prevails around the world.

A key feature of the asymmetric nature of the two conflicts in the present study is that first and foremost both the Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram actually carved some areas for themselves in Nigeria and by so doing directly challenged Nigeria's ability to effectively control its borders. Even now, the Niger Delta control the creeks in the region than the Nigerian state. Several oil pipelines pass through this environment which the militants attack any time it pleases them. Some of them hide in the creeks having offended the Nigerian state and it is often difficult to find them as the government is now facing locating the whereabouts of Tompolo, one of the militant leaders in the region.

Thus, the areas controlled by the NDM and BH in Nigeria is vast. The militants dictate the security of the Niger Delta region since the formation of the MEND in 2005. The three regimes in Nigeria from this period up to 2015 when President Goodluck Jonathan left office could not stamp up the problem. President Umar Yar'Adua tried to placate the militants in 2009 by starting an ongoing amnesty programme. But the problems in the region are yet to end and it has been difficult for the Nigerian military to fully defeat the militants.

In an attempt to assess and understand the role of this amnesty program on the activities of NDM, some participants of the Course 26 2018 from the NDC Abuja, believe that the program has positively impacted on the activities of the militant group. This is because they believe that the program has brought significant reduction in the restiveness of the youths in the area, reduced attacks on the oil pipelines, and led to the disarmament of some of the militants. Thus, the relative peace being enjoyed in the region as reflected in the oil production output in recent time. Furthermore, some of the participants observe that the amnesty program made militant activities unattractive because of the inherent opportunities for the ex-militants to be trained both at home and abroad on different skills thereby making them to be self-employed and self-reliant.

The situation in the North East is neither different. It has been difficult for the government to defeat BH despite its supposed "elements of state power". Why and how does this question the potency of the implementation of the NDP 2006?

In the course of this research, three core factors were found to be responsible for the resilience of the insurgents in the Niger Delta and the North East. Students of NNDP must carefully consider these. First and foremost, the insurgents brought themselves to limelight and partly sustain their insurgency by keying into some existing local grievances. In the Niger Delta, there is a widespread condemnation of how oil companies pollute the people's land to the extent that farming; fishing and hunting are difficult in the area. This provides the insurgents very robust local support and reduces the readiness of the people to cooperate with the government to defeat the militants. Similarly, the BH crisis in the North East derived its initial legitimacy from the popular quest for the practice of Sharia in Northern Nigeria. Nigeria has consistently found it difficult to formally respond to this issue. A number of northern Nigerian Governors subscribed to the practice of Shariah in their states - starting with Zamfara in 2000. However, these Governors were not truly committed to the project. They simply used it to win the popular votes of the people and then withdrew from practicing the policy. This seemed to have added to the level of frustrations in various parts of northern Nigeria today. Hence, Yusuf was actually riding upon a popular quest when he asked that Nigeria should become an Islamic state. The only point of disagreement is that the system should be based on his own kind of controversial ideology, called Islamic religion.

Combined with this quest for establishing an Islamic state is the high level of poverty, frustration and state failure in the North East where Mohammed Yusuf the founder of the movement did his missionary work leading to the present crisis situation. This enabled Yusuf to swim with social currents very easily to the extent that he did not face any major problem in recruiting members when the time came for it to start defying the Nigerian state. Poverty further attracted fighters to the organization when it changed its tactics to full terrorism in 2010. Commenting on the situations put in place by Yusuf as early as 2008, Andrew Walker in his widely cited book, 'Eat the heart of the infidel: The harrowing of Nigeria and the rise of Boko Haram" observed that:

By the end of 2008 the group was operating like 'a state within a state', they had their own institutions like a shura' council that made decisions and a religious police who enforced discipline. They had rudimentary welfare system, offered jobs working the land they had acquired in Bauchi and they even gave microfinance loans to members to start entrepreneurial endeavours. Many used the money to buy motorcycles and worked as achaba. The group also arranged marriage between members, which many of the poorest could not afford in normal life…and the community grew as it pulled in the needy (Walker 2016: 152).

The point made here is that state abandonment of the people enabled Yusuf to have the right kind of followership. Several young people joined the militant groups in the Niger Delta for same reason. Many of the boys are unemployed. Some parents cannot fend for their wards having been retrenched from the agricultural vocations by the pollution of their land by oil prospecting activities. How should a NDP respond to this kind of issue aside from recommending how to build the armed forces and get them ready for defending the nation?

The NDM and BH members are made strong by their easy access to weapons. Their supplies come from three lines: (i) arms acquired by them through supporters and money made from extortionate terrorism including bank robberies (Walker 2016); (ii) arms taken by raiding police stations and military formations and (iii) locally made weapons, most especially improvised explosive devices. The quantum of these weapons enables BH to be able to engage the Nigerian military in long drawn battles. In the Niger Delta, the militants had all forms of illegal weapons smuggled to them through the sea. The suppliers are believed to be oil thieves from different parts of the world who need the support of the militants for successful running their business.

Both insurgent groups have access to and actionably used the information technology against the Nigerian state. The NDM used IT to coordinate their operations. For example, MEND had a public relations officer that was popularly known in the media as Jomo Gbomo. He sent several threat letters through e-mails posted to Nigerian media houses and the military. In the process, MEND was on top of the information warfare in the Niger Delta crisis until the 2009 amnesty programme when some MEND leaders decided to give out the identity of the person using the code name "Jomo Gbomo" and how he operated. On the other hand, there was noticeably poor use

of military IT to match those of the armed groups. This leaves a major poser for students of NDP: "What strategic role should satellite telephones, GIS and cable television channels play in the contemporary security challenges to the armed forces in Nigeria most especially in stemming the increasing terrorist activities in Nigeria?"

The asymmetric nature of the encounter between the Nigerian state on the one hand and the NDM and the BH on the other hand is that whereas the Nigerian forces were trained to fight conventional wars using legitimate weapons, showing respect for principles of war and laws of armed conflict, the non-state armed groups they encountered engaged in unconventional war methods as evident in the other parts of the contemporary world (Barnett 2008:20). Whether in the urban or rural spaces, they fight in a manner leading to heavy civilian casualties. They mix with the civilian population and taking advantage of this opportunity launch their attacks on soft targets believing that state responses would result in heavy collateral damage that ends up demonizing the state (Alexander and Keiger 2002: 9). They take strategic advantage of local geographical features such as rivers, mountains, forests and the like. Hence, in the Niger Delta, the militants attack oil companies and the Nigerian military and retreat to the creeks to hide themselves. In the North east, the Boko Haram have become experts of keep safe by hiding in Sambisa and a few other forests in the region.

4.3. To discuss the challenges of operationalizing the NNDP to address asymmetric conflict in Nigeria

A careful study of the letters of NNDP 2006 shows that it is based on the belief that the country has its basic element of state intact. In other words, anybody confronting the country militarily must first contend with that fact. The truth on the other hand is that since 2006 that the NNDP was put in place, the basic elements of state (the diplomatic, economic, informational, and military) in Nigeria have been gradually eroded: making the security challenges of the country more asymmetric than otherwise. The problem came to a head starting from 2010 when the BH sect resorted to the use of terror strategies in engaging the Nigerian state. By 2015, the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan had to constitute a presidential panel to review Nigeria's defence policy.

On a global scale, the history of asymmetric conflict could be said to have formally started with the bombing of the US on September 11, 2001. This was the first time an aircraft, commercial or military, was converted to a bomb for killing over 2000 people with the majority of the dead not inside the aircraft but in their respective offices in New York. No conventional military formation would ever venture into doing that: it can only be done by mindless bunch of terrorists. The US response to the attack also foregrounded how this kind of violent conflict should be dealt with unconventionally. The speech of President Bush on September 11 reflected his first reaction to the issues:

> Good evening. Today our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The victims were in airplanes or in their offices: secretaries, business men and women, military and Federal workers, moms and dads, friends and neighbors. Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror.
>
> The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet, unyielding anger. These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our Nation into chaos and retreat, but they have failed. Our country is strong. … These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve. America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining.
>
> Today our Nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature…The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them. … America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism….This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of us will ever forget this day. Yet, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world. ..Thank you. Good night, and God bless America (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58057).

President George Bush gave his second speech on September 11 event on September 20, 2001. The speech was delivered to a joint session of Congress in the following terms:

> On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country…Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen (emphasis mine).
> (Source: History Today,
> https://www.gilderlehrman.org/content/george-w-bush-911-attacks-2001)

Some salient issues and questions characteristic of asymmetric warfare and those engaged in them are marked in italics above. This was deliberately done to show how President George Bush struggled very hard in the speech to educate Americans and the rest of the world about the nature of asymmetric warfare and how to fight it. He said the war known to America was the one fought on foreign soil and not the September 11 type delivered to the US right inside its most popular city: New York. In the speech, the President made it very clear that though America had never fought such elements before, the people should be ready to collaborate with the government to fight back using all elements of state power at the disposal of the US and its allies.

The response of America to the September 11, 2001 attacks as clearly expressed in the speech of President George Bush did not as expected put the Nigerian State on alert on the possibility of asymmetric warfare in the country. Thus, when asymmetric conflict played out in Nigeria, operationalizing the NNDP to address asymmetric conflict encountered serious challenges. These include but not limited to issues below

I: Political considerations
4.3.1 Drafters of the NNDP: An actionable defence policy takes its lessons from both domestic and international security experiences and challenges. The drafters of the 2006 NNDP did not seem to have taken any critical lesson from the America's experience on September 11 by showing clearly that Nigeria, like the US and other members of the international community, is now in the age of asymmetric conflict as clearly articulated by President Bush above. Hence, Nigeria did not seem to have

budgeted for that kind of warfare or acquired requisite military equipment for it. This issue came up in the interview with General Richard Duru, who served in the Presidential Panel on the Review of Nigeria's Defence Policy in 2014 and 2015. According to him,

> The 2006 NNDP recognized the threats of international terrorism, and that current wars would be intra – state wars spurred mainly by ethnic and religious contradictions. Regrettably it failed to appreciate the threats of terrorism to Nigeria's national security…Thus, the drafters never envisioned the advent of Boko Haram Terrorism (BHT) and current counterinsurgency operations in the North East. It was indeed one of the several shortcomings in the analysis of our geo – strategic environment that includes domestic, regional and global security environment. The drafters and indeed the armed forces failed in one of its major contribution to the drafting of a defence policy, that of providing to the politicians a sound analysis/assessment of the prevailing security environment. This failure meant that the needed training on asymmetric warfare particularly on counter terrorism and counterinsurgency by armed forces was not carried out and the needed special forces a vital capability to counter terrorist and insurgent forces. The armed forces were thus ill prepared in training, Order of Battle (ORBAT), doctrine, equipment, manpower capacity to confront the BHT. On the Niger Delta Militants, the 2006 NNDP merely recognize the threat but failed to define the desired effect to address the situation. The main gaps include:
> Failure to predict the threat of terrorism, and BHT insurgency.
> Flawed drafting procedure, membership and citizens participation was limited and it was not driven by the political masters.
> Since the draft was not driven by the politicians, there was virtually no budgetary appropriation for its implementation.
> Doctrinal approach to national defence was flawed
> There was no implementation plan (Duru 2018).

That the drafters of the 2006 NNDP did not envision the recent security challenges in the North East is probably not a good excuse for the lapses in the BH operations. Beyond the American experience, one would have expected Nigeria to have drawn some lessons from the experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone where the insurgents were equally "rag tag" civilians guerilla fighters. One would have expected some lessons to have been drawn from the Niger Delta where the activities of militant youths had serious effects on Nigeria oil supply to the global market and hence the drastic reduction of Nigeria's oil revenue.

On the other hand the 2006 NNDP created the impression that the country was still in the age of conventional warfare in which the enemies to be fought would necessarily come from somewhere outside the country's borders in an easy to recognize form. The said enemies would wear uniforms that would make them discernible for counter attack and they would use conventional weapons. Nigeria did not seem to have come to terms that a time would come when it would find it difficult to procure arms from the international arms market for fighting its enemies. This mistake in Nigeria's planning process accounts for some of the problems that the country faces today. It explains why Nigeria decided in 2015 to start reviewing the 2006 NNDP. Things are messier for Nigeria since then, with the escalation of the Boko Haram crisis and the seeming endless killings of innocent Nigerians by herdsmen.

4.3.2   Mindset of Nigerian Leaders: The lesson from President Bush's handling of September 11 calls attention to the role that political leadership should play in shaping a country's defence policy and defence strategy. The leaders have to define the policy objectives that the defence policy is trying to achieve. In a country with little or no rooms for consultation of the larger society before policies are made, it is most likely that a country's defence policy would be nothing but an articulation of the interests of select political leaders: most especially the head of state and his security management leaders.

What was the mindset of Nigeria's political leaders responsible for shaping the orientation of the 2006 NNDP? This question can be easily answered by taking a critical look at the foreword, preface and acknowledgement to the policy document. They were written by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, the President; Engineer Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso as the Defence Minister, and General Martin Luther Agwai in his capacity as Nigeria's Chief of Defence staff. None of them consider themselves to be working towards a policy document that could be used to deal with asymmetric conflict. The focus was on regime and not necessarily national or human security. An effective NNDP must focus more on this key concerns about human security. The National Security Strategy of Nigeria (2014) adopted this approach for mapping Nigeria's security threats to include the following: terrorism, transnational organized crimes, crude oil theft/illegal bunkering, borders, climate change, communal and ethno-religious conflict, politics and federalism, governance challenges, poverty, kidnapping,

and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The others are illegal migration, economic challenges, financial crimes, information technology and cyber security; natural, man-made and medical related threats and environmental security (FGN 2014).

In the foreword to the document, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo called attention to three critical issues that might have goaded him into giving Nigeria a defence policy. He was not too happy with the "not-too-edifying roles" the military played in Nigeria's recent history. By this he was referring to the history of military rule in Nigeria. From this context, it could be said that the President expected the defence policy to discourage military coups. Secondly, he felt the military should remain the most respected institutions of the Nigerian state. Hence, he posited that: "I…observe that in spite of the nation's chequered history, the resulting traumatizing experiences of the military itself, the Nigerian Armed Forces still retain the pristine qualities of honour, patriotism and selfless service to the fatherland" (Obasanjo 2006:v). He expected the defence policy to further enhance this factor. Obasanjo saluted the significant contribution that the Nigerian armed forces made to international peace and security through participation in peacekeeping around the world and expect the 2006 NNDP to further this element of "Nigeria's prestige and standing in the world" (FGN 2006:vi). Like the policy document itself, the Head of State failed to acknowledge that Nigeria was already in an age of asymmetric conflict that would require a new thinking as President Bush of the US tried to do in his September 11 speeches. His experiences managing the Niger Delta crisis were enough to make Obasanjo realize that Nigeria's security environment was already changed.

In the preface, Engineer Raibu Kwankwaso located the need for the NNDP in the 1999 Constitution which expects the Nigerian Armed Forces to "loyally defend and protect the sovereignty, territory and people of Nigeria against external aggression" in addition to help to "assist the civil authority in maintaining law and order whenever necessary". He called attention to the "history of military intervention in politics" and hoped the defence policy would help the Nigerian Armed Forces to "uphold peace and security in a democratic Nigeria". Last but not the least, the Defence Minister said "an overarching goal of this policy is the consolidation of civil control over the military,

which is one of the characteristics of a truly democratic society" (Kwankwaso 2006:vii).

The third Nigerian leader to be considered in respect of the 2006 NNDP is General Martin Luther Agwai, the Chief of Defence Staff. He wrote the acknowledgement. According to him, the NNDP "arose from the need to provide a frame work that will ensure the protection of the territorial integrity of Nigeria within its internationally agreed boundaries". His second justification for the NNDP is "the roles of Nigeria in the sub-regional, regional and international peace efforts".

The three Nigerian leaders who should be in the best position to say why Nigeria needed a NNDP in 2006 seemed to be in agreement over one thing. They were all interested in Nigeria having a defence policy targeting conventional rather than asymmetric warfare. The focus of Obasanjo and Kwankwaso was particularly on giving Nigeria an NNDP targeting regime security rather than national or human security. The three concepts have different meanings. Regime security has to do with having to weave the security system of a country around the ruling elite lacking political legitimacy or facing the possible threat of military coups, insurgencies, or domestic rivals (Koblentz 2013). National security on its own has to do with the safety of a nation from threats such as terrorism, war, or espionage. The concept is often taken to merely mean the protection of a state's sovereignty, territorial integrity and internal stability through the use of coercive power of the state. This understanding of the concept is gradually changing given the intrusion of non-traditional threats like pandemics, climate change, environmental conditions into security calculations. Hence, what is advocated now is a more holistic understanding of the concept to the extent that national security is no longer what is attained through the use of coercive elements of state power alone but also non-coercive instruments such as inclusive leadership or good governance (Chandra and Bhonsle 2015).

Human security is the third security concept. According to Thakur (1997), it means the quality of life of the people of a society or polity. Anything which degrades their quality of life – demographic pressures, diminished access to or stock or resources, and so on – is a security threat. Conversely, anything which can upgrade their quality of life – economic growth, improved access to resources, social and political

empowerment, and so on – is an enhancement of human security." Kofi Annan (2000) shed more light on the term when he observed that:

> Human security, in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a steep towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment …these are the interrelated building blocks of human – and therefore national – security.

What came out of the foregoing review, most especially the positions of Obasanjo and Kwankwaso, is that the NNDP 2006 was more a tool for preventing military coup than any serious attempt to protect Nigeria (national security) or its peoples (human security) in an age of emerging asymmetric warfare. This conclusion is given better vent by several sections of the NNDP most especially the Chapter 7 dealing with civil military relations. That aspect of the document dealt with supremacy of the constitution, the democratic imperative, civil control of the military, and military professionalism. In the chapter, civil military relations was defined in the following terms: "Civil military relations refers to the hierarchy of authority between the Executive, the NASS and the Armed Forces, as well as to the principle of civil supremacy over the forces" (NNDP 2006:64). This is a reductionist and state-centric understanding of civil military relations. A more encompassing understanding of the term is needed for capturing the kind of challenges that security agencies were facing in the Niger Delta by that moment. The most significant of this was the refusal of the local population to work with the military. The Nigerian military fighting Boko Haram is facing the same problem. In the two operations, the local people failed to provide support to the military. How could and should this problem be solved? One expects a more integrated definition of civil military relations to have captured this issue.

4.3.3 Nigeria's National Interest: The disparate opinions expressed by Nigerian leaders above emanate from the fact that even up to the present, Nigeria does not have universally acceptable "national interest". Every Nigerian leader come to the people with the interests of his ethnic or religious groups or political and impose it on

everybody as Nigeria's national interest. Nwolise considers this to be the main problem with the 2006 NNDP. According to him:

> Security policy, development policy, defence policy is supposed to derive from one thing – National Interest. We don't have one…. I told them that in 1986 at NIPSS (National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies) Kuru (in Jos), the NIIA (Nigerian Institute of International Affairs) organized "Nigeria's Foreign Policy to the Year 2000". The NIIA DG at that time was Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, while the conference was opened by President Babangida himself and I was there. Babangida charged the conference to produce a document that focuses solidly on Nigeria's National Interest…There is none now. Dr. Bala Usman of blessed memory, the radical, was the chairman of the Political Committee to produce that document. I was in the Socioeconomic Committee and I was more interested in seeing how blacks in the diaspora – our brothers and sisters abroad can effectively be persuaded for the execution of Nigeria's foreign policy. But Bala Usman said I should join him – so that is seven of us in the committee. We worked three nights, came up with a document that we were proud of will be Nigeria's National Interest. That document was submitted to government, no white paper up till now. The National Interest is the starting point of every policy. We debated at the Air Force War College for 30 minutes, I was telling them it doesn't exist because I was in the last effort. And that is why when Babangida was asked about Nigeria's National Interest several years after that Kuru conference, he said anything that progresses the country is our National Interest; anything that secures the country is our National Interest. How can it be anything? (Nwolise 2018).

This is a critical issue. A sound defence policy is supposed to be hinged on the kind of society the military is expected to protect. When the society does not have a clear vision of where it is going, it is difficult for the defence policy to clearly define itself and get properly operationalized. That is probably one of the major problems that the defence sector is facing in Nigeria most especially in managing the Niger Delta and BH crises. The insurgents see the military to protect an unjust Nigerian state. This is because the way these fighters see Nigeria is different from how the AFN see same society. Resolving the differences between the two is also difficult other than for the AFN to simply force the insurgents to accept Nigeria the way it is.

4.3.4 Lack of Political Will: That it took the Nigerian state up to 2006 to produce Nigeria's first defence policy and 2014 to think of revising the 2006 NNDP is to

suggest that there was inadequate political will for having or implementing the policy. In this regard, the term "Nigerian leaders" is broadly defined to include the military leaders that were in charge of Nigeria up to 1999 and the civilians that took over from them since then. Nwolise reminiscent on his experience with Nigerian military leaders on this in the 1990s. He said:

> We don't have leaders, we have never had leadership. The nearest would have been General Murtala Muhammed but they cut him short. The rest are rulers… We were in Marina when Defence Headquarters was in Lagos. We held a conference there and I was arguing that we don't have a Defence policy. This was in the 1980s, because I started interacting with the military since 1982, when we had a conference at NNS Quora in 1982 and then the argument went on, some Generals got angry. They said look, how can you say there is no Defence policy, how can a nation not have. I said, show me one. It's practical and then the following day before we reconvened, somebody brought a document – a two page document – that was not signed by anybody. He said that is the Defence Policy. I just laughed. I said, well at least we saw something. On the third day, another person brought a two-page document - the same document but it was signed. I said, well this document was signed, so this is our Defence Policy. A two page document. I brought out the Defence Policy of three nations, and each of them started with a mission. And then the issue of total defence (Nwolise 2018).

Why would a military not have a defence policy? The simple answer is lack of political will: most probably because the military did not see any need to produce any document to guide its operations in war sitautions. Even then, this would have been strange for any serious military. The fact remains that political will is required to enforce decisions and to give strategic guidance towards the attainment of strategic objectives. Over the years, political will has ebbed due to the need to satisfy every interests in a democratic dispensation, as such sensitive issues like the implementation of the NNDP have suffered. Political will is required to ensure NNDP objectives are seen as paramount and overarching above all other interests and prioritized above all.

Probably related to the issue of political will is the inadequate funding of the Defence Sector in Nigeria. In a situation where the AFN are funded from the regular envelop system, the capability of the Military is reduced to minimum and has been largely attributed to non-implementation of the NNDP. Added to this are dearth of military

and technical resources which have negatively affected its actualization as well as operational efficiency of the AFN. Records available in 2017 shows that there was drastic reduction in budgeting allocation to the AFN by about 30 percent in terms of budget performance and this impinges, to a great extent the conduct of operations in the North East, Lagos Environs, and South. This inadequacy needs to be addressed.

Professor Nwolise has an interesting perspective to this issue of lack of political will to correctly apply the defence policy which must be captured by a study of this nature. According to him, the mindsets of all the political leaders in Nigeria – from Olusegun Obasanjo, Umar Yar Adua, Goodluck Jonathan, and muhammadu Buhari must be taken into critical considerations on when or not to properly equip the AFN for fighting terrorism. He used the example of the President Goodluck Jonathan who considered the BH crisis to have been deliberately started to frustrate his regime. According to Nwolise:

> President Jonathan had the mindset that BH was raised to fight his government. Because people said before the President that if they did not win the 2011 elections there will be war. And within 72 hours of his inauguration, there was crisis, there were riots. So when BH started he said the North have started, so let them stew in their own manufacture. That was his mindset. It wasn't interpreted as a national security threat, it was interpreted as a threat to his government. And once that mindset comes, it is difficult. That is why when the kidnap of Chibok girls happened, the wife played the whole thing jokingly: "na only you waka come?" (Nwolise 2018)

Nwolise is of the view that the perception of Nigerian leaders on the crisis situations in the country would have been positively changed if they had maintained a close touch with the intellectuals that could provide them with objective analyses of the happenings in the country. Nwolise argued that:

> Our rulers see intellectuals as troublemakers: 'they will come and expose us, we don't want them near us'. Henry Kissinger was still a lecturer in the university when the American government began to send him on errands in confidence. They will call him. The things they don't want the world to see government doing, they will send him underground to go on this errand, to talk to these people. Before he was made the Secretary of State, he was already assisting as a lecturer in the university, going on foreign errands.

That is where knowledge is respected. In this country, knowledge is not respected. I will keep saying it that we are governed on sentiments, are governed on trial and error (Nwolise 2018)

II: Leadership of the military

The term "leadership of the military" is used advisedly here. It is different from "military leadership". The latter refers to how the military establishment is led by commanders at different levels. On the other hand, "leadership of the military" means how the military is governed generally: by both political, military and civilian leaders most especially at the level of the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The leadership of the military is used in this section in reference to the quality of leadership that is provided for translating the letters of the 2006 NNDP to positive outcomes. The issues addressed here include the quality of leadership provided by the MOD which is responsible for managing the NNDP? This issue is very important given the fact that once a defence policy fails at the top leadership level, it is difficult to expect it to produce positive outcomes at the operational levels.

As observed above, the interest of the Obasanjo regime that produced the 2006 NNDP was to have a policy that would make the military to remain perpetually subjected to military authority. On the other hand, the document provided too little mechanisms for preventing the misuse of the military by the civilian leaders as experienced in Odi and Zaki Biam (HRW 1999, 2002; Nwolise 2007). Another major problem identified in the course of this research is that successive Ministers of Defence often have difficulties getting the service chiefs to comply with their directives. As AVM Ode observed during the interview with him, it was for this reason that Lt. Gen. Aliyu Gusau Mohammed (Rtd.) who was Nigeria's Minister of Defence from March 5 2014 to May 2015 suggested the need to review the 2006 NNDP to President Goodluck Jonathan (Ode 2019). He seemed to have done it to deal with his own frustrations of managing the defence ministry. The service chiefs did not cooperate with him. He threatened twice to resign from office as the Defence Minister. Reporting Gusau's first confrontation with the service chiefs immediately he was appointed, the Sahara Reporters said:

Several sources at the Defense Ministry told SaharaReporters that Nigeria's top military officers yesterday refused to have a joint

meeting with Mr. Gusau and his deputy, Musikilu Obanikoro, a former senator… Nigeria's top military henchmen kept Mr. Gusau waiting for two days after he summoned them to a meeting, with different military service chiefs making excuses for their inability to meet with him and his deputy immediately. Finally, the situation turned testy yesterday when, after keeping Mr. Gusau and Mr. Obanikoro waiting for several hours, the Chief of Defense Staff, Air Marshal Alex Badeh, showed up alone for a meeting…the Minister of Defense told him he was expecting all the chiefs of staff within the military, but Badeh reportedly told him there was no need… he alone would be meeting with the minister as the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), stating that this arrangement was the collective decision of military officers in the country… an attempt by the junior minister of defense, Mr. Obanikoro, to intervene was rudely brushed aside as Badeh asked him to "shut up." "Air Marshal Badeh is said to have called Senator Obanikoro a 'small boy' and warned him that the military was not going to be taking orders anymore from bloody civilians like him," one source stated…Soon after the altercation, General Gusau reportedly ended the meeting and asked the Permanent Secretary in the ministry to transmit his letter of resignation to President Goodluck Jonathan (Sahara Reporters 2014).

Gusau must have been encouraged not to leave. He was said to have attempted to leave the second time. The foregoing is not to suggest that Badeh too did not have his own problems with the service. In many cases, Nigerian CDS hardly enjoy the cooperation of the service chiefs who are expected to work collaboratively with him to implement the NNDP. Prof. Tar of the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) called attention to the need to address this issue during the interview with him. He opined that the DHQ, as now constituted, leave the CDS with little or no power; he is simply sidelined thereby making the Tri-Service Chiefs (Army, Navy and Airforce) more powerful. Consequently, he posits that this model is a challenge to the implementation of the NNDP (Tar 2019).

Another key issue is the number of civlians in Nigeria's MOD. Though defence matters are highly professionalised, most of the directors in the Ministry are civilians without any prior training in defence matters. This negatively affects how quickly and professionally the ministry could respond to defence manners.

III: Operational Matters

No NNDP, no matter how good, would implement itself. It has to be used by human beings. What were presented above are factors internal to the NNDP, the government that produced it and those that drafted it. It is necessary here to call attention to some factors that worked against the AFN but boosted the efforts of the insurgents on the other hand. In this respect, the failure to fully decimate the insurgents can be attributed to Nigerian military's poor awareness of the contents of the NNDP, inadequate platform, reinforcement capability of the insurgents, and nature of conflict. Others are troops' limited knowledge of the ground, perception of BHT invisibility, and porosity of the border. These will be further highlighted subsequently.

4.3.5 Awareness: In the course of doing this research, it was discovered that the knowledge of the existence of NNDP and its contents is quite low considering its importance. Most commanders especially at tactical level do not have access to the document until they get to National Defence College. With the load of academic work at the College the operational commanders do not have enough time to study this critical document. Throughout their one year direction in the College only one week is reserved for the study of NNDP, which is grossly inadequate. Sequel to the completion of their strategic courses, references are hardly made to this vital document in the field. This had limited the awareness across the board and negatively impacted on its utilization at the strategic level. Prof. Nwolise blame this problem on the weak academic culture in the Nigerian military. To him, the situation would have been different if the Nigerian military is given better attention to knowledge economy: acquiring necessary knowledge as and when due and updating knowledge through the institutionalizing of a strong Research and Development (R&D) tradition. He said:

> …in the military how much is voted for R & D? There's nothing for R & D. Those who are in the military, if you're posted to R & D you say you have been sent to jail. Because knowledge has no place. The first set of people who got PhD in the Army, were retired. Emeka Omerua and a host of others. The moment they came back with PhD, they were out because they (the Army) wanted to maintain standard. Standard of what? Illiteracy? If not for Gen Buratai who came in and started this transformation, knowledge-based policy, you can see the reward he is getting. Look at the fact that there is resurgence. I was with Canadian, USAID, some white people yesterday. By this time we were

blowing grammar at NERI – North East Regional Initiative (Nwolise 2019)

Nwolise observed that the Nigerian military would continue to have low awareness of what to do so long as it does not invest in research and encourage its officers to see knowledge that goes beyond the present. Further stretching the significance of knowledge system for honing a military institution, he observed that:

> …the example I always use is that of Nostradamus' prediction of the conquest of France. He predicted it more than 400 years before France was conquered by Nazi Germany. Nostradamus predicted that a foreign power will march on France through a forest. Now when the Second World War started, the French did not take that seriously. They thought that no Army will march through the Adonis forest. But the wife of Goebbels, the propaganda man of Hitler, was an ardent reader of Nostradamus. The wife of Goebbels saw that prediction and gave it to her husband, her husband then took it to Hitler. The Generals sat and some of them said how can we march through this forest with all the lions and the jungles and everything there? So they said no. Hitler said, march through it! And in 72 hours, 72 hours, Nazi forces marched through the Adonis forest and captured France. That was strategic intelligence … This country is ungoverned by knowledge that is why there is nothing about this country. No country ever moves anywhere without knowledge (Nwolise 2019).

AVM Ode is equally of the opinion that if the Nigerian state had taken sufficient cognizance of the existing knowledge within the country, things would probably not have been the way it is. If the NNDP 2006 does not have anything on terrorism and how to respond to it, it is not becausce of a complete absence of that understanding within the country. He cited his American experience on this issue. According to him,

> In 1999 President Obasanjo came to the US as president elect. I gave him a little brief on the Niger Delta, and the country as a whole. When he left, I had a brief discussion with one of the colonels from Zimbabwe. I said - sir, what you are talking about… and I said if there is a war today is it the Colonel-Major ranks that are going to fight the war? But this is what I am thinking as the president of the Military Attachés Association. So I said why don't we call some US agencies together... so we organized the first African Ambassadors and Defence Attachés Association – it was a conference. Two years after the conference, what did we discuss?

> "Terrorism: Africa the new frontier" (2002). Three days after the conference, the US National Security Adviser invited me to the White House and said because of your conference, there is a policy change toward Africa. I said not our conference, it is the conference of military defence attachés. He said even your members didn't believe what you were saying and I knew you founded it for a partnership. So they created 40 terrorists watch stations in the whole of Africa were you can just pick a phone and you can talk to any of the stations. We have four in Nigeria because it was my idea. Where they are located in Nigeria the people didn't know that it was there (Ode 2019).

The simple point being made here is that Nigeria ought to have been leveraging on the existing resources within the land rather than claiming that by 2006 it knew nothing about terrorism and hence end up producing a defence policy that atomises the role of terrorism in global politics and national stability.

4.3.6 Local Support and Recruitment Capability of the Insurgents: In both the Niger Delta and the North East, the communities seemed to have been more comfortable working for the inusurgents than the Nigerian military. This weakened the capacity of the Nigerian military to easily defeat the enemy. In the Niger Delta, the local communities perceive the militants to be working towards liberating the people from the injustices suffered from the Nigerian state. Oil is taken from their communities, the oil companies degrade their land and what they get in turn from the oil revenue is not considered good enough. Hence, parents find it difficult from preventing their wards from joining the militancy. They hide the fighters from the Nigerian military.

Similarly, the BHTs continue to device means of ensuring that their strength is not completely degraded. They encouraged the people to fight on their side arguing that the Nigerian state does not care for them. Commenting on this, Nwolise said:

> The North East is the worst part of Nigeria. There are areas that motorcycles cannot even pass, and so they feel neglected as much as the Niger Delta man. And you know Boko Haram started with this propaganda of neglect: they are busy in Abuja "chopping" you are dying here. You don't have water, you don't have roads. So when they see one young man that says "I want to marry" then

they will say: "okay take money, go and marry". All those who read "Boko" are the ones cheating you in Abuja. Even University students were tearing their certificates. So that cause you are talking about is indeed recruitment propaganda. Initially, until the troops came out and said: "we are not fighting for anybody in Nigeria (Nwolise 2019).

Where the people fail to fight for BHT voluntarily, they are forced to do so. The people are threatened, intimidated and conscripted. The consequence is that there exist significant number of the populace that are sympathizers of BHT ideology and collaborators for inflicting dastardly acts on the society. Furthermore, due to high rate of starvation, poverty, and unemployment among other social vices that are prevalent among the civil populace, some innocent citizens are easily bought over or lured to become members with stipend offered to them. This situation is further exacerbated by the reported instances where parents have deliberately volunteered their wards to be used by BHTs as suicide bombers. Thus, there is the need for an holistic approach to discourage citizens from supporting BHTs ideology or activities.

On the other hand, Nigeria had serious manpower problems when it came to fighting BHTs. By the time the crisis broke out, Nigeria had several international peacekeeping obligations. Some of the soldiers that fought in the North East had to be returned to the country from Sudan.

4.3.7   AFN's Low Reinforcement Capability: The AFN engagement in asymmetric conflicts as well as other internal security engagements in the country has stretched its personnel and equipment resources thin. This has grossly affected the AFN ability to effectively maintain the reinforcement of its personnel engaged in asymmetric conflicts and operations in general. For instance, military personnel engaged in asymmetric conflicts in Operation LAFIYA DOLE in the North East of Nigeria even though rotated yearly, are encumbered by the need to return the same soldiers into the same theatre of operations after a period of 24 months due to inadequate manpower. In this respect, the AFN seemed to have faced two problems. The first is shortfall in the number of the soldiers. As Nwolise argued "…the size of our armed forces today cannot man the northeast" (Nwolise 2018). The second is some soldiers lack of readiness for the battlefront. Calling attention to the nature of the second problem, Nwolise observed that:

Soldiers were calling their fathers. From NDA, straight to Maiduguri. (Comically) "Daddy, daddy, they say I should go to Maiduguri. I don't want to go to fight Boko Haram. Better call the Commandant. Can you call the Div.?" Why did you go to the army? To just eat jollof rice? But it showed flaws in our recruitment, which we want to take care of in the new Defence Policy. That only able-bodied young people who are ready to fight and die for the Nation should be recruited into the army. So this is the problem. When in nations that face serious problems like Sri Lanka, Singapore, and the others, they will recruit people who are ready to fight and defend their nations, whether they have school certificate or not (Nwolise 2019).

AVM Jon Ode claims that this kind of situation that now threatens military operations across Nigeria has its roots in the faulty recruitment system into the armed forces. Sharing his own personal experience, he said:

I am for the first time putting this on record. I was deputy commandant, acting commandant NDA during a selection process exercise. The recruitment exercise of cadets, I got 327 letters from our leaders, both the military and outside the military and traditional rulers. I did not honour one of them for the 58 regular course, and I said to the chairman of the selection board sir, (I won't call his name now) if you take any candidate on any ground outside merit whatever is due to you and your children God will take it away from you. Thereafter the board did not sit for two days. I was reported to the CDS, that I was giving a moral lecture to them and everything, I was called from the CDS' office "Jon, Jon, Jon – what is the problem again?" I said, "What is it that they have said I have done again?" We have compromised heavily, so right now we pick the wrong people and you cannot fight war on wishful thinking. So when you are given that note to get this person into the military I hope you will give them a note also to go to the warfare (Ode 2019).

Many of the parents that put the Nigerian armed forces under pressure to recruit their children do not seem ready for the kind of problems soldiers now face in today's battle fronts. Their expectation was that of a military where the officers corps would only be getting the best of benefits without the commensurate service to the nation. There is an urgent requirement to ensure that the AFN manpower strength capabilities and

equipment availabilities are significantly increased to match current military requirements and obligations.

4.3.8 Limited Knowledge of the Ground: Most of the NA personnel deployed in OP LAFIYA DOLE and Niger Delta Creeks are serving in the environment for the first time in their professional career. The implication is that commanding officers, commanders and majority of personnel deployed require quite an ample amount of time to understand the terrain, get acquainted to the weather and have reasonable knowledge of the ground in general. Unlike the BHTs who are operating in a familiar terrain and have very vast knowledge of the topography. No doubt, this limited knowledge of the ground by own troops deprived them of some tactical and operational advantages at the early stage of OP LAFIYA DOLE, which ordinarily would have enhanced combat efficiency. Things have since improved and the level of success for own troop has increased significantly. The situation in the Niger Delta is not different. In both situation, Albert reports that the insurgents use their knowledge of the forested regions to put the Nigerian military at serious operational disadvantages (Albert 2017).

4.3.9 Inadequate Platforms: The number of serviceable platforms in the Theatre is grossly inadequate. This inadequacy in platforms cuts across combat support and combat service support arms of the AFN. The few serviceable equipment are often times rendered incapacitated during conduct of operations from the devastating impact of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) laid for own troops by the BHTs. Furthermore, unavailability of spare parts to maintain platforms also account for acute shortages in the number of platforms available for operations. For instance, out of a total of 21 x T-72 Tanks inducted into the Theatre in Nov 15, virtually all of them have been rendered unserviceable due to lack of one spare part or the other. Thus, there is no unit or formation in the Theatre as at now that is equipped to scale in any platform. It has, therefore, become expedient that an enduring procurement, maintenance, and resupply spare part chain be put in place to enhance operational efficiency in the Theatre. A similar situation obtains in the Nigerian Air Force, according to AVM Jon Ode:

> Where was the air force that Rhodesia played her video after 1989?
> They played Nigerian Airforce video for the whole week. Also, in

Ghana, after May Day 1988. So, where is that red air force? I led 9 planes from my unit alone to Makurdi for that show. As a squadron leader I had 48 fighter planes - 100% serviceability status, all 48! I was actually the most distinguished squadron leader in Africa. With 48 fighter planes you couldn't find another person like that. On our worst day, we had a fleet of 45 soldiers, on our best day we had a fleet of 62 soldiers. The entire Nigerian Air Force today cannot fly the soldiers we flew in one month in one year…So far, asymmetry needs a real definition. Equipment, I believe equipment to fight cannot be hidden. They will be visible in training. The core essence of the military is men and machine combination to get the best result. And machine is not only in our psyche, we should see it. I just gave an example in Kano as a squadron leader commanding the flight school. I had 48 air planes exclusive of Alfa Jets and excess of 36 in Kainji in excess of the MIG 21. I don't know the number now. The MIG 21Bs. The MIG 21 Bs had the capacity; there were only two air planes at that time only the MIG 21 Bs and F18 oh… sorry F15 can accelerate in the vertical. We had it. Two variants of the MIG 21 and of course 18 Jaguars joined for ground attacks. Today I don't think the Nigerian air force can effectively raise a squadron of fighters (Ode 2019).

4.3.10 Poor Intelligence: The conduct of counter terrorism and counter insurgency operations globally is intelligence driven. Accurate and actionable intelligence is therefore a critical factor which shapes military operations. Most of the quantum of information on BHTs are often speculative, unverified, and in some cases are viruses injected by the BHTs to confuse own forces. The adversary intelligence networks when compared with own forces seem more accurate hence, their successes in attacking own mobile and static positions undetected. For us to be steps ahead of our adversary, the need for proper coordination, collation, and timely dissemination of HUMINT, SIGINT, AIR-INT and other intelligence sources is very critical to own operational success. This brings to the fore the importance of the newly established Joint Intelligence Fusion Centre (JIFC) at Headquarters Theatre Command. The need for the immediate operationalization need not be overemphasized.

4.3.11 Perception of BHT Invincibility: At the onset of operations in the North East, there was this perception amongst the troops that BHTs are invincible and therefore cannot be defeated. This perception became strong among the troops especially when the spiritual dimension was brought into it, which then introduced fear in own troops. This impression had serious negative impact on the conduct of operations. It took

deliberate psychological operations and information management techniques to get own troops over this unfortunate beliefs. Not until when the perceived invincibility of BHT was erased from the minds of the troops that the confidence to take on the insurgents re-energized. This resulted in the moderate successes recorded across the Theatre as of today.

4.3.12 Porosity of the Border: It is a well-known knowledge that Nigeria's borders with most of her neighbours are porous. The Theatre of Operation is bordered by 3 different countries namely; Cameroun, Chad, and Niger Republic. The porous borders have helped to provide opportunity for BHTs to have safe havens across the borders whenever the heat is much on them, only to return at their own time. Furthermore, the porous borders facilitate delivery of aids to BHT by their local and foreign sponsors and collaborators. All these had adverse effect on the conduct of operations. The reinvigorated diplomatic ties by Nigeria with her neighbours and setting of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) have helped a great deal to improve level of success in OPERATION LAFIYA DOLE. Thus, there is the need for Nigeria to continue to put measures in place to tighten up its international borders.

4.3.13 Low Level of Technology: The low technological base in Nigeria has also been attributed to the non-implementation of the NNDP. Technological advancements are key to innovation and development and serve as the bedrock for enterprise in military technology. Nigeria is regarded as a developing country with a fledgling technology industry. At the policy level, it has not properly articulated and implemented a holistic strategy for the development of the technology sector. This in turn has stifled growth in terms of military technology development and research and development.

Building on this challenge, some of the Course 26 participants from the NDC in the FGD observe that military forces often devote little effort in utilizing ICT platforms in carrying out activities aimed at countering the propaganda of the extremist groups in the mission areas. It was also revealed during the course of the interaction that the military lack adequate modern technology like drones in monitoring the movements and attacks launched by both the BHT and NDM. It was further asserted that the Nigerian Armed Forces significantly failed in the deployment of Jammers to jam the

insurgents' remote controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and also failed to use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to observe own troops and their activities in the field of operation. According to the FGD, the Nigerian Armed Forces is yet to advance to the level of installing closed circuit televisions (CCTVs) at strategic locations to monitor the activities of insurgents across the country. Also, there is poor use of internet protocol (IP) address to track uploaded videos by insurgents and to remove whatever the insurgents uploaded for the general public's consumption. Ultimately, if this trend is not stemmed, it will become inimical to the security operation of the forces in the field. However, if improved upon, technology will accelerate the operational efficiency of the AFN.

4.3.14 Nature of the Conflict: The nature of the conflict, which is principally asymmetrical, is a major factor affecting success rate in the Theatre. The beliefs and ideologies being propagated by BHTs are intangible and basically issues that affect the mind of an individual. Obviously, progress can be achieved physically, but if there is no strategy put in place to change the mindset of the civil populace, very little will be achieved in the counter insurgency efforts.

4.3.15 The Effect of Mass Migration of IDPs: Some other operational challenges confronting the fight against insurgency particularly in the North Eastern Nigeria are factors that border on the migration of IDPs. In view of this therefore, the FGD with Course 26 participants from the NDC observe that the mass migration of IDPs has the tendency to increase the level of insecurity in their resettled communities, and might also affect the quality of data needed for intelligence gathering. Also, it will create opportunities for insurgents to infiltrate the IDPs camps thereby making it easy for them to recruit new members from within the IDPs. The FGD further revealed that mass migration of IDPs can constitute a large financial burden on the relevant government agency saddled with the responsibility of relocating the IDPs to wherever it is reserved for them. In another perspective, the participants in the FGD noted that such movements of IDPs can potentially bring about complete distruption of family and commercial life, increase social tension, and bring about new patterns of settlement (for example, people from one region relocating to occupy another environment dominated by another region) capable of distrupting the operation of the

armed forces. This view is also corroborated by the FGD conducted with the civilian participants in the North Eastern Nigeria.

4.3.16 The Effect of Globalization: Globalization, which creates a situation where the world is reduced to a mere "global village", ensures that activities happening in one country (far away) is made visible everywhere without barriers that might be caused by distance. In view of this, the FGD with the Course 26 participants of the NDC made it clear that globalization through the use of internet and other IT systems, and people (predominantly insurgents) can easily access and easily form alliances with other organizations across the globe leading to exchange of technical know-how in developing small arms and light weapons locally, thereby, frustrating the efforts of the armed forces in procuring peace in the combat areas. The FGD also reveals that globalization contributes negatively because it makes it very easy for extremist groups within Nigeria and beyond to interact freely online, thus, constituting some difficulties for security agents to trace their activities. The FGD further established that globalization provides an avenue for sales of weapons in the "black market", easy access to gun runners, and ease of making contact with illegal weapon traders.

The FGD with the course 26 participants of the NDC also reveal that the evolution of the internet has made it possible for insurgents to use IT in advancing their activities since it is unregulated and uncontrolled, even though some argue that IT grants insurgents minimal advantage as it mostly attracts public sympathy for the insurgent elements. These participants opine that IT is an easy platform for the insurgents' propaganda against the state, hence it becomes a force multiplier for these groups because the internet and such channels offer easy access for the insurgents' recruitments and mobilization. Consequently, through this medium, both NDM and BHT coordinate their activities and plans and they also garner support from some international terrorists groups. This way, the insurgents use IT to spread information, develop alliances, spread false propaganda against the military and possibly intercept classified military intelligence.

The framers of the document, namely the President of Nigeria and his officials were actually not poised to producing a NNDP that would target asymmetric warfare. They seemed to have been more interested in producing a policy that could prevent and

manage military coups. The NNDP could not play any active role in the management of the Niger Delta and BH crises also because the Nigerian military lack adequate platforms and fighting forces. There was also the problem of the perceived invincibility of BH and even some leaders of the NDM. The bad situations were compounded by lack of sufficient financial resources for the military operations; Nigeria's porous borders and poor access to actionable intelligence. Hence, the NNDP 2006 played little roles in the management of the problems. Despite this, the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan tried its best to defeat the insurgents in the two cases in spite of the shortcomings in the NNDP. The Nigerian state in partnership with other relevant stakeholders are critically considered. The measures are discussed under three related sub-headings: (i) short term, (ii) mid term, and (iii) long term.

The short-term measures are the immediate steps taken by the government to prevent the Niger Delta and BH militants from escalating to more deadly dimensions. The mid term measures are things that were done gradually as the counter insurgency operations unfolded with a view to strengthening the drive towards defeating the insurgents. The long-term measures are the steps taken to prevent future problems from happening or ensuring that the problems now being faced are completely stamped out in the conflict prevention and management spectrum. Under each of the three kinds of measures, this chapter focuses on only one key intervention of the federal government. The same thing is done for the mid term and long term measures. For the short-term measures, the chosen intervention discussed in this chapter is the deployment of vigilantes ("Civilian Joint Task Force" – CJTF, and hunters) to the war theatre to provide support to the Nigerian military fighting BH. This could not be done in the Niger Delta because the militant youths in that region are closely knitted together by the causes of the crisis in the region: the need for the Niger Delta people to control Nigeria's oil wealth. It was therefore difficult getting some young people that would fight the NDM in support of the Nigerian state. However, the government was able to divide the militants later using the amnesty programme. It led to the factionalisation of the MEND. A faction was loyal to Tompolo and the other loyal to Henry Okah. This seemed to have formally marked the end of MEND as the militants could no longer operate as it did in the past.

For the mid term measures, the intervention chosen is an increased usage of information technology for dominating the Niger Delta and BH militants. The chosen long-term measure is the decision of the federal government to develop a number of policy tools for correcting the problems noticed with the 2005 NNDP. This most critical of these policy interventions is the decision of the federal government to review the NNDP 2006 to produce the NNDP 2015 which consequently led to the production of the most current one – NNDP 2017.

Short Term Solutions

4.3.17 Deployment of Vigilantes

The first major problem faced by the Nigerian military when BH members resorted to the use of terrorist strategies in 2010 was the difficulty in knowing and apprehending the insurgents. It was difficult for the military to differentiate between the BHT and the ordinary Nigerians in the city of Maiduguri, where the insurgents were originally based. The insurgents attacked innocent people, mosques and Churches; they attacked police stations and fled into neighborhoods where they mixed with the civilian population. Frustrated by the persistence of this problem and the seeming lack of cooperation by the communities in identifying the terrorists, the Nigerian military started to arrest and attack the young men and neighborhood considered to be harboring the terrorists. In the process, several innocent people had their homes destroyed by the military and several young people were attacked or even killed considered to be BH members.

The foregoing led to two decisions by the youths in Maiduguri most particularly. While some joined the BHT in annoyance or to protect themselves and their family members, the others formed themselves into a vigilante movement for helping the Nigerian military to apprehend their peers in the BH movement. The belief was that with this approach the Nigerian government would stop targeting innocent youths and family members. Commenting on the formative stage of BHT, Bamidele (2016:127) observed that:

> In June 2013, the civilian JTF emerged and volunteered to assist the
> Special and Joint Task Force with the counter-terrorism campaign.
> The civilian JTF is made up of young and old civilians armed with
> mundane weapons such as bows and arrows, swords, clubs and
> daggers that operate under the supervision of civilian JTF sector

> commanders. The civilian JTF began as a community effort and later as a joint effort with the security forces to help fight BHT. Maiduguri city has gone back to normalcy with the aid of the civilian JTF.

They moved from home to arrest BHT members and then hand them over to the police or the military. So effective were they in the operations that the JTF established by the AFN to fight the insurgents started to work with the vigilantes. It was at this stage that the Nigerian public started to refer to them as "Civilian JTF". At the initial stage, the group was only armed with sticks, clubs and machetes.

The CJTF helped the Nigerian military to collect intelligence in the communities where counter insurgency operations took place: not only in Borno but also Yobe states. With time they won the admiration of the Nigerian military to the extent that a collaboration was established between the two in dealing with the security situation in the North East. It was at this stage they better armed for fighting the insurgents. They worked with the Nigerian military and were able to stem the activities of BHT in Maiduguri and other cities in the North East. They also helped to restrict their movements to the rural areas, most especially Sambisa forest which now serves as the headquarters of the terrorist movement. When fully integrated into the counter insurgency in various parts of the North East, the CJTF members fought side by side with the Nigerian military. The only difference between them in most cases is that they do not wear the uniform of the Nigerian army.

Equally supportive of the counter insurgency operations of the Nigerian military were some hunters. While the CJTF provided support for tracking down the insurgents and physically fighting them, the hunters led the military through the forests and helped to identify the possible location of the insurgents in forested and mountainous areas of the North East.

Indeed, the CJTF contributed significantly to the success of the military operations in the North East (Campbell 2015). Commenting on this, Bamidele (2016:124) said "The civilian JTF has helped recover towns and villages from BH, rescued women in the northeast and helped identify Boko Haram members shielded by some local people". He observed further that: "Many of the BH members who feared the civilian JTF have

run out of Maiduguri and out of the major towns of the State to villages, and quite a number have travelled to neighbouring countries" (Bamidele 2016:127).

The population of the vigilante group was put at between 20,000 and 23,000 by 2015. Hundreds of their members were killed but they too are accused of different forms of human rights abuses: carrying out extra judicial killings of BHTs and dumping their remains in mass graves, engaging in diversion of essential humanitarian provisions most especially food supplies, and engaging in different forms of gender based violence most especially raping of girls and women in camps meant for IDPs. For these reasons, hundreds of them are in detention camps in different parts of the North East. On the other hand, it has proved difficult for government to compensate the families of those of them killed during the military operations.

Intermediate Solutions

4.3.18 – The Use of Information Technology

One lesson that the global community learnt from the United States of America in fighting asymmetric warfare is the use of information and communication technology to gain operational advantage over terrorists. In recognition of this, the AFN started to invest more in providing the requisite communications infrastructure that would assist commanders exercise effective command and control over deployed forces for the attainment of assigned missions, with Nigerian Army Wide Area Network Infrastructure (NAWANI) as an example. The NAWANI system is primarily designed to interconnect the DHQ and Divisional headquarters and this had greatly impacted on the speed of information management in the AFN. The NAWANI and other similar infrastructure also facilitate video conferencing for enhanced command and control. Furthermore, in order to cater for the fluidity operations and widespread distribution of forces typical of asymmetric operations, the AFN has deployed an extensive array of Combat Net Radio (CNR) and Land Mobile Radio (LMR) resources in the various theaters of operation in the country. These have ensured communications with remote locations and the speedy passage of tactical messages which have been critical to the successes recorded by the AFN in asymmetric conflicts in Nigeria.

The AFN in the course of its operations had deployed a variety of ICT means to acquire information in the areas of surveillance, open source intelligence and Lawful

Intercept (LI). Added to this, the AFN in collaboration with National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA) ensured terrain analysis which proved useful in aerial and terrestrial surveillance. This further enhanced the acquisition of drones by the AFN. Similarly, the Nigerian Navy introduced a surveillance system, the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC). The RMAC is designed to enhance maritime domain awareness in our territorial waters thereby improving the operational efficiency of Naval commands and formations. The AFN has also invested in Open Source Intelligence (OSI) assets and Global System for Mobile communication (GSM) as well as satellite phones tracking and monitoring devices using LI assets. These assets have proved considerably useful in tracking and locating belligerents and terrorists that have disturbed the peace and security of the citizenry. These devices have been used efficiently in intercepts, locating and jamming of communications among belligerents. For instance, the arrest of Henry Okah, the mastermind of the 1 October 2010 bombing was orchestrated through the use of such tracking devices. Similarly, several high profile arrests and surgical attacks conducted by the AFN in decimating the BHT group have been based on intelligence articulated through the use of such tracking and monitoring devices. Thus, the utilization of ICT has proved invaluable in the AFN asymmetric conflict engagements.

The AFN has also ensured the effective command and control of the troops in the theater of operations in the North East of Nigeria through the use of Link and Cross Patch technology utilizing Nigerian Communication Satellite (NIGCOMSAT) communications infrastructure. This was aptly exemplified in January 2015 and January 2016 when the President and Commander in Chief of the AFN was able to broadcast live video feed from Abuja and converse with his troops in the field in Maiduguri, courtesy of Maj Gen CT Olukoju, the current Commander Corps of Signals.

Various measures were also put in place by the AFN to achieve operations security leveraging ICT platforms. In this regard, secure communications in the AFN have been realized through Virtual Private Networks (VPN) leading to the safe passage of classified information. Having considered AFN successes and its current ICT capacity, it is expedient to look at factors militating against the AFN's effective use of ICT in asymmetric conflicts in an Information Age. Explaining how the new 2017 NNDP

responds to this issue, Prof. UA Tar, the Director, Centre for Defence Studies and Documentation, NDA and a member of the drafting committte of 2015/2017 NNDPs observed that:

> The National Defence Policy provides for general broad based statements of principles with regards to how to handle the National Defence and Security challenges. So I think the policy would have been better if we had mentioned ICT, National ICT backbone which should now provide every form of technology intervention in the field. I would make bold to say that we have drone system today, the policy did not make mention of. We made broad statements, we did not deliberately, we did not sit down to develop the specifics. We just stated the basics in principle.

Long Term Solutions

4.3.19 New Policy Platforms

For strengthing the short and mid term measures of the federal government to turn the tide against the NDM and BHT, some policy documents were developed most especially for the Nigerian military. Each of the policy documents are aimed at filling the gaps noticeable in the Nigerian security architecture. The new security documents produced include (i) National Security Strategy (ii) National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) for Nigeria, (iii) National Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy, and (iv) 2017 NNDP. While the first three documents respond to different operational problems in fighting the insurgents and other categories of groups and individuals subverting Nigeria's national security, the reviewed NNDP 2006 to produce the 2015 draft and subsequently the current and the newest 2017 document was aimed at correcting most of the problems earlier mentioned in this study. The rest of this chapter will deal with the NNDP 2015 given its direct relatedness to the focus of the present research.

4.3.20 NNDP 2015: As observed earlier in this study, the draft 2015 NNDP started it review in 2006. The overall objective of this draft 2015 document is to guide the AFN on how to protect Nigeria, the people and her core values among others. The draft NNDP 2015 provides a framework for bridging the 10 year policy gap that existed since the enactment of the NNDP 2006. It articulates measures for employing the AFN in the resolution of contemporary security challenges. Some issues such as synergy of the Services during joint operations, the development of a virile military-industrial

complex, the imperatives of a joint procurement system and operationalization of AFN Reserve Force are addressed in the draft policy. Furthermore, the approval of the draft NNDP 2015 would provide a clear policy direction to the AFN in the better fulfillment of its Constitutional roles.

One of those interviewed in the course of this research is Prof. UA Tar, the Director, Centre for Defence Studies and Documentation, NDA and a member of the drafting committte of NNDP 2015. He adduced three core reasons why the federal government had to review the 2006 NNDP. The first is that under the Nigerian system, the defence policy is expected to be reviwed every five years. That means that the 2006 one ought to have been reviewed since 2011 but this was not done. By 2015 when the presidential review committee was empaneled, the 2006 document ought to have been going through its second review. In other words, the 2015 review was made necessary by the fact that the process was long overdue. The second reason for the review according to him is that:

> …when the 2006 Defence Policy was written, there was scarce reference to, or awareness of the emerging security challenges. In fact, it was just a generic policy, and the word "terrorism" was mentioned once or twice in that policy. And when we checked other Defence Policies of other places we realized that its like when you read it, they are aware that an impending crisis is inevitable, and they create scenarios and they try to provide solutions to the scenarios. In Nigeria's case it was just a sketch, it was just an abstract policy document that was oblivious of BH. 2006 was three (3) or more years before BH, which the Defence Policy should have foreseen it, since it's a futuristic statement of what you anticipate and how you will respond to it (Tar 2019).

To Tar, it is suprising that Nigeria was not aware of or foresee terrorism as a serious security issue by 2006 when the first defence policy was produced. According to him, "it's not as if we were not aware. We are aware that 9/11 happened, we are aware that terrorism is happening all over the places. We took BH or the early signs of BH as a police case so the indigeneous policing did not take care of that and there was clear demarcation between policing and the military. So we did not adopt the whole of the government approach in handling defence and security issues. BH is a major problem, so they were not very keen on that problem until it became a serious problem. So by

2014 when we sat down we took very good care of BH and terrorism and even future emerging threats like cybercrime, cyber terrorism" (Tar 2019).

Before the argument as to whether or not Nigeria was aware of terrorism before 2006, Tar is of the opinion that Nigeria needed to review its defence policy in 2015 because there were several things happening around the world that such a document must capture. Even within Nigeria, there were several changes taking place within the military that the defence policy must capture. In this respect Tar said:

> From the time the first Defence Policy was written until the time we reviewed it, a number of transformation in the Armed Forces took place – the Jaji Declaration, and the Armed Forces Summit, were conducted by Obasanjo. They happened immediately after the Defence Policy of 2006 was released. And those declarations provided for new structures in the Defence and Security Architecture. For example, the Department of Civil-Military Relations is now a substructure within the Defence establishment. The 2006 Defence Policy provided for Civil-Military Relations in principle, and you could even say that it actually laid the foundation for the emergence of the Department of Civil-Military Relations, and the Jaji Declaration and so on. But as at when we sat down to review it, we wanted to give it a fine look, so we addressed it very well. So there were a lot of loopholes in the Defence and Security Architecture that the new policy aimed to address…Funding was an issue that the 2006 policy provided a quota but that quota was grossly inadequate. So in 2014 we recommended that 5 percent of the GDP should go for Defence operations and the Military Budget (Tar 2019).

The new defence policy tries as much as possible to fill the existing gaps in the old one. While the first chapter of the NNDP provides justification for the review and the direction of the new policy, Chapter 2 of the NNDP 2015 elaborates the strategic environment and looks at the dynamics of conflicts and how it could affect defence and security in Nigeria. Similarly, Chapter 3 looks at contemporary threats such as climate change, terrorism, and cybercrime among others. While the draft NNDP 2015 does not specifically address asymmetric conflicts, it nonetheless addresses threats that are manifestations of asymmetric challenges such as kidnappings, insurgency, and terrorism. Chapter 4 considers appropriate response mechanisms required to manage them.

The draft NNDP 2015 also illustrated the attainment of appropriate conventional warfare capabilities, premised on credible combined structure, as such, attention is given to develop the capabilities in all 3 dimensions of defence namely land, sea, and air. The other strategic indicators considered therein are inter-Service cooperation, interoperability and ICT among others.

It is also pertinent to state that the influence of ICT in asymmetric conflicts is on the rise. This coupled with the effects of globalization has significantly increased the impact a smaller force can wield on a much larger force. The draft NNDP 2015 therefore considers the need to address cyber threats as they can significantly impact on critical national defence and security infrastructure, economic institutions and population, to mention a few. In tackling these, the primary consideration is the requirement to develop appropriate strategies to develop the capacity and capability of the local content in defence, science and technology, which includes ICT.

As at December 2016, Nigeria was ranked 137 out of 175 countries in the ICT Development Index. This situation shows the level of access, use, skills in ICT sophistication. From this, it is evident that it may not be possible to attain the level of sophistication of the adversaries that have access to international funding, especially from advanced countries sympathetic to their cause. The fact remains that cutting edge technology is often available to the highest bidder through dark channels. The need to overcome these challenges therefore becomes imperative to win such asymmetric conflict.

It is worthy of mention that the NNDP enumerates the risks and challenges inherent in Nigeria's Defence Strategy to include protection of national interests, technological development, human dignity, domestic and regional peace, protection of culture, stability of government, and economy – local and global. Laudable as this may seem, yet, the AFN has not completely overcome the activities of the insurgent elements. This can be attributed to several factors such as the paucity of human, material, and technical resources for the actualization of the Defence strategy. Having considered these, it is expedient to look at asymmetric conflicts in Nigeria.

Some of the measures to ensure a rebust NNDP that would address Nigeria's security needs in an era of asymmetric conflicts and the information age include the establishment of a National Security Trust Fund, the review of the NNDP 2015, which is still in a draft form and formulation of a Strategic Plan. Consequently, the need to review the NNDP 2015 became a major concern for the Muhamadu Buhari presidency. Therefore, the review committee was set up to look again at the NNDP 2015 to produce a more robust one that will address new trends in warfare particularly the asymmetric warfare. It is heart-warming to note with emphasis that this latest NNDP 2017 has been done and already signed by president Muhamadu Buhari. Though in limited circulation and yet to be gazetted in government gazette, the signed copies are available. Other measures worthy of consideration are effective Border Management System and integration of identity databases. These, and particularly the reviewed 2017 NNDP are discussed hereafter.

4.3.21 NNDP 2017 : In his directive to the review committee, President Muhammadu Buhari to the NNDP 2017 review committee stress how "globalization has facilitated new socio-economic, defence, and security challenges characterized by rise in terrorism/insurgency, drug and human trafficking, cybercrime, proliferation of SALW, cattle rustling and kidnapping among others" (p.vi). The aforesaid challenges are among the factors that necessitated the need for the review of the NNDP 2015. In the preface to the NNDP 2017, the Minister of Defence, Gen. Mansur Muhammad Dan-Ali appreciated the salient contributions of the NNDP 2006 in capturing the essence of a defence policy, establishing the "guiding principles on how best national defence systems can protect national values and interests, and addressing the emerging threats at strategic, operational, and tactical levels" (p.viii). However, with the advent of emergent security challenges of an asymmetric nature and the duration of time past since the NNDP 2006 was signed into law, it became imperative that a holistic review covering all areas of total defence is put in place, hence, the NNDP 2017.

The drafters of the NNDP 2017 consider it as a deliberate effort "a people-oriented defence policy geared towards the promotion of national interest" (p.1). Furthermore, this review document took cognizance of "citizens' participation in national defence in accordance with global best practices" (p.1). The NNDP 2017 also emphasizes the need for a vibrant defence industry that will entrench a culture of self-reliance through

R & D, Public Private Partnership (PPP) and local production of defence needs" (p.1). As a direct offshoot of the extant National Security Strategy, the NNDP 2017 focuses on "the preservation of the safety of Nigerians at home and abroad, protection of the sovereignty of the country and its territory and assets" (p.2). In essence, the NNDP 2017 is a clear departure from the shortcomings of the NNDP 2006. Consequently, the review 2017 NNDP "enunciates general guidelines for the employment of the AFN in particular and other associated resources in general" (p.2), in a bid towards safeguarding Nigeria's territorial integrity and the protection of the country from any form of external aggression.

4.3.22 Establishment of a National Security Trust Fund. The establishment of a National Security Trust Fund (NSTF) would ensure the implementation of key aspects of the NNDP. The availability of the NSTF would ensure the prioritization of objectives of the NNDP as well provide adequate funding for research and development in the AFN. This could be achieved by ensuring that the FGN allocates 1 percent of the Gross National Income to the NSTF.

4.3.23 Formulation of Strategic Plan. As a result of uncertainties in the security dynamics of nations especially with the increasing incidence of asymmetric conflicts, most countries formulate Strategic Plans to cater for likely scenarios that would impact negatively on national security. Such as forward looking scenario would, for example, make projections on the likely impact of the dislodging of ISIS terrorists from their strongholds in the Middle East and North Africa on national security. This would serve as a guide to the AFN and other security agencies in their preparations to counter such threats whenever they manifest. There is thus need for the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) to be proactive in articulating a Strategic Plan for Nigeria.

4.3.24 Implementation of Effective Border Management System. Preservation of the territorial integrity of Nigeria is one of the core Constitutional roles of the AFN, as also amplified in the 2017 NNDP. An effective Border Management System (BMS) is key to this role and it would also greatly assist in reducing some of the security challenges in the country such as BH insurgency, cross-border banditry, and the smuggling of small arms and light weapons. Due to the difficult terrain in our border areas it would be apt to have an integrated BMS leveraging ICT for overall enhanced

effectiveness. The BMS could include a mix of ground and aerial based surveillance assets as well as biometric identification systems to check illegal movements into the country.

4.3.25 Integration of Identity Databases. Identity systems are veritable tools for enhancing national security with the data of these systems stored in databases. Identity databases in Nigeria include the National Identity Card Database, SIM Card Database, Crime Database, Biometric Verification Database, International Passport Database, Drivers' License Database, Vehicle Registration Database, and most of which currently exist in silos. The integration of these databases would greatly assist security agencies in the performance of their duties by the instantaneous cross-referencing of information held independently by the agencies. The intelligence derived from the seamless integration of databases would also be invaluable in AFN operations, especially during asymmetric conflicts, thereby attaining one of the key objectives of the 2017 NNDP.

This thesis argued that the Nigeria's National Defence Policy that evolved in 2006 was crafted largely to deal with conventional conflict and that its inadequacies in terms engaging it to manage asymmetric conflict became noticiable with the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents against the Nigeria State, which took a more threatening dimension with the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the sect. Predictably, this observation undergird the modification of the nation's NDP in 2015 and the subsequent review of 2017.

Though, the modifications of 2015 and 2017 Nigeria's NDP which were targeted at responding to asymmetric conflict contained strategies for dealing with unconventional warfare (asymmetric conflict), the application of these strategies remained complex and challenging. The point is that the implementation of NDP has been bedeviled by a number of challenges both at the operational and strategic levels. The kernel of our argument in this study is that the Nigeria's National Defence Policy has not been well implemented from 2007 to 2017 to adequately curtail the challenges of asymmetric conflict due to logistic and institutional deficit. Consequently, there is the need for the key stakeholders in the nation's security architecture to address these challenges to

ensure effective implementation of the NDP and ultimately the realization of the essence of the 2015 and 2017 reviews.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1   Summary

The point made in this research which is graphically illustrated with facts and figures in all that chapters is that this is the age of asymmetric warfare in Nigeria given the characteristics of the Niger Delta and BH crises. The work has clcearly shown that there is a remarkable difference between the conventional and asymmetric warfare. The latter is a form of unconventional warfare. It questions the existence of state power and often takes a long time and more careful planning to prosecute. President Goodluck Jonathan committed his entire tenure dealing with this kind of conflict. It is unfortunate that those assessing the performance of that regime in the management of Nigeria's security hardly take the nature of this problem into consideration when drawing their conclusions. The present administration in the country, namely that of President Mohammadu Buhari, benefitted from the public criticism of the shortcomings in how Goodluck Jonathan handled the BH crisis. However, the new administration still confronts some of the problems faced by Jonathan meaning that these issues have to be confronted accordingly. The problems associated with asymmetric warfare are well underscored in extant literature.

That the Niger Delta crisis has continued to fester beyond 2009 when the militants were granted amnesty in exchange for dropping their guns and that the Nigerian state has not been able to conquer BH since the group resorted to terrorism shows clearly that the NNDP 2006 has not been strong enough to stabilize Nigeria in an age of asymmetric conflict. Regime of President Olusegun Obasanjo contended with this problem before it ended in 2007. The government of President Umar Musa Yar'Adua faced the problem and that of President Goodluck Jonathan was very much disturbed by the problem.

Obasanjo left office in 2007, a year after the NNDP 2006 came into place. Hence, there was little he could have done at responding actionably to observed limitation in the use of the NNDP. The challenges fell on President Yar'Adua but who could hardly do anything concrete until his demise on May 5, 2010. The administration of President Jonathan bore the brunt of the entire problem. The BH crisis escalated under him. He succeeded in reducing the intensity of the Niger Delta crisis given the fact that he comes from the region. However, despite the reviews to strengthen the NNDP, especially with respects to reining in and curtailing assymetric conflict, the efforts have not yielded the desired results due to lack of political will on the part of the leadership and failure on the part of the security agencies to effectively collaborate for a more fruitful outcome in their fight with the insurrents.

5.2   Conclusion

The importance of peace and security to the realization of a nation's national interest cannot be over-emphasised. This explains why globally, national governments evolve their national defence policies in order to address security challenges, promote their national interest and engender peaceful environment for national development. And, when necessary nations do modify their national defence policies in line with exisiting reality and even perceived future challenges. The clear understanding of the importance of a national defence policy to the actualization of the dream of the founding fathers of the Nigerian State, undoubtedly, informed the crafting of the NNDP of 2006 and the subsequent reviews of 2015 and 2017.

However, there is no doubt that the challenges of asymmetric conflict which is a new development in the warfare scenario of the country were not fully addressed by the 2006 NNDP. Hence, President Jonathan took a further bold step to ensure the review of the 2006 NNDP to the 2015 reviewed document. In spite of this, new dimensions and combat scenario proved too complex for the reviewed 2015 NNDP to still have the potency of addressing the enormity of these challenges as the war against insurgency kept becoming almost unwinnable. Scholars of defence policies after critical review of the combat scenarios with the BHT in the North East and the NDM in the South-South now believe that the reviewed 2015 NNDP requires a review itself so as to address some of these new challenges in the insurgent environment. Hence, the current

administration of President Muhammadu Buhari decided to set up another review board which has produced the reviewed NNDP 2017 which is now a signed legal document by the President.

Though, the latest NNDP of 2017 has sufficiently address the deficiencies inherent in both the 2006 and 2015 versions, especially with respect to managing asymmetric conflict, the document, as it were, has not been well implemented to adequately curtailed the challenges of asymmetric conflict due largely to the crisis of leadership that has come to define the Nigerian State. The point is that however beautifully crafted a policy may be, its success or otherwise is too a large extent a function of the quality of those saddled with the implementation. Unfortunately, the Nigerian State has not been able to throw up leaders that are passionate and committed to her collective national interest. For the NNDP to seriously impact positively on Nigeria's security architecture, there is the need for a leadership that is driven by nationalistic values to galvanise other stakeholders towards achieving the essence of the NNDP.

5.3 Recommendations

The need to strengthen the implementation strategies of the Nigeria's National Defence Policy towards the achievement of its essence cannot be over-emphasised. In the light of this, this study is making the following recommendations:

- First, there is the need to restructure the Ministry of Defence (MOD). This becomes imperative in light of the fact that it is important to have the right personnel, those who are sufficiently knowledgeable about defence issues and its operational dynamics, to man the ministry. The MOD, without mincing words is the engine room for the implementation of the NDP and so required personnel with a lot of knowledge on the needs of the military in terms of training, equipments and other logistics. The point is that a MOD that is staffed with the right mix of personnel who are knowledgeable about defence and security issues will be of invaluable support to the security personnel on the field that are directly engaged in curlailing asymmetric conflict in the country.

- Second, there is also the need for the public and local communities to provide the necessary support for Nigeria's security operatives engaged in the war

against insurgents and militants. Indeed, the importance of public and local support for the military personnel operating in the different conflict zones in the contry cannot be overemphasized. The truth of the matter is that when the public avail the military operatives with security intelligence through sharing of information on the activities of insurgents and other criminal elements undermining the security of the State, it will give the officers the impetus to effectively plan toward stemming the insurgents' activities in the South-South and the North East. In other words, it will help in timely deployment of security agents to trouble spots in order to curtail the escalation of insurgent activities. Moreover, public support will grant legitimacy to the action of the government, it will consequently boost the level of trust for more cordial relationships between the military officers and the civilian populace.

- Need for Actionable Early Warning System (EWS): While the Nigerian milirary could claim, whether rightly or wrongly, that they were not trained and prepared for fighting asymmetric warfare, the civil authority in the country cannot claim to be ignorant of the warning signs of what is today tagged Boko Haram crisis. The crisis did not start with the death of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 but was heralded by politicians arming young people against one another. Nigeria needs to put in place official early warning system for averting the kind of problems in the North East. It is hoped that the new defence policy would make the needed provisions for EWS.

- In addition, there is the need to strengthen strategic communication among the key stakeholders managing the nation's security architecture. Indeed, the role of effevtive strategic communication among the key stakeholders in the management of the ongoing asymmetric conflict in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized. Effective strategic communication can go a long way in influencing the opinion of the public and the troops at the battlefronts. It can help to improve on the relationship between the military and the civilian population, and further build collaboration with other countries (especially the neighboring countries) in stemming the activities of insurgent groups in Nigeria as a whole. Through strategic communication, the correct narrative of events

(particularly in the combat zone) can be made available to the public (as against the grape vine messages that often awash the social media) in order to win the support of the public. Furthermore, strategic communication can help significantly in reducing all sort of fears, doubts, and misgivings about the government and their actions.

- Closely related to the above is the need for the establishment of community policing as part of the nation's peace and security architecture. The establishment of community policing will give the local people who undoubtedly are more knowledgeable about their environment than the regular security personnel who perhaps are coming to the conflict zone for the first time to provide the required intelligence report that can be leveraged on by the federal security personnel for a more effective onslaught against the insurgents and the management of asymmetric conflict. Community policing can serve as a platform through which trusted individuals within the communities could be engaged to serve as link between the people of the community and the fderal security operatives who, to a very large extent, are strangers in the conflict zones. The engagement of the local people on the platform of community policing will give the locals a sense of belonging and this will engender their commitment and provide them the opportunity to make their own contribution and support to the management of the genre of conflict currently ravaging their society. The establishment of community policing can actually serve as one of the strategies to promote the much required civil-military relations in the theatres of operation.

- There is also the need for enhanced training for the military targeted at significantly improving their capacity in curtailing asymmetric conflict. The gaps in the ongoing military operations suggests that Nigeria needs to invest more in training her military locally and abroad, especially in the management of unconventional warfare. Fighting terrorism requires a knowledge system that cannot be sourced within Nigeria alone. Nigeria must also learn to fight along other African and non-African forces. There is also the need to strengthen the capacity of the Nigerian military to collect and exchange military intelligence

across national borders. Military commanders must also be ready to take responsibility for their failures rather than being escapist in the shortcomings of the ongoing opereations.

- The Nigerian military should also be strengthened through the acquisition of sophisticated IT devices like drones and by leveraging on the the facilities of NigComm Sat. The point is that if the nation's security agencies, especially the armed forces are exposed to sophisticated IT equipments, this undoubtedly will serve as a force multiplier and consequently enable the nation's armed forces to effective curtail the ongoing onsloughts of the insurgents against the Nigerian State.

- Also, there is the need to rejig the leadership of the armed forces at both the tactical and strategic levels. The performance of the Nigeria's armed forces against the insurgents will certainly be more impressive if the military commanders could improve their leadership capacity. A leadership that is proactive and exhibit great passion for the well-being of the soldiers and military personnel on the field is needful. Military commanders must be well schooled in leadership skills and demonstrate clear understanding and commitment to the all the issues germane to maximum and effective performance on the part of the soldiers deployed to curtail the activities of the insurgents.

- Furthermore, it is imperative that efforts be made to strengthen the level of collaboration among the various security agencies statutorily saddled with the responsibility of managing the ongoing asymmetric conflict in the country. As it were the level of collaboration among the various security agencies is abysmally low. Indeed, rather than collaborating and synergizing among themselves to facilitate effective service delivery, they compete and in some cases undermine each other. Strengthening collaboration among these agencies will go a long to promote a more result oriented and effective outcome in the fight against insurgents and all forms of asymmetric conflict in Nigeria.

- The need for increased funding of the military and other security agencies in the country cannot be over-emphasised. One obvious problem that the Nigerian military and other security agencies in the country are facing today is that they are ill-equiped in terms of both men and requisite equipments to addresss the challenge of terrorism and militancy that have come to define the phenomenon of asymmetric conflict in Nigeria. The nation's security agencies will continue to falter in their efforts to rein in the insurgents except they are better equipped with sophisticated weapons and the men on the battle front are sufficiently taken care of in terms of enhanced salaries and allowances. All these can only be achieved when more resources are deployed for the security agencies and such disbusments are transparently utilized.

- Lastly, there is the need to ensure that recruitment into the military and other security agencies are based on merit rather than the nepotistic recruitment framework that currently define recruitment process in Nigeria. The security agencies should be treated as professional and specialized agencies that should only be populated by the nation's best in terms of intellect and moral standing. People who are committed to defending the sovereignty and unity of the country should be the class that should be considered for engagement in the security services.

5.4 Contribution to Knowledge

This thesis has revealed that though the initiators of the Nigeria's National Defence Policy that came into being in 2006 recognised the imperativeness of a framework to serve as a guide for the stakeholders in the management of the nation's defence and security issues, they never took into account the management of asymmetric conflict as the document largely focused on management of conventional warfare. The inadequacies of the 2006 NNDP in terms of engaging it to manage asymmetric conflict became noticiable with the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents against the Nigeria State, which took a more threatening dimension with the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the sect.

This study also revealed that the deficiencies inherent in the 2006 NNDP, especially in respect of managing asymmetric conflict, informed the modification of the nation's NNDP in 2015 and the subsequent review of 2017. Though, the modifications of 2015 and 2017 Nigeria's NNDP which were targeted at responding to asymmetric conflict contained strategies for dealing with unconventional warfare (asymmetric conflict), the application of these strategies remained complex and challenging.

Against this background, this study has made three key contributions. In the first instance, it clearly brought into light the fact that the implementation of the NNDP has been bedeviled by a number of challenges both at the operational and strategic levels. Put differently, the study emphasized the fact that the Nigeria's National Defence Policy has not been well implemented from 2007 to 2017 to adequately curtail the challenges of asymmetric conflict due to logistic and institutional deficit. Second, the thesis revealed that the lack of political will on the part of the leadership of the Nigerian State and the theatre commanders to dispassionately implement the NDP has become a major challenge to the accomplishment of essence of the document, especially with respect to addressing asymmetric conflict. Third, the study brought to the fore the critical role that the local community can play in terms of providing intelligence and moral support to the fighting troops at war zones. Local people are invaluable assets in the war against insurrection and terrorism. Indeed, the failure of the Nigerian military to sufficiently win the support and confidence of the local people is one of the factors responsible for the abysmal failure of the military in many situations in their fight against Boko Haram.

The kernel of the study is that there is the need for the key stakeholders in the nation's security architecture to be committed to playing their respective role and be ready to collaborate with each other to address the challenges to the effective implementation of the NDP and ultimately the realization of the essence of the 2015 and 2017 reviews.

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International Encyclopedia of Information and Library Science (2nd ed.).
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APPENDIX A

PICTURES OF THE INTERVIEW WITH PROF. OBC NWOLISE

APPENDIX B

PICTURES OF THE INTERVIEW WITH AVM JON ODE

APPENDIX C

PICTURES OF THE INTERVIEW WITH PROF. TAR

APPENDIX D

PICTURES OF INTERVIEW WITH REAR ADM. ALADE